Strangers, Ambivalence and Social Theory

Bülent Diken
STRANGERS,
AMBIVALENCE
AND SOCIAL THEORY

Bulent Diken
Publisher: Ashgate Publishing Limited (11 Jun. 1998)
ISBN-10: 1840145226
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Introduction: Immigrants on the Margin

Coming to “Wonderful Copenhagen”, one cannot avoid seeing the glittering signs of the Tivoli Gardens just across from the central train station. As a symbol of Denmark and Danishness, Tivoli has become one of the fortresses of the Danish tourist and leisure industry, and thus one of the first stops on the tourist path. Perhaps ironically, Tivoli is the place where the foreign element, the Orient, first appeared so explicitly and visibly in Denmark.

Georg Carstensen, who grew up in Algeria as a diplomat’s son, created with Tivoli (established in 1843) and later with Alhambra (established in 1857) a Danish department of the Orient, a realization of 1001 Nights. In Tivoli’s bazaar, with onion-shaped domes and a facade decorated with lamps, every visitor could feel like Aladdin, experiencing an almost systematic sublimation of all distances and borders. (Zerlang 1994: 6; my translation)

According to Martin Zerlang, Orientalist forms were popular in architecture, painting and furniture design in Denmark in the 1840s, but Tivoli was the spatial centre of this form. As such, Tivoli was also the symbolic centre of Danish modernity. The Danish writer, Jørgen Bonde Jensen, characterized Georg Carstensen as “the first modern man” in Denmark. He was the first modern man at a time when Denmark was only one of those “damned peasant countries”, according to Engels, and in a city “the claustrophobia and provincialism” of which Kierkegaard satirically criticized (Zerlang 1995: 2, 5, 20).

Given Tivoli and the idea that Danish modernity began with it, one could say that the symbolic or imagined “Danishness” of Tivoli, or of Danish modern urban geography in general, has been largely dependent upon the internalization of an “alien” element, upon hybridization. Today, this is often concealed by a
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forgetfulness, which deeply characterizes contemporary discussions of Danish culture in the context of immigration.

Approximately 120 years after Tivoli was built, the cultural element of the Orient was once more brought to Denmark, but this time in the form of the immigrant. They did not come as tourists, to gaze upon Tivoli’s architecture, nor as persons, but as a category (“alien worker”) or, perhaps more aptly, as a commodity, that is, labour power. In contrast to the easy assimilation of the Orient in Tivoli, the assimilation of these immigrants has been ambivalent. Although invited and assimilated as labour in the earlier phases of immigration, immigrants during later phases were gradually pushed outside the reach of systematic and social integration. In the 1990s, immigrants have often been perceived as “outsiders”. Today, the discourse of immigration operates with homogeneous, hierarchical identities, positioned from the centre outwards: “Danes”, “Turks”, “immigrants”, “refugees”, etc.

The in-between reality experienced by the immigrant is negatively reflected also in more general social phenomena. As Saskia Sassen points out:

the city concentrates diversity. Its spaces are inscribed with the dominant corporate culture but also with a multiplicity of other cultures and identities, notably through immigration. The slippage is evident: the dominant culture can encompass only part of the city. And while corporate power inscribes noncorporate cultures and identities with “otherness”, thereby devaluing them, they are present everywhere. (Sassen 1994: 122)

According to Sassen “the city of the immigrant” and immigrant communities are actually a part of our urban geography, and the invisibility and devaluation of these communities are “a good part of the colonial history”, which is increasingly in need of being redefined and rewritten (see Sassen 1994b).

In the context of immigration, this socio-political problem of “under-representation”, which will be dwelled on at length in this study, coincides with another problem, “over-representation”. Immigration is a popular issue that many people are concerned with and have an opinion about. Much research is carried out on this topic, which is constantly problemetized, and in the Danish mass media, immigration is one of the most popular subjects. Consequently, cultures of immigrants are “over-represented”. Thus, immigrant culture(s) and their “ghettoes” can be regarded as sites of representations, within which immigrants, their lives and cultures increasingly become subjects of the discourse of immigration. This discourse determines who is in the position to talk about “them”
and in which ways. Accordingly, one could say, immigrant cultures are defined, to
the extent they are seen and shown, by the metaphors of the discourse of
immigration.

The field of immigration is thoroughly saturated with an already existing body of
knowledge. In this preconstructed world, “reality offers itself to you. The given
gives itself.... This is one of the reasons that the given is so dangerous” (Bourdieu
1992: 44). It can be argued that, in the context of immigration, “familiarity” is “the
stauncest enemy of inquisitiveness and criticism” for sociological thinking
(Bauman 1990: 15). Confronted with this common sense familiarity, which
constantly reasserts the given and unquestioned assumptions in the field, the task
of sociology, as it is defined by Bauman, is to act “as a meddlesome and often
irritating stranger”. Hence, one of the ambitions of this study is to “defamiliarize”
the familiar and what is taken for granted in the field of immigration. I have
adapted a deconstructivist position, which mainly builds upon Foucault’s, Derrida’s,
Game’s and Bauman’s works. My main purpose in this has been to show the
fictitious and constructed character of the identities that are normally
presupposed and taken for granted. I attempted this by letting the “immigrant”
speak through interviews. Seeing him or her as a subject rather than as an object
of the discourse was illuminating because it showed that much of what is ascribed
to the “immigrant” or the “truth” in the field is indeed a fiction. But what was
expressed by those interviewed indicated even more: as Borges says, “if the
characters of a fictional work can be readers or spectators, we, its readers or
spectators, can be fictitious” (quoted in Game 1991: 3). In other words, a
deconstruction of the images about “them” also cracks the images of ourselves, or
“us”. This study explicitly suggests that we cannot consider immigrants as objects
of an isolated research field without referring to and reflecting upon “us”.

Related to my interest in the discourse of immigration, which plays an
important role regarding both over- and under-representation of immigrants in
different contexts, this study focuses on how this discourse is associated with
power, that is, the practical question of winners and losers. In this context, the
study dwells on local and central state policies and planning. This requires a merger
of social theory with research on immigration as well as (social and physical)
planning. I aim at doing this in the Danish context. A central question here regards
the degree and the way in which planning and urban politics are oriented toward
immigrants. Planning in Denmark either is not oriented toward immigrants
(especially because of a distance between the apparatus of planning and
immigrants’ daily lives), or, when it is oriented toward immigrants, is often used as
a disciplinary instrument. Both, in turn, directly affect immigrants’ life-chances in Denmark.

This double interest, in the discourse and politics of immigration, is necessary in order to come to terms with the ambiguity of the “discipline”. As Foucault has shown, the concept of discipline means both to order, to classify, to make the other obey and the knowledge that is accumulated in a distinct field (see especially Foucault 1991). This study aims, then, at showing that these two meanings of the concept are also integrally entwined in practice: for instance, planning physical and the social framework of daily life of citizens and denizens, or conducting research on a distinct group of people, also have a direct effect on their condition.

While the focus is on how the discourse and politics of immigration function to disciplinary ends, it is also important to illuminate how these are accepted, neglected, translated, escaped from, ridiculed, or manipulated in the daily lives of immigrants. Thus, together with an interest in political and discursive “strategies”, the “tactics” used by immigrants in coping with these strategies are focused on at length.

The empirical part of my analyses is based on a case study, which focuses on the situation of Turkish immigrants in the second largest city in Denmark: Aarhus. The aim here is to start with clear conflict situations. Aarhus is interesting because the largest Danish “ghetto”, Gellerup, is located within its borders. Gellerup is a public housing area, where immigrants are densely concentrated.

Why the Turks? The Turkish minority is chosen because it is one of the largest immigrant groups in Europe and the largest one in Denmark. It is also the largest “ghettoized” immigrant group in Denmark, as it is in several other European countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden. Concomitantly, Turks in Denmark are that segment of the population with the highest unemployment rate. Furthermore, it seems that, more than any other group in the Danish social space, the Turks arouse sentiments of cultural and social fear related to strangerhood. Thus, to measure how assimilated any other group of immigrants is, the picture of Turks is often used as a counter-example: “they are not like Turks” becomes a compliment addressed to these other groups. Not surprisingly, immigration research in Denmark has focused primarily on Turks and has contributed to the state of affairs in several ways, which will be discussed later.

Why Denmark? Denmark is a “cosy” country on the European periphery and is often held up as a distinctively democratic country with social policies that reflect this democracy. Especially when its social policies are compared with those of many other countries, this seems to be true, at least at first. Yet cosy Denmark has
another side, and this is illustrated by its problem with the way it has tackled immigration and with its fear of “strangers”. Denmark remains one of the most culturally homogeneous countries in Europe and thus experiences social and cultural heterogeneity rather traumatically. Hence, we find the immigrant ghetto on the margin of this rather peripheral society at a time in which globalization is greatest.

How are the processes of globalization, processes in which immigration plays an important role, seen from the margin? The margin will be understood both as a position of exclusion and as a position of power and critique (see Shields 1991: 277). Furthermore, as Soja writes, marginality will be understood as “a space of radical openness, a context from which to build communities of resistance and renewal that cross the boundaries and double-cross the binaries of race, gender, class, and all oppressively Othering categories” (Soja 1996: 84; see also hooks 1990).

The main message proliferating from this study is three-fold. Firstly, it is useful to begin research (and other forms of the debate) on immigration by deconstructing the political, scientific and popular hidden assumptions. Most of what is taken for granted in the debate is seriously problematical. Secondly, this field is severely in need of multi-dimensional perspectives and in-depth analyses that can avoid oversimplified and hasty syntheses. Lastly, theorizing in the field must build on an active perspectivism and a dialogical “both/and” thinking, which does not take theoretical positions for granted, and which does not seek to establish a hierarchial relationship between the empirical material and theories that are employed.

The plan of the book

Chapter 1 is about the politics of immigration. It focuses on Aarhus and on the ghetto. It looks at what the central and local state politicians and the technocrats are saying and doing. Thus, it can be read as an introduction to and a discussion of problems related to immigration as defined by mainstream politics. Issues, such as social and cultural discrimination, exclusion from the economic system, and the increasing political problematization of immigrants are some of the topics mentioned here. The aim of this chapter is to introduce the general framework, themes, concepts, promises, false dichotomies and illusions of the politics of immigration. This chapter is important in that it contextualizes phenomena that are often discussed in de-contextual terms. Concomitantly, it focuses not only on
ideas, intentions and formal politics, but also on political practice. It not only
studies the “plans” made, but also how the “realities” are constructed and how the
plans are implemented. Given this background, Chapter 1 becomes a polemical
intervention aimed at “unmasking” what lies behind major current policies.

The discussions in succeeding chapters deconstruct and reconstruct the
mainstream framework introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 focuses on the theme
of deconstruction. Rather than “unmasking”, or “debunking”, to show the “reality”
behind what is said, Chapter 2 will open up for further interpretation some
unspoken and hidden assumptions of the discourse and politics of immigration.
The focus will be on what the politics of immigration, as discussed in Chapter 1,
does not address, that is, what the politics of immigration takes for granted,
assumes, remains silent on and thus hides.

In general, a substantial amount of accumulated knowledge on immigrants is
already available. In the debate, ways of speaking, possible subject positions and
the “pre-constructed” primarily consist of conceptual dichotomies and political
polarizations. Chapter 2 tries to dig beneath these by showing what they share in
common, despite dispersion and dissemination. Furthermore, the constructed
character of social identities and the processes of “estrangement” in terms of “us”
and “them” will be dwelled on. Here I will also focus on how mainstream research
relates to the main assumptions of the discourse of immigration. I will argue that
much mainstream research perpetuates the discourse of immigration, which
constructs immigrants as outsiders.

In the 1990s, both the discourse on and the politics of immigration has
increasingly focused on spatial issues and thus the “ghetto”. Therefore, Chapter 3
will focus on the ghetto in general, and Gellerup in specific. Here the central
argument will be that the physical environment of the Danish ghetto is, above all,
an expression of a “fear of touching”, which, as Richard Sennett has shown,
characterizes modern urban life in general and modernist urban planning
specifically with its emphasis on social and spatial segregation. Gellerup is
physically an isolated area, and what is done in the context of present urban
policies, like urban renovation work, which still continues, does not break this
isolation, but rather contributes to it by focusing on its centre rather than on its
limits, where interaction with other social groups and urban areas could take place.

The “fear of touching” related to physical space leads to the issue of social
space in Chapter 4. Here, by building on Bourdieu’s concepts like “capital”, I look at
the social space of immigration and illuminate how the “immigrants’ place” is
positioned in its hierarchically differentiated structure. In this respect, we will dwell
on some anomalies and ambivalences related to social space and immigration. For example, in a Danish context, Turkish immigrants might be characterized as members of an “underclass”, while in a Turkish context, their positions and concomitantly their dispositions can be quite different. What do these anomalies mean in our context? This discussion will take us to broader issues.

To look at the social space in terms of these anomalies, the phenomenon of globalization is focused on in Chapter 5. Globalization diverts the perspectives adapted in the preceding chapters to such phenomena as fragmentation and hybridization and to the concept of “the stranger”. These issues add significant, new dimensions to the problem at hand, dimensions which transgress the imagination and the static boundaries of Danish politics and the discourse of immigration. Thus, the questions which proliferate in the preceding chapters also take new forms. Most significantly, what is taken to be ordered and pure in the politics of immigration, like social identities, begin to seem increasingly hybrid, ambivalent and kaleidoscopic in this chapter.

How should the issue of ambivalence be dealt with? Chapter 6 takes the first explicit step toward answering this question by taking a position against modernity understood as an ordering project. The context in which this discussion is undertaken is the quite commonly used dichotomy between tradition and modernity made when discussing Danish immigration research and politics. In Chapter 6, it will be argued that it is more productive to look at both tradition and modernity in the context of postmodernity instead of focusing on immigrant cultures as “tradition” and looking at them in the context of modernity. To argue against these dichotomies, the concepts of tradition, modernity and postmodernity will be discussed not as realities but as perspectives. In this context, the theories of detraditionalization and reflexive modernization, especially Giddens’ version, will be critically analyzed. Here the main argument will be that much dichotomous theorizing about tradition and (post)modernity, as if they were some monolithic entities walled off from each other, is based on the notion of chronological time. Instead, building on literature related to the sociology of time, on the one hand, and Bauman’s work, on the other, it will be argued that each of these concepts can be discussed in relation to order and ambivalence, which will help in using these concepts in more relaxed and productive ways.

Where the focus in Chapter 6 is on what is ambivalent, without the ambition of ordering it, Chapter 7 focuses on what is ordered in the longue durée of contemporary Western societies and how. Here I make use of Luhmann’s system theory and Lash and Urry’s theory of “economies of signs and space” in the context of immigration. The focus is on understanding the systems which set the structural
framework of immigration. This chapter can also be read as a reaction to culturalism, the dominant tendency in the immigration debate. That is, issues like unemployment, exclusion and discrimination will be explained with respect to changing social structures rather than in cultural terms.

Then, by undertaking an extended discussion of the new forms social theoretical inquiry should take, and by addressing a wider audience, Chapter 8 collects the different threads developed in preceding chapters. It discusses firstly that, in the context of immigration, a more “ambivalent” social theory is needed. Here “ambivalent” social theory is defined as a social theory that can concurrently “settle” on systemic issues (stable social orders as Luhmann’s systems or Bourdieu’s habitus), on unstable power relations and hybridized orders (such as actor-networks), and on ambivalence related to sociality and what Bauman has called “habitat”. Secondly, it discusses some of the major possible trajectories of such a social theory. Furthermore, it is argued that an ambivalent social theory must be content with “dialogic” relations between these different perspectives instead of seeking only “dialectic” totalities. Subsequent to the exploration in preceding chapters of how social theory contributes to the understanding of immigration, the chapter looks at if the converse relationship holds.

Chapter 9 discusses ambivalent social theory and planning together. Just as an ambivalent social theory is offered as an alternative to the existing research framework in the field of immigration, a corresponding method of planning is offered here. It is generally held that, for example, “postmodern planning” is a contradiction in terms because while planning needs “reason”, postmodernism attacks it (see, for example, Rosenau 1992: 131). But I argue that things are more complex, and that what is needed is a new form of planning that builds on a new form of professional expertise. This new form of expertise will be called “heterogeneous reflexivity” (Albertsen & Diken 1997). Above all, heterogeneous reflexivity seeks to combine cognitive, aesthetic and hermeneutic reflexivity with each other in the context of planning, and it is argued that such an understanding of planning is necessary to move beyond the reductionist versions of functionalist, participatory, corporative and aesthetic planning, which have characterized the last decades of Danish and European planning.

Chapter 10, the last chapter, summarizes the most important concepts used in the study. Instead of formulating a clear-cut “conclusion” or a final word regarding the topics at hand, it underlines the importance of further interpretation in the form of a horisontal “flow”.
1 Politics of Immigration and “The Spirit of Aarhus”

As if we were afraid to conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought. (Foucault 1994: 12)

The city exists as a series of doubles; it has official and hidden cultures, it is a real place and a site of imagination.... We discover that urban “reality” is not single but multiple, that inside the city there is always another city. (Iain Chambers; quoted in Soja 1996: 186)

Rick Shaw has “just one piece of Big Red gum left” in his office at the New York Times, but his boss takes it and sends him on a “mission” to Europe. He somehow ends up in “a place called Aarhus”, or so goes the story printed in the cover text of a short film, “The Spirit of Aarhus”, produced in 1994 for the Municipality of Aarhus. In the film, Rick Shaw tells about the city while the viewer, or the tourist, sees an easy-going and cosy Aarhus. As he says “hello Denmark” in the beginning, the camera presents the viewer with an aerial view of the rolling, green areas in the southern part of the city, of the sea and then of the harbour. Soon after, Rick Shaw presents the well-known images of Denmark, such as H. C. Andersen and S. Kierkegaard, and he reminds us of the Tivoli Gardens, the royal family and the Queen, etc. Later on, the camera focuses (although much of the view remains aerial afterwards) on the centre of the city, where the cathedral and the Hotel Royal are located. We are then presented with bits and parts of Aarhus. We visit the Old Town Museum (consisting of reconstructed, old houses carried piecemeal from other parts of Denmark and rebuilt in the city centre), the Museum of Art (“Asger Jorn was a local boy”), the beach, the Concert Hall, the University of Aarhus, the
Scandinavian Congress Center, the City Hall. To be sure, these are the parts of the built environment which the Municipality of Aarhus is most proud of and wants to emphasize in marketing the city. In addition, some of what the producers think strangers would like are also introduced: Danish beer, Magnum ice cream, the exotic viking demonstrations for tourists, the annual Aarhus Festival “for which Queen Margrethe is protector”, etc. Even Big Red gum is available in Aarhus! (Rick Shaw actually finds it in a shop). At the end of the film, we find out that Aarhus is an ecological city—“eco-trucks” collect non-ecological garbage from all around the city.

In short, what we see in this film is the sweet and feminine side of Aarhus (Rick Shaw’s taxi driver is also female, which the film stresses several times) just waiting to be discovered by the Western (and male?) tourist gaze. But beyond this orderly view of cosy Aarhus, and beyond this tour “planned” for the tourist’s “discovery” (see Game 1991: 156 about contradictions inherent in this), there are other layers of the city. The “rest”, which the cosy picture pushes away, is quite large, in fact: for instance, the industrial areas, the “modern” suburbs, the endless single-family housing areas and so on. And even though the municipality claims that 9.4 per cent of the population of Aarhus stems from “foreign origins” (see Jyllands-Posten, 24 October 1996), there are no signs of Aarhus’ immigrants or refugees in the film. Using Foucault’s phrase, they do not belong to “the time of our own thought”. Since there is no equivalent of a Chinatown in Aarhus, not even a modest one, as is becoming the case in European cities where multiculturalism is marketed for the tourist, Aarhus is represented without “them”. To be sure, the least physically appealing public office in the city, the immigration office, is not a piece of architectural design to be showed off either. Thus, it is “understandable” that the municipality prefers a “white” representation of Aarhus. At any rate, “they” are “invisible” in the visual field of the tourist, and thus ironically, “The Spirit of Aarhus” tells a lot about immigrants without saying anything directly about them.

However, this may not be so interesting or strange in itself. After all, the image of the city can sell better without these people. It is not a solution either to aestheticize and market the life of immigrants as, what Necef (1992) has called, “ethnic kitsch” (for example, in the form of a second-class Chinatown).

But the repressed returns: “in representing the city as a knowable, mappable thing the ironic and paradoxial aspects of the urban are elided, only to be rediscovered later as anomalies” (Shields 1996: 232). Thus, what is actually more striking in Aarhus is probably the otherwise tremendous “visibility” of immigrants and refugees in urban politics as an “anomaly” or ambivalence. As this chapter will elaborate, the daily lives of these people are in another field, in the politics of
immigration, in almost constant focus. In this field, which is significantly also a visual field, as I will argue throughout this study, the “problem of immigrants” is discursivized and represented, and “solutions” are produced. In this visual field, rather “hot” political debates continue without end, and the municipality, the central state, the media and the housing associations, that is, the main actors, struggle with the anomalies they continue to discover and rediscover, which happens mostly when elections approach and when economic issues predominate.

Before going into the details of this ambivalent story of the simultaneous visibility and invisibility of Aarhus’ immigrants, the main traits of Danish immigration will be presented. After an overview, the focus will shift to Aarhus’ relationship to its immigrants and refugees and to the ways in which the problems related to immigration are tackled. Here the important question will be what political elites say and do.

Immigration and Denmark

Today Denmark has 222,746 non-Danish citizens comprising more than 160 nationalities. This amounts to 4.2 per cent of the total population (Statistisk Årbog 1996: 69-70). This number of immigrants is quite low compared the number immigrating to other Nordic and European countries, such as Sweden and Germany.

Besides refugees, there are four official categories of immigrants in Denmark; those from Nordic countries, those from EC countries, those from North America and those from the third world countries. Policies toward these categories differ in relation to their respective rights and duties; exceptions, however, are access to the country and deportation, with regard to which immigrants from North America and from third world countries are treated equally according to the Law on Foreigners. The categories mentioned differ not only in relation to official policies, but also in relation to time, extent and motivation for immigration (Hamburger 1992).

There has been a steady increase in the number of immigrants from third world countries since the mid-1960s. Since Danish immigration policy was liberal at that time, it was easy to cross Danish borders to work and to settle, which was very much in accordance with the interests of Danish industry. They were experiencing an economic boom, which created a great need for unskilled labour power. Rising rates of unemployment in Turkey (from 22% to 36% during the period 1962 to 1977; Sayari 1984: 14-17), combined with pull-factors in liberal immigration policies
and economic advantages of employment in western Europe explained Turkish immigration in the late 1960s and in the 1970s. In the early stages of immigration, it was primarily men from Sivas, Çorum, Konya and Usak, four peripheral cities in central Turkey, who migrated, but the number of immigrants remained very low. In 1967, only 171 Turks lived in Denmark.

When the economic and political climate in Denmark began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s, especially when unemployment stemming from the economic recession began to rise, the Danish trade union SID (representing unskilled and semi-skilled workers in Denmark) demanded a temporary stop to labour immigration. In November 1970, the Minister of Labour announced a halt to the granting of residence and work permits to immigrants (Simonsen 1990: 15-23). This became permanent in 1973 and is still valid today. In spite of this, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of Turkish citizens living in Denmark: 5,517 people in 1973; 14,086 in 1980; and 27,929 in 1990 (MS 1993). Totalling 35,739 people in 1996, the Turkish immigrants today constitute the largest minority group in Denmark, which can be explained by the effects of “chain-immigration”, which characterizes Turkish immigration to Denmark, and new births (Statistisk Årbog 1996: 70).

Over these three decades, the group of Turkish immigrants has gone through considerable demographic changes. Since the middle of the 1970s, Turkish men (formerly being single “guest workers”) have brought their families to the country, according to the rules of family reunification, so that today, the proportion of women and men is nearly the same (MS 1993). Generally, the Turkish population in Denmark is very young compared to the whole population. For example, 35.3 per cent of the Turkish population is under 15 years of age and only 1.4 per cent is more than 64 years old. In comparison, 17.5 per cent of the total population in Denmark is under 15 years of age; and approximately 15.1 per cent is older than 64 years of age (Statistisk Årbog 1996: 60, 70).

In contrast with other immigrant groups, e.g. Pakistani immigrants, relatively few Turks (for example 2,429 persons from 1980 to 1992) have acquired Danish citizenship (MS 1993), meaning that nearly all Turks continue to be counted in the categories relating to “immigrants”. Relatedly, in Denmark, children of immigrant parents also inherit the status of immigrant, because citizenship is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. Hence, 33 per cent of Turkish “immigrants” were born in Denmark, and still have only Turkish citizenship (Diken & Hamburger 1993). Therefore, the figures presented above give a good picture of the actual demography of Turks in Denmark.
Thus, many Turkish citizens have lived and worked in Denmark for more than 20 years, and many of them were even born in Denmark, making the legal term “immigrant” deceptive. In this context, the term “denizen” can be more useful. A denizen is distinct from both citizens and temporary foreign visitors, or “guest workers”, and is defined as a person who has lived a long period in the host country, has strong family ties and whose residence status is fully granted, or almost so (Hammar 1990). This definition not only describes Turkish residents in Denmark, but also reflects their legal status. Even though they are regarded as de facto citizens in many ways, in that they have many substantial rights (Soysal 1994: 138), unlike Danish citizens, they are not completely protected against deportation, for example (Hamburger 1992: 301). A paradigmatic example for denizenship in Denmark is that immigrants, just like citizens, can vote in and run for local elections, but, unlike citizens, they cannot vote in or run for general elections, which to a large extent excludes them from political life (Hamburger 1993: 132-137). In other words, denizenship means inclusion and exclusion at the same time. Thus, the term denizen aptly refers to the “ambivalence” of being a stranger (in Simmel’s and Bauman’s terminology), that is, being both an insider and an outsider at the same time.

One of the most important and problematical areas with respect to immigration in Denmark is the labour market. As can be seen in table 1.1, there is an “ethnic hierarchy” in the labour market in that the distance to Danishness and to the labour market increases in parallel. Regarding the labour market, it is as if “Denmark is for Danes”. Thus, the unemployment rate among immigrants considered part of the labour market is almost three times higher than the average in the country. But some immigrants are considered more “foreign” than others. Thus, with unemployment rates at 44 and 56 per cent, for men and women respectively, Turkish immigrants are the most excluded group in the labour market. On comparing the rates between Danes and Nordic immigrants, the cleavage between “indigenous labour” and “immigrant labour” almost disappears. Hence, what seems to be important is not whether you are an immigrant or not in the strict sense of the word, but rather which immigrant group you belong to.

Table 1.1: Unemployment among different groups as a percentage of labour power.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment as % of the labour power, 1994</th>
<th>unemployed (total)</th>
<th>men</th>
<th>women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (total)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danes</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants (all)</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU &amp; Scandinavia</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ex-Yugoslavians</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americans</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Turks and Pakistanis are nearly in the same “excluded” and insecure position, although not with respect to occupation and job type. For example, the number of Turks employed in unskilled jobs in industry is nearly twice the number of Pakistanis. Furthermore, Pakistanis are in a better position with respect to job quality. An analysis by Schierup (1993: 91-150) reveals that the rate of skilled workers and the quality of jobs is higher among Pakistanis than Turks.

In the 1960s and 1970s, immigrants were mostly employed as unskilled workers in industry, where the jobs available were dirty, more dangerous and badly paid (Horst 1980: 72-93). Still today, this situation has not improved very much. Thus 82 per cent of all Turkish workers are unskilled, and most of them who are employed are still employed in dangerous and dirty industrial jobs (Hjarnø 1989: 320-331; Schierup 1993: 91-150).

These are only “objective” factors regarding immigrants in Denmark; it leaves much unsaid. For example, prejudice, intolerance and discrimination against immigrants are widespread phenomena in Denmark, and this affects the everyday lives of people in schools, in shopping centres, at workplaces, etc. In relation to
integration policies, this attitude has had serious consequences. For example, in 1992 a sociologist, Peter Gundelach, investigated “Danish intolerance” towards immigrants; one of the main results of his survey was that 51 per cent of the Danish population think that employers should prefer Danes to immigrants in a situation of unemployment (1992: 8).

Even though prejudice and intolerance do not automatically result in discriminating behaviour and practice, it does indeed affect the situation of immigrants in relation to both access and position in the labour market (Hjarnø 1990; Arbejdsmarketsstyrelsen 1993; Schierup 1993). On the other hand, as Gaasholt and Togeby make clear, mere tolerance towards immigrants as such does not automatically result in tolerant behaviour either (1995: 19). For example, an employer may well have tolerant ideas, but can still prefer to employ a Dane instead of an immigrant.

Discrimination exists not only among employers, but also among workers, in labour organizations, etc. According to Schierup (1993: 92, 121-122), there exist illegal agreements between local trade unions and employers concerning immigrant quotas, so that only a certain number of immigrants can be employed in a certain company. This can explain, for example, why LO, the umbrella organization of trade unions in Denmark only pays little attention to the problem of discrimination in a report on immigrants in the labour market (LO 1991: 17).

Politicians have (belatedly) realized that discrimination is a barrier to immigrants’ economic and social integration. In June 1992, the Danish government decided that the integration and legal position of immigrants in Danish society should be improved (Folketingssbeslutning, 18 June 1992). This decision resulted in several initiatives, committees and reports, including a report on barriers in the labour market written by a committee set up by the Minister of Labour. The report stresses the importance of discrimination as a barrier to integration. However, the proposals made by the committee for combating the barriers were more symbolic than effective and included elements such as more information, mutual cultural understanding and tolerance, etc. (Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen 1993).

In contrast with issues related to the labour market, which have been marked by a relative “silence”, issues on housing conditions and the placement of immigrant settlements, especially for Turkish immigrants, have received explicit focus and have been problematized in Danish politics for more than 15 years now. Residential concentration is considered a problem, both in relation to the housing market and to the social integration of immigrants.
In the 1960s and 1970s, most Turks settled in the capital city, Copenhagen, because of richer job opportunities. But from 1975 to 1985, Turks began to settle in small cities in western Denmark, where small industries were expanding (such as the textile industry in Herning and Ikast). Today approximately 50 per cent of all Danish Turks live in the region of Copenhagen (MS 1993: 36). Despite this, and compared with other minorities, the Turkish immigrants constitute the least geographically concentrated minority group at the national level.

Table 1.2: The geography of Turkish, Moroccan and Pakistani settlement (1993) in comparison with the geographical distribution of the total population in Denmark (1994). *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected counties</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Morac.</th>
<th>Pakist.</th>
<th>Whole pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The region of Copenhagen</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>89.4</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederiksborg county</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roskilde</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sealand</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fyn</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vejle</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aarhus</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers in the table show the percentages of each group living in a definite area.
Source: MS 1993: 36; Statistisk Årbog 1994: 54

As can be seen in table 1.2., more than 80 per cent of all Moroccans and Pakistanis, yet less than 50 per cent of all Turks, live in the Copenhagen area. With respect to these Turks, more than 45% live in two inner city areas, Vesterbro and Nørrebro. Most of the dwellings here are old and relatively poorly equipped, but they are quite cheap. This inner city settlement, which in part characterizes immigrant settlements in Copenhagen, is not typical for other regions. The general pattern of settlement is that Turks (and other immigrants) predominantly live in suburban public housing communities. In accordance with the available data, 92 per cent of all Danish Turks are tenants. Of these, 81 per cent of them live in flats
while 15 per cent live in detached or semi-detached housing (Henriksen 1985: 139-152; newer data cannot be found).

In the context of this study and in contrast to the pattern observed at the national level, it is important to note that the concentration of Turks is very high within almost all cities in Denmark. For example, Gellerup, the suburban area five kilometers from the Aarhus city centre and the location of the case studied here, is generally considered the largest “ghetto” in Denmark.

A letter from the largest Danish “ghetto”

Aarhus is the second largest city in Denmark and has a complex economic structure. The local politics are characterized by a Social Democratic policy, and the cultural context of the city varies more than in most other Danish cities. This variation implies that the city has had more to offer immigrants regarding their life-strategies compared to what other smaller Danish cities could offer.

In Aarhus, the population of which totals approximately 270,000 inhabitants, there are approximately 17,000 non-Danish dwellers. Almost 60 per cent of them are concentrated in public housing at three locations: Brabrand-Gellerup (5090 persons), Hasle (2864 persons) and Viby (1561 persons). Thus, Gellerup houses approximately one-third of the total immigrant population in Aarhus. There are 396 immigrants living in the city centre, although most of them are from other Nordic or from EU countries (Statistisk Aarbog for Aarhus 1996).

Gellerup is a suburban public housing area, planned and built as a total plan in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although it is quite near to the city centre (5 km), it has its own distinct physical and social character. The area was planned according to the bedroom community principle, that Gellerup’s inhabitants would be nuclear families, the parents of which would work during the day, inhabiting the area only at night. The great pillars of this social vision and spatial organization were the Keynesian ideology of full-employment and the principle of welfare-state regulation. But today, contrary to the social vision of those times, Gellerup is an area where “socially burdened” groups, such as single mothers, the jobless and immigrants, are concentrated.

In 1993, the concentration of immigrants in three different housing units in Gellerup, i.e. in Toveshøj, Skovgaardsparken and Gellerupparken, was 39 per cent, 28 per cent and 62 per cent, respectively. The housing associations and the municipality considered this a problem (Municipality of Aarhus 1994). Thus, the
same year, in an open letter to the Municipality of Aarhus, Brabrand Housing Association (Brabrand Boligforening), the housing association responsible for Gellerup, wrote that the area “was a ghetto”. In this official letter, it was pointed out that newcomers to the area were primarily immigrants, refugees and socially disadvantaged people, and it was underlined that there already existed a concentration of these groups in Gellerup. This problem was especially visible with respect to the education of the immigrants’ children, who in their educational process had almost had no contact with Danish children of their age. Therefore, the housing association found that the existing situation made integration “illusory” because it was “settling new generations [of immigrants] outside the Danish community” (Brabrand Boligforening, 20 August 1993; my translation).

According to Brabrand Housing Association, the solution to these problems was, and still is, to reduce the concentration of immigrant families, refugees (who differ only in their legal status from immigrants) and the socially disadvantaged Danes in the area. To this end, the housing association requested in a letter a formal cooperation with the municipality and asked the Municipality of Aarhus for the right to reject immigrants’ application for flats.

The context of the letter: immigrants’ Denmark of 1990s

The strategy of halting the movement of immigrants into specific areas and dispersing them instead throughout the municipality, as proposed in the letter from Brabrand Housing Association vis-à-vis Gellerup, was tried in several Danish municipalities, especially those with a Social Democratic majority on their councils. This was in the early 1990s, when municipalities and housing associations laden with immigrants complained about their “problem”. There was quite an array of “immigrant problems” around this date. There are three examples that can be considered elements of the political context in which the letter referred to above makes sense. The first two examples come from other municipalities.

By the beginning of the 1990’s, the Municipality of Ishøj, one of the suburbs of Copenhagen, had long had an immigrant policy that aimed both at keeping the number of immigrants in the municipality low and dispersing immigrants to the municipality’s borders. For instance, in the late 1980s, the municipality rejected the applications of some immigrants wanting to move into a housing community (the applicants had waited several years for this). The explanation for this rejection was
that the “quota” for immigrants in the housing area had been reached. However, this reasoning was, and is, both against Danish law and the UN’s convention on racial discrimination, dating from 1965, which also includes residential rights and which Denmark joined in 1972 (Hamburger 1989: 144-145). The case ended up in court, where the decision was made (by Østre Landsret, 22 January 1991) against the Municipality of Ishøj.

The second example comes from another suburb of Copenhagen, the Municipality of Hvidovre, about which intense debates were carried out in the media in 1993. The municipality had refused to house 42 refugees in a specific public housing community on the grounds that they were refugees (see for example, Information, 24-25 July 1995). Formally, the refugees were denied access because their incomes were too low, not because they were refugees. The restrictive practice of the municipality, therefore, officially involved not only refugees and immigrants, but all low-income groups. According to Britta Christensen, the Social Democratic Mayor of Hvidovre, the aim was “to stop the explosion of socially disadvantaged groups in the municipality” (Information, 21 July 1993; my translation). But the Conservative member of the council, Arne Wichmann, explained the day after Christensen’s statement “… that it [the policy] is really aimed at foreign-speaking, non-Danes. But you know, we must not discriminate, and that is why the policy was made so general” (Information, 22 July 1993; my emphasis; my translation).

The third example is proposal B 65, on “better integration” of immigrants and improvement of their judicial position, made by the Social Democrats (on 7 February 1992) to the Danish parliament. This proposal strongly influenced the changes and interventions in the politics of immigration in the years following. New in the proposal was the idea that municipalities could suspend existing allocation rules on the renting of flats in the public housing communities, which in practice meant the right to deny immigrants a flat, or switching to more compulsory methods in the dispersion of immigrants. This proposal could be seen in relation to other two proposals—B 77 from April 1989 and B 11 from October 1989—also formulated by the Social Democrats. They all shared a wish to disperse immigrants geographically, but were all unclear about if it should be done voluntarily (on the part of the immigrant) or in a compulsory manner, which is what B 65 proposed.

B 65 was voted down by the Danish parliament (18 July 1992) on the grounds that the regulating set of rules on immigrants’ residence should agree with existing laws and conventions on equal treatment, non-discrimination, etc. As as result, the Ministry of Housing tried to find a rule regulating immigrants’ access to public housing that did not conflict with international conventions. At that time, in 1993,
the Danish Center for Human Rights, which was consulted by the Ministry of Housing on the issue, also found the proposal to be in conflict with the convention on racial discrimination. Based on this, the Minister of Housing decided to withdraw the Ministry’s proposal.

The story of the Urban Committee

In spite of the more “careful” attitude of the central authorities in the beginning of the 1990s, the municipalities and the housing associations were actively engaged in a dangerous gamble: the process of problematizing their own housing areas had now gained velocity. And importantly, those inhabitants, who had more resources than others in these now-problematicized public housing communities, started to collaborate in this process. The general message was that they did not want their housing areas to become “a ghetto”. They set out to produce negative images of the multicultural character of their areas, which in turn stigmatized those areas even more. A vicious circle was set in motion. The shouting and problematizing by the local authorities only accentuated the existing problems (Thomsen 1994).

Meanwhile, something new in the Danish politics of immigration happened. In 1993, the “problem of immigration” and the housing problems began to coincide, making the issue of immigration an overt, very hot, “urban”, political issue. Gaasholt and Togeby write that, until the mid-1980s, there was broad agreement among Danish political parties about the politics of immigration, but that, after then, political conflicts increased. And the social democracy felt squeezed between progressive parliament members and restrictive local politicians and that is why they held a low profile. In 1993 the situation changed for the social democracy. Now it was a Social Democratic Minister of the Interior who was responsible for the situation of refugees [and immigrants], and it was simply no longer possible to maintain a low profile. (Gaasholt & Togeby 1995: 152; my translation)

This impossibility, diagnosed by Gaasholt and Togeby, became manifest in the government’s actions in 1993. The Urban Committee was established by the government in September 1993 as a direct off-shoot of the Hvidovre case, mentioned before. The committee comprised originally six, and later twelve, ministers. It was established in response to conflict in the Social Democratic
municipalities and public housing communities, and its aim was to improve “the social strain” in these housing areas via instruments of physical and social planning.

In the guise of helper, the Urban Committee published two reports (and later, another report evaluating the implementation of the proposals). These two reports both were a response to the demands of local politics of immigration and themselves have characterized local politics in later stages. In preparing the reports, the Committee sent questionaires to all municipalities with immigrants to collect their ideas, wishes and proposals regarding what to do. Neither immigrants living in the relevant housing communities nor their national organizations were asked.

The interest in the Urban Committee in this study is three-fold. Firstly, it touches upon all the problems relating to immigrants and refugees, which has long been the topic of local governments. Seen in this perspective, the government’s establishment of the Urban Committee was also a response to the municipalities that had problems of legitimacy regarding their immigration policy, which was in conflict with existing laws. In fact, the first report of the Urban Committee was published one month before the 1993 local elections, and it was for a long time high on the agenda in every municipality with immigrants.

Secondly, in contrast with the way the subject was handled in the 1970s and 1980s, during which interventions and debates on the issue of immigration focused mainly on the topic by isolating it from broader social issues, the Urban Committee took a broader social and political perspective and lanced “a new orientation in social and housing politics” (Byudvalget 1994 I: 1).

Thirdly, the Urban Committee bound together the issue of immigration (which had hitherto been discussed predominantly in culturalistic terms) and the issue of urban politics, understood as both social and physical planning.

In the three reports, the Urban Committee presented 30 action proposals, half of them explicitly addressing issues related to immigration, even though the Committee had clearly written that no causal relationship could be shown to exist between foreign-speaking households and households with social problems (Byudvalget 1994 II: 11). Therefore, the Committee operated with the relationship between immigration and social problems on a rather different level, namely the rhetorical level, where the two words, “immigrants” and “problems”, were constantly juxtaposed and had mutually complementary relations in lingual correlations. In other words, although casuality was denied, correlation was not, a double movement which also served as an alibi or a disclaimer: we do not mean there is such a relationship, but ...
Out of this disclaimer came many proposals. The basis for the Urban Committee’s work seemed to hang on the idea that physical concentration of immigrants and bad housing environments automatically resulted in social problems. Therefore, one of the perceived solutions, and hence one of the proposals of the Committee, was to change the population mix of those residential areas via the physical dispersion of immigrants. In this way, Denmark, in the beginning of 1990s and especially after 1993, began to redefine the immigration debate in its own style, replicating the famous racialized debates on “inner-city problems” in other European countries:

... when aid was advocated for the Inner City it was coupled with the

notion of population replacement carried out in the name of dispersal and balance....

Incidentally the policy was thought of ... as a means of improving the conditions of the immigrant minorities, but quite often this was confused with an opposite notion, namely that of saving the city from the minorities. (Rex 1988: 3, 58; my emphasis)

What is very significant in this context is that the concentration then problematized by the Social Democratic government and municipalities was actually stimulated by the very Social Democratic housing policies in the 1970s via housing benefits and allocation rights: groups of immigrants were almost “placed” in public housing communities (see chapter 7). Thus, one could say that, having placed immigrants and concentrated them in these segregated areas in the earlier stages of immigration, the authorities were now trying to “reconquest” the same areas, a process John Rex called “public gentrification” (Rex 1988: 73).

The 30 proposals of the Urban Committee dwelled mainly on: introducing activities to break the isolation in socially strained public housing communities; employing tenants’ advisors (beboerrådgivere) to work preventively in the areas; renovating (and financially supporting municipalities and housing communities for this purpose); motivating co-operation between the municipalities and the housing communities; preventing crime; mobilizing local networks (including the churches); distributing refugees equally among municipalities; and increasing information to aid in changing the tenant-mix of the housing areas. Other proposals suggested initiatives for: improving the Danish language among immigrants and refugees, dispersing their children among institutions, increasing their leisure activities, assuring their integration in the labour market, promoting the education of adult
immigrants and refugees, establishing immigrants’ languages as a second language in the schools (instead of as the first language), tightening rules for family reunification and repatriation, and activating immigrants and refugees in local social networks.

One of the most important proposals (proposal 11) was the establishment of a residence committee (bosætningsudvalg), to overtake (from the municipalities) the task of dispersing immigrants and refugees throughout the municipalities. This was to be placed under the Ministry of Housing, but even today its position is still unclear. Another important proposal (proposal 12) was to give the municipalities the right to locate immigrants and refugees in private housing within their borders. A third important proposal (proposal 13) was to ease the system of rent subsidies on which the housing associations were dependent—a key factor in causing high rents of the flats, making it very difficult to attract new inhabitants not dependent upon welfare benefits, making it unlikely to effect a positive tenant-mix. This proposal was probably the most responsive to the ultimate motive behind the way municipalities and housing associations had tackled their “immigrant problem”: an economic motive. People without jobs were concentrated in the suburbs, pulling the tax incomes down.

**Local versus central government**

As can be expected in a society that has been busy for two decades discussing its immigrants, most of the Urban Committee’s reports were positively welcomed. The majority agreed that “something should be done” about these problems, which was, after all, the seeming aim in establishing the committee. But there was harsh criticism as well. The criticism came exclusively from either the few critical intellectuals engaged mostly in discourse analysis of what the politicians were saying or from the municipalities engaged in the practicalities of policy formulation and implementation.

On the part of the municipalities, the Association of Municipalities in Copenhagen County (FKKA) came with the most visible criticism formulated in a report, undersigned by 18 mayors (Foreningen af Kommuner i Københavns Amt, 1994). This report focused exclusively on those aspects of the Committee’s report regarding the population mix of housing areas. The FKKA formulated eight “wishes” and proposals on this issue, one of them directly affecting the presence of
immigrants, namely the right of municipalities to refuse new immigrants and refugees if “many” were already present. It was very clear that FKKA was also interested in dispersing immigrants, not only among housing communities and municipalities, but also among schools.

Nevertheless, the “hot” issue became “the need to change the law”. The FKKA’s purpose was clearly to legalize the discriminating practices of municipalities vis-à-vis immigrants and refugees. As Per Madsen, the Mayor of Ishøj and the representative for the working group of FKKA, explained “… the proposals have the aim of legalizing former practice of municipalities in the area” (Information 18-19 June 1994; my translation). In other words, FKKA was not satisfied with the Urban Committee’s work.

The harshest criticism from an individual municipality came from the Mayor of Aarhus, Thorkild Simonsen. Some months after the FKKA report was issued, he declared his agreement with the 18 mayors and proposed “keener” methods in “the war against concentration of definite immigrant groups in the public housing areas”:

The [preceding] initiatives are not far-reaching enough. They won’t stop ghetto formation…. The Social Democrats—and the Radicals—have formerly mentioned [the necessity of] restrictions about movement into public housing areas, but unfortunately the Minister of Housing ... was not interested. Without restrictions we cannot stop [immigrants’] from moving to these areas. (Information, 8 August 1994; my translation)

Those agreements with and criticisms of the Urban Committee’s reports converged on one point: the need for dispersion. But the method for dispersion was in dispute. Because of international conventions and Danish law, the Urban Committee (and especially the Ministry of Housing) argued that dispersion should be voluntarily done. But the municipalities demanded changes in the law itself. On the part of the central government, the idea of dispersion was okay, but it needed to be “legal”, which is precisely what the municipalities considered a barrier and wanted (and still want) to change. Nevertheless, the reports of the Urban Committee were effective in calming the municipalities for awhile. Applications were made to the Urban Committee from almost all municipalities with immigrants and refugees. But the Committee had been taken seriously, perhaps too seriously given its later modification (see below). The municipalities would eventually feel betrayed and would launch a harsh criticism against the Committee. This is an interesting issue which I will return to again.
Is the target clear?—From September 1993 to May 1994

As mentioned earlier, in preparation for the reports published in 1994, the Urban Committee distributed a questionnaire to those municipalities with immigrants, inquiring about their interests and proposals regarding immigrants. On September 14, 1993, the Municipality of Aarhus replied to the Committee with a five-page letter, stating that a “precondition to be able to point out some proposals for solutions is naturally that the target is clear”:

The target should, in our opinion, be a dispersion of refugees/immigrants and the socially strained groups to all (rented) housing. We do not see ... a way out other than by putting into effect either a literal stop to undesired moving into strained housing areas and/or the introduction of other rules for suspending or sanctioning procedures. (my translation)

In May 1994, Brabrand Housing Association sent its application to the Urban Committee with many project proposals. In this application, Gellerupparken, Toveshøj and Skovgaardsparken were characterized by: their high percentage of welfare-dependent people, the high percentage of inhabitants with “foreign origins”, a significant group with social and psychological problems, a high frequency of turnover, high rents, high criminality, a fast destruction of green areas and a very low participation in the local tenant meetings and social activities. According to this housing association, the consequences were weak integration, isolation among inhabitants, weak networks, a lack of life-values and the lack of identification with (and thereby the absence of responsibility for) the local area. Regarding the lack of identification:

The last situation is often grounded in cultural differences, such as language, norms and traditions as well as a lack of understanding of how a democratic society works and what a society demands from a single individual. Many of the inhabitants have none or a very weak understanding of democracy, which creates misunderstandings regarding attitudes. (Brabrand Boligforening 1994; my translation)

Some of the examples the housing association postulated regarding the “undemocratic” attitudes of inhabitants were the following: “The housing
association only thinks about making money on us”; “The association only does what suits it”; “We have nothing to do with the association; we only live here”, etc. And, after this lesson in democracy, there comes the main issue. The housing association, just like the municipality, finds it “necessary” to make changes in the allocation and suspension rules. This application also hints at what the housing association expected from the Urban Committee besides money. These two initiatives from the municipality and the housing association also show very clearly in which direction authorities in Aarhus wanted the new politics of immigration to be formulated in 1993-1994.

In May 1994, while this debate was continuing, the Municipality of Aarhus arranged a meeting to discuss “immigrant problems” with immigrants’ organizations in the city (such as the Turkish-Danish Association, the Chilian-Danish Association, the Iranian-Danish Friendship Association, the Arabic Cultural Union, and the Anatolian Cultural Union), focusing on six themes: housing, children’s situation, leisure life, schools, labour market relations and the elderly immigrants’ situation. Somehow the discussions concentrated only on housing, which had something to do with the impact of the Urban Committee. The most important idea raised by these organizations regarding housing was that an eventual dispersion should be “voluntary”, that municipalities or housing associations should not be given the right to suspend existing rules for renting. Some of the participants confirmed that there were problems in these housing areas, but that initiatives of the municipality and the housing associations and their interest in tightening their policies made these problems worse by signalling further discrimination and territorial stigmatization.

In a later account of the meeting, the municipality stated that “the principle of voluntarism was stressed several times” and that “there were different conceptions of dispersion.... [t]here was agreement that dispersion should be based on the principle of voluntarism”. The account pointed out that some of the participants did not believe the inhabitant-mix in the housing areas to be a problem in itself, and that areas, such as Gellerup, were in need of more business and cultural activities, etc. (Letter, 4 July 1994 from the Municipality of Aarhus to the May meetings’ participants). In short, the municipality had asked some of the immigrant representatives their opinions, but these opinions were not exactly what the municipality and the housing associations were thinking about.

In October 1995, a very detailed report came from the municipality. The report contained even more statistics on how (too) many immigrants and refugees were flooding Aarhus, how big the problems were, and what should be done. Although this report, “Proposals of the Municipality of Aarhus for the Policy on Refugees and
Immigrants” (PMAPRI, Forslag til Århus Kommunes Flygtninge- og Invandrerpolitik), was made by the civil servants in the municipality, it expressed the most important and prevalent ideas in the municipality, especially among Conservative and Social Democratic politicians, who together constituted the majority.

The report from October 1995

The declared aim of the above mentioned report was to succeed in making refugees and immigrants “self-sustaining” and in getting them to participate in social life “on equal terms with the rest of the inhabitants of the municipality”. Indeed, this sounds very reasonable. According to the report, the conditions for succeeding in making all equal required that immigrants and refugees “master the Danish language” and “connect with the labour market” to the same degree as the rest of the population. An important “barrier” to realizing these aims was perceived as “housing concentration”, and thus dispersion was seen as the means for integrating refugees and immigrants into Danish society. Thus, the “three cornerstones” for the municipality became housing, language and employment.

The main proposals regarding housing were that immigrants should be dispersed to new areas “where there are fewer”, and “at the same time, measures should be taken to guarantee that new [refugees and immigrants] do not move into” areas where immigrants were already concentrated. Those new areas were mainly housing communities without immigrant concentrations, flats owned by the municipality itself and some private housing at the borders of the municipality. The main proposals regarding dispersion were that the municipality be given the right to approve rent contracts drawn up between the tenants and the housing associations and that, to start with, 100 five-room flats in the socially strained housing areas were to be transformed into smaller flats for younger people, in the hope that they would be too small and unattractive for refugee and immigrant families.

The municipality already had the right to allocate every fourth vacant flat in the public housing communities, but in the report, the municipality formulated its interest in allocating these so-called 1/4-flats with respect to “criteria” other than existing rules (that is, the ordinary waiting lists and the priorities for single mothers or families with more than two children) for the purpose of dispersion. Furthermore, in the communities “with few immigrants and refugees”, the municipality wanted power over more than 1/4 of the flats, the main idea being
simply to search for new flats mostly in the “well-functioning” housing communities. In addition, the municipality wanted the right to allocate all the flats being occupied for the first time in new public housing.

The purpose of these initiatives was to “avoid the formation of ghettos”, defined by the municipality as a place where “many with the same background—here refugees and immigrants—live, go to school, spend their leisure time ... and predominantly use their own mother-tongue”. According to the municipality, this condition arose if more than 25 per cent of the total population in a single housing area were immigrants and refugees, but no explanation was given for this “magic” percentage.

Most importantly, for this housing policy to be effective “[t]he rights associated with waiting list procedures ... should be suspended by the municipality”, a proposal that has been heard before. A change in the law was and is seen as a prerequisite for the implementation of these ideas, which government policies in general and the Urban Committee specifically agreed on. In other words, implementing this housing policy required changing the general framework of immigration politics, which also meant that municipal immigration politics would succeed or fail in accordance with the response of the Urban Committee.

Regarding labour market relations, the municipality mentioned that while 66 per cent of Danish citizens in the ages 18-66 years are in “normal” occupations, this is true for only 32 per cent of the immigrants. While 10 per cent of Danes with unemployment insurance are unemployed, this is true for 31 per cent of immigrants. Although immigrants constitute 4.4 per cent of the total population between 18-66 years, they receive 20 per cent of all welfare benefits. These are very important social problems, which I will dwell on in detail in the following chapters. As is the case with housing concentration, these problems rightly point out the scale and scope of general problems related to immigration. But, despite the municipality’s intention to integrate, both its way of locating the sources of these problems and its proposals to deal with them have been deeply problematic.

For example, the explanatory framework presented by the municipality with respect to unemployment of immigrants reads: firstly, there are many refugees and immigrants who lack fluency in Danish; secondly, many of them have weak educational backgrounds; thirdly, a portion of refugees and immigrants have become passive due to long-term unemployment; and fourthly, there are many immigrant women outside the labour market with the consequence that neither they themselves nor their children learn Danish, thus weakening the integration of the family. To me, it seems rather curious that the municipality does not operate
with any structural explanation of this unemployment, say the gradual formation of a “two-thirds society”, or systemic transitions, or changes in regulative mechanisms, and so forth. Hence, even if not intended, the municipality’s reasoning comes functionally close to “blaming the victim”. And one wonders: is the rule of the municipality’s language game not to discuss the hidden assumptions and unquestioned assumptions in its own discourse? Or is it only formal politics—is there really something else happening? These are some interesting questions which will be dwelled on at length in the following chapters.

Using statistics to document the problems, the proposals of the municipality are grouped under various headings. Among these proposals, the municipality is interested in the establishment of “incubators” for encouraging “the general integration of refugees and immigrants” and their “language education” for “activating” them in the workplace. To this end, the municipality wants to use half of the positions reserved for activation and rehabilitation of the unemployed in the municipality for refugees and immigrants, and to employ some of them under the municipality. The municipality also wants to continue the existing practice of refusing the distribution of welfare benefits to anyone not willing and available to take a job in the labour market.

In practice, the above mentioned proposals imply some important consequences for unemployed immigrants. Firstly, that the municipality will place immigrants and refugees in the municipality’s “activation positions” does not mean that these persons will receive a salary, but that they will work for the amount they get as welfare benefits. It simply means “compulsory work”, which many see as the least interesting work one could find. These jobs most often consist of the lowest level, public service jobs, such as cleaning, being a “porter assistant”, transporting second-hand wares, etc. And as I will argue later, the character of this form of employment has already played an important role in the disappearance of Turkish immigrants from the labour market and removing work as an organizational principle in their daily life.

Secondly, for the period one works under these conditions, one does not accumulate the rights regarding unemployment insurance and therefore unemployment benefits. This is because the new labour market law from 1993 requires that one finds a job by independent means to be able to accumulate this right. This also seems to contribute to the disappearance of Turkish immigrants from the labour market, by implying that those who are excluded become even more excluded.
And lastly, the effect of this policy has already been an increase in the number of immigrants and refugees in language schools. They are forced there to preserve their rights to welfare or unemployment benefits. There are indeed many more on the waiting lists to get into the schools, a wait that can take up to six-seven months.

The municipality wants the implementation of these measures, proposed in line with the recent changes in the labour market law, to result in “in a full daily programme for the refugees and immigrants receiving supplementary benefits” (PMAPRI: 27; my translation and emphasis). What must be underlined here is that, as a consequence of viewing refugees and immigrants as responsible for their own unemployment, the municipality tries to “discipline” them, whereas the “optics” it uses tends to become a “panopticon”. And the Danish language, the third cornerstone of the municipality’s policy, is the key to determining if one is supposed to be included in this machine of integration: “Mastering the Danish language is conceived of as a decisive precondition for integration ... [it] is a precondition for participating in the labour market, for teaching and education, for participating in the social, cultural and the political life in Denmark, and for learning about Danish values and norms” (PMAPRI: 19; my translation).

One report, many problems

The municipality’s report was prepared by civil servants, the technocrats, of the municipality who on several occasions, when confronted with criticism, underlined their “neutrality” by implying in the public debate that they were not politicians. It was, after all, the politicians’ responsibility to decide upon the proposals formulated by them. Thus, it is interesting that on 8 May 1996, the main parts of the report were approved by a clear majority, consisting of Social Democrats and the right-wing parties. This indicates a reason to suspect the “neutrality” of the technocrats and that they may have an increasing role in creating public opinion.

In this context it is important to note that the report itself manufactured many problems while supposedly bringing “solutions” to problems it defined. To start with, we can focus on the way the discourse of the report pictures immigrants. In developing its arguments, the report characterizes refugees and immigrants clearly as outsiders: one feels the warning to watch out “they” do not move in! It further declares areas with more than a 25 per cent non-Danish population a “ghetto”. While the definition of a ghetto in the report seems to be rather crude for a
municipality that has declared ghettoization one of its biggest problems, the four reasons given for ghetto formation all point toward one common denominator: that “they” are aliens. In other words, given the municipality’s definition of a ghetto, there seems to lie an unreckoned fear of strangerhood. Concomitantly, all through the report, the immigrant is constructed as someone “different” in the sense that his or her “deficits” serve the writers of the report in devaluing the cultural, social and symbolic resources of these people. Thus “they” are constructed in advance, already in the first pages, as not-integrated, passive, not self-sustaining, not able to speak Danish and not able to assimilate Danish culture and norms. In short, they are “not”.

This accentuation of deficits is closely related to the municipality’s perception of immigrants as “burden” rather than as “resource”. This is interesting in light of the demographic stagnation Denmark is facing. For example, researchers from the Department of Statistics, University of Copenhagen, stress that with no in-migration and the continued current level of out-migration, the total population of Denmark in 50 years will be reduced to 3.2 million. This implies an older and smaller Danish population. In this respect, researchers Hans Oluf Hansen and Paul Maxim point out that immigrants could be a demographic resource and add that, only if in- and out-migration both continue unchanged will the population of Denmark in 50 years be at about the same level as today’s, that is, 5.4 million (see Borg 1995). Their approach constitutes a stark contrast to that taken by the Municipality of Aarhus.

In this context, it is of prime importance to stress that in the statistics of the municipality, those former “immigrants” who have now acquired Danish citizenship are still included as “immigrants and refugees” because they have foreign “origins”, in all 7682 people: Jus sanguinis? The reason given is simply to be able to identify target-groups to be integrated; the municipality stresses that people of foreign origins may be Danish citizens, yet still unintegrated, just as immigrants not yet citizens may be integrated. However, the municipality gives no explanation of who and how many can potentially be integrated, despite the fact they know the number of the potentially unintegrated (simply all with different origins).

The Mayor of Aarhus constructs immigrants as “outsiders” when he says that:

The idea is not—you know—for immigrants to come to Denmark just to be taken care of. They should—you know—be integrated and dispersed throughout Danish society so that we don’t wind up with these huge concentrations in some cities and quarters. I ... do not think we as a nation are interested in it. (Information, August 8, 1994; my emphasis; my translation)
What is significant here is the construction of the “we” as a nation. It is precisely this assumption that the whole ideology behind the politics of immigration builds upon. It is also this “national” frame that legitimizes a differential treatment of “denizens” in regard to a dispersion policy, a policy that would be unthinkable vis-à-vis Danish “citizens”. On this battleground, where they are “targeted”, denizens have only the “transnational” laws against ethnic discrimination (and Danish law no. 289 from 1971, which prohibits differential treatment because of racial differences and which was decisive in the Ishøj case; see Diken & Hamburger 1993: 28). This is why the strongest criticism against the municipality came from the Danish Center for Human Rights, which underlined that aspects of the municipality’s proposals were against human rights. What is important in this context is that such a line of thinking requires a “postnational” frame, that is, an accept that people no longer have claims to “rights” only because they are “citizens” of a definite nation-state. As we will dwell on later, this issue is also closely related to the phenomenon of globalization, of which immigration and other human flows are good examples. But while the Municipality of Aarhus markets “The Spirit of Aarhus” to attract tourists, who increasingly have the right to cross borders, which is not guaranteed by any single state but by supra-national authorities such as the EU, it simultaneously attacks the residential rights of its denizens.

In reply to this postnationalist line of criticism regarding human rights, the Mayor of Aarhus chose to label the critics mentioning human rights “human rights-religious people”, pointing out that they themselves would not want to live in “such a place as Gellerup”. The municipality “only wanted to help” the people implicated (Aarhus Stiftstidende, 4 October 1995). But in a modified version of the policy proposal, which was approved by the city council, an explicit point refusing applicants access to housing communities on the basis of ethnicity (which was a part of the original proposal) was dropped, mainly because of the criticism from the Danish Center for Human Rights. Hence, in later phases, the rhetoric of the municipality shifted primarily toward the “social” planning aspects of the policy: In this context, the Mayor stated:

There is nothing in the decision of the municipality about refusing applicants on the basis of race or nationality. On the contrary, the arrangement applies to all applicants having special social problems. (Aarhus Stiftstidende, 11 May 1996; my translation)
Given this background, the Aarhus case seems to parallel the example from Hvidovre, mentioned earlier (“we must not discriminate, that’s why it is general”). Against any charge of discrimination, the municipality can now say, as a Social Democratic member of the city council formulated it: “we do not want any isolated discussion of ethnicity; instead, we want to centre our discussions on social problems”. But he added somewhat ambiguously: “I can see the problem if we take steps against human rights, but we get a bigger problem if we do not” (Jyllands-Posten, 10 May 1996; my translation). That is to say, the municipality wants to “solve” the problems by discriminating.

However, as Niels Erik Eskildsen from the Socialist People’s party (SF), one of the few local politicians on the city council who sets himself against the tide, points out, “in spite of the formulation in the plan, there is no doubt who in practice will be refused permission to move in. The aim is clear enough despite ambiguous remarks” (Aarhus Stiftstidende, 11 May 1996; my translation).

It is remarkable that by defining the problems as a social planning problem, the municipality can normalize away the “compulsary” aspect in refusing “socially burdened” applicants access to the housing communities, because, as Bjarne Ørum says, this tactic “is employed in the whole planning process ... in addition, [all] can be forced toward something [via planning]. Therefore, there is no racism in this” (Aarhus Stiftstidende, 3 May 1996; my translation). Hence, one could say that the municipality tried to de-manoeuvre criticisms by reformulating the new policy as an overt planning policy in order to relieve tensions. But this definition of planning is still immensely narrow and problematic and, in practice, it is more about “planning the immigrants” than planning for them. In other words, planning understood in this way, as a social engineering activity, reduces problematized human beings to “objects”.

**Housing associations as a barrier to implementation**

One important aspect of the municipality’s new immigration policy, which aims to disperse immigrants, has been that, until the end of 1996, it had not specified where nor how this dispersion was to take place. (It was first in October 1996 that four suburban areas on the outskirts of Aarhus were specified: see the following section).
In this respect, it is important to note that many municipalities, including Aarhus, had not fully used their existing allocation rights regarding one-fourth of the flats in public housing. As Dan Ove Pedersen, from the Danish Building Research Institute, pointed out, the municipalities had an “anxiety problem” regarding these flats. “In other words, there was no interest in dispersion because of a fear of reactions from inhabitants in the well-functioning areas” (Jyllands-Posten, 7 June 1995; my translation). This meant that local politicians were not even able to use the means at hand “to avoid ghetto formations”, which also partly explains why the municipality wanted to change the law. However, to understand why housing associations other than those “socially strained” did not seem to be interested in receiving immigrants, we must dwell on the general response of housing associations to the municipality in more detail.

On November 30, 1995, the National Federation of Housing Associations (Boligselskabernes Landsforening) sent a letter to the Municipality of Aarhus praising the “serious and comprehensive proposal for solving the refugee and immigrant problem in the Municipality of Aarhus” and pointed out that the Federation agreed with definition, target and criteria of success regarding the integration of refugees and immigrants. Interestingly, the letter noted that the municipality’s proposals for changing the law set the precedence for “relatively radical measures for guaranteeing better dispersion, whereas the proposals regarding education did “not contain such radical measures”. In other words, the municipality tried in the housing sector something it could not affect in other sectors. The letter continued that, even if the proposed law initiatives could be realized, it would supposedly be unrealistic in the very long term to achieve even a reasonably balanced resident-mix in the relatively few communities [of the housing associations] having the largest concentrations of refugees and immigrants.

Furthermore, the Federation had “difficulties in seeing” how criteria different from existing rules for using the municipality’s right to one-fourth of the flats could “help” the dispersion of refugees and immigrants. It also had “difficulties in evaluating” the municipality’s interest in allocating all the flats for first-time occupancies in newly-built public housing, since it would “not contribute to a considerable degree to a different housing pattern for refugees and immigrants”. And most importantly, the Federation was categorically opposed to the municipality’s interest in having rights to more than one-fourth of the flats in the “well-functioning” public housing communities.

With respect to the last two issues, the Federation thought that the municipality could “solve the vast majority of the illustrated problems” by using the existing right to allocate every fourth vacant flat. The letter supported this point by noting that
the municipality only used 70 per cent of its 1/4-flats and by proposing “a thorough analysis of how the municipality allots the flats in relation to the different target-groups”.

Regarding a change in the law, the Federation stated it could possibly support the political proposals for suspending existing rules for flat rentals, but pointed out that, “as the municipality knows, such proposals have repeatedly been discussed in the government and in the parliament, and so far the political will has not been there to realize the proposals”. Therefore the Federation urged the municipality to use more “positive” initiatives, such as the “experiment-areas” model.

In pointing out the “unrealistic” sides of the report, the Federation made it very clear that it would not co-operate with the municipality on the terms set out in the report. Thus, one might say that the housing associations became themselves a barrier to implementing the municipality’s proposals. In this context, as far as the issue of immigrants and refugees was concerned, it should be pointed out that the general feeling in the Federation has been very mixed. For example, only one and a half months after the letter from Brabrand Housing Association, referred to earlier as “the letter from the ghetto”, was sent, there was a conference in Gellerup where the representatives of the largest housing associations in Denmark discussed the issue of resident-mix. The attitudes about immigrants and refugees were split. During the discussions, one side maintained that the problems in the housing communities were first and foremost social ones, saying that “[t]he immigrant problem is not at all the most important one. Let us put this problem in the proper magnitude, in line with many other social problems”. The other side, represented mainly by administrators from Ishøj, insisted that “the concentration of immigrants is the biggest problem in housing areas” and insisted that “the conference demand a stop on immigrant and refugee flow into housing communities having more than 15 per cent foreign residents” (Aarhus Stiftstidende, 11 October 1993; my translation). Given that Ishøj is the municipality with the highest concentration of immigrants and refugees in the country, this expression of ideas was not surprising.

On the other hand, even at this time, a consciousness had developed in the housing associations that they themselves were stigmatizing the areas they were managing. For example, Keld Albrechtsen from Brabrand Housing Association commented after the conference: “We no longer want to use the word ghetto to describe our housing areas, partly because we see hope in the future and partly because [the term] ghetto implies immigrants and refugees” (Politiken, 11 October 1993; my translation).
Albrechtsen stated this only one and a half months after his housing association officially referred to itself as a ghetto in its open letter to the municipality. Hence, his utterance cannot easily be taken to suggest that the housing association underwent a general attitude change (see, for example, the quotations above regarding the application of the housing association to the Urban Committee). Rather, it points out how ambivalent the attitudes have been and how mixed the feelings are even within a single housing association. But rather than a change of attitude towards immigrants and refugees, I want to suggest that the ground for this ambivalence has mostly been the housing association’s reconsideration of their own problems, namely the problem of not being able to attract more well-to-do families—that it has simply turned out to be very expensive for them to problematize immigrants and refugees. But it should be noted that this problematization has also been profitable in another sense, since these “immigrant-associations” have received most of the money from the Urban Committee.

To conclude, the only major allies of the municipality have been those housing associations experiencing problems, and they could not possibly expect other “well-functioning” housing associations to lend support. Thus, a change in law would enable the one and only real instrument of implementation in the eyes of the municipality, indicating that, from the start, “how” to carry out dispersion has been more important than “where” to disperse.

Recent development in the Urban Committee

With its daring proposals, the famous report from the Municipality of Aarhus was the first of its kind in Denmark, and to my knowledge, in post-war Europe. The issue now is that many of the proposals in the report will succeed or fail depending on legalization and legitimation via equally daring changes in the law. The Urban Committee was a central actor in this context because of its proximity to the parliament, which has this power to permit and legalize local practices. In the meanwhile, however, there were two decisive things that took place regarding the development of the Urban Committee.

Firstly, even though the Ministry of Housing had long been hesitant about the legality of these municipal practices, it sent very clear signals just two days prior to the time the Aarhus report was politically approved by the city council in 1996. The Minister of Housing, Ole Løvig Simonsen, wrote in *Det Fri Aktuelt*:
There are limits to what you can and should make plans for. On several occasions, I have pointed out that international conventions, ratified by Denmark, have set a framework for the work of the Urban Committee. Among other things, this framework contains the right of free settlement for all citizens in society—also for immigrants and refugees. This right must naturally be respected. (Simonsen 1996; my translation)

Just after the approval, the Minister of Housing stressed once more that “the proposals were simply politically unrealizable and not in accordance with international conventions” (Jyllands-Posten, 10 May 1996). This naturally meant that the ambitious proposals of the municipality were at risk of becoming nothing more than wishful thinking. The implementation problem also made the Aarhus policy sound like, as local politician Jørgen Skov (SF), nicely put it, “an embarrassing signal” from the city council to the outer world (Weekendavisen, 15-23 May 1996; my translation).

Secondly, the Urban Committee underwent a modification so that the backbone of the earlier reports of the committee—the binding together of housing and immigration problems—was already in late 1995 and in 1996 officially something of the past. The Urban Committee, whose secretariat was located in the Ministry of Housing, was still most influenced by this ministry (after the prime minister). But now the Urban Committee was bureaucratized by the establishment of an administration (a transversal group of civil servants consisting of department chiefs from 12 ministries) called the “Housing/Social Initiative Group” (Boligsociale Initiativgruppe) and their focus was turned exclusively to housing areas. The link to refugees and immigrants was by and large externalized to the Ministry of the Interior.

In other words, already in October 1995, when the Aarhus report was published, the Urban Committee was no longer interested in the issue. And the Ministry of Housing no longer automatically considered immigrants or refugees the main problems in public housing. Thus, when the report was approved by the Aarhus city council, the Urban Committee was otherwise engaged in issues like urban ecology, urban renovation and community upgrading (kvartersløft projekter). The last one is interesting in our context, because, instead of focusing on socially strained housing areas in themselves, the focus had now shifted to the social and physical context in which they were placed and to their relationships with their environment. This planning philosophy constituted a strong contrast with the two Urban Committee reports from 1994, which the municipalities had eagerly welcomed. The new
keywords, however, were flexibility, urban ecology and crime prevention. Thus the Minister of Housing formulated new questions, such as: “How can we strengthen the local labour markets? How can we stimulate a richer cultural life? How can the isolated urban areas establish physical and ‘organic’ relationships with the areas around them?” (Simonsen 1996; my translation).

But why were these declarations so long in coming? Why did the Minister of Housing wait for the approval of the Aarhus report? Of course, there are several explanations. Mine is based on the view that for a long time, the Urban Committee, the Ministry of Housing and, as a whole, the government, tried to hold a low profile because of the expectation that, as soon as such declarations were made, the municipalities (and some housing associations) would shout even louder. Having better contact with individual localities than the state politicians do, the municipal politicians could play the taxpayers and voters against the government. This in turn would create even bigger immigrant problems, even bigger pressure on the government and would cost the government more money. The ideological image of state politicians (what they need most in international politics and in national elections) could also have been a barrier to taking such a “harsh” stand in the context of immigration politics. It costs a lot of money to satisfy municipalities, and this money is ideologically vulnerable. On the other hand, the image of local politicians seems to become even firmer when they sharpen their discourse of immigration—as “practically minded” people they have to work with “dirty hands”. Furthermore, it seems that more problematization would bring more votes from a majority of the population looking for scapegoats, and hence more power. Thus, it is no coincidence that Aarhus city council member, Bjarne Ørum (R), almost directly threatens by saying that “I think we risk getting an election campaign with racist undertones next time if we do nothing” (Aarhus Stiftstidende, 3 May 1996; my translation). This also means that what the state politicians tried to avoid by keeping a low profile as long as they did was present anyway and may have been strengthened.

Meanwhile the municipalities did not get what they wanted most: changes in the law. But they seem to have gotten something else instead. As of late 1996, the Ministry of Housing was working on a new bill related to upgrading community projects and some experimental decisions regarding allocation rights (“forsøgsbestemmelser med anvisningsregler”). If passed, this would mean that municipalities could “offer” another place to a family or an individual who wanted to move into public housing. But nevertheless, they could not refuse them in the last instance if they are not willing to take the offer (see Jyllands-Posten, 1 October 1996).
At the end of 1996, newspapers reported that the concentration of immigrants and refugees in public housing continued to increase, and even though rents were falling, as a result of the Urban Committee’s activities, this did not attract Danish families to Gellerup (Jyllands-Posten, 24, 27 October 1996). The municipality now plans to make new experiments in the context of the new bill being proposed by the Ministry of Housing by trying to place immigrants and refugees in Skæring, Sabro, Solbjerg and Harlev, all of which are suburban areas 15-20 km from the city centre and where new public housing is being built (Jyllands-Posten, 22 October 1996). In accordance with this, and in cooperation with Brabrand Housing Association, the municipality plans to replace the existing allocation priorities, which favour families with children and those already living in public housing, with priorities given to Danish families.

But if Danes are not interested in moving to public housing like Gellerup, none of this will help. In this context, the paradoxial effect of all initiatives is that they devalue the areas in the eyes of most Aarhusians even more. Meanwhile, both the municipality and the housing associations “acknowledge that the proposals [based on experiments with allocation rights] cannot alone remove the tendencies of ghetto formation” (Jyllands-Posten, 1 October 1996, my translation).

To conclude, not much has changed in Aarhus yet. The story of the Urban Committee is interesting in that all too many people thought it was the ultimate solution. But perhaps it was not much more than a cleverly organized political manoeuvre, because, seen retrospectively, the idea was predominantly to keep the municipalities going, because the central government had the problem of “governing” the municipalities, which demanded the legalization of their own practice. But the municipalities’ pressure on the ministries for this legalization has also forced the ministries to take a clear (and more democratic) stance, which in turn was not appreciated by the municipalities. Ironically, the role of central versus local governments on the issue of immigration highlighted the realization that decentralization can lead to quite unhappy endings for vulnerable groups, rather than to an improvement in local democracy. Thus, in the case of immigrants, or “denizens”, the rights at a national political level (which in fact make them de facto “citizens” in some cases) and at a transnational level (as in international conventions) are of extreme importance, which is the very thing the Municipality of Aarhus attacked. There is no doubt that a decentralization of power within the municipality would be positive with respect to immigrants’ participation in planning processes.

Now, as it was before the Urban Committee was established in 1993, most of what is undertaken in immigration politics goes on in the Ministry of the Interior.
But there have been no important changes in our context, except the tightening of rules regarding family reunification and citizenship, which we will dwell on more in the following chapters.

The voters and the political elites

In the municipality’s report from October 1995, a standard sentence appears several times in the context of immigrants lacking integration in the labour market. It more or less says that, even though immigrants can overcome some barriers, such as education and language, “there will still be [other] barriers—like the attitudes of Danes—which refugees and immigrants will have to overcome in the labour market”. The municipality most likely means, to use the popular phrase, “the man in the street” when it says “the attitudes of Danes”, which implies the popular racism of ordinary people who are both the vote basis and at the same time the most important cradle of racism (excepting the overtly racist parties with which only few identify). What is important in our present context is that, by shifting the focus of attention to the population in general, the municipality implicitly disclaims and displaces the possibility that it itself can have something to do with such “dirty” issues like racism.

In other words, by referring to the attitudes of the man in the street, the municipality avoids having to reflect on its own attitudes. Institutional discrimination thus seems to be something nobody wants anything to do with. This is of course an easy, but not innocent pretension. Furthermore, throwing in the negative “attitudes of the Danes” in such an abstract manner does not change how the municipality perceives the issue: until immigrants meet this barrier of attitudes, the strategy of the municipality seems to be to blame the victim.

In short, the municipality projects negative attitudes onto the Danes and thus opens up an image of “popular racism”, thus trying to assuage the thought that it is the municipality itself or other political elites that have discriminating and repressive attitudes. Thus, in referring to Mayor of Aarhus Thorkild Simonsen, the newspaper Politiken (14 December 1994) wrote that:

Mayor of Aarhus Thorkild Simonsen personally thinks that local and national problems with refugees and immigrants are not as big as the debate makes them appear, but that the population looks at it in a different way. It is because of this that he demands action
from the government and the parliament. (quoted in Gaasholt & Togeby 1995: 147; my emphasis; my translation)

The mayor seems to be saying: I do it because I represent the population who have voted for me, and they think so. But this is rather tricky. As Gaasholt and Togeby point out, given his roles as representative, opinion-creator, and decisionmaker, the mayor chose to underline only the first one. Gaasholt and Togeby go on to argue that politicians are also opinion-creators in that voters many times respond to the political initiatives of the elites, and even if the attitudes of the population can be stable regarding unwillingness and intolerance toward immigrants at times, these attitudes are to a high degree flexible with respect to images and ideas about concrete political issues, which is precisely why politicians have a decisive influence.

Thus, there is a dimension of “persuasiveness” in the politicians’ discourse of immigrants and refugees. In this context, Teun A. van Dijk remarks that the major discursive functions at work in the debate about denizens are persuasive, that is, “speakers aim to influence the minds of their listeners or readers in such a way that the opinions or attitudes of the audience either become or remain close(r) to those of the speaker or writer” (van Dijk 1993: 30). He emphasizes that the elites in politics, mass media, academia, business corporations, labour unions and welfare offices control many discourse types and communicative events:

... white group dominance in general and racism in particular ... presuppose a creative process in which ... elites play a crucial role. For most members of elite groups, this thesis is hard to swallow, being fundamentally inconsistent with their normative self-concept. After all elites often see themselves as moral leaders and will therefore generally dissociate themselves from anything that has to do with racism as they define it. (van Dijk 1993: 9)
2 Discourse of Immigration and the Gestures of Power

Small acts of cunning endowed with a great power of diffusion, subtle arrangements, apparently innocent, but profoundly suspicious, mechanisms that obeyed economies too shameful to be acknowledged, or pursued petty forms of coercion.... Describing them will require great attention to detail.... Discipline is a political anatomy of detail. (Foucault 1991: 139)

It is very often assumed in the mainstream debate on immigration that the language one uses only “reflects” realities already existing exterior to the person(s) speaking or writing. Here the argument will be that the way one speaks in fact constructs and creates the realities by depicting them in definite ways and hence by blocking other ways of seeing them.

There are many hidden and “apparently innocent” assumptions, or “details” that the immigration debate does not take into consideration. This neglect does not stem from stupidity. Rather, it is closely related to the issue of power. It is in this context important to recall that power is power because it can be invisible and can circulate in the hidden, unquestioned assumptions of discourse as if it did not exist. To quote from the popular film, The Usual Suspects: “the greatest trick the devil has ever pulled is to convince the world he did not exist”. In most cases, power functions according to this logic too.

Concomitantly, if power is an ability to do things in the social world, the role of language in this context is a critical one, because the language we use “decides whom we will help or hurt, and why”; thus, the discursive, or the textual, “in the broad sense of all meanings we make, whether in words or by deeds, is deeply political” (Lemke 1995: 1). In this view, one can no longer assume that language is only an “instrument” of description which, for example, is what the technocratic discourse of the Municipality of Aarhus on immigrants implies when it pictures the
social field in which it operates only as a field of “action”, minimizing the importance of its own language use.

I take the discourse of immigration to be a domain of language-use unified by overt or covert common assumptions and practices in the field of immigration. A discourse is defined in a broad sense as “a corpus of interwoven arguments, metaphors, assertions, and prejudices that cohere more associatively than logically in the strict sense of the term” (Jay 1994: 16). As Jay tells it, the term discourse is derived from the Latin discurrere, which means “a running around in all directions”. The arguments, metaphors and gestures of a discourse can cohere with or contradict each other, but nevertheless, they can disseminate in every possible direction and can set limits to how we talk, and what we can say, about its objects, e.g. “immigrants”, without the risk of saying something completely meaningless to others. What is crucial in our context is the fact that any discursive utterance is not merely a linguistic but also a social practice. That is, the most decisive element of a discourse is not the single word, utterance, semantic system or speaker in itself, but as Bakhtin has put it, “the social event of verbal interaction implemented in an utterance or utterances” (quoted in Lemke 1995: 22). Thus, any creation of meaning is a social practice and discursive utterances are typically used in social contexts. Hence Foucault’s phrase “discursive practices” will be used to point out this bounded togetherness of meaning and event.

The chapter deals with only some of the roots of the formation of the discourse of immigration and with only some of the most important routes that can be identified in today’s Denmark. By using a deconstructive approach, the purpose is to take the first steps towards an analysis of power/knowledge relations regarding immigration. This analysis does not aim to “unmask” or to debunk the discourse of immigration, only to illuminate the “realities” behind it afterwards. In tune with a deconstructivist understanding of discourse analysis, the aim is to open up and problematize some unspoken and hidden assumptions of the discourse of immigration for further discussion and interpretation.

**Identity as a “fixed star”—Imagining “us” and “them”**

The children dirty the stairs and run about naked. They dance folkdances at night and it’s noisy. There are more persons living in the flat than regulations allow. The staircase is damaged. They have no curtains in the windows. The eldest girl doesn’t go to school.
Their wash is put out to dry on the staircase. (*Fremmedarbejderbladet*, 10 December 1972; my translation)

December 1972. The subtitle of this news article is “The result of different mentalities”. And it is only a few years after immigrants have arrived. As reported in the “Foreign Workers’ Newspaper”, some “angry Danes” complained to a real-estate company and demanded an immigrant family thrown out.

One could ask “who would want such neighbours?”. But what is more interesting in our context is the way the immigrant family is exposed to publicity in a newspaper by their neighbours who probably cannot speak to them in Danish, or the way the “public eye” replaces the role of direct sensual interactions or encounters between neighbours. Not surprisingly, when newspapers speak instead of “neighbours”, public discourse proliferates. Thus, one can say that even the very early phases of the immigration debate transformed such practical issues into “social” ones. And the editors of the newspaper, with all their good will toward “foreign workers”, were complicit in formulating the conflict in socio-cultural terms: “different mentalities”. This is not a “neutral” difference, of course; dirt, nakedness, noise are all metaphors that tend to express “uncivilized” manners (see, for example, Douglas 1991), and together with “folkdances”, they point toward a social hierarchy.

A second incident involved another newspaper article in “Ugens Rapport”, a Danish sex magazine, which announced in May 1973 that “blood vengeance has now come to Denmark” and, referring to a conversation with two Turks, postulated that “the Turks would take blood vengeance if anybody were to insult their women” (quoted in *Fremmedarbejderbladet*, 10 June 1973; my translation). The editors of the “Foreign Workers’ Newspaper” replied in defence that “[t]he accusation is a downright lie. All Turks are honest and sensible people”. Here Turks were made out to be an undifferentiated whole. From then on, immigrants were “them”, latecomers, from the outside invading “our” territory, a relationship that, again, could not be maintained as neutral, because at stake was that they would do something—“they would take revenge”. The response of the “Foreign Workers’ Newspaper” again helped in this construction of us/them: even though “all Turks” were defended in positive terms, they “all” were still parabolically constituted as outsiders, although “honest and sensible”. The question is how long one could remain “honest and sensible” when one is described as an outsider and as a pure addition.
1976: *Ekstra Bladet*, one of the most popular and most populist newspapers in Denmark, printed a letter from a resident of Ishøj, who claimed that Ishøj risked becoming “a multi-lingual Asian ghetto”. Ishøj later became the Danish municipality with the highest percentage of immigrants. Now immigrants are explicitly a threatening group:

We don’t want flats only for whites. On the contrary, we want an even distribution so that ghetto-like situations can be avoided. We, the Danes, wish to continue to be Danish, and we, who moved to Ishøj, do not think about moving to Baghdad or India, so it is fair that they [immigrants] who come here try to integrate [themselves] and not try to create a new homeland—in that case, they could have stayed at home”. (quoted in Sørensen 1990: 4; my translation)

“They” are now essentially different from “we, the Danes” who should beware of their territorial claims to build a new Baghdad here. When immigrants are constructed as “them”, then we can define our territory in our own terms. The housing area spoken of is “ours”, even if immigrants live there as well and even if it is a new housing area that immigrants moved into at the same time as the Danes. Because, the Danish “Home” is constructed temporally: we, the Danes, were here before—they came later. “We” are the “established”—“they” are the “outsiders” (see Elias & Scotsson 1994 about this relationship). Naturally this both limits and devalues immigrants’ spatial practices, which here only signify a horrific danger: “creating a new homeland”. A new homeland endangers “our” construction of temporality.

The three examples above clearly show some of the bricks of a discourse of immigration that emerged in the 1970s. As immigrants’ arrived in the 1960s and in the early 1970s, one heard discussions, for instance, of the advantages and disadvantages of the “guest-worker phenomenon”. But this was a period in which “the role of labour-power still dominated the social situation of the immigrant” (Schierup 1993: 27; my translation) and thus there was “no general resistance to the import of foreign labour power” (Sørensen 1990b: 13; my translation). After this phase, the formula became, as Jonathan Schwartz put it: “immigrants minus their labour-power is equal to problems of immigration” (quoted in Loona 1986: 4; my translation).

An interesting aspect, in addition to the topics, metaphors and techniques used in the early period of the guest-worker debate, is the early entrance of the concept of “nation”. For example, already in 1964 and drawing on experiences from other
European countries, Ellen Nielsen raised the following two arguments against labour-power immigration to Denmark: firstly, the different nationalities would try to protect themselves against new lifeforms of the host country resulting in big sociological and human problems; and secondly, Europeans would become a minority in their own countries (Sørensen 1990b: 15-16).

To sum up, it seems that immigrants were very early perceived as “them” from a cultural, national and religious point of view. Today this assumption of the existence of demarcated whole identities is still extremely important in the mainstream discourse of immigration. Thus, if we look at the actual debate in today’s Denmark, we find almost only abundant repetitions and variations of the theme of us/them as an assumption in the background, which enables a continuation of the debate.

At its worst, the us/them dichotomy can be found in the Danish nationalist discourse, which consists of a mixture of national, religious and cultural fundamentalisms. For example, the famous ideologist of Danish neo-racism, Søren Krarup, asks himself: “who am I?” and then speaks of immigrants in this way:

Denmark cannot survive as Denmark if one day a half to one million Muslims stand up within our borders and demand that they remain Muslims....

A Muslim is a Muslim. His whole life and attitude determines this. In Denmark, we are Christians and our whole life and attitude determines this. How could a Muslim and we could be “integrated” without ceasing to be ourselves? This is naturally impossible.... In the world of realities, one is either Muslim or Christian—and here in Denmark, we are Christians. (quoted in Schierup 1993: 163; my emphasis and translation)

But one needs not be Søren Krarup to base one’s discourse on a polarity of “us” and “them”. For instance, the utterances of Aarhus politicians on immigration, which we dwelled on in chapter 1, characterize immigrants as the neatly defined category “them” and Danes as “us”, as a nation. Thus these utterances belong to the mainstream use of language in the politics of immigration (see Feutchwang 1990).

In its “best” version, this difference of “us” and “them” may seemingly operate on behalf of “them”. For example, the president of the association “Friends of Refugees on Møn (Flygtningevenner Møn), Inge Andersen, says about Bosnian refugees that “[m]any Danes compare them to Muslim-extended families from
Turkey or the Arabic countries. But Bosnians are really ordinary people”. The journalist summarized the message as: “Bosnians are just like us” (Information, 6 October 1995). Putting aside the reflexive devalorization of those “Muslim-extended families” achieved by this new division among “them”, the question here is whether it is good for Bosnians themselves to be mentioned in this way. To me, it seems not, as I will argue in the following.

In more abstract terms, what we are dealing with, in these mainstream ways of speaking on immigration, are totalities and dichotomies. These totalities, or large general entities, and the dichotomies that make them “coexist in a state of tension produced by what is believed to be radical difference”, constitute the main critical issue raised by earlier studies like that of Said’s Orientalism:

Can one divide human reality ... into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? ... I mean to ask whether there is a way of avoiding the hostility expressed by the division, say, of men into “us” (Westerners) and “they” (Orientals).... When one uses categories like Oriental and Western as both the starting and the end points of analysis, research, public policy ... the result is usually to polarize the distinction—the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western—and limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions, and societies. (Said 1978: 44-45; my emphasis)

In chapter 1, we saw how immigrants in Aarhus (including those who had become Danish citizens) became more immigrant-like as a consequence of discursive practices. But why do these binary oppositions prevent human encounters, which Said mentions? Firstly, because thinking with(in) binary categories about the “other” predefines the subject-roles before coming in touch with the other, or experiencing her or him. Or, in other words, binaries delimit the outcome of proximity, if not prevent proximity itself, by predefining the reality before practice. This is very clear in the semiotics of everyday experiences of immigrants in Denmark, where the different parties very often operate with stereotypes about, for example “Turkish culture” or “Danish culture” as signs of themselves. This blocks the channels of concrete practice and experience and thus ends up affirming the already established stereotypes—just as a tourist often takes pictures he or she has already seen in guidebooks and tourist brochures before travelling.

Secondly, and more importantly, these binaries, which are often produced and sustained by research on immigration, keep a tight monopoly on the premises upon
which policies are formulated and are thus used in politics to legitimize discrimination.

And thirdly, in these phrases, the immigrant, perceived as “the other”, or “them” in contrast to “us”, is transformed into a category (the etymological root of the word, *kategorein*, means “to accuse publicly”; Bourdieu 1990: 34). Here, we are no longer able to think about concrete immigrants of flesh, only as “non-Danish”. All the dynamic subdifferences and subdivisions between two large groups of people are thus reduced to a single binary opposition of Danes and non-Danes.

This way of seeing and speaking is not as innocent as it seems at first because an exclusionary and hierarchical relationship can easily be established between the binary opposites, that is, between the primary term “Danes” and the marked term, or the deviant group, the “non-Danes”, which is also the crucial move in the differentiating representations of this kind. Derrida calls this process “the economy of the same” in contrast to simple differentiation, where “the other”, say, the immigrant, is a neutral “other” where he or she is not yet defined by deficits, such as non-Dane. In “the economy of the same”, “we are not dealing with the peaceful co-existence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the 2 terms governs the other … or has the upper hand” (Derrida 1981: 41).

The only way to establish equality between the two poles of such a dichotomy is to get rid of difference, the “non” of the “non-Dane”, for the only choice is to become like the Dane (whoever he is). But, paradoxically, this is a process which does damage to both sides of the polarity, because in the fabrication of binary opposites, the meaning, that is, definitions of both Danes and non-Danes and boundaries between them, are indeed created by both terms. Hence one can ask what sense Danishness would possibly make or how one could define it alone without any reference to “other”. In this respect, one could say that the immigrant identity as “them” functions as a “fixed star” for the construction of any Danish identity opposed to “them”, a point which James Baldwin puts very nicely in another context:

... the danger, in the midst of most white Americans, is the loss of their identity. Try to imagine how you would feel if you woke up one morning to find the sun shining and all the stars aflame. You would be frightened because it is out of the order of the nature. Any upheaval in the universe is terrifying because it so profoundly attacks one’s sense of one’s own identity. Well, the black man has functioned in the white man’s world as a fixed star, as an immovable pillar: and as he moves out of his place, heaven and earth are shaken to their foundations. (Baldwin 1964: 17)
The marked term is in fact necessary for the primary term to be defined, which also means that there can be no “pure” identity and that, in reality, each side of the binary is necessarily invaded by its other. That is why writers discussing “Danishness” in the above quotations are only repressing the “other”, although they think they can exclude it.

As I will argue throughout this study, identities, cultures and territories of the immigration debate are more hybrid than the order of the mainstream discourse allows for. Hence, against totalities and oppositions of the politics of immigration, and the essentialisms, truth claims, fixed meanings and closures behind them, it is necessary “to undo the need for balanced equations, to see if each term in an opposition is not after all the accomplice of the other” (Spivak 1976: lix). For this purpose, we first have to look at the philosophy of deconstruction more closely.

**Deconstruction, discourse analysis and difference**

Arguably, the roots of discourse analysis are in the thought of the Greek Sophists, who insisted that every utterance was really a matter of rhetorical performance within which questions of truth and cognition were strictly subordinate. If they were right, then, all language is ideological, and seen in this way, ideology as a separate category collapses in its birthplace. However, the antique debate between the Sophists and Socrates, who favoured “truth”, was not won by the former. On the contrary, mainstream Western philosophy (metaphysics) was perceived for many generations as an activity of “unmasking”, that is, attempting to show the “naked” truth, which—prior to the philosopher’s intervention—was masked by ideology, an activity which also excluded rhetoric from the domain of reason (see Sløk 1987: 7-13).

In his myth of the cave, Plato (1941; Book 7) speaks of the journey from darkness into the light, and tells us that to stand in the light of the sun is to be dazzled by the full and immediate presence of justice, beauty and goodness. Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Plato and others has the primary purpose of showing how in each text this dream of pure presence, this desire for the unmediated truth of the world, operates. Just as a dream seemingly satisfies desire by providing a substitute for the object of desire, thus creating an illusion that the fundamental impossibility of the satisfaction of desire can be overcome, so the metaphysics of presence is the substitute which has allowed the metaphysician to
deceive himself into believing that one could at once overcome and fulfil the desire for presence. The important point in our context is that presence is attained without really attaining it through the strange logic of the “supplement”:

... the concept of the supplement ... harbors within itself two significations whose cohabitation is as strange as it is necessary. The supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence. It cumulates and accumulates presence....

But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of; if it fills, it is as if one fills a void. If it represents and makes an image, it is by the anterior default of presence. Compensatory ... and vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a subaltern instance which takes-(the)-place.... As substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence, it produces no relief, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness....

This second signification of the supplement cannot be separated from the first.... Each of the two significations is [in turn] effaced or becomes discreetly vague in the presence of the other. But their common function is shown in this: whether it adds or substitutes itself, the supplement is exterior, outside of the positivity to which it is super-added, alien to that which, in order to be replaced by it, must be other than it. (Derrida 1976: 144-5)

Therefore, the supplement is added to make up a deficiency, but as such it reveals a lack, for since it is in excess, the supplement can never be adequate enough for the lack. It is this peculiar quality that accounts for the importance of the notion for Derrida. In a way, it makes presence both possible and impossible at the same time. Following this, Derridean deconstruction consists of showing that the whole edifice of metaphysics rests on the possibility of compensating for a primordial nonpresence by way of the supplement.

This point is extremely important in our context. As can be seen in the quotations about the Danes and immigrants above, the relationships of supplementarity play a decisive role in the discourse of immigration. In this discourse, an “essential” Danishness is conceptualized or imagined in metaphysical terms as an unchanging inside, and this essential identity is privileged against the “accidental” outside, immigrants as a “non-constitutive” addition.
The category of the accidental allows for the essentialist discourses to account for differentiation and variation while simultaneously claiming that essence always remains absolutely the same. Essentialist discourse claims that accidental differences are wholly non-constitutive; they are supposed to be purely external to presence. Repetition, the absolutely identical return of the same essence, is supposed to be guaranteed by the absolutely impermeable boundary between essence and accident. (Smith 1994: 71-72)

The essentialist discourse devalues the other by reducing it to a “simple exteriority”. “Metaphysics consists of excluding non-presence by determining the supplement as simple exteriority, pure addition or pure absence.... [as if] What is added is nothing because it is added to a full presence to which it is exterior” (Derrida 1976: 167).

But this “accidentality” of the immigrant as an addition in the sense of the first signification of the supplement mentioned before is only half the story. In other words, so far the discourse of immigration is only related to the first signification of the supplement as a “surplus”, or an addition. But its second signification, which as Derrida says “cannot be separated from the first”, is also at work at the same time in the discourse of immigration. Thus this discourse:

flickers constantly between representations of blackness as a pure addition, as a wholly foreign population which can be simply “repatriated” back to their “home” countries, and representations of blackness as a dangerous supplement, as an insidious element which has thoroughly penetrated education curricula and local government policies. (Smith 1994: 75; italics added)

“Dangerous supplement”. These are words used by Rousseau to express a “condition almost unintelligible and inconceivable [to reason]” (quoted in Derrida 1976: 149). Smith explains that this “apparently contradictory” way of representing immigrants (simultaneously as exterior addition and dangerous interior supplement) is very effective in that these relations of supplementarity both point to the “enemy within” and, because of the “accidentality” of immigrants (as pure addition or “late-arrival”), make white-Britishness, in our case Danishness, appear solid and “invulnerable”. This ambivalent interplay of first and second significations of the supplement is what constitutes the basic assumptions enabling us to speak of “them”. And importantly, it works not in spite of ambivalence but because it is ambivalent.
In light of this, one strategy of deconstruction against the essentialism of the mainstream discourse of immigration could be to show that the supplement is not a cosmetic late-arrival, but indeed a necessary completion to the essential interior. In this context, it can be useful to pay attention to the perspective Martin Zerlang makes use of with respect to the relationships between “Danes” and “others”. His point is that the stranger has always been the source of both fascination and fear in Danish literature, architecture and planning, and the same ambivalence can be detected in the very definitions of “them” and “us”, definitions that both set limits but also, therefore, create zones of contact and contiguity between them. Zerlang writes, for example, that in Danish Orientalist literature, the boundaries between Christendom and the infidels, work and leisure, eroticism of marriage and free eroticism, etc. were constantly crossed. Architecturally, his focus is on Tivoli as a montage, in which different worlds are juxtaposed and boundaries between interior and exterior, the near and the far away, culture and nature, are shifted. On this basis, Zerlang criticizes the all too static assumptions that culture generates lifestyles and that cultures can be defined by their differences and borders with other cultures. He concludes that the distinction between “us” and “them” simply cannot hold, because the borders can always be crossed (Zerlang 1994; 1995).

What Tivoli can teach us, therefore, is that “we” are indeed constructed by the use of “other” elements, that is, substitutes. Consequently, in a deconstructivist framework, it can be argued that so much focus on immigrants’ difference has indeed been constitutive of the Danish identity again by way of supplement(s). “But”, intervenes Derrida, just as “the blind person cannot see, in its origin, the very thing he produces to supplement his sight”, “blindness to the supplement is ... the law” (Derrida 1976: 149). Construction of identity by way of supplements, one could say, is blind to its supplements and to the concept of supplement. Hence, the notion of the supplement serves to demystify the full presence in that it can show how the supplement is an integral part of the metaphysical machinery employed to build identities in essentialist terms. Not itself being the origin of the presence, the supplement can thus become what Derrida (1976) calls “the origin of the origin”, the place from which we can begin to deconstruct the origin.

As mentioned before, a supplement is that which supplies a lack, that which replaces something missing, that which heaps plenitude only to fill a fundamental void. In the play of representations via supplements, the point of origin becomes ungraspable. In spite of an infinite reference of one image, or one thing, to the other, one can no longer find any sources. Thus, the deconstructivist strategy points out the impossibility of an origin, of a “reality”, outside language. But if not an extra-linguistic origin, “reality” or essence, then what does language represent?
“True”, I said, amazed. Until then I had thought each book spoke of the things, human or divine, that lie outside books. Now I realized that not infrequently books speak of books: it is as if they spoke among themselves. In the light of this reflection the library seemed all the more disturbing to me. It was then the place of a long, centuries-old murmuring, an imperceptible dialogue between one parchment and another, a living thing, a receptacle of powers not to be ruled by a human mind, a treasure of secrets emanated by many minds, surviving the death of those who had produced them or had been their conveyors. (Eco 1983: 286)

“The sign”, says Derrida, “is always the supplement of the thing itself” (1976: 145). A supplement, as much as signifying a lack, is also that which is supplementary; it is that which “seems to add itself as a fullness to a fullness”, that which heaps plenitude on plenitude and multiplies presence. That is, the sign adds itself to the “reality” in the act of representing, which in turn makes representation of a reality or an origin outside impossible. One is always in the reality; one cannot stand outside it and “represent” it without effectively changing it. Hence, whenever one attempts to make a representation, one is always making a presentation. So, if representation of a reality is impossible, what is possible is re-presentations which do not seek a correspondence between the sign and the referent and which acknowledge that speaking of reality is an act, a presentation. In addition, the “reality” mentioned above must not be conceived as an all-encompassing totality. There are always a plurality of realities. Reality is a fragmented concept, and it is this plurality that allows for different positions and perspectives to exist.

Derrida argues that all we can find out about the origin before the work of the supplement consists of the traces of past investigations of presence. “Throughout there are only differences and traces of traces” (Derrida 1981: 38). The world as a trace is not singular or simple; it is plural and complex, a “plurality of presence”. What we have, therefore, is a plurality of re-presentations in the form of traces and signifiers, which enrich and multiply the presence itself.

Hence, for deconstruction, difference is prior to the formation of all identity and the condition for their formation. Without difference, there could be no determinate being and no oppositions: no objects and no subjects, no insides and no outsides, no presences and no absences. Importantly, Derrida conceives of difference not as a demarcating line, but as a distancing, a spacing: “an interval, a distance, spacing, must be produced between the elements [which became, become, or are to become] other, and be produced with a certain perseverance in repetition” (Derrida 1986: 8). In this spatial sense, what difference connotes
primarily is, therefore, the presence of the opposite of the identity, that is, the “other”.

There is a second, temporal, dimension of difference. In this context Derrida points out that the other as a transcendental presence, or as another origin, is an irreducible absence here and now in the presence of the trace. With this temporal dimension, difference signifies the distance of time between presence and its representation, given that representation is always the signification of a past event. It is, in other words, the very absence of such presence at the time of representation that is the condition of representation. And what makes the act of representation possible is only the traces of past representations; thus, for Derrida, everything begins with a reproduction, which is always already a case of meaning that has never been present, and thus whose signified present is always re-constituted later, after the event itself. Difference should, therefore, stand for a deferring, a delay, a reserve and a re-presentation—a reserve of the signified, the deferring of its presence, the delay between representations, the detour via the sign and the supplement which constitutes the identity of all things (Derrida 1976; 1978).

Derrida coins a new word, différance, in order to articulate these two, spatial and temporal, dimensions of difference. He thus places différance at the intersection of time and space, at what he refers to as “the becoming-time of space” and the “becoming-space of time”. The temporal connotation of différance is a reference to the act of creation and to the wholly other. It is a reference to the fact that every identity has been “created” or constituted by the other, and as such, every identity is marked by its other, for it is only through the traces of the other that one can define identity. It is in this sense that Derrida defines difference as articulation (1976: 248). As articulation, différance means that each determinate thing or moment in time bears a relationship, a connection, to something other than itself, preserving in itself the mark of the other. Différance, therefore, is an affirmation of the constitutive outside: The fact that every objectivity and every identity is partially constituted and partially threatened by its other, and this is the condition of its existence (Laclau 1990: 27).

There are two methodological points to make here, which are two consequences of deconstruction discussed so far. The first is the impossibility of a meta-language, free from what early Barthes has called “myths” or from what, in other terms, can be called ideology. This point, which has a radical potentiality of undermining the privileged “scientific” discourses, is strongly made by Derrida when he asserts that to question the categorical framework of metaphysics with a view to stepping entirely outside it is only to duplicate the structure of the
understanding which is in question. The second point, deriving from the first, is that deconstruction consists of the tracing of a path to stir up and expose forgotten dormant sediments of meaning that have accumulated and settled into a text’s fabric. These two points will be central in the rest of this study.

The “unsaid” and the technocratic/scientific discourse

There are particular ways of re-presenting immigrants. These ways of re-presenting, or discourses, make it possible to construct “immigration problems” in definite ways, but at the same time they limit other possible ways of thinking and constructing the problems. This limitation occurs mainly because of the constituting capacity of the discourse (see Hall 1992: 291-5). Thus, certain ways of asking and answering the questions and practices related to immigrants establish a preconstituted framework. This framework makes certain statements possible in a discourse and others impossible. So to say, questions become already-given answers.

The manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this “not-said” is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said. (Foucault 1994: 25)

According to Foucault, all manifest discourse is based on an “already-said”, a silent voice, or the unquestioned assumptions of the discourse. To put it in Foucault’s words, the already-said in a discourse is really a “never-said, an incorporeal discourse” (Foucault 1994: 25). Hence, in discourse analysis, the aim of criticism is not to reveal the essence, the reality or the truth the discourse hides, but to problematize its “facile gestures”:

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices we accept rest. We must ... stop regarding as superfluous something so essential in human life and human relations as thought.... It is something that is often hidden.... [but] There is always thought in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits. Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as
one believed, to see what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such.
Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult. (Foucault 1988: 154-
155)

To go deeper into an analysis of the discourse of immigration, we can initially
concentrate on the technocratic discourse as a particular way of re-presentation,
which can in general be characterized by its positivistic methods easily discernible
with respect to a sort of fetishism of “facts” and which is indispensable for the work
of local and central political authorities in Denmark. In addition, it is also a
discursive field in which it is convenient to demonstrate some of the points made
by Foucault and to show how much a discourse can hide rather than reveal when it
is at work.

Mainstream immigration research in Denmark is done mostly by free-lance
researchers (hired by local and central governments on a sectoral basis), by
research institutions, such as the Danish National Institute of Social Research
(Socialforskningsinstituttet) in Copenhagen and academics. This research is
conducted mainly in a “positivist” frame.

Some of the ideal/typical basic assumptions of positivist research can be
summarized as: firstly, that knowledge is more or less universal and, importantly,
available; and secondly, that the researcher is disinterested and that the research
process is characterized by an organized scepticism about knowledge itself and the
mechanisms it is created in. As I discuss in this study as a whole, the first
assumption is directly an illusion because of its impossibility, and the second one is
often only wishful thinking because practical situations often transform the
desirable “disinterestedness” of the researcher and the “organized scepticism” of
his or her environment into a question of degree. These assumptions often overlap
with or are supported by some general empiricist ways of seeing in the social
sciences, which are based on a set of assumptions: that scientific discourse is
distinguishable from other kinds of knowledge; that the (sense) data collected in
research is “unmediated”; that what is unobservable is meaningless; that there is a
sharp distinction between facts and theories; that language of observation is or can
be theory-free; that scientific improvement is “cumulative”, or in other words,
more and more facts will produce more knowledge and hence “continuity” is
characteristic for scientific knowledge; and finally that science is free of values and
interests (see Keat & Urry 1994: 14-30).

In illustrating these issues, we turn to an example. Our example is a research
report that is highly esteemed. It is the report/book, “Ethnic Minorities in Housing
Areas” (*Etniske Minoriteter i Boligområder*), published by the Danish National Institute of Social Research (Jeppesen 1994). This example is significant in that it is the only research mentioned specifically in the report of the Municipality of Aarhus. But I want to underline that, in giving this example, my purpose is not primarily to speak of the relationship between the author and what is written:

If a proposition, a sentence, a group of signs can be called “statement”, it is not ... because, one day, someone happened to speak them or put them into some concrete form of writing; it is because the position of the subject can be assigned. To describe a formulation *qua* statement does not consist in analysing the relations between the author and what he says (or wanted to say, or said without wanting to); but in determining what position can and must be occupied by any individual if he is to be the subject of it. (Foucault 1994: 95-96)

Our example, the book from the Danish National Institute of Social Research, is organized in such a way that the writer firstly provides “objective” facts about immigrants and some housing areas. “Presented here is exact knowledge about”, “official statistics show...”, “a research project covering the whole country” are some of the examples of how already in the beginning the “numbers” and “facts” are urged to speak their own “neutral” language. This emphasis on facts “above the fray”, free of interests, presumes that there are some basics that all parties must accept and build upon. Lemke sees this as a characteristic of the technocratic discourse, which “argues for action and policy based on particular opinion regarding what it calls ‘facts’ and from which it draws necessary or obvious consequences without explicit discussion of value choices” (Lemke 1995: 69-70).

This stress on “facts” plays a crucial role throughout in Jeppesen’s report, and the writer seems to think that unambiguous “facts” can be found on almost all issues related to immigration and that these can be interpreted unambiguously. For example, with respect to the concentration/dispersion of immigrants, she repeatedly writes: “[t]here is no exact knowledge about what effects concentrated or dispersed housing have on ethnic minorities” (Jeppesen 1994: 35; my translation). Or, for example, “there is no nationwide research or statistics which show that ethnic minorities’ proficiency in Danish is worse or that they less frequently have contact with Danes in housing areas inhabited with many immigrants and refugees” (Jeppesen 1994: 6; my translation).

In accordance with this, one of the main points raised in the book regarding the politics of immigration is that policies “are based on political evaluations and not on
exact knowledge about ...” (Jeppesen 1994: 5-6; my translation). Consequently, the writer seems to think that more knowledge and more facts are what is primarily needed in the field. The book criticizes the Urban Committee’s reports by way of a devalorization of “ideology” and a valorization of “facts”:

It must be observed that the proposals of the Urban Committee rest on ideological or political standpoints.... Furthermore, they are not based on exact knowledge about the consequences of, for example, the dispersion of ethnic minorities, because such a knowledge is not to be found.... If a subsequent evaluation can be set in motion, it will presumably shed light on many positive and negative consequences of the different initiatives. (Jeppesen 1994: 44; my translation)

The first sentence is tricky in that one thinks that a subsequent criticism of those ideological premises will follow. In our context, it would be natural to do this by looking at those assumptions without separating “reality” and its “ideological” representation from each other. But the text does not do this. On the contrary, by denigrating common sense and “ideologies” (assuming that these only “suppose”, while scientists “explain”), the text recourses immediately to the importance of “facts” and “knowledge” that is not yet found. One wonders why then the writer does not tell them already in this book. It must be because they are buried deeply somewhere and only further research can extract them out: if only “a subsequent evaluation can be set in motion ...” (And one begins to wonder if this is the way researchers legitimize their search of financing).

Importantly, the artificial poles of “positive and negative consequences of different initiatives”, expressed as “facts”, only strengthen already existing discursive polarities like “assimilation or integration”, and “dispersion or concentration”. Although denigrating politicians’ common sense assumptions, the text itself has interdiscursive relations with them, at any rate by speaking the same language.

The writer is consistent on these points. Thus, elsewhere, she criticizes the Municipality of Aarhus precisely in the same way:

It has good intentions, but the city council produces policy on the basis of an assumption, a “dispersion philosophy”, which one can choose to believe or not. It is not scientifically grounded and can turn out to be wrong. (quoted in Weekendavisen, 15-23 May 1996; my emphasis and translation)
Needless to say, this search for “scientific grounds”, the concept of exact knowledge, expectations of pure science and the seductive power of “facts” are important in building the authority of the scientific text in immigration research on much broader scale than the example given above. Having said this, I want to argue that, as an alternative to this illusion of pure science, immigration research can be conceived of as a research community, as a social institution, or as a field of expertise/authority, and additionally, one can in this respect focus on the relationship between research and the public sphere.

Regarding social science, there are many organizational aspects which problematize the universality of knowledge. For example, in the context of the academic institutional setting, it can be said that many researchers and students of research believe in the validity of their knowledge often because they are told to, or in other words, because they are “socialized” in a particular social scientific community. Local conditions of the scientific community of which the researcher is a part and in which the scientific facts are, so to say, “created” has a direct impact upon why and how something is regarded as important, and these communities are, at the same time, the context of both innovation and validation. The individual researcher also internalizes the norms of his or her scientific community, which many times explains convergence between the members of the same community (for example, different institutional settings in immigration research have internally converging traditions). The researcher also learns the basic metaphors, argumentative turns, the ways of re-presenting knowledge on ethnic matters, etc. in a local setting in which she or he works or studies. As many practitioners of immigration research know, a good way to be become an “expert” on immigrants is often to live among other experts and to engage in their rituals. Thus, the more a researcher of immigration is “socialized” within a research community, the more he or she reproduces the norms of that community.

If one focuses on the instances when Danish immigration research has been presented to the public, one can again easily detect widespread, unspoken, but problematic assumptions. For example, quite often it is unproblematically taken for granted that prejudices do not play a big role and that self-criticism is an important part of scientific practice in the field. Equally often, it is supposed that “errors”, or the sporadic and/or individualized character of “deviating” researcher attitudes (for example, such as statements implicitly correlated with racism), are only “exceptions”, and that scientific practice of immigration research is otherwise rationally organized.
Another assumption, which seems to be important has to do with the instrumental purity of the research process: that the researcher’s (individual or institutional) interests can be distinguished from his or her “search for truth”, which is not always the impression one gets in practice. In this context, it is also important to recall that much research on immigration is organized to meet some social goal (to solve the “immigrant problem”, to solve immigrants’ problems, to integrate immigrants, etc. depending on who defines these) that is characteristically based on some criteria not internal to immigration research as social science, at any rate to the criteria of “pure science”.

Even the concept of “immigration research”, or the pretension that this field is a unified body of knowledge, rests on an illusion given that many experts contradict each other, and that disparities, disputes and controversies are more characteristic of the field than is homogeneous consensus (but note that these controversies can be variations of what Kuhn has called “puzzle-solving” exercises in the same paradigm or “dispersions” in the same order of discourse). Another illusory assumption regarding contact between the public and research on immigration is that knowledge is there just to be “gathered” (via statistics, interviews, etc.); the scientist has “access” to this knowledge; and this knowledge, “exact knowledge” and/or “facts” can be collected in certain files and served, say, to politicians, who then make decisions. In short, the processes in which science are “popularized” mask some important issues regarding parallelisms between re-presentation of science and re-presentation of society.

What is important in this respect is that scientific practice is often quite different from those normative prescriptions or assumptions of pure science about “extracting” facts. For example, regarding methods of research on immigration, it can be said that these methods are generally valued to the extent that they can show, or “detect”, the phenomena, say, immigrant cultures, problems, etc. On the other hand, the phenomena itself exists, or is detectable, to the extent that those methods can measure and detect them. A good example in this context might be that “hybrid” identities are very difficult to detect with “pure” theories based on divisions and dichotomies. This circularity becomes even more important when, as Latour (1987) reminds us, what we accept as true or untrue depends not only on representations of them, but also on what we do with them. In other words, validating the truth (to the extent one can detect the phenomena) is also dependent upon practice, that is, how one prepares, regulates, controls, places and replaces the variables of the phenomena, and most importantly how and in which community one practices one’s knowledge. So to say, seeing the world from a particular perspective directly affects one’s interpretation of it. An odd example of
this creation of truth in practices other than those assumed by mainstream positivistic and empiricist immigration research could be to repeat the same method of analysis again and again until it becomes the truth. The consequence of such research is often that immigrants get reduced to numbers or categories, which in turn become the only instruments for “measuring” the problems or the only way of speaking about “them”.

A crucial effect of the positivistic and empiricist research on immigration is that it tends to reduce political and ethical uncertainty and ambivalence of many important issues to “the need for more exact knowledge”, that is, to cognitive questions. In this, political and ethical questions regarding living with the “other”, for example, are translated into “risks” stemming from a deficit of knowledge. To be sure, this knowledge itself is assumed to be quantitative and calculable. What this all amounts to is that in the routines of extracting information in this risk-management process, one does not need to go back to “other questions” related to interpretation, ethics and politics. Or, in other words, one effectively ignores those broader questions, many times taking them for granted or placing the responsibility somewhere else (e.g. on “decision-makers”).

This tendency, which indeed produces what I call a “deficit of interpretation”, ironically contributes to a type of “ignorance” other than the one positivist research declares exists. This new ignorance is not characterized by one in which the “facts” are not known, but rather it is a situation where one has facts but does not know, or is not interested in knowing, how to interpret them. Whereas positivist immigration research imagines that the problem is a lack of knowledge, ignorance is not always only a purely cognitive matter (a situation of knowing what one does not know). But, on the contrary, it is very often also a practical matter, e.g. practising a definite way of posing questions and a definite way of researching.

Having said this, the positivist approach to research of immigration itself actively constructs ignorance in at least two ways. Firstly, together with production of “knowledge”, the people who do not have it become “ignorant” to the degree they do not have access to it, and naturally they need and become dependent on the “experts”. And secondly, it seems that the more knowledge such research produces, the more difficult it becomes to discuss its unspoken premises, assumptions, and to problematize its “facile gestures” to be able to interpret the phenomena in other words.

To conclude, I want to reassert that technocratic and positivist discourse of immigration hides a lot by depicting the problems accumulated around the issue of immigration as solvable via a routine of extracting information, something which
Thomas Kuhn has labelled a “puzzle-solving” tendency of established paradigms. Reduced to puzzle-solving, by taking the established paradigms for granted, science risks becoming a form of silence. As is written in *The Name of the Rose*:

‘And is a library, then, an instrument not for distributing the truth but for delaying its appearance?’ I asked, dumbfounded.

‘Not always and not necessarily. In this case it is’. (Eco 1983: 286)

**Dispersions, the order of the discourse and power**

According to Foucault, conditions of the existence and maintenance of a discourse depend first and foremost upon “rules of formation”, which can define the possible objects, mode of statements, thematic choices, enunciative modalities, subjects, concepts and strategies of the discourse (Foucault 1994: 38). Regarding Foucauldian discourse analysis, it is important to remember that “statements within a discourse need not all be all the same. But the relationships and differences between them must be regular and systematic, not random” (Hall 1992: 292). Foucault defines this “system of dispersion” as a complex amalgam of “rather various strategic possibilities that permit the activation of incompatible themes, or, again, the establishment of the same theme in different groups of statement”, which also makes a “discursive formation” possible (Foucault 1994: 37-38).

This explains, for example, how nobody can agree and, at the same time, talk about the same topic, “immigrants”, in Denmark. What I want to argue in this context is that in the debate on immigration in Denmark, such an open but not random system of dispersion, which makes it possible for different positions to co-exist, can be detected. Even if from these positions vastly different statements can be uttered, they often share a focus on the choice of objects (immigrants, refugees, etc.), concepts and thematic choices (ghetto, assimilation, integration, difference, tolerance, etc.), and sometimes material strategies; in other words, they speak in the same terminology, on the same object, with the same concepts, around the same table.
Some basic forms of speaking about immigrants in Denmark can be grouped ideally/typically, and somewhat artificially, under five headings which in no way excludes the possible existence of others, such as fundamentalist discourse, monoculturalist (assimilationist) discourse, multiculturalist (integrationist) discourse, technocratic discourse and neo-modernist discourse.

Technocratic discourse of immigration was mentioned above. What I mean by fundamentalist discourse is above all characterized by the Danish nationalists’ essentialist way of speaking about immigration. As quoted before, in the context of this discourse, “Muslim immigrants” are typically characterized as an unambiguous and unchanging group that cannot be assimilated. As Necef formulates it in his criticism of this discourse, their “new-racism” is not based on biology, but on “culture”, which is taken as “something that sits in one’s unconscious and rules” a person, or as something unchangeable thus very similar to genetic formulations of “difference” except that culture now, as the basic concept, replaces biology (Necef 1994: 57). Perhaps ironically, this Danish fundamentalist discourse and a great deal of what can be called immigrant fundamentalism overlaps in that they both operate with the same two homogeneous totalities that are neatly walled off from each other by clear differences in the sense of demarcating lines. In both cases, one is always either Muslim or Christian, but the primary terms of the dichotomies they operate with are changed: whereas the “we” is Christianity or Danishness in the first case, it is Islam or another single national identity in the second.

Monoculturalist discourse as an intellectual ideology and institutional practice proliferated already in the early phases of immigration to Europe and North-America:

[The history of monoculturalism is contemporaneous with melting-pot assimilationism as the prevailing standard underlying policies concerning ethno-racial immigration and relations in the United States. The United States was taken in its dominant self-representation to have a core set of cultural and political values, and assimilation meant giving up all those “un-American” values to be able to assume those that would fashion one American subject to the warrant of monocultural interpretation. (Goldberg 1994: 4-5)]

Goldberg dates the monoculturalist practices of assimilation back to the 1940s and 1960s in the United States. In Denmark, where a “core set of cultural and political values” are generally defined on the basis of nationality and increasingly of Europeanness, a monoculturalist assimilationist discourse still prevails.
Traditionally, the politics and discourse of assimilation prioritized a homogeneous vision of Danish society, and making minority groups invisible without creating ethnic enclaves or ghettos has been the main target. The individual immigrant’s role in such a vision has been to adapt oneself to the homogeneous values of this monocultural, thus homogeneous, society.

The idea of multiculturalism, which has been a dominant discursive strategy in the Danish immigration debate, especially in the 1980s and in the beginning of 1990s, stems from responses and resistance to “monoculturalism”. Multiculturalism is a broad concept that is descriptive, normative, ideological and political all at once (Goldberg 1994). One distinctive version of the multiculturalist discourse, and probably the dominant version now partly established in local and central institutional settings and adapted largely by immigrant organizations and politicians, is what the Chicago Cultural Studies Group has called “managed multiculturalisms” (1994), or “difference multiculturalism” as Goldberg formulates it. According to Goldberg, identity (which can function both as a “bond” and a “bondage” in social relations) and difference are the catchwords of difference multiculturalism, which “presumes a fixed ‘we’ or ‘us’ at an unshifting centre”. This multiculturalism “not only leaves groups constituted as givens but entrenches the boundaries fixing group demarcations as unalterable” (Goldberg 1994: 7, 16).

What has come closest to “difference multiculturalism” in Denmark has been “integrationist” ideologies. The politics of integration have prioritized a vision of minorities as “groups” having a consistent internal organization, and thus, contrary to the politics of assimilation, which is mainly concerned with the assimilation of the individual, the politics of integration maintains that integration can take place both by the development of ethnic minority’s relations to Danish society in general and by strengthening the internal organization of the ethnic group (Einarsdóttir 1992: 127-134; Hamburger 1989: 36-40). As Charlotte Hamburger has excellently shown, integration very often has been something politicians have talked about in theory, where their idea of integration and their implementation of theories in local politics have more often than not been much closer to “assimilation”, as described above.

It is interesting to note that even though both politics and the research on immigration had been polarized between “assimilationists” and “integrationists” and still is partly today, there are important common assumptions between these two poles. For example, it is held in both views that “they” are “different” in a dichotomic, or essentialist, sense, and that is why it is often argued that immigrants should either be assimilated (differences disappear, as in a melting pot) or integrated (“their own culture” is protected). Whereas the assimilationist view
prefers the heteronomy of universal or national norms and values (as “becoming Danish” by stripping off one’s individual history), the integrationist view takes into consideration the “group” autonomy against Danish society at large, which also means that the group’s heteronomy replaces the individual’s autonomy inside the group. As Zygmunt Bauman puts it in the context of the multiculturalism debate:

a new consensus is emerging. If the left and right, the progressivists and the reactionary of the modern period, agreed that strangerhood is abnormal and regrettable, ... the postmodern times are marked by an almost universal agreement that difference is good, precious and in need of protection and cultivation ... a misdirected, and—I would say—retrograde critique of the modern project, as it only proposes to shift the site of disablement and subordination from the universalist state to the particularist tribe. It only replaces one ‘essentialism’, already discredited, by another, not yet fully unmasked in all its disempowering potential. (Bauman 1994: 11-13)

What integrationist difference multiculturalism has moved toward is a new “tribalism”. And it must be noted that the difference we talk about here has nothing to do with its Derridean conception.

Even though critics of multiculturalism, like Bauman, speak in a postmodern context (a strategy I will also adapt in this study), in the Danish context, reactions to and criticisms of multiculturalism has mostly given way to what can be termed a revamped “modernist” discourse. Thus, today, especially in local politics, there is a strong tendency to move away from the segregationist and thus repressive “tolerance” of difference multiculturalism towards more openly discriminating and repressive forms of modernist local politics, as I showed in chapter 1 in the context of Aarhus. Hence, what took place in Aarhus in the 1990s cannot be characterized as an “integrationist” politics or discourse, but rather, as I will argue in this study, a “modernist” one.

In this context, we can also speak of a neo-modernism, which, on the one hand, is much more sensitive to the issues of democracy compared to the modernist discourse of the municipality and, on the other hand, has affinities with the old “modernism”, especially regarding issues like universalism. To deal with this, we can adapt a broad definition of neo-modernism formulated by Jeffrey Alexander. He writes that, because of the recent worldwide revival of the market and democracy, universalism has once again become a viable source for social theory (1994: 184). Alexander argues that many intellectuals “have found in neo-modernism a unifying vehicle to dispute the postmodern hegemony”, and as a consequence
“retrospective verifications of modernization theory have begun in the earnest” (1994: 191). His warnings follow this characterization:

The theoretical danger is that this enthusiastic and long overdue re-appreciation of some of the central thrusts of postwar social science might actually lead to the revival of convergence and modernization theories in their earlier forms... (Alexander 1994: 191)

Interdiscursivity

As I already underlined, it is artificial to group the ways immigrants are spoken about. This is mainly because in practice none of these ways exist independently of each other and one often sees intersections and overlaps among them. These include analogies, relations of complementarity, oppositions and mutual delimitations among them, which also make them highly heterogeneous and polyvalent, or, so to say, hybrids. This is also why the theme of interdiscursivity, that is, “the complex inter-dependent configuration of discursive formations”, has in the formation of discourses primacy over parts which can only analytically be isolated from each other (Fairclough 1992: 68). This importance of interdiscursivity in the discourse of immigration is mainly because these different types of discourses all share the same configurations of objects as well as basic assumptions. Besides, the concepts used are more or less the same.

We can observe interdiscursivity in these different types of discourses at work using a concrete example and dwelling upon the consequences of this. The example is an event from 1996, which many “immigrant-experts”, including journalists, researchers, social workers, etc., have discussed publicly. On July 10, 1996 a Pakistani woman was murdered, and the police suspected her brothers for the crime. According to the newspapers, one of her brothers had killed her because she did not want to live together with a man with whom her family had pushed her into marriage two years before. Hence the media called the event a “murder of honour”. Since this occurred during a period in Denmark when the parliament was in recession, at a time when news intensity is lowest, this event attracted much more public attention than previous similar events. Following are some of the main positions commentators took:

X: It is all about understanding the problem. When murder or violence takes place, for example, in Muslim families, one should remember it is about codes of honour. In an arranged marriage, it is the parents’ problem if their daughter escapes from her
husband. She brings shame on the whole family, and the family-by-marriage demands revenge. (*Ekstra Bladet*, 15 July 1996; my translation)

Y: For normal, peaceful and honest Pakistanis, it is doubly tragic to see that this reprehensible and extreme murder is interpreted as a natural consequence of Pakistani culture, religion and behaviour. (*Information*, 16 July 1996; my translation)

Z: People with medieval norms are under hard pressure in this country, because their morality is so far away from ours.... (*Politiken*, 12 July 1996; my translation). Many of the [immigrant] families who came to Denmark 20 years ago still live according to old traditions and norms, which are not even up-to-date in the home country.... We must not feel disdain for the individual.... We must have respect for him, but not for the culture, which makes him do horrific things (*Det Fri Aktuelt*, 17 July 1996; my translation) ... For immigrant families who live traditionally, it is accepted that males experiment with pre-marital sex. But for women, sex before marriage is strictly forbidden. (*Fyens Stiftstidende*, 21 July 1996; my translation)

T: We cannot live with the idea that some men go around and play tough guy and kill because of old-fashioned codes of honour. Danish society should send a powerful signal by sharpening penalties for these kinds of crimes, so that all who are convicted can be deported from Denmark after imprisonment. (*Politiken*, 12 July 1996; my translation)

H: [referring to X above] ... what is the meaning of the word ‘understand’ in this context after all? It must well be something ... that can provide us with knowledge ... and that can make us accept that Muslim murderers have been obliged to act as they did. But this is an intellectual operation which will fail for most Danes. To be sure, luckily. We will continue to have an abysmal disdain for people who kill in cold blood because of a hazy code of honour. (*Ekstra Bladet*, 15 July 1996; my translation)

L: X entered into the debate by telling of the horror show many immigrant women experience.... Y has obviously not learned anything new, but has chosen to reactualize the old injured tone and anticipated new examples of Danish discrimination... Naturally, we must both understand and explain. We must collect and mediate information.... We must give newcomers the possibility to hold on to their language, culture and religion. But not a second at the expense of Danish principles of law.... If newcomers choose to remain immigrants, we must, at a minimum, demand that they accept cultural contact—that their own and their children’s life become different from what is was like where they came from. Therefore, thanks are owed to T [quoted above], because she has grasped the seriousness of the situation, has acknowledged her political and pedagogic
responsibility and has had the courage to go against habitual reactions of the politics of immigration. (*Information*, 16 July 1996; my translation)

These quotations cover the most central arguments launched in the debate about this murder.

In a culturalist urge, X, who is a social worker, mentioned the necessity of “understanding” cultural and religious origins, which is here implicitly conceived as something that controls the individual by remote-control. “Understanding” naturally invites a “tolerance” regarding living with other cultures. In this, the text could be placed in the integrationist or multiculturalist discourse. But, at the same time, it signals a monoculturalist understanding of culture by engaging the assumption that one is a member of only one culture. The murderer cannot be, in this understanding, both Muslim and have contact with “us” in other spheres of life. In other words, because of its scenography, this discourse does not allow for any kind of zone of “intercultural” contact. Thus the implicit absolutist relativism of this text seems to share with the essentialism of the fundamentalist discourse the assumption that culture is a prison one cannot come escape from.

This is exactly the “naturalization” of culture that Y, who is a representative of an anti-racist organisation, is afraid of. Thus the text embarks on a clear strategic projection of protecting “normal, peaceful and honest Pakistanis”. It is a clear invitation for avoiding essentialist generalizations and for keeping in touch with internal differences within a group, which is often wrongly assumed to be homogeneous. But despite this, the text still parabolically accepts that there is something that can be called “Pakistani culture, religion and behaviour”. In other words, the text still re-presents (at least part of) Pakistani culture as a substance which existed prior to discursive operations. Thus, trying to play a discursive game without paying attention to its rules, the text itself gets entrapped in it. What it significantly forgets or does not take account of and thus perpetuates is that it is the very use of language in the discourse of immigration that constructs the immigrant as a coherent subject. In other words, the “immigrant” does not exist before we speak of him. Using language, we address the immigrant in a position he or she must first of all “step into” to be able to answer back, a process called “interpellation”: “The operation of linguistic interpellation requires that the addressee accept its configuration as a subject without direct reflection in order to carry on the conversation or practice at hand. Interpellation may be calibrated by gender, age, ethnicity or class or may exclude any of these groups or parts of them ...

... what is important is that the process goes on at the level of language and that in
Western culture it takes the particular form of the subject” (Poster 1996: 279). This is precisely this paradox, which I believe is impossible to solve and which Y has a problem with. This is also what makes the text seem naïve. (In this context, it is also relevant to know that Y is an immigrant).

Z, a researcher, offers an explanation based on a dichotomy between tradition and modernity. Z still speaks in general terms, but importantly, the difference between “us” and those traditional “others” is not necessarily essentialized; one could say that the text rather temporalizes the difference: they are not like us—yet. In this temporalization, the text is directly associated with a “backwardness” of the immigrant, and does so in general cultural terms, which is interesting to note, because this “modernist” discourse is reborn very much as a reaction to the “culturalism” of integrationist discourse. Thus it seems to be a paradox that Z discusses the crime in almost exclusively culturalist terms by referring to “old traditions and medieval norms”, which is also a reason why the text shares a culturalism with other texts referred above. Needless to say, this discourse also works, not despite but because of this ambivalence. Furthermore, it can be added that the text presumes that the “individual” immigrant, as a subject, pre-existed discursive interventions. In this, the text forgets that the individual immigrant is constituted as a subject in absentia via interpellation, a process this text itself is a part of. The specific role of underlining sexuality is also remarkable.

T is a Social Democratic politician, and while, according to the newspaper the quotation is taken from, disagreeing with what Z brings to the discussion, T actually takes Z’s intervention to its logical conclusion in the framework of a now old-fashioned or “simple” modernity. Thus, the impossibility of a domestication of the otherness at issue supports this politician in arguing for disciplinary technologies, which makes T’s discourse authoritarian: “authoritarian discourse organises consent precisely by taking up already popularized discursive forms and reorienting them towards authoritarian ends” (Smith 1995: 120). It is also this interdiscursivity that explains the widespread accept and sympathy T, who is also an immigrant, has received in the debate. But criticism was forthcoming, saying that T’s standpoint was “not considered thoroughly, that it was populist and aimed at the Danish voter base to promote T’s own personal popularity” (Information, 26 July 1996).

H is a journalist in a newspaper known for its populism. The text shows that, even though the newspaper disagrees on many topics with Social Democratic politics, it did not in this case. The text is remarkable in that it labelled people as “us” and “them”, and the murder, which could easier induce “abysmal disdain” for whoever committed it, became a discursive tool for this grouping, separation and
fixation. Note the role of the “Muslim murderer” as a fixed star for the Danish identity.

L is the tired voice of a newspaper known for its progressivity. I believe that L rightly points out the impossibility of avoiding cultural contact and signals an understanding of what can be called “interculturalism” or hybrid proliferations between those cultures. But L all too easily recourses to a multiculturalist integrationism, referring to “their language, culture and religion” as the frame. In a rhetorical manoeuvre, L disclaims “Danish discrimination” (as if it evaporates because of a “Muslim murderer”) and refers to “information” and “pedagogic” interventions as absolute necessities for working against the habits of immigration politics. But the text itself, as I already implied, repeats those habits one by one. It is interesting to note that the text does not refer to anything else than “Danish law” as a common ground for possibly making a platform for “us” and “them”. The legal authority of the state and heteronomy is thus confirmed indirectly, signalling a close relationship with other modernist texts above.

The order of the discourse and hegemony

Was it necessary to bring all of this up to explain a murder? Could one, for example, not be content with condemning this murder on some more common-sense related grounds? Nils Christie, a criminologist, mentions in another context that

human beings are basically identical, not because of biology, but because they share a basic human experience ... about ... being the most vulnerable of all beings in a longer period after birth.... We all have a shared intuitive feeling about justice and injustice....

(Christie 1996: 187; my translation)

In such a framework, it is natural to be against murder, because we are human beings and have shared ethical experiences that tell us it is wrong and not necessarily because we are Danes or live in Denmark. But the commentators did not take such a position. On the contrary, the debate increasingly rotated around immigrant cultures as if a murder were, or would be, unquestionably natural in “other” cultures.
Four months later, one of five Palestinian teenagers killed the doorman of a discotheque because he did not allow them to enter. This was also debated in a similar, exclusively culturalist, manner. Roughly a week later, a Dane killed a person while firing into a discotheque, again because he was not allowed to enter. This time, the newspaper *Ekstra Bladet*, which had presented the Pakistani murderers mentioned above as “Muslim murderers”, presented the Dane as a “madman”, as a deviant, and made no reference to his religious or national identity (*Ekstra Bladet*, 30 November 1996).

In reference to the first example, we can continue asking: why did those very different persons resort to systematizations, by juxtaposing “culture” and “murder”, to explain what happened? Does it have something to do with social practices and political hegemony?

In Foucault’s account, reason, awakening in the classical world like a sleeping giant, finds chaos and disorder everywhere and embarks on a rational ordering of the social world. It attempts to classify and regulate all forms of experience through a systematic construction of knowledge and discourse, which Foucault understands as systems of language imbricated with social practice. He argues that various human experiences, such as madness and sexuality, become the objects of intense analysis and scrutiny. They are discursively constituted within rationalist and scientific frames of reference, within the discourses of modern knowledge, and thereby made accessible for administration and control. Since the eighteenth century, there has been a discursive explosion whereby all human behaviour has come under the “imperialism” of modern discourses and regimes of power/knowledge. The task of the Enlightenment, Foucault argues, was to multiply “reason’s political power” and disseminate it through the social field, eventually the spaces of everyday life.

Therefore, Foucault adopts a stance of hostile opposition to modernity by rejecting the modern equation of reason and freedom and by attempting to problematize modern forms of rationality as reductive and oppressive. Especially in his genealogical works of the 1970s, he attacks modern rationality, institutions and forms of subjectivity as sources of domination. Whereas modern theorists tend to see knowledge and truth as neutral, objective, universal or vehicles of progress and emancipation, Foucault analyzes them as integral components of power and domination.

In today’s Denmark, Foucault’s points are relevant with respect to the mainstream immigration debate in which some common assumptions, or with Foucault’s words, some “economies too shameful to be acknowledged”, can be
deciphered. And this is the case despite everybody not explicitly agreeing; hence some “petty forms of coercion”, or dispersions, in this discourse are equally detectable. All the dispersions in, or the variants of, the mainstream discourse of immigration constitute the same “object”—the immigrant—by naming, describing and explaining, and working it “to the point of transforming it altogether”. The discursive order is based “on the space in which various objects emerge and are continuously transformed” (Foucault 1994: 32).

The “space” Foucault refers to here points to “relations of resemblance, proximity, distance, difference, transformation”. To be able to place the object “in a field of exteriority”, “these relationships are established between institutions, socio-economic processes, behavioural patterns, techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization” (ibid, 44-45). What is especially important in this context is that these relations are neither internal (they do not only connect words and concepts to each other) nor external to the discourse (they do not “impose” certain forms upon the discourse). These relations are:

... in a sense, at the limit of the discourse: they offer it objects of which it can speak, or rather ... they determine the group of relations that discourse must establish.... These relations characterize not the language (langue) used by discourse, nor the circumstances in which it is deployed, but discourse itself as a practice.... A task ... consists of not—of no longer—treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course discourses are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things. It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (langue) and to speech. It is this “more” that we must reveal and describe. (Foucault 1994: 46-49)

While the immigrant is discursivized, a group of particular social relations also proliferate. The relationships between juridical definitions of the immigrant and the culturalist interpretations of his or her different behavioural patterns; the relationship between the authority of counselling institutions and local and central governments; the relationship between research on their “mentalities” and ways of policing the ghetto; the relationship between journalism on them and political discrimination, and so on are all parts of these social practices.

These relations take us to the connection between discourse and practice at a more abstract level. Just as Umberto Eco, referred to earlier, points to intertextuality of discourses in that different texts are articulated with each other, those differential positions of speech and writing and the “extra-discursive” actions
to which they are linked cannot be separated from each other by an iron curtain, for both speech and actions are differential positions within operations of larger scope. We thus come to a significant conclusion that the concept of discourse is not linguistic but prior to the distinction between linguistic and extra-linguistic.

An example from Wittgenstein is helpful. If I am building a wall and I tell someone “hand me a brick” and then place it on the wall, my first act is linguistic and the second is behavioural. But it is easy to see that they are both connected to a total operation, which is the construction of the wall. This relational moment within the total operation is neither linguistic nor extra-linguistic, for it includes both types of actions. Wittgenstein concludes: “I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the language game” (quoted in Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 108). In this sense, discourses can be thought of as coterminous with the “social”. Because every social action has a meaning, it is constituted in the form of discursive sequences, which articulate linguistic and extra-linguistic elements. The relationship of discourse and social practices builds upon these premises while rejecting the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices.

That is why for Foucault the micro-techniques of power “imply a dual relation between power and knowledge in modern society: on the one hand, the techniques of power are developed on the basis of knowledge that is generated, for example in the social sciences; on the other hand, the techniques are very much concerned with exercising power in the process of gathering knowledge.... This conception of power suggests that discourse and language are of central importance to the social processes of modern society” (Fairclough 1992: 50).

Discourse is not only implicated in power, but it “is one of systems through which power circulates. The knowledge that a discourse produces constitutes a kind of power, exercised over those who are ‘known’. When that knowledge is exercised in practice, those who are ‘known’ in a particular way will be subject (i.e. subjected) to it” (Hall 1992: 295).

The relationship of discursive practice to social practice takes us to the concept of “hegemony”. We can demonstrate how a hegemonizing process operates by taking an example inspired by Wittgenstein. If I begin by counting 1,2,3,4, and ask someone to continue, the spontaneous answer would be 5,6,7, etc. But I can claim that this is wrong, since the series I have in mind is 1,2,3,4; 10,20,30,40; 100,200 ... etc. But if my interlocur believes that he understood the rule and tries to follow it by counting the series in this way, I can still claim that he is wrong since my initial enunciation was merely a fragment of a different series—for example, one...
comprising the numbers 1 to 4000 and then one from 5 to 8000, etc. And obviously, I can always change the rule by continuing the series in a different way (Wittgenstein 1963: par. 2, 7, 8, 10; Laclau & Mouffe 1985).

There are two conclusions that follow from this, on the nature of discursive operations and hegemony. Firstly, everything depends in this game on who is in command, and by the same token, hegemony is a game of power. If hegemony is the condition of fixation, then power is the condition of society and identity, which is not but a sedimented form of power. Such a game of power is necessary because of the very non-presence of any extra-discursive objectivity preceding its discursive re-presentation. Consequently, a totalizing discourse can only represent society as an objective totality in a mythical (ideological) form, which itself is “a dream of presence”. If, on the other hand, we take into account that the social is groundless and accept the ambiguous and relational character of all identity, then the role of politics, power and hegemony increases in importance because, through the conviction which a political argument can contribute, it itself constructs the social reality. Society can then be conceived as a vast argumentative texture through which men construct their own reality.

Secondly, the problem with hegemony is that the rule is undecidable and can be transferred by each new addition. As shown with the above example, if the series is undecidable in terms of its formal structure, the hegemonic act will not be the realization of a rationality preceding it, but an act of radical de- and re-construction.

Both of these conclusions bring us to the constitutive role of discourse and argumentation. An apodictic decision that claims for itself an incontestable “rationality” is not a decision at all: a rationality that transcends me has already decided for me, and my only role is that of recognizing that decision and the consequences that unfold from it. This is the form of argument which grounds itself on what Aristoteles called theory (purely speculative knowledge). But if, on the contrary, it is shown that there is no ultimate rational foundation for the social, what follows is not a total arbitrariness, but an argumentative structure that has the tendency to prove the verisimilitude of an argument rather than its truth. This verisimilitude is, in turn, determined by other arguments used on other occasions. The texture of the ensemble of arguments constituted in this way is by definition open-ended, that is, ungrounded in any ultimate algorithmic certainty, and it is responsive to the diverse argumentative practices that take place in society. One argument answers another, and in this process of counter-argumentation, the argument itself is modified in one way or another (Laclau 1990: 194; see also Laclau 1994: 3-4).
Essentialism and anti-essentialism

With the “contested” concept of difference, which is always already positional, conditional and conjunctural, deconstructivism has a distance to essentialism (see Hall 1992b: 257).

On the other hand, it must be underlined that deconstructivism has a distance to a wholesale anti-essentialism too. As Spivak says, “no representation ... can take place without essentialism” (Spivak 1990: 109). In other words, we cannot even speak of any form of identity without at least partial fixations. In the face of this, deconstruction is not totally “anti-essentialist” either. Such an attitude would require that essentialism had an essence, which is impossible. On the face of this impossibility, deconstruction establishes “an infiltration and subversion of essentialism, rather than a simple rejection of essentialism altogether” (Smith 1994: 72).

Deconstruction is positioned vis-à-vis presence as a supplement, not as an exterior entity or as an opponent.... There is never, then, a ‘pure’ deconstructive practice that escapes the metaphysics of presence; one finds oneself, inevitably, doing something and, to an extent, doing its discursive opposite—precisely at the same time. (Smith 1994b: 173)

According to Smith there is nothing inherently progressive in anti-essentialism, and resistance against essentialism in racializing discourses of immigrants must take a dual form:

Deconstruction’s approach to identity therefore amounts to the following paradox: identity is never purely possible, for identity is always dependent on that which is “outside” identity, and it always differentiates itself in its shifting relations with its otherness; but identity is never purely impossible, because there always remains something irreducibly other against which an “inside” can be constructed. (Smith 1994: 74)

Let us now go into some details to make this paradox—the simultaneous possibility and impossibility of identity—clearer. Identity can be regarded as a supplement that brings about the possibility of compensating for the fundamental non-presence of its origins: it exists only as a form of re-presentation. If not a
reference to a “present” objectivity, then what is it that provides identity, a certain closure? The answer to this question opens up another question, that is, the limits of identity. As is the case with any context, an identity can only be defined in terms of its difference from the other, with reference to a constitutive outside. Difference from the other is therefore the condition of formation of every social identity, a process which involves an externalization of the other.

However, the relationship to the other is not merely a relation of difference, it is rather in terms of an us/them dichotomy, that is to say, difference must also be thought as an antagonism with an outside that threatens the identity’s existence. This means that the other fulfils two crucial and contradictory roles at the same time. On the one hand, it is antagonistic; it blocks the full constitution of the objectivity to which it is opposed. On the other, given that this objectivity is merely relational and would not be what it is outside the relationship with the force opposing it, the other is also a condition of its existence. Since the exterior at the same time threatens the identity in question, the constitutive outside can also be shown to be subversive. What we face here is a limited and given situation in which society and every social identity are partially constituted and partially threatened.

Recognizing this relational character of any social identity implies that any identity is ambiguous and kaleidoscopic insofar as it is unable to constitute itself as a precise difference within a closed totality. If we maintain the openness of the contexts, then fixation of social identities become impossible.

The social identity, however, is not only the infinite play of differences, but also the attempt to limit that play, to affect the ultimately impossible fixation of identities. But this system—or structure—no longer takes the form of an underlying essence of the social identity. At certain privileged discursive points (nodal points), the flow of social differences is temporarily arrested through partial fixation of identities by discourses. Laclau and Mouffe thus conclude:

The practice of articulation therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity. (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 113)

What can be argued against anti-essentialism is the obvious necessity of maintaining criticism on two fronts at the same time. Thus:
What Spivak calls “strategic essentialism” and what Hall refers to as “the fictional necessity of arbitrary closure” ... are crucial for any ... struggle that hopes to allow for communities of identification, even if those communities are multiple, discontinuous, and partly imaginary.... In this sense we are less interested in identity as something one “has”, than in identification as something one “does”. (Shohat & Stam 1994: 346)

One last point I want to touch upon is related to the fact that most interventions against the mainstream discourse of immigration are based on the “political correctness” argument. I am not saying that political correctness is not an important issue. Rather, in light of the arguments presented before, what matters is not first and foremost which concepts we use but what we do with them. In other words, concepts, or other signs have no essential meanings in themselves; they are always ambivalent from the start, and this is unavoidable in that the very classification process under which a concept is produced excludes some aspects of the phenomena it depicts to be able to include some others, a process which itself produces ambivalence (Bauman 1991: 2). Given that a one-to-one map of social “reality”, or a total representation, would be impossible, and if it were possible, such a map would itself necessitate another map as Borges says (see Game 1991: 22), one can use a concept in the best possible way, in what Eco has called “semiological guerrilla warfare” (1987: 135). An example of this is when Rushdie uses the word “bastard” in *Satanic Verses* to point out hybrid identities of British immigrants. He chooses metaphors normally used in a denigrative way, for example “bastard” and “satanic”, to give a picture of the world from the point of view of those who are called “bastard” or “satanic”, like immigrants in Britain. Rushdie wants to recapture the language (see 1990: 21).
3 “The Fear of Touching” and the Suburban Ghetto

We have left the land and have embarked. We have burned our bridges behind us—indeed, we have gone farther and destroyed the land behind us. Now, little ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean: to be sure, it does not always roar, and at times it lies spread out like silk and gold and reveries of graciousness. But hours will come when you realize that it is infinite and that there is nothing more awesome than infinity. Oh, the poor bird that felt free now strikes the walls of this cage! Woe, when you feel homesick for the land as if it had offered more freedom—and there is no longer any “land”.

Nietzsche

A ship-wreck. March 1902. SS Wanda, a Russian ship, got stranded somewhere very close to the western coast of Denmark, somewhere around Husby, a little fishing village. The rescue work was done by the local people, and it turned out that 15 people on the ship were Chinese sailors. The residents of Husby had never seen Chinese before, and now their physical closeness suddenly aroused sentiments of a whipping nervousness. A local teacher wrote shortly after: “It was a dangerous happening; they came with their lifeboat.... Are the Chinese not the wildest of all?” The residents of Husby, during a single day’s contact with the Chinese from the wrecked ship, which they at first sight thought was a “slave ship”, were very afraid of them and “their terrible faces”, which they imagined “cannot be created in God’s image”. “All the Chinese seemed the same, and when their eyes blinked, one did not know if they were smiling or if they were malicious.... We had heard many kinds of languages, but we had never heard such gobble as Chinese”, they said (see Engelbrechtsen 1995 for the details of this story; my translation).

The first contact the residents of Husby had with the Chinese reflects traces of similar confrontations elsewhere and at other times. The common denominator of such contact is the exposure to strangeness, which arouses
fear, two kinds of fear that are interrelated. Firstly, there is heterophobia, the resentment of the different connected to “something or someone disquieting through otherness and unfamiliarity”; and secondly, there is proteophobia, “the apprehension and vexation related ... to something or someone that does not fit the structure of the orderly world ... of the established categories” (Bauman 1994: 208).

This chapter and the following two tell similar stories, but in a Danish-Turkish context, stories that are still going on daily, quite a long time after the unplanned visit of those 15 Chinese sailors. However, there is a significant difference. Those Chinese sailors left Husby the day after; they were truly guests, or “wanderers”, which, as defined by Simmel, are “the man who comes today and goes tomorrow”. But immigrants stay; they are whom Simmel called “strangers”: “the man who comes today and stays tomorrow”. Simmel’s stranger is thus significantly an element of the group itself, like other “inner enemies”, such as the poor and sundry, “an element whose membership within the group involves both being outside and confronting it”. The stranger comes from a different origin and “interacts” with society, which is also to say that his relationship to society “indicates that one who is close by is remote, but his strangeness indicates that one who is remote is near”. Hence, remoteness and nearness at the same time make one a stranger (Simmel 1971: 143-4).

Gellerup: a suburb of Aarhus and “the long dark tunnel”

There is nothing human beings fear more than being touched by something unknown.... Everywhere human beings draw back from the touching of the stranger. (Canetti 1996: 1; my translation)

... fear of touching, a fear made evident in modern urban design. In siting highways, for instance, planners will often direct the river of traffic so as to seal off a residential community from a business district, or run the river through the residential areas to separate rich and poor sections or ethnically divergent sections. In community development, planners will concentrate on building schools or housing at the center of the community rather than its edge where people might come into contact with outsiders. (Sennett 1994: 18)
The physical environment in and around Gellerup, which can indeed be considered one of the settlements in Denmark that best fits Sennett’s description above, reflects the modernistic architectural taste and power of the period in which it was built: the late 1960s, early 1970s. Two interrelated characteristics initially defined its history of planning: functionalism and the expectations of growth. Functionalism, which created similar housing areas all over Denmark, was an answer to the severe housing shortage of the 1950s. But this was an optimistic answer that built on great expectation of growth: planners had presupposed that wealth would continue to accumulate and that life in these housing areas would be predominantly defined by leisure time, that is, people would use the areas after work time. Large flats, well-supplied public and private institutions, separation of housing from industrial areas and car traffic were also signs of this optimism (Boligstyrelsen & et al. 1985: 8-9).

Gellerup consists of industrialized and standardized buildings made of concrete. These high, rectangular buildings stand separately with large distances in between them and are placed quite monotonously without variation. They are images of an impersonal and cold geometric power. Gellerup is a place designed by technical planners under, what Gregory (1994) renamed, “the optics of expert-systems”, that is, under their aerial gaze, which indeed never “touched” the area. With its huge free areas among the blocks, which are too large to be filled with urban life, Gellerup is in a way like a desert, or in fact a true “labyrinth”, for which Jorge Luis Borges sees the desert as the best expression (Borges 1985: 81).

Housing in Gellerup was originally planned for nuclear families consisting of couples, both of whom had jobs outside the area during the day while their children used the schools and kindergartens in Gellerup. (This was the “standard family” of the welfare state, which used full-employment as a regulating mechanism.) Suburbanization, with all its escapist and passivizing urges against “the urban jungle”, its ideological withdrawal from the threats of meeting strangers in the urban centres, was the urban ideal behind the planning of the area. Supposedly, or so it seems today, this was also the urban ideal for “standard” families of the welfare state at the time. Perhaps one could, along with Elgstrøm, say that suburbanization has been a strong anti-urban ideal in Denmark:

It is ... seductive to see Denmark as a nation that dislikes cities, whose deepest longing is attached to the unspoiled idol of country life. A historic tradition exists
for viewing the city as a symbol of evil—as the seat of decay, sickness and pollution. (Elgstrøm 1995: 23; my translation)

Even though Gellerup is not planned in accordance with the idol of country life, it should be asserted that its planning ideology and suburban character still visualized a will to withdraw from city life, which also was considered a privilege at the time it was built. As such, Gellerup also seems to prove Schmidt and Kristensen’s point that sterilization has become a social ideal of the twentieth century:

In the twentieth century, we have made hygiene almost identical with cleanliness, with sterilization and the ordinary cleansing of illnesses in general. It is thought-provoking that our modern culture has turned the antic notion of Hygiea, as the sound and proper mode of life, into Ajax and white cleaning tornadoes—that hygiene has become a huge, almost crazy, project of cleansing.... The clean and the sound ... also became transformed into good taste in the twentieth century. In short, one could speak of idealization and aesthetization of the sterile. Now the sterile ... is an image of “order”. (Schmidt & Kristensen 1986: 11-15; my translation)

One could say that sterilization, or a fear of touching, is the epitome of Gellerup’s functionalist design. Considering this fact, the modernity of Gellerup’s urban design can be qualified more exactly by speed (concentrated traffic surrounding the areas), escape (from city life) and passivity (in relation to strangers one does not want to meet), all of which are concepts Sennett (1994) uses in characterizing modern urban design. All were keywords behind the physical planning of Gellerup.

Today it is not those “standard Danish families”, whatever that means, who inhabit the area, but overwhelmingly immigrants and those “socially burdened” Danes. Yet, the principles of its planning are still at work, with a qualification that its spatial identity is now very much characterized by the daily life of immigrants, who are very often not connected to the labour market, and hence also use the area also during the day much more than a nuclear family of the almost bygone welfare state would do. And, although the area might originally have been planned for a group who wanted to differentiate itself from the rest of the city as a no-go-in area, it seems today that it also has become a no-go-out area for those living there. Consequently,
and ironically, the isolation of the area from the outside has meant quite different things for these people who, being themselves strangers in a new society, need contact and proximity much more than suburban life can offer.

Think of a city and what comes to mind? Its streets. If a city’s streets look interesting, the city looks interesting; if they look dull, the city looks dull. (Jacobs 1961: 29)

There is no “street” in the ordinary sense of the word in suburban Gellerup. The existing roads in and around the area do not, generally speaking, bear witness to anything but cars. There is the broader pathway, a line binding the northern part of the area through green areas and the blocks to the shopping centre, “Gellerupcenter”, the centre of the suburb. But it is hardly a built environment that invokes a symbolic richness from or historical meaning in its architectural form. Gellerupcenter is a single three-floor shopping mall, which serves the area. It includes a bank, a post office, supermarkets, a few cafeterias and approximately 70 small shops. Strikingly, there are two immigrant businesses: a pizzeria and a small jewellery shop. Knowing that many of the greengrocers, kiosks and a few restaurants in the city centre are owned by Turks or other immigrants makes one wonder how the business structure in this area, where immigrants represent the overwhelming part of the population, can be so overwhelmingly “white”. (As will be mentioned later, almost none of the Turkish greengrocers or restaurant owners in the city centre live in Gellerup either).

Because businesses dominate, the social life in the centre depends on closing time, as is typical for shopping malls and other privatized public spaces. Thus, after 5.30 p.m., life in the centre disappears. However, commercialization affects social life in the centre in other ways. The centre is used very much by immigrants during the day, by both women and (mostly) men. Women shop, and men often use the centre to meet each other, chat a bit, etc. Even though there are other places, such as the International Women’s Club, the Anatolian Cultural Union, and several other both Danish and immigrant clubs, these places are overwhelmingly characterized by quite a homogeneous member-mix. Thus, the only, or the most important, “civic” interior for strangers to meet each other in Gellerup is the centre. Many immigrants, especially the older men, simply love the place, but the shop owners and authorities have been irritated by the fact that “they stand in a
corner or along the staircases [where there is a view over the ground floor downstairs] and chat for hours”. Or they sit down at a cafe and talk quite a long time, buying only a single cup of coffee, they say.

More to the point, Gellerup is centreless (except for the shopping mall) and streetless (except for the pathway). And it is still so even with renovations made since 1985. The renovations have undoubtedly bettered the physical environment around the blocks, especially the in-between spaces around the entrances of the blocks—before, they were almost extensions of parking places, and it has resulted in better green areas. But it has not helped very much the “urban” character of the area. On the level of urban design, the most heroic attempt was to improve the green areas and to paint (typically birds) on the sides of some of the blocks to give the blocks a more human image. Some Turkish residents have called these attempts “a butterfly on a horse’s cock”. A second wave of heroic attempts regarding the physical quality of the area was made by the Urban Committee’s intervention in 1994, as mentioned in the first chapter.

Renovations were not able to change Gellerup’s disconnection from the outer world, a problem typical of suburbanization in general: having two highways on two sides and open land and physically-isolated, single-family housing areas, more or less, on the other two, the urban design of Gellerup resulted in an area almost completely isolated from the surrounding urban areas. Being exclusively an housing enclave, and lacking overlap zones with other housing areas or urban functions (like industrial, service, recreation, public areas), Gellerup looks like an “island”. As Sennett (1990) would put it, Gellerup seems to be a neutral city: contact with the outer world is physically minimized and sterilized behind the fences and gates of the regulated, planned enclave, yielding no permission to touch that beneath the clear boundaries. As said before, Gellerup is physically both a no-go-out and a no-go-in area.

Although Gellerup does not have contact with surrounding urban areas, the facilities inside it are actually good enough, just as the quality of flats is high. Gellerup has also been one of the institutionally “richest” areas in the municipality. There is the shopping centre, a library, schools, kindergartens, project-groups, a theatre, some municipal institutions, various institutional sport facilities, and so on. But recently, the local department of the Municipality of Aarhus, responsible for services in the area, and a bank moved out. Although they are still physically quite close (a ten-minute walk), and there are technical explanations for why they moved out, the individuals I
interviewed in Gellerup think that these institutions, especially the municipal one, moved out simply “not to be too close” to immigrants and other Danish groups whose patterns of social conduct are perceived as “problematic” and “irritating”. For example, they were noisy, they too often came with or without good grounds, only because the place was nearby, etc.

There are still institutions in Gellerup, but this institutional complex can no longer be considered a duplication of that in the larger society, because, most of these institutions are either problematized by others and themselves (for example, as in the case of the primary school, Nordgaardskolen, which constantly makes a problem-fixed issue out of the fact that over 90 per cent of the children in the school are immigrant children), or because they were founded on “problems” which they aim to solve and which constitute their “therapeutic morality” (e.g. many problem-focused projects and initiatives related to immigrants; the newer ones are financed by the Urban Committee’s funds). That is, one could say that Gellerup is much richer in special institutions than in institutions in general.

The existence of many facilities inside the area also means that inhabitants can literally spend 24 hours in Gellerup without leaving the area: one can shop, use one’s own ethnic club for leisure activities, use the sport facilities and so on. Seen from this perspective, the accumulation of these possibilities inside the area makes social withdrawal and isolation (from urban life in general) easier. This is also physically reinforced by the suburban character of Gellerup in that, like many other suburban areas, Gellerup is physically separated from, and too functionally self-sufficient to have contacts with, other surrounding urban areas: hence, one of the puzzling consequences of urban renewal attempts to create a self-sufficient community. As a consequence, most immigrant families in the area have restricted relations outside Gellerup, and many of them only seldom go to the Aarhus city centre. It is not surprising, then, that many Turks in Gellerup do not know the city well, except some nodal points, even though Aarhus is quite a small city.

One Turk interviewed said that he experiences travelling the five km between Gellerup and the Aarhus city centre as if he is travelling “through a long dark tunnel”. This is of course a natural consequence of the criteria—speed, escape and passivity—used to plan city-life. In addition, perhaps he feels a wall, a barrier, or a gap between different worlds, between Gellerup and Aarhus. This can be the result of social, psychological and/or physical elements. This chapter and the next one will try to illuminate these
About “travelling to” and “looking at” the ghetto

In the previous section, the focus was on the planning of Gellerup as an urban site. In this context, I briefly mentioned some of the symbolic meanings attached to this process. The focus was on, as Lefebvre has called, the “perceived” and “conceived” space of Gellerup. Perceived space refers to the socially produced and materialized empirical space; and it is thus “directly sensible and open, within limits, to accurate measurement and description” (Soja 1996: 66). Conceived space mainly refers to the conceptual ordering and/or designing of space:

For Lefebvre, “this is the dominant space in any society (or mode of production),” a storehouse of epistemological power. This conceived space tends, with certain exceptions “towards a system of verbal (and therefore intellectually worked out) signs” again referring to language, discourse, texts, logos: the written and spoken word. (Soja 1996: 67)

Because the concept of “conceived space” draws attention to the importance of discursive forms of knowledge and power in the production of space, Lefebvre also uses the concept of “representations of space”, which is directly inter-related to and interchangeable with conceived space. “Representations of space” include “the forms of knowledge and hidden ideological content of codes, theories, and the conceptual depictions of space.... These are the abstracted theories and ‘philosophies’ such as the ‘science of planning’ cited by Lefebvre” (Shields 1991: 54). Referring to discursive conceptions of space, the concept of “representations of space” also draws attention “to constellations of power, knowledge, and spatiality—in which the dominant social order is materially inscribed” (Gregory 1994: 403).

If we focus on Gellerup as a conceived space, it is clear that the symbolic meanings enacted by the planning policies related to Gellerup are primarily associated with, as I already mentioned, a fear of touching, which also seems to be a more general characteristic of modern urban planning. This is relationships by embarking on a journey to Gellerup through this “dark tunnel”.

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especially true when planning is related to the issue of immigration. In Denmark, the fear of touching was recently reactualized by the geographical dispersion of ex-Yugoslavian refugees in newly built barrack-cities, most of which are located completely outside and far away from cities. As pronounced officially, this segregation took place so as “not to integrate” them in broader society. In other words, the aim of concentrating strangers in “barrack-cities” was to prevent the refugees from mixing with the population and to make it easier for them to return to their origins after the war(!). Thus, in the face of a culturally complex situation caused by the existence of new strangers in Danish cities, the basis for the fear of touching seems to be the ambition of neutralizing strangerhood and thereby the city (and city-life).

This tendency of neutralizing, or sterilizing, space via urban design can be viewed, in the context of relationships between body and space, as “the decorporealization of space” (see Gregory 1994: 382). The decorporealized space described by a fear of touching is a space dominated by the eye, where the body and tactile reality are extinguished by the dominance of visuality. Or, in other words, a space where contact and encounters among strangers are reduced to predominantly visual contacts, to the extent possible. Hence, in the process of decorporealization, visualization overwhelms the body and the lived space, and this leads to what Foucault calls “the eye of power” (Foucault 1980: 146-165 and Gregory 1994: 395). “The eye of power” plays a significant role in the physical and social isolation of an urban area like Gellerup from the surrounding areas.

In the rest of this chapter and in the next one, I will concentrate on Gellerup as a “lived space” and build discussions based upon my interviews. But before introducing these interviews, I want to mention the importance of visuality, that is, of views in general, and dwell a bit more on the relationship between visuality and “representations of space”. This is especially relevant for showing how “representation of a site emanate[s] from another site”, the demonstration of which also helps “the denaturalising of the researcher’s own categories and prepares the way for alternative stories” (Duncan 1993: 53-54).

I mentioned “travel” to Gellerup. Thus, let us reside by the metaphors of the tourist and travel a bit more, as is becoming more commonplace in the literature on qualitative research. For example, Steinar Kvale uses the metaphors of the traveller versus the mine-worker to illustrate how different theoretical understandings lead to different conceptions of qualitative research.
In a miner metaphor knowledge is understood as a buried metal and the interviewer is a miner who unearths the valuable metal.... The alternative traveler metaphor understands the interviewer as a traveler on a journey leading to a tale to be told when returning home.... The interviewer wanders with the local inhabitants ..., conversing them in the original Latin meaning of conversation as “wandering together with” (Kvale 1996: 3-4)

The basis for my discussion on visuality is that the discourse of immigration in general and especially the issue of the ghetto are increasingly characterized by and heavily loaded with visual metaphors. That the physical space is itself visual in character is important in this context. But, in addition, it is worth mentioning that we live increasingly in a culture where postmodern visual “images” have the tendency to replace modern literary sensibilities. Scott Lash explains this broad tendency of increasing visualization by contrasting the ideal types of modern “discursive” and postmodern “figural” sensibilities. The latter is increasingly “a visual rather than a literal sensibility”, whereas the modernist “discursive” sensibility “gives priority to words over images” (Lash 1990: 175). In the following, as in chapter 2, I use the term discourse in a broad sense and hold the view that the theme of visuality can itself be elaborated on as a discourse (see Jay 1994). Nevertheless, Lash’s point above importantly supports the point that visuality has in general an increasing role to play in discourses.

In this context, using an artificial analytical distinction, we could speak of both a directly “spatial”, or physical, visuality (e.g. regarding urban areas or ghettos or immigrants themselves) and a predominantly “social” visuality, where visuality becomes a metaphor for discursive representations by which immigrants are seen and shown by researchers or the media or by regulative activities of the functionalist welfare state. But as we proceed, this artificial distinction between the “spatial” and the “social” would become superfluous because the two constantly intermingle. Thus, to point out the bounded togetherness of the spatial and the social, both in general and regarding visuality, we can use the term “social spatialisation”, proposed by Rob Shields. This concept “designates the ongoing social construction of the spatial at the level of the social imagery (collective mythologies, presuppositions) as well as interventions in the landscape (for example, the built environment). This term allows us to name an object of study that encompasses both the cultural logic of the spatial and its expression and elaboration in language and more
concrete actions, constructions and institutional arrangements” (Shields 1991: 31). In our present context, the relationship between visuality and social spatialization is interesting.

In addition, it should be emphasized that Gellerup is also a “racialized” space because of its multi-ethnic character and its problematization in ethnic terms. This also means that, to begin with, there is an important link between visuality and ethnicity in a space like Gellerup:

“Look, a Negro! ... I am being dissected under white eyes. I am fixed.” (Frantz Fanon; quoted in Shohat & Stam 1994: 348)

I asked a Turk, who had moved from, or as he said, had “escaped from”, Gellerup after having lived there for 13 years, if his moving out had anything to do with the way Gellerup was mentioned or represented in the media. He said:

One begins to hate it ... really, hate it.... You always see in the newspapers ... that everything about Gellerup is a problem.... Let us disperse Gellerup ... let us demand something [from the immigrants and refugees].... Or another one says, no we must not.... One says, let’s do this; another says, let’s do that.... Everywhere the topic is Gellerup.... You get affected by this....

But I ... no longer ... when it catches my eyes, when I hear something like that.... It no longer interests me. (Hakan, an alias; my translation)

Today he “no longer” wants to see newspapers, which in fact could be interpreted to mean he no longer wants “to be seen”. Both Fanon and the Turk feel they are being looked at, and they see themselves in others’ eyes.

This visual fixation means for the immigrant a situation of being left to “the conscience of the eye” in the (pan)optic machine called the immigration debate. Visualization has the possibility of holding what is seen at a distance. The gaze of the immigration debate, which hides the corporal eye of the politician, the researcher or the journalist, is distanced from its “object” (if one needs to distinguish the eye and the gaze from each other).

It is as if the lack of touching is compensated for by the gaze. Relatedly, to be gazed upon, or in Laura Mulvey’s term “to-be-looked-at-ness” (Shohat &
Stam 1994: 348) is an important part of the experience of being an immigrant/stranger in Gellerup, and in this context, making policies and research on immigration have necessarily some semiotical aspects. One gazes upon others and then organizes a story, a narration after this gazing, or to use a more apt metaphor, one “takes a picture”.

To photograph is in some way to appropriate the object being photographed. It is a power/knowledge relationship.... Photograph seems to be a means of transcribing reality. The images produced appear to be not statements about the world but pieces of it ... in fact photographs are the outcome of an active signifying practice in which those taking the photo select, structure and shape what is going to be taken. (Urry 1990: 138-139)

In the scopic regime of immigration politics and research, the “photographs” taken are also ways of appropriating or possessing. To take a picture can be a means of establishing a hierarchy, which is, for the object, felt like “being fixed”.

According to Urry, the metaphor of tourist is revealing for much of the modern experience since the modern subject is a person on the move. Movement, anticipation of meeting something or someone different, sensibility towards contrasts and the search for “the typical” are important dimensions in most mainstream research studies on ethnicity and immigration as well. Above all, since immigrants are a “residual category”, or “denizens”, in Danish society, research and politics are necessarily also ways of “travelling to the ghetto”, that is, to the “margin” of society, quite often with an anticipation of meeting “the other”. Thus, the “tourist” can be a useful metaphor for the researcher or the politician in search of the “Truth” of the immigrant.

As with tourism, the “travel” of the researcher or the politician is socially organized in such a way that one reads “the guidebooks” before or while looking at the environment; one learns where to look, how to look, and most importantly how to interpret what one sees. In a similar way, this dimension of “intertextuality” is evident in the immigration debate in that, besides the fact that ways of seeing as discursive practices are socially organized, almost every text quotes the others and refers to the relationships between itself and others. Hence the “immigrant” revealed by the written or spoken statements is indeed, above all, the immigrant of the “library”.
According to Urry “the gaze is constructed through signs, and tourism involves the collection of signs”. And in this context, he quotes from J. Culler’s book *Semiotics of Tourism* (1981) that “the tourist is interested in *everything as a sign of itself*... All over the world the unsung armies of semioticians, the tourists, are fanning out in search of the signs of Frenchness, typical Italian behaviour, exemplary Oriental scenes, typical American thruways, traditional English pubs” (Urry: 1990: 3; my emphasis). Similarly, I want to argue that the immigrant has become “a sign of her/himself” (does the “immigrant” of politics and research really exist?) as the ghetto is increasingly represented. In this process, the activity of collecting signs (in political debates, journalism, research, reports, statistics, pictures, etc.), “the mind’s eye”, or visualization techniques which effectively blur the distinction between “the seen” and “the known”, performs an important function (see Jenks, Chris 1995: 3).

And lastly, the metaphor of photographing points to an important side-effect of the activity of representation, namely, that what and how it is said and showed makes other things to be said and other ways of showing them sometimes impossible. This is an important point relating the photograph to discursive practices that give shape to travelling to the ghetto.

A consequence and at the same time a necessary condition of travel is the attachment of values to a place, which is also the reason to travel. One can say that every “traveller” brings some expectations to the “ghetto”, which is itself increasingly an effect of these expectations. As Britton formulates it, “[a]n analysis of how the tourism production system markets and packages places and people is a lesson in the political economy of the social construction of ‘reality’ and social construction of place” (Britton 1991: 475). The outcome of “travelling to the ghetto” is similar, but more visibly in a double sense. The processes of constructing the reality of the ghetto, or “remaking the space”, that operates in this travel, *devalues* places as much as they attach values to them. Or one can say that the values attached are generally negative and stigmatizing. In this context, the “place myths” operate not to advertise a place to consumers but mostly to cause territorial stigmatization by establishing a bond (or rather bondage) between a place and a group of people via a series of “problems”. In other words, the fact that many Turks live in Gellerup makes their representations also easier, for example, compared to Turks living in the city centre. In this, the concepts of culture and territory fuse with each other.

By using very visual metaphors, Foucault says that “we are surrounded by spaces which help form evidences of the ways we see ourselves and one
another” (quoted in Gregory 1994: 277). Hence, his version of the disciplinary society incorporates a surveillance in “panopticon”, which, meaning “seeing all” in Greek, expresses an:

enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised, in which all events are recorded, in which an uninterrupted work of writing links the centre and periphery, in which power is exercised without division, according to a hierarchical figure ...—all this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism. (Foucault 1991: 197)

In other words, Foucault sees visuality and visibility as important elements of the politics of space. According to him, a counter-politics of space must provide an alternative “description-scene” where one can illuminate “how things were made visible, how things were given to be seen, how things were shown to knowledge and power” (quoted in Gregory 1994: 277). Thus, by re-describing and re-presenting space from other vantage points, one can engage in a (counter) politics of space. In the following section, the counter (but not privileged) vantage point will be the daily life and the lived space of Turks in Gellerup.

Abstract space versus lived space

... the essence of the erecting of buildings cannot be understood adequately in terms of either of architecture or of engineering construction, nor in terms of a mere combination the two. The erecting of buildings would not be suitably defined even if we were to think of it in the sense of the original Greek techné as solely a letting-appear, which brings something made, as something present, among the things that are already present.

The essence of building is letting dwell. Building accomplishes its essential process in the raising of locales by the joining of their spaces. Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build.... Dwelling ... is the basic character of Being, in keeping with which mortals exist. (Heidegger 1993: 361-2)
We have previously focused on Gellerup as an abstract space, that is, the space of planners and political authorities, or the space of the power. Abstract space is a category which is rationalized and which has become similar to other homogeneous, quantified and calculable values of exchange transformable into money in accordance with economic and political systems. The focus here will be Gellerup as a lived space.

After perceived (physical) and conceived (mental) spaces, lived space is the third form of space Lefebvre mentions. It is closely related to what Heidegger above called “dwelling”. As he indicated, an architect cannot transform a building, or a built environment, into a lived space as such; the abstract space, which the architect and planner “lets appear”, is transformed into a dwelling, or to a lived space, by human daily practices, by dwellers’ bodies, discourses and use patterns.

Thus, in contrast with abstract space, one could speak of “the swirling, kaleidoscopic lived space of everyday life” (Gregory 1994: 275). In this sense, space is “an intersection of moving bodies” (de Certeau 1990; quoted in Augé 1995: 79). In his distinction between abstract and lived space, Michel de Certeau refers to, firstly, Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between “geometric space” (synonymous with the abstract space mentioned above) and “anthropological space”, which means “the scene of an experience of relations with the world on the part of a being essentially situated in relation to a milieu” (quoted in Augé 1995: 80). Secondly, for de Certeau, this kind of space is like “what the word becomes when it is spoken: grasped in the ambiguity of being accomplished, changed into a term stemming from multiple conventions” (quoted in Augé 1995: 80). And lastly, he conceptualizes lived space in terms of a “narration”:

the narrative, and especially the journey narrative, is compatible with the double necessity of “doing” and “seeing”... but is ultimately associated with what de Certeau calls “delinquency” because it crosses, “transgresses” and endorses “the privileging of the route over the inventory”. (Augé 1995: 81)

Spatial practices characteristic of lived space can give way to a decoding and recoding of main premises, assumptions, inclinations and directives of “representations of space” put forth by “the eye of power” and thus can aim at new representations of space. In other words, practices related to lived space, transgressing conventional representations, can become an arena of
symbolic resistance similar to Foucault’s counter-discourses mentioned above. When this happens, spaces are also transformed into what Lefebvre termed “spaces of representations”, a term expressing, in opposition to institutionalized discourses of space, some new modes of spatial practices that imbue “other conceptual categories and symbolic systems with an often unrecognised ‘spatial life’” (Shields 1991: 54).

But the distinction between abstract and lived space must not be taken as dichotomized entities that exclude one another. In such a dichotomization, the main risk is idealizing the lived space as the interesting, mobile or “exotic” one. In this respect, two points must be made. Firstly, if lived space is taken as the “real”, one risks falling (once more) into the trap of what was called “metaphysics of presence” in chapter 2. In other words, it is important to recall that the concepts related to descriptions of “lived space” are, like other concepts, “second-order” concepts about the activities of actors whom the social theorist observes and who do not necessarily use the same concept to define their “practices” in their daily life (also the persons one interviews speak with similar “second-order” concepts when they “tell” discursively what they “do”). And secondly, a dichotomic idealization of lived space and practices related to it always potentially risks containing hidden power discourses in themselves if one forgets that the lived space is itself partly structured and shaped in a complex interrelationship with the other two spatialities. As Soja stresses, social space is “comprised of all three spatialities—perceived, conceived, and lived—with no one inherently privileged a priori” (Soja 1996: 68). Thus one cannot hope to elevate oneself above the social contexts in which spatial practices take place by leaning against the concept of lived space. But nevertheless, one can maintain that a focus on lived space can give a more nuanced picture, compared to one-dimensional ways of seeing based exclusively on the other two spatialities which cannot grasp, in Lefebvre’s words, the “qualitative, fluid and dynamic” character of the lived space (quoted in Soja 1996: 69).

Having said this, we can now focus on immigrants’ use of the physical environment in Gellerup by investigating how agents cope with and subvert or cannot subvert the networks of power at work in the physical and social design, or by investigating the lived space and spatial practices.

Lived space—where tactics and strategies meet
Here the question is how the dominating and reductive spatial frameworks of Gellerup are connected to their immigrants’ lives. In this context, de Certeau’s work (1984) is interesting in its contrasting juxtaposition of daily practices, which are characterized by tactics, singularity, rhetoric, practicality, language games, contextuality and practices, such as “walking”, etc., and theoretical/systemic practices, which are characterized by strategies, totalities, discursivity, conceptuality and abstract, context-independent “maps”.

De Certeau defines, for example, a tactic, such as the “logic” of daily life. A tactic is a calculus which does not have a fixed base and hence does not set up an unshifting barrier between itself and an external other. It always has to manipulate events “on the wing” and transform them into chances. Tactic does this by spontaneously evaluating the given possibilities in a given time interval and in a given concrete context: “The place of a tactic belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into the others’ place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it at a distance” (De Certeau 1984: xix).

As such, tactics of everyday life are counter-posed with more systemic strategies “which, thanks to the establishment of a place of power ..., elaborate theoretical spaces (systems and totalizing discourses) capable of articulating an ensemble of physical places in which forces are distributed” (De Certeau 1984: 38). The construction of a strategy becomes possible first when a subject can isolate oneself from the concrete environment. A “proper” place, which the subject can use as a base in power relations with an external subject, a target or other objects, is therefore a condition of existence for a strategy.

In the confrontation between tactics (of everyday life) and strategies (of systemic discourses), or, in other words, at the intersection point of a tactic and strategy, de Certeau finds the processes of “subversion”:

For instance, the ambiguity that subverted from within the Spanish colonizers’ success in imposing their own culture on the indigenous Indians is well known. Submissive, and even consenting to their submission, the Indians nevertheless often made of the rituals, representations, and laws imposed on them something quite different from what conquerors had in mind; they subverted them not by rejecting or altering them, but by using them with respect to ends and references
foreign to the system they had no choice but to accept. They were other within the colonization that outwardly assimilated them; their use of the dominant social order deflected its power, which they lacked the means to challenge; they escaped it without leaving it. (De Certeau 1984: xiii)

In Gellerup, the local environment in which immigrants live, and in their flats, one can investigate many active spatial practices which I believe closely resemble what de Certeau called “tactical manipulations”. These practices are “subversive”, possibly not on the same scale and scope as in de Certeau’s example above but principally. For example, inside the blocks, it is easy to find dense social networks based on ethnicity in which family networks, kinship and relations to fellow townspeople from the community of origin are the most important pillars. These resources are appropriated to “reterritorialize” everyday life “in ways which allow a selective appropriation or a ‘presencing’ of past spatial practices”, just as Smith and Tarallo describe the new immigrants’ use of space in American cities. They go on to note that “[i]n the process, they have created a new milieu in which selected elements of their past culture are juxtaposed in delicate cohabitation with the spatial practice of ‘others’” (1993: 69). Furthermore, as will be dwelled on in the next chapter, it seems that Turks in Gellerup have developed several tactics and discursive strategies against the sort of “visibility” the discourse of immigration ascribes them. These, for example, include their temporal and spatial (re)constructions of identities and new “Homes” in the social space, which build not necessarily on strategies of “rejecting or altering” the system in general but on subversions of it, trying to escape the Danish social space without leaving it.

One good example of the new milieu where the presencing of observable past spatial practices determine the physical environment in Gellerup today is Turkish women’s use of green areas as meeting places during the summer. A Turkish woman, Döndü, who, in the 1970s, came from a rural area in Turkey to Aarhus, where her husband already was, and who since then has lived in Gellerup, tells about a small place near her flat, a park which was recently built (belonging to Skovgaardsparken) together with a playground for children and with enough space for charcoal-grilling. She tells: “We come together there, we cook, we roll out dough and bake ... many things from my old village are actually alive here as well”.

She adds that the group of women she associates with is exclusively Turkish, and when Danes are around, “they [the Danes] look at” them, but only those who know the women join them. Of those who join them, most do
not participate in the activities and are more or less passive onlookers: “They are very curious. They say they cannot come together the way we can”.

This small park is a single one where she can let her spatial memory unfold during the summer. One of the things Döndü missed most in this neighbourhood in her first years, was:

... neighbors going out and shouting, and calling each other out to sit somewhere in the street. We miss these kinds of things. Why shouldn’t we? Even today, when we go somewhere to visit somebody, we talk about sitting outside in front of the entrances, talking together. But nobody else does.

The practices of Döndü’s and the other women create new milieus in Gellerup, and these localities seemingly have at once urban, suburban and rural characteristics. Vegetable gardens, established in the context of urban renovation projects, which Turkish families are very glad for, and spatial practices, such as organizing a market place on the weekends, are common. (In periods over the recent years, this market place was forbidden by the local authorities on the grounds that “white” neighbours complained about the “noise”.) Some “invisible” mosques and ethnic clubs inside the blocks are also examples of their differing spatial practices inside segregated areas. The green areas and the free areas are used quite often by the immigrant families, both women and men—at any rate, much more than Danish families use them. This occurs to such an extent that, along the pathway, some Turkish men and (rarely) women walk up and down and use corners, creating “nodes”, to pause, to stand and to chat, while looking at others; these men are the only “flaneurs” to be found in Gellerup.

Most of the Turkish men I talked with spend a lot of time in one of the Turkish clubs in Gellerup. One of these clubs is the Anatolian Cultural Association, which is located in the basement of one of the blocks. It consists of two small rooms furnished with quite plain tables and a small canteen, which serves very cheap tea, coffee and sandwiches. The rooms are in bad condition, and in the winter, people sit here for hours with their coats on. But it is almost always full of people. While the men play backgammon, they can watch all the Turkish channels on the TV, which is always on. They can read two or three different Turkish newspapers. On the walls, there are pictures from Istanbul, a picture of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Turkish flag. Some of Mustafa Kemal’s sayings together with Muhammed’s also hang on the
walls. A quotation from Walt Whitman also hangs on the walls next to the others. In order to receive money from the municipality, the Anatolian Association must have approximately 150 members; currently, most of them are the more secularized Turks living in Gellerup, a tendency that seems to be in the process of being reversed in the 1990s.

Two other important places for men in the area are a club in Laden (Brabrand Ungdoms- og Kulturforening), in the northern part of Gellerup, and a café just across Silkeborgvej where a Turkish mosque is also located. Both places are physically in better condition than the Anatolian club. The first one is dominated by the more religious Turks living in Gellerup. The newspapers read and the TV channels watched reflect either the ideologies of “Milli Görüş” (the name of the movement and the newspaper known as the most fundamentalist one in Turkey) or those of the Refah Partisi (the fundamentalist party which got more votes than any other single party in the last Turkish general election in December 1995). More religious reading materials are also available here.

These three places are what is available for the Turkish men at first hand in and nearby Gellerup. And naturally most of these men spend long hours in all or some of these places. Alternatives have been the cafés in the Gellerupcenter and in the city centre, if not the open spaces inside Gellerup, which are quite often used in the summer.

In Gellerupcenter, there is a small bakery located on the basement floor. Close to the entrance of this bakery, there are a few tables where one sees almost exclusively Turkish men sitting from very early in the morning to closing time. For the time being (in the beginning of 1996), it is the most popular place, or coffeehouse, for Turkish men, especially the older ones. This place is called “Mustafa’s place” among Turks. Mustafa (an alias) is a Turk in his mid-sixties, who started going to the bakery in 1995, early in the morning, to get his coffee. This gave the owner the idea to put out tables. He did it and Mustafa attracted other customers as well, which the owner is in turn grateful for. (Mustafa has another “place”, nearby the place for women, mentioned above. The men meet there in the summer and converse around a cup of coffee or tea).

“We don’t want you here”
Mustafa’s is undeniably a creative story of spatial practices. But why this small place on the basement floor of the centre, and why first in 1995? Until 1994, there was a café belonging to the supermarket Føtex in the Gellerupcenter. This café was liked and used a lot by Turkish men until the day a sign was posted on the door limiting the sitting time in the café to one-half hour. The sign was written in Danish, Turkish and Arabic, and it was addressed to those, like Turkish men, who used the café as a meeting place and normally did not buy more than a single cup of coffee. Shortly after, while Mustafa was sitting in the café, his cup was unexpectedly taken away by the waiter. Because he had been there less than half an hour, he complained (through a Turk he found in the centre; Mustafa could not speak enough Danish). The answer he got from the manager was, as Mustafa recalls: “You cannot complain. We don’t want you here”.

Because many of Føtex’s customers are refugees and immigrants living in Gellerup and because Mustafa’s family also shops in the supermarket, Mustafa threatened the café manager to walk around the centre with a sign proclaiming racism in Føtex if he were not allowed to drink his coffee in peace. This threat worked and he was allowed to stay in the café. But nevertheless, he stressed, Føtex lost him as a customer.

“There isn’t any place to go, you know. In all these years, the only place has been Anadolu” (the nickname for the Anatolian club). “That they hang that sign on the door confuses one. Perhaps someone only intends to be there five minutes, to drink a cup of coffee. But now, seeing that sign will irritate the customer”. Now, he says, he normally goes to Kerim’s café (a nearby cafe across from the mosque). He described that coffeehouse as a place where people play chess, etc. and chat. He asked me if I had been there. I said that such places were quite introverted, and since people coming there see each other almost every day, I would feel like a stranger. I said it wouldn’t be like that in coffeehouses in Turkey, except in the very local ones. He agreed and said that the ones in Gellerup were not “real cafés” in that sense. But Kerim’s place was the only one nearby. At this point, he said “you know, the coffee is an excuse, what one really wants is conversation”.

For the reader not acquainted with Turkish and Turkish coffeehouse convention, it can be difficult to appreciate the richness of this point. In Mustafa’s youth in Turkey, coffeehouses were decorated with plates, pictures, mirrors and signs of sayings. The most common sign was probably one
Mustafa referred to: a quotation from a classic poet which says: “The heart wants neither coffee nor coffeehouse; it desires acquaintances. The coffee is an excuse”.

Under the Ottoman empire, but also during the contemporary republican period, the authorities considered the coffeehouse a place where “mean creatures” came, because, among other functions, they were the centres where rebellious groups, the poor, the vagabonds, and strangers came together. The religious leaders during the Ottoman empire often complained that people neglected the mosques because of coffeehouses. Hence, until the mid-nineteenth century, both coffee and tobacco were forbidden many times. It is only now that coffeehouses are considered recreative spots (Birsel 1991: 32). Today, they are still very important places for social life. For example, Salah Birsel, a Turkish essayist and poet who probably has collected the richest material on the socio-spatial history of old Turkish coffeehouses, refers to another Turkish writer, Sait Faik, who ironically says that coffeehouses have traditionally been “independent universities” in Turkey, indeed “more independent than the universities” (Birsel 1991: 26; my translation).

**Conversation and walking**

R. Harré says that “the primary human reality is persons in conversation” (quoted in Shotter 1993: 1). To a large extent, conversation seems to be the organizing principle behind the spatial practices in Gellerup. In this respect, the metaphorical similarity de Certeau draws between conversing and walking, in contrast to discourses and urban plans, seems to be insightful in researching daily practices. Turks “walk” around in Gellerup and in a way subvert, or make holes, in existing urban plans. For example, to reach Kerim’s place and the mosque along Silkeborgvej, both of which opened in the 1990s, one walks through the single family housing area in the southeast of Gellerup, something not done before 1990. In other words, given an urban plan which does not provide opportunities for touching the outside world, they develop their own “tactical” ways of walking and conversing within those plans and creating their own pathways by, so to say, manipulating the plan.

The Turks walk in Aarhus city centre as well. For example, Mustafa sometimes goes to cafés in the city centre. Compared to, for example, his 28-
year old son, who seldom goes to the city centre and only with a definite purpose, Mustafa goes to Aarhus alone “to kill time”. But his Aarhus is full of stories about places where he and his friends, who like him came to Aarhus in the early 1970s, were or felt unwanted. At first, they used the central railway station to stroll in and around; afterwards, they began to use the café in the bus terminal, then another café nearby, etc. Mustafa tells that it was irritating for Danes in all these places that Mustafa and his friends would come together as a group. They were unwanted and had to leave these places one after the other. The story of Mustafa’s immigrant city is characterized by a succession of these “temporary territories”. At present, he goes to the café in Salling, a department store in Aarhus centre along the main pedestrian street. “They also take your cup away in Aarhus, but they do not say it directly [as in Gellerup]” he says. Mainly because of the incidences that take place during his café visits, or which he feels take place (would it make so big a difference?), he more prefers “to stroll”, or see without “touching”.

This is a quite common practice for older, first generation Turkish men. Most of them lived in the city centre before the 1980s. They have memories attached to almost every single quarter in the centre. And when they reflect on those times in the interviews, their eyes almost glimpse. One can often see these old Turkish men strolling alone or in company in the city centre.

Younger Turkish men from Gellerup can also be seen in the city centre. But they come especially at night. These men are most commonly seen in groups in discotheques and in some cafés, where they sit together. As a rule, they are all married to Turkish women. “They are afraid of going around alone” one Turkish man said to explain why they were always together, even when they are attempting to “steal a day from the devil”, e.g. betray their wives or make a try. He added that they “do not even know the city enough to go alone because most of them have never lived outside Gellerup. This is a strong contrast to the case of the older Turkish men.

“Paranoid spaces” and/or a quest for invisibility?

In 1995, a new Turkish club/cafè opened in the city centre with a sign on the door saying “for members only”. Only Turkish men aged 20-40 come. Although the place is located on one of the most crowded streets in Aarhus
(Latinerkvarteret), it is invisible from the outside. In fact, one would not know it exists unless told about it. The interior is architecturally banal, if not run-down, but it is a very lively place. It is possible to play pool, backgammon and card games. Turkish TV channels are always on. And beer and tea/coffee can be bought more cheaply than in the cafés. Men living in Gellerup also come here, and approximately half of the customers of this club are younger, second generation Turks speaking Danish well. As a whole, the place seems like an invisible Turkish enclave midst in the city, withdrawn from the street. The secret of this place is the will to be “invisible”, which, as I will argue in the next chapter, seems to be one of the main tactics or strategies Turks have developed to cope with the visual strategies of the immigration discourse.

As has been described, and will be dwelled on later as well, the fear of touching mentioned above is valid among the immigrant cultures as well. But in the discourse of immigration, “the missing will of integration among foreigners” is discussed in a way almost insulated from Mustafa’s narration. Recall, for example, the municipal reports mentioned in chapter 1. In contrast with that, Mustafa’s narration regarding the same issue begins with: “In a society, you are seen as inferior...”.

He continues, “You feel it. It destroys you.... Danes have maybe always seen strangers as inferior; they have not experienced homesickness or really experienced what it means not to be able to speak a language.... They think they have seen the world, but they have not felt this pain...”.

Some of the Turks who come to the club mentioned above go to other places in the city as well. A café called Don Quixote is one of them:

Once we went to a place called Don Quixote, they did not let us come in. And we said it was okay. But another time we went together with Hasan [another Turkish guy], and because he knew the man, we were allowed in. (Ahmet, a Turk, 31-years old; my translation)

Obviously, to be Turk wanting to come in such a place, one needs “good friends”, who might also be a “good Turk”, that is, a “private and special” Turk the owner of such a place may want to protect. (This ironically brings to mind General Himmler’s complaint about the invention of the “good Jew”: “... then they all come along, the eighty million good Germans, and each one has his decent Jew. Of course the others are swine, but this one is a first-class Jew”; quoted in Bauman 1989: 187).
Generally speaking, this example reflects some dimensions of the relationships between urban public spaces and Turkish men quite well. But there are naturally exceptions to this, like commercialized public spaces, e.g. department stores. In addition, there have been some politically “alternative” places which some immigrants have found attractive.

Café X (the name is changed), which is or has been one such “alternative”, is an example. It is located in an area where grassroots activities in the 1970s were most active. Traditionally, it has been an area for experiments for leftist local politics, local democracy and subcultural lifestyles, and its resident union has been quite active. Now, to a large extent, it is a gentrified and cosy area that has attracted middle-class residents. Café X has existed for the last 25 years and is itself a product of the grassroots movements with leftist undertones. For example, it is not privately, but collectively owned. At first sight, it is not surprising that Turkish men have chosen to come to Café X, especially because it holds backgammon tournaments on Monday evenings. This is the one day of the week one mostly sees Turkish men in Café X today. Sometimes Turkish men come also on Saturdays, when there is live music and a discotheque, but as a rule they mostly sit together, four or five men, and “look at” the events, and talk with each other.

Since the middle of the 1980s, some Turks, more cosmopolitan and mobile regarding their cultural capital, came regularly to Café X. I talked with one who came to Café X “at least six days a week” for several years. His Turkish family was not in Denmark, he was student, he could speak Danish, etc. Most importantly, he participated in the Danish networks in and around Café X, and was close friends with some of the personnel and other regular customers. With respect to his cultural and social capital, he could easily be stereotyped an “integrated immigrant” in Denmark. But when Café X advertised an opening for a bartender, a job he applied for, he found out something new: he did not get the position, as was explained to him, because of the “difficulty of having a Turkish bartender”.

It was “nothing personal”; it had nothing to do with him or his social position as such (confirmed by their hiring a Dane with exactly the same social position, sex and age, etc.). Referring to former problems with some immigrant customers, the personnel explained that immigrants were not so easy to handle sometimes. And that if they were drunk, etc. they might be more “provoked” seeing another immigrant behind the bar, and thereby create even more problems. “But it is also for your own sake”, they added. But “how can it be for my own sake”, he asked. “I apply for a new job, I try to get
rid of the cleaning job I had, and they tell me it is better for me not to get the job which is better paid and socially and culturally much more attractive for me. Where do I get the chance if not at Café X?” he asked. “I could imagine what managers of other places would think and say in such a situation!”.

The odd element in this story is that what Café X tells seems to be true, or “objective”, in a sense: it could definitely be a practical “problem” having a Turk as a bartender, which in fact also explains the scope of the problem the Turk above has to deal with. One can probably not find a more “tolerant” place than Café X in the city. On the other hand, one could hardly have found many other, more “integrated” Turks to fill the job. What makes the story even more interesting is that there is “nothing personal” in it; that is, the people saying this are friends and see him privately, and so on. Because of these circumstances, this example is perhaps an extreme case showing the limits and difficulties in relationships between Turks as a group and the city and in showing the premises on which Turks have to operate in creating a niche for themselves in the city.

There can be problems with my interpretation of the example above. For example, it may be that Café X had decided to employ someone else, that is, the difference between such a decision (if there had been one) and the explanation to the Turk could have hidden many things, and above all, that is why the interpretation above could be an exaggerated one. Or, it may simply be that the person really did not fit the job. But, as appears clearly in the narrative, even if this had been the case, the only explanation he got was a mainstream “culturalist” one, which is very important in that it also reminds the Turk who he really is. That is, his “identity” became his “bondage”. Isn’t this the very thing a “cosmopolitan” person tries to escape?

My purpose with this example is to show precisely the difficulty of “forgetting” identity, or in other words, the difficulty of invisibility for an immigrant in today’s Denmark. Thus, even if this story had been totally constructed by the Turk, it still tells us that he, a person who had been in Denmark for eight years at that time, “remembers” or had to remember and reconsider his identity after the event, a process which for him resulted in further “estrangement”. He concludes that, “after this experience, I really found out that I am a ‘Turk’”.

These are the first impressions one gets when observing where and how Turkish men spend time in Aarhus. Of course, besides the activities I focused on, Turks use the urban space in other ways too: they go shopping, use the
institutions and so on. And in these contexts, one also sees Turkish women together with these men, but not normally at Café X, for example.

**Internal sexual/spatial segregation, and the flats**

In an interview, I asked Ahmet (an alias) where he spends most of his time in Aarhus. Besides the main pedestrian street and some other nodal points, he named two cafés, one of which is Café X. I asked him if he spends time in the city or in these two cafés together with his wife. Yes, he said. His wife, Kadriye (an alias), whom I interviewed together with him, also said yes.

Then I said to Ahmet that it was perhaps a coincidence that I had never seen him together with his wife at those cafés. Kadriye smiled at this point and said “no comment”. Later in the interview, I asked her if it was she who did not want to go to Café X or if it was Ahmet who did not want to go to Café X with her. She said: “It would be a lie to say I do not like the place, because I have never been there, I have never seen the place”. Sometimes Ahmet tells her about the happenings in the city and she thinks “I wish I were there as well”.

On another occasion I asked Kadriye’s older brother and his wife, who live in the central city, the same thing. They said that Kadriye and Ahmet may have been at some cafés in the city centre, but it was mostly because they had invited them out. For instance, when going to meet each other, they would “arrange” the meeting at a café nearby.

Kadriye, who is 27 years old and has lived in Gellerup for 18 years, has never been in most of the places mentioned earlier. This is so simply because of a very strong segregation between spatial patterns of Turkish men’s and women’s daily lives. Even to the cafés in the Gellerupcenter, Kadriye has been only a few times together with her father, and this took place in her childhood.

This spatial segregation, which is typical for most of the women I interviewed, means that almost all the available public spaces of the “immigrant city” of Aarhus are reserved for men. One never sees, for example, a Turkish woman from the first generation sit and drink a cup of coffee in any one of the places mentioned above.

The only exception to this segregation occurs around the small green areas inside Gellerup (as in Döndü’s example above) and shopping activities, in
which women participate with or without men. Otherwise, the Turkish women navigate mostly inside the blocks, especially the flats, and the nodal points of their strong spatial network in Gellerup seem to be other women’s flats. They tell in their interviews that flat visits, which basically form the framework of women’s public life, are sometimes spontaneous and sometimes planned, for example, in the form of monthly visits to one of the women in one’s group. During these visits, women share expenses and organize a day for themselves.

As a consequence of these “rituals”, Turkish women in Gellerup participate in quite dense, but introverted networks consisting exclusively of women. All the women I talked with belonged to one or more of these informal women’s groups, which are normally organized independently of men and in most cases among women living close to each other. Hence there is a very clear spatial determinant of their networks, but there are other determinants which are more social in character, such as social, economic or symbolic capital, which determine their participation in the groups, an issue which will be detailed in the next chapter. Here suffice it to say that the spatial framework in which Turks operate in daily life is even more repressive with respect to gender differences. That is also to say that the victim of the fear of touching can him or herself be a repressor against the other sex.

A detail which was skipped over in the above analysis is the ethnic women-clubs in Gellerup. These consist of a few officially financed “women-clubs” located inside the area. They are established on the criteria of ethnic identity and legitimized by a “difference-multiculturalist”, therapeutic morality which holds the view that such activities, which are exclusively for immigrant women, will help their integration into broader society by reducing isolation. But it seems to me that such “official” solutions, to the immigrant women’s exclusion from public life and the bodily stigma attached to this, merely consolidate and strengthen the existing sexual/spatial practices related to segregation by replicating spaces where immigrant women still only have the chance to meet other immigrant women and where the rituals developed in the flats still predominate. Thus, these clubs can be taken as a part and parcel of sexual/spatial segregation rather than as an alternative to it.

The women’s situation constitutes only one example among many others where spatial practices can be as repressive as well as liberating, or for example, “manipulative”, against repressive spatial frameworks. Therefore, it must be explicated that, except for those daily activities organized around the shopping centre and institutions (e.g. schools, “women’s clubs”, sport centres), the domain of possibilities for immigrants’ spatial practices seems to
be quite limited. For example, as I already mentioned, in Gellerupcenter, almost none of the businesses are driven by the immigrants who are the dwellers of Gellerup.

However, despite this limitation, and especially when compared with other smaller immigrant settlements in Denmark, it can still be asserted that at the level of the local environment, Gellerup is a space in which localized practices “often constitute creative ways by which ordinary men and women, as historical subjects, overcome structural constraints and resist the dominant orders of discipline and power” (Smith & Tarallo 1992: 61).

At all levels of urban complexity and space, and especially when strangers use the urban space, one sees the situation where an existing space is used by others than those it was planned for. This could be the cities, local housing areas, or even a single flat. But it seems as if, in the context of Gellerup, these are especially true regarding the use of flats in the area by the immigrants. These flats, in which most immigrant families with other cultural backgrounds live, were designed in a standard modern way with two or three rooms placed along a corridor. The function of every room was more or less predefined in advance by the design so that a single room cannot be used for purposes other than what it was designed for. This lacking polyvalence in design means that the functionalist planning philosophy of the flats generally dictates a predefined use-pattern and does not allow for flexible or polyvalent interpretations by different users.

But immigrant families actively “interpret” these flats and put them to different uses than they were planned for. This is partly because some families are larger or defined differently than the traditional modern Danish family. Rather than 3-4 persons in a nuclear family, they might consist of 5-6 persons and some are extended ones either by tradition or because of re-intensification efforts. This will be touched on later. Here, a few examples will help illustrate these spatial practices.

Because of the different social structures of Turkish families, the flats are used often and intensively. The hierarchy in these families, both between different sexes and generations, often creates a zoning principle other than that originally designed for. Depending also upon how religious the family is, there are generally two dwelling centres for the two sexes in the living-room; women guests can use one of the other rooms, the kitchen and the sleeping-room when families visit; when an extended-family uses the flat, the children do not usually have their own rooms, and in this case, some rooms are used
for more than one function, e.g. the sleeping room might double for storage also, or, in a few cases, especially when there are men in the living room, for women’s more ritualistic or intimate arrangements. Informal economic consumption activities, which will be described in the following chapter, are space-requiring, and in some cases Turkish women come together to help each other cook, which transforms the kitchen into an area where cooking also becomes a more visibly “social” activity.

This all becomes even more spatially interesting when one considers interrelations among the different spatial practices and activities (social, value and ritual oriented, economic, etc.). For example, cooking is sometimes a common social activity, which also has economic consequences for the household.

These activities suggest that, when one thinks about the limited character of civic and public spaces in Gellerup, on the one hand, and isolation from the larger society and joblessness among immigrants which give more time for the kind of practices we are interested in here, on the other, much of daily life goes on in these flats in Gellerup.

**Gellerup and the “multicultural city”**

From the point of view of urban life in general, I want to suggest that even though those practices mentioned above are undeniably a richness, to the extent they take place, they do so in Gellerup’s “interior”, in the basements and very introverted localities, such as the Turkish clubs and in the flats. They constitute the invisible daily lives and powers of the immigrants.

But these activities are very group-specific. Most of the Turkish people do not have any or have only very limited contact with Danes (inside or outside Gellerup), except for those working as social workers, civil servants, shop owners in the centre, etc. Of course these limited contacts can give way to further engagement in deeper relationships later, but mostly the relationships remain on the tertiary social level. On the other hand, again generally speaking, the relationships to other minorities (there are approximately 50 minorities in Gellerup) are also very weak and full of prejudices, stereotypes, etc. against the “others”. For example, the Palestinians (gradually becoming the largest minority in Gellerup) are pejoratively called “Arabs”, and in the
eyes of most Turks I have spoken with, they are the ones “responsible for criminality” or who “are very dirty”. All the blacks and Africans are “Negroes”, etc. Most of the interviewees believe that the bad image of Gellerup is grounded in the presence of minorities, like “Arabs”, and that “whatever they do, Turks are blamed for it”. None of the interviewees had, for example, a close relationship with an individual of one of these other minorities (but there are some exceptions, especially regarding Iranians). In short, the “colourful spatial practices of Gellerup are confined to each group; interactions with each other are not visible in the arenas of daily life.

In other words, the existence of a multicultural structure and a very strong lack of intercultural relationships is part of what characterizes the spatial practices in general. Thus, in spite of the visual diversity found in Gellerup, one does not find the expected level of interactions which this diversity would or could cause. Thus, Pia Søstrøm, a social worker from Gellerup, describes the area in the following way, 20 years after it was designed:

Gellerup is a local area with 54 nationalities. More than two-thirds of the inhabitants are foreign-tongued. For me, it means an opportunity to get an overview of and to learn something from the cultural richness the area represents. But it is thought-provoking that in spite of the existence of this rich culture, it is not reflected especially much in the local area.... There are neither domes, colonnades, the possibility of raising animals, mosques, etc., which could be a logical consequence seen in relation to the inhabitant mix. (Aarhus Stiftstidende, 9 October 1993; my translation)

To me, it seems a bit curious why immigrant settlements should necessarily reflect plurality and visual diversity in this way. Or why immigrants should necessarily become carriers of cultural diversity via ethnic architecture, domes, colonnades, bazaars etc. as if it were their “mission”. In other words, demanding visual and architectural diversity in this way can very easily become a part of an idealizing or disciplinary discourse about immigrants that fixes and stigmatizes them not necessarily in negative, but also in positive terms. So I am for the moment not going to discuss if “raising animals” (because some of the immigrants came originally came from rural areas) or colonnades and mosques, in short creating a visually multicultural area, is the solution to problems. It is not clear that a lack of reflection of cultural richness has been caused by a lacking visualization of the inhabitants’ anthropological
background, which is taken here as a fixed point of reference, and it is not clear that making this diversity more visible would be enough.

There is more at stake. The problem is precisely that, even to the extent diversity is visible, it does not seem to promote interactions in Gellerup. Here I want to quote a Turkish woman who has lived in Gellerup for 15 years. I asked her if she feels that the existence of so much diversity in Gellerup makes it a more “lively” place in her eyes:

Lively? No. I don’t think it is a lively place.... Well, in many ways it is ... but no ... you know, everybody runs in her own track.... there is nothing mixed. A Turk and an Arab don’t talk together, an African and a Pole don’t talk with each other.... How can you see this as richness?

In a similar context, Sennett comments on the multiculturality of Greenwich Village, which, because of having many different ethnic minorities, has by many urbanists, such as Jane Jacobs, been identified as an exemplary multicultural urban formation expressing the diversity of its inhabitants:

Yet one’s eye often provides misleading social information about diversity. Jane Jacobs saw people in the [Greenwich] Village so tightly packed together they seemed to have fused. On MacDougal Street, though, the tourist action consists mostly of people looking at one another; the Italians occupy the space above the street-level shops, talking to their neighbors in opposite buildings as though there were nobody below. Hispanics, Jews, and Koreans interweave along Second Avenue, but to walk down Second Avenue is to pass through an ethnic palimpsest in which each group keeps neatly to its own turf.

Difference and indifference coexist in the life of the Village; the sheer fact of diversity does not prompt people to interact. (Sennett 1994: 356-357)

To conclude, then, visuality is not enough and ocular-centrism is not the solution to the co-existence of visual difference and social indifference: this is also what characterizes the relationships around the physical environment and its diverse mix of inhabitants. For the gaze of the multiculturalist seeking diversity, it is found in Gellerup, but it is generally not more than “a visual agora”; unfortunately Gellerup is more like, in Sennett’s terms, “places of the
gaze rather than the scenes of discourse”, because it is “an ethnic palimpsest in which each group keeps neatly to its own turf”.

Proximity and displacement

Those 15 Chinese sailors, with whom I started this chapter, went to Hamburg after their one-day visit in Husby. But something happened the next morning, on the day they departed, something I find more telling.

That morning the Chinese left for Hamburg. Husby’s inhabitants took them to the train station in Ringkøbing, a town larger than Husby. In Ringkøbing as in Husby, the Chinese people became a sensation; “everywhere people jumped to the windows and to the doors, and the street was full of people, who wanted to catch a glimpse of the special ... human beings”. Just like when they first came to Husby.

But the story, which is told by the teacher in Husby, takes a very interesting turn in Ringkøbing. He wrote: “We ... thought for awhile [about the situation in Ringkøbing] that it was funny enough. But at last we became ill-tempered about the curiosity of the people. Dear me! We did not come driving with a load of animals ... Chinese are also human ...”. “We were almost ashamed on behalf of the people from Ringkøbing” (Engelbrechtsen 1995; my translation) At last they waved goodbye to the Chinese, who left by train. The teacher continued:

And to see them [wave goodbye to us] ... it was hard on all of us.... We could see in the innocent eyes of the Chinese how grateful they were, for their eyes may be oblique, but there is, however, something sincere in their look, and since we now knew them so well, and they had the right clothes on [they had given the Chinese sailors new clothes], they were like brothers to us, which they also should be, so to say, when we have Christianized them. (Engelbrechtsen 1995; my translation)

What was the reason behind this “humanization” of the Chinese sailors? What happened during that single day in Husby? The reason was not that they had learned more philosophy or social theory. Firstly, it was the physical proximity, e.g. eating together, trying to speak to each other, or in other words a “touching”, which made endorsement of some of the first much more
ethnocentric characterizations of the Chinese sailors possible. The first day they saw each other without touching; the second day, they touched, that is, they had physical, social and moral contact.

Secondly, the day in Ringkøbing was the day of “displacement”. In Ringkøbing, the people of Husby saw themselves and their guests/strangers in a new context. Thus, looking at themselves somewhere else, looking at the people of Ringkøbing from another perspective, Husby’s people became “displaced”. So were their perceptions of the Chinese. Perhaps, in looking at the people of Ringkøbing, they saw themselves, they reflected over themselves and also saw the Chinese people in a different perspective. It is not surprising that displacement took place somewhere else than in their own town. Getting out of their home made them able to come in touch with the Chinese, and this destabilized their prior judgements of them. At home, they could be more indifferent. In Ringkøbing, they had themselves become strangers in a way. As Edmond Jabés said once, “the foreigner allows you to be yourself by making a foreigner of you”.

In his article, “The Foreigner”, Richard Sennett identifies Marcel Duchamp and Eduard Manet as the artists of displacement, a concept which in his view also summarizes the experience of being a stranger. For instance, Sennett maintains that in paintings of city life, Manet “made use of visual gestures which trouble the eye, which wrench it from object to object within the frame of the painting, and which often suggest that the real story of the painting is happening elsewhere, off the canvas. In painting the city, Manet is an artist of displacements” (1996: 173). “Cracking” the frames of reference (not destroying them), which coincidentally happened to Duchamp’s “The Large Glass”, may give unexpected turns to one’s way of seeing so that one can “re-envision others and oneself as concrete, particular human beings rather than as cultural types”. Duchamp was the artist of the “anti-work”, which displaced common ways of seeing and ridiculed the solidity and familiarity of common ways of representation. As such, his art became a self-parody of the institutional settings of art (Sennett 1996: 197).

What people of Husby said about the Chinese sounds somewhat awkward to us today. But does this very awkwardness not also invite a self-reflection? Perhaps people will think in the same way in the future about how “we” speak of our contemporary strangers. Time will show, depending on “displacements” that we, the actors, with our discoursive and social/spatial practices, can make occur.
4 Social Space and the Secret of “Invisibility”

In this chapter, the focus will be more specifically on “social space”. In other words, we will dwell on the questions of where the Turkish minority in Gellerup stands and which social positions immigrants hold on the social map, or the social hierarchy, of Danish society.

Pierre Bourdieu replaces the concept of “society” with those of “social space” and “field”. “Society” refers to an undifferentiated unity integrated by systemic functions, a common culture, or all-encompassing authority structures. In contrast, social space and field refer to a “differentiated society”, that is, “an ensemble of relatively autonomous spheres of ‘play’ that cannot be collapsed under an overall societal logic, be it that of capitalism, modernity, or postmodernity” (Wacquant 1992: 17). Those “spheres of play”, or fields, prescribe their particular values and possess their own regulative principles (ibid, 17). Following this logic, one can speak of various fields, e.g. the economic field, the field of philosophy, the artistic field, etc., which are relatively autonomous from each other.

But despite this relative autonomy, one can observe a whole range of functional and structural homologies between different fields and the general structure of the social space (or class structure): “each has its dominant and its dominated, its struggles for usurpation and exclusion, its mechanisms of reproduction, and so on. But every one of these characteristics takes a specific, irreducible form in each field (a homology may be defined as resemblance within a difference)” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 106). Because of these homologies, the struggles that go on in a single field are always “overdetermined” by the field of power (ibid, 106). Thus, the field of power can be thought as a kind of “meta-field”, characterizing the general structure of the social space (Wacquant 1992: 18).

To be able to speak of a field, one must be able to identify a group of people who are sufficiently many and who operate with and throughout a “game”, the rules of which are defined in advance. Although a field is not a product of
deliberate action, and although it does not follow some explicit and codified regularities, it has to do with some “stakes (enjeux) which are for the most part the product of the competition between players. ... [P]layers are taken in by the game, they oppose one another, sometimes with ferocity, only to the extent that they concur in their belief (doxa) in the game and its stakes; they grant these a recognition that escapes questioning. Players agree, by the mere fact of playing, and not by way of a ‘contract’, that the game is worth playing” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 98). According to Bourdieu, the gaming that characterizes a field is also what constitutes a social struggle among those who are differently positioned in a definite field.

Immigrants practise, at least to some degree, the same games with others occupying the established fields of Danish society. In other words, they compete with others in these fields. In these fields there are specific stakes and efforts, and valid cards are the various forms of capital, which can neither exist nor function except in relation to the fields (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 101). In the following, regarding Turkish immigrants, I will concentrate on the four forms of capital activated as material resources in social space: the economic, the social, the cultural and the symbolic. Together with the volume and composition of their overall capital with respect to the distribution of material resources, that is, the positions they hold in the game, I will, at the same time, look at Turks' dispositions; that is, thoughts, feelings and judgments, ways of being, strategies of mobility, or in other words, their “habitus”. Thus, positions in the social space (as external determinants and framework of daily life) and their interrelationships with perceptions, inclinations and appreciation from inside the group of Turks in Gellerup are simultaneously the object of a double reading in this chapter. In other words, social topology and more phenomenological approaches will be used at the same time, which brings us to Bourdieu’s concept “praxeology”, for which, instead of building dichotomies between agent and structure; actor and system, etc., the primacy is always given to the relations between these artificial poles (Wacquant 1992: 11-19).

Such a relational analysis involves, firstly, mapping out the “structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the agents or institutions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 105). In this conceptual framework, the position held by an agent (which also determines life strategies and styles of the agent) in the social space is defined by one’s various types of capital (that is, economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital) and by the agent’s ability to transform these different types of capital into each other and thereby to increase one’s mobility in the social hierarchy (Çaglar 1995: 309-310).
Secondly, such an analysis must involve mapping out the dispositions, the habitus, or position-takings of the agents, which are the practices realized in the framework of the given positions in a field. Since positions and position-takings are like “two translations” of the same phenomenon, they must be analyzed together. Yet, all things equal, “the space of positions tends to command the space of position-takings” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 105).

But this is not all: players can play to increase or to conserve their capital, their number of tokens, in conformity with the tacit rules of the game and the prerequisites of the production of the game and its stakes; but they can also get in it to transform, partially or completely, the immanent rules of the game. They can, for instance, work to change the relative value of the tokens of different colours, the exchange rate between various species of capital, through strategies aimed at discrediting the form of capital upon which the force of their opponents rests ... and to valorize the species of capital they preferentially possess.... A good number of struggles within the field of power are of this type.... (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 99)

Given this short introduction, the aim of this chapter is to illuminate the positions held by the Turks, referring to their different forms of capital and their power to transform or translate these into each other, that is, their chances for mobility in the Danish social space.

For this purpose I initially conducted some unstructured conversations and structured interviews building on what Bourdieu called “participant objectivation”. But the results reported do not directly parallel the way most interviews proceeded. The mixture of Danish and Turkish languages, hesitations and doubts, and discursive back-and-forth movements disappeared in the English translations to a considerable degree. Thus, the interviews reported are a re-writing, a re-presentation, of the interviewees’ and my presentations during the interviews. As Roland Barthes says: it is a “fiction that research is reported not written” (quoted in Game 1991: 27).

A non-violent form of communication is a prerequisite for making interviews: in an interview, it is “the investigator who starts the game and who sets up its rules”, and thus the interview, being itself a social interaction and exchange, is inherently and unavoidably open to symbolic violence. In this context, one can try to adjust the distance between the objective of the interview as perceived by the researcher and the respondent. But, as Bourdieu says, all precautions one could enlist to reduce social distance and symbolic violence have their limits: thus, the
investigator must be “capable of mentally putting herself in their place” (1996: 22). Putting oneself in the social space that the interviewee occupies is a “spiritual exercise, aiming to obtain, through forgetfulness of self, a true transformation of the view we take of others in the ordinary circumstances of life” (ibid, 24). To “instigate a relationship of active and methodological listening, as far removed from pure laissez-faire of the non-directive interview as from the directiveness of the questionnaire survey” is what can be sought in the face of such difficult and complex situations, according to Bourdieu (1996: 18-9).

This obviously requires a will on the part of the researcher to participate. But this participation requires knowing the supra-personal rules of the game the actors are engaging in their representations, their positions and their possibility to continue or disrupt this game. The research interview becomes a “display of total attention to the person questioned ... with methodological construction, founded on the knowledge of objective conditions common to an entire social category” (ibid, 19). Without this “objectivation”, one risks, for example, taking responses literally, and this would be absurd, as this chapter will show. Importantly, participant objectivation includes self-reflexivity on the part of the researcher in that the researcher is not neutral with respect to its object; on the contrary, the researcher directly affects the condition of the agents he or she investigates. Thus, research must be able to objectify its own “interest to objectivize inscribed in the fact of participating” as it should be able to bracket this interest and the representations it supports. In other words, a sociology of the object, in this case, immigrants, must necessarily include a reflexive “sociology of sociology” (Bourdieu 1992b: 259-60).

**Aarhusian Turks’ economic capital**

Regarding economic capital, one can say that, as a whole, Turks in Aarhus are not a homogeneous group; there are workers, civil servants, unemployed and jobless people, restaurant owners and greengrocers (most of the greengrocers in the city centre are owned by Turks), etc. Hence they are all placed differently according to their economic capital.

Nevertheless, the story of the Turkish immigrant is very much a story of unemployment and joblessness. There are some striking statistical materials which relate information on the economic situation of the group of immigrants and
refugees as a whole. For example, in the 1993 statistics of the municipality, it is found that, while 10 per cent of the Danish workforce is registered as “unemployed”, 30.7 per cent of the foreign citizens in the workforce living in the municipality are unemployed (Municipality of Aarhus 1995b: 75).

Immigrants and refugees claim 6.7 and 15.7 per cent, respectively, of the total welfare benefits in the municipality, while they make up 2.7 per cent and 2.2 per cent, respectively, of the total population of the municipality (Municipality of Aarhus 1995b: 74). It should be noted that the category “foreigners” the municipality operates with also includes persons from Nordic countries and the EU (that is, 4546 out of 16,744 people) who have better access to the labour market than people from third world countries. This overall figure gains even more importance when consideration is given to how limited the opportunities are for immigrants in Aarhus to engage in informal economic activities which are based on economic production and bring in money income (which will be detailed later).

If we focus on the situation of Turks in Gellerup, the situation is even worse, especially when it is remembered that those Turks having “normal” incomes (e.g. restaurant owners, greengrocers, the Turkish middle class, those who own more cultural capital, etc.) most commonly live outside Gellerup. In addition, Turks living in Gellerup who are succeeded in building up their resources are becoming part of the more mobile segments of the population and are increasingly moving out of Gellerup; hence contributing to a worsening of the statistics regarding Gellerup (see chapter 7).

For example, Hakan (an alias), who “escaped” from Gellerup (chapter 3), did this on the basis of his economic capital. Economically his family could be considered middle class, since both his wife and he have stable jobs and the earnings to be able to “escape” to a single-family housing area 10 km from the city centre. They lived in Gellerup for 13 years, until 1992. During this period, Hakan worked actively in the Anatolian Cultural Association in Gellerup. Meanwhile he has given countless interviews to journalists and researchers on the subject of Gellerup and Turks living in Gellerup, that is, along with his economic capital, he also has accumulated a degree of cultural capital, and thus he is considered one of the more mobile Turks. (Somewhat ironically, in the articles resulting from those interviews, Hakan has been identified by the journalists as “an ordinary Turk”—the gaze of the journalist seeks “the typical”).

He told me that one reason his family had moved out of Gellerup was the poor educational facilities there: the concentration of immigrant children in the schools. He said, for example, that his children “learned more Arabic than Danish in the
school”. Another reason was “the negative attitudes of the Danes toward us”. In the quotation given earlier, when he complained about being fixed, this was visibly the case. Thus, moving out of Gellerup was a strategy aimed at enriching both the children’s cultural capital and the family’s symbolic capital, which can only be defined “in the eyes of the others” (see Çaglar 1995: 311). Needless to say, to a great extent, this strategy (moving to a single-family house outside Gellerup) was based on resources emanating from economic capital, the attempt being to translate the economic capital into cultural and symbolic capital. This was also confirmed in the other interviews I held with Turks, who were asked to imagine the “ideal” urban location. Their answer was “a single-family house near to the city centre”, where “a few” Turks are already.

If one or two in a family have jobs, buying such a house could mean a rational investment for a Turkish family. Thus, Hakan explained that he gave the same amount of money to buy his single-family house as he paid for his rent in Gellerup. It is simply because only a family on social welfare can afford to live in Gellerup, that is, if the rent is being paid by the welfare system. As soon as a family can “earn” money, it becomes more rational to move out, preferably to a more prestigious area, where it can be “cheaper” to live.

Now Hakan’s family lives in a quite small, suburban area on the outskirts of the municipality, where three other Turkish families also live. Two of these families are relatives of Hakan, one being that of his younger brother. But the group there does not want other Turkish families to move to their new area: “If I had wanted a Turkish community, I wouldn’t had moved here”, says Hakan.

As pointed out earlier, most of the economically more mobile Turks in Aarhus do not live in Gellerup. The best examples of this are the Turkish (relatively small scale) investors in the city. But it must be stressed here that the low level of mobilization among the Turks in Gellerup does not necessarily mean they have a deficit of economic capital. For example, it may be that some Turks have strategies for activating their economic capital in ways other than that used by Hakan. Thus, for example, investments in Turkey, most generally in the form of a house or a bank account (hence being independent of some taxation in Denmark), is another strategy related to economic capital, especially for the first generation Turks. In this case, one clearly sees that economic capital activated in Denmark does not tell very much in itself about all the economic capital or the overall composition of different capital forms Turks have.

In addition, there is a more important ambivalence regarding the economic capital of Turks in Aarhus. That is, in Denmark, they can be considered poor, or
even underclass, as I will discuss later in chapter 7. But when translated into a Turkish context, their economic capital achieves other meanings. As Ayse Çağlar explains about German Turks:

Given the minimum wage of a worker in Turkey (approx. DM 250 a month), their income in Germany (DM 1500-2000 a month) is far better than that of workers in Turkey. In fact, it is above the salary of an average middle-class employee. Thus, together with their investments in housing and land and with their (mostly) petty business interests in Turkey, the overall volume of German Turks’ economic capital acquires a different character in the context of Turkey. While it makes them working class in Germany, with the same amount of economic capital they come close to being middle class in Turkey. (Çaglar 1995: 313)

Even if one could say that not all Turks in Aarhus (or in Denmark) can be considered part of the working class, because of increasing joblessness and intensified underclass formation processes in recent years, Çağlar’s argument about German Turks can be used in a Danish context to underline an ambivalence regarding the relationship between immigration, class and economic capital. The existence of such an ambivalence also draws attention to clear differences regarding the social space in two different, Danish and Turkish, contexts. These two contexts in turn affect each other. This issue is especially important regarding the possibilities of translating different forms of capital into each other and will be revisited in the following.

**Social capital and its relations to economic capital**

Social capital is in general understood as the size, efficiency and mobilization capacity of one’s networks and relationships in society (Bourdieu 1977; Çağlar 1995). The relationships of Turks to the Danes, and hence their social networks in Aarhus (or in Denmark as a whole), are very weak. According to writers, such as Carl-Ulrik Schierup, this is profoundly the reason why Turks and other immigrant groups are “captured” in what he terms “occupational ghettos”, characterized by monotonous and fatiguing work (1993: 110-111). Personal social networks and contacts are very important channels for getting a job. Therefore, it is difficult for “outsiders” to get into the labour market and for those who are “captured” in the
ethnic ghettos to “get out” in order to find a better job outside the ghetto. And because Turkish denizens are to a very high degree isolated not only from the labour market but also from society in general, their chances of network building and hence occupational mobility are limited.

But looking at networks inside the group and among the Turks themselves, the scene changes completely. There are very dense social networks in Gellerup, and they are very closely related to, but not always directly “convertible” to, economic capital in terms of money. To understand how Turkish networks in Gellerup function, we can focus on the Turkish household and its reproduction mix as an intersection area between Turks’ economic and social capital. This focus on the Turkish household can also be helpful in observing some connections between formal and informal economic activities in Gellerup.

The most important unit of the Turkish household is the family. Thus let us initially note that the typical family form among Turks in Gellerup (and Denmark) is the nuclear family consisting of 3-6 persons. But temporary extended families, where for example two or three generations share a flat, is also widespread. Among the nuclear families, interfamily relations are also intense. In this context, it is very important not to seek exclusively “culturalist” explanations for these dense inter-family relations in Gellerup. As Manuel Castells pinpoints: “the more the underground economy develops, the more the family that becomes important is the extended family.... So, between the economic tendency toward the extended family and the cultural tendency toward individualization, the traditional patriarchal nuclear family is in crisis... (Castells 1986: 17).

This is a tendency that can also be observed in Gellerup, at least in the sense that intense inter-family relations really have much to do with economic and social networks and that they are far from diminishing. But even if their existence has been preserved, extended families were not characteristic of Turkish households at the beginning of immigration; on the contrary, they were weakened in the first 10-15 years of immigration, and it is only in the late 1980s and the 1990s that their use has been re-intensified.

Living in Gellerup is important for establishing informal economic relations among Turks. And this dimension gains more importance in light of the disappearance of Turks from the local labour market. Informal economic relations are, therefore, decisive for their economic fundament in daily life.

In this context, I want to look at the reproduction mix of the Turkish families in Gellerup by placing the emphasis on inter-family relationships. Following Mingione (1983; 1985; 1987), one can focus on six kinds of income and their
interrelationships in establishing the basic parameters of the reproduction mix. These are: (1) incomes from formal employment; (2) subsidiary payments, that is unemployment and welfare benefits; (3) incomes from informal employment; (4) informal support in form of presents/gifts, work exchanges, investments in Turkey, and so on; (5) household activities, work for own consumption, self-service; and (6) official services, municipal support, gifts in the form of work directly for consumption, etc.

Areas 1, 3 and 5 are based on production internal to a single household, and areas 2, 4 and 6 point more directly to external support—the welfare state, the extended family, friendships and networks. Likewise, areas 1 and 2 point to formal money-based resources; areas 3 and 4 point again to money-based resources, but outside the formal labour market; and areas 5 and 6 point to non-money-based resources.

On the basis of this scheme, it can be said that areas 2, 4, 5 and 6 are the most important components of the Turkish household in Gellerup. Because of the weakness in area 1, that is, the high unemployment rate, Turks predominantly turn their strategies towards area 2. Area 3, informal productive economies, or the “black” economy in popular language, is not especially important regarding most of the Turks in Gellerup. There are almost no Turks in Gellerup with informal work as their primary employment, and those few who have the “opportunity” to take on permanent secondary employment do it on the basis of their incomes in area 2. In other words, even when there is informal employment in the form of a secondary employment, it is based on area 2.

The “activation” policy of the municipality, mentioned in chapter 1, could be a factor making the mixing of areas 2 and 3 more difficult in the future. This is simply because already there are not enough jobs, including informal ones, for Turks in the “two-thirds society”, and this tendency does not seem likely to reverse itself in the near future. Thus, welfare state institutions, and thereby supplementary benefits, will become much more important for immigrants’ economic capital. But in these areas, restrictions have been the dominant characteristic in the period from 1985 up to now. As I will argue in chapter 7, these restrictions regarding welfare benefits, such as the increased weight given to being “available” for the labour market or the increased use of “compulsory” work, etc., set new limits on informal activities (especially in areas 3 and 5).

As a consequence of this development, the scope of informal work among Turks is generally limited, mostly to restaurants, greengrocers, and other “ethnic businesses”, which a relatively small number of Turks in Aarhus are engaged in.
This underrepresentation of informal work directly points to both a deficit in Turk’s social capital and their exclusion from networks outside their own ethnic group. This is so because, as Pahl points out, informal work generally requires informal contacts (for example, to find customers), which is difficult for them who are already outside the labour market. In other words, precisely on the basis of opportunities that are closely related to having a formal job, one can make use of “interactive effects” stemming from this in getting and maintaining an informal job. As Pahl summarizes:

Informal work, unsurprisingly, requires informal contacts and these are more likely to be found at work or after a good evening’s drinking. The unemployed cannot, by definition, get access to the first and, being poor, cannot risk getting involved in the second. (Pahl 1988: 250)

In many cases, informal productive activities also demand qualifications and investments (for example, in the form of machines) or space (for example, in the house one lives), which is also difficult for many of the Turks in Gellerup. Thus, the highest rate of informal productive work in Denmark is to be found among skilled workers (Jensen 1995: 72-5). The consequence of this is, as Pahl asserts: “to them that hath, more is given, whereas to them that have little, even that which they have is taken away” (Pahl 1988: 255).

Given this background, the Turkish household in Gellerup focuses to a high degree on “informal consumption” (areas 5 and 6 above) and work exchange (area 4) especially in inter-family relations. By way of these activities (helping each other or self-help), the household tries to reduce its money expenditures. Hence, the household economy becomes more and more important, which also explains why the women’s position in the single family’s reproduction cycle is central.

Work exchange between families necessitate that the single household navigates in social structures and networks consisting of neighbours, families and friends (see Cornuel & Duriez 1985: 172). Thus, in addition to the contribution these networks make to the creation of social cohesion among Turks, at the same time, they establish constraints for those who want to “opt out”. In light of this, it is important not to romanticize these forms of “solidarity”:
... there is the claim that, for poor, working-class households in particular, there is a kind of social capital in more established neighbourhoods and communities, which enables those in misfortune to be supported by others who have resources of time, money, goods and services to bestow on their more deserving comrades....

Such assertions by leading writers, politicians, economists and others are rarely supported by evidence.... The local working-class community may be less of a source of support and more of a context for informal spying and reporting as resentful neighbours are more concerned to hold everyone down to a common level. (Pahl 1988: 249-250)

Solidarity among Turks in Gellerup is not unreflected either. Therefore, it can be viewed as “calculated” instead of as “putative”. But nevertheless, it must be pointed out that, in Gellerup, there is some evidence indicating that “those in misfortune” can be “supported by others who have resources” on the condition that they are close family members or friends. Thus, most of the interviewees I spoke with have either helped others and/or received help from them in certain cases.

Cultural capital

Cultural capital generally refers to educational and cultural skills and qualifications. But if one thinks about cultural capital in broad terms, one also has to include citizenship as “a part of the institutionalized form of cultural capital”, as Bröskamp argues for, because its possession affects one’s standing in society (see Çaglar 1995: 310). Then the low level of Danish citizenship among Turkish denizens must be considered a deficit in cultural capital. But one can say that the majority of Turks in Aarhus have clear deficits regarding cultural capital also in the more restricted sense of the term referring to educational and cultural skills. Many people who belong to the first generation do not have any educational background; some are even illiterate, and some belonging to the second generation have little or weak background in comparison with Danes.

As to the general educational level in Denmark, there are differences between minorities and Danes and among the different minorities. The educational level is generally higher among young Danes between 18 and 25 years of age than among Turks (and, for example, Pakistanis) of the same age. Necef states that 23 per cent and 56 per cent of Turkish first generation men and women, respectively, have
never had a formal education, that 61 per cent of Turkish men in Denmark have had a formal education for a period of less than five years, and that senior high school (gymnasium) frequency is only 5-7 per cent for Turks whereas the same figure is 31 per cent for Danes as a whole (Necef 1994: 12, 15).

With respect to generations, young Turkish and, for example, Pakistani denizens are better educated than their parents. Most of them have graduated from primary school, and the number of young denizens graduating from high school and college is increasing (especially among young Pakistanis). Moreover, the majority of young Turks and Pakistanis master the Danish language almost perfectly, or at least very well (see Jeppesen 1989: 74-83 and Ejrnæs & Tireli 1992).

Although the trend points toward increases in their cultural capital in general, the Turkish minority’s (and, as whole, third world immigrants’) educational qualifications are still a huge gap away form those of the Danes. It is important in this context that, even if the general educational qualifications are rising among younger Turks, one often sees that the translation of this cultural capital into, for example, economic capital can be very problematic. Because of this, many Turks with a relatively good educational background also have difficulties entering the local labour market.

I want to give just one example. A second generation Turkish girl, Esme Sahin, grown up and educated in Denmark as a correspondent, sent an application to a shipping firm, Bi-Thor Consult A/PS, in Aarhus. Only two days later, she received a letter from the firm informing her that the position had been given to somebody else.

This had not been the first or only refusal she had received. But this time she wondered how the job could have been occupied so fast. So, she called the firm, presenting herself with a Danish name, Dorthe Steen. It turned out that the position had not yet been filled, and that the firm was interested in making an appointment to meet her (Aarhus Stiftstidende, 30 July 1995).

In a related article in the same newspaper, the owner of the firm denied “that they have something against foreigners”, but when the journalist asked “shouldn’t you then write to Esme Sahin ... instead of informing her that the position is occupied”, the owner only replied, “yes, we could have done that”. When Sven Wolff-Jacobsen, the director of the “Institute for Career Development in Aarhus” (Institut for Karierudvikling i Aarhus), was asked for another related article about immigrants’ relation to the labour market in general, and specifically about Esme’s case, he had only the following “advice” to give: “If one has an exotic name, one
has to tell a little something about it when one applies for a job. The application must not be mystifying”. He said further that Esme could have enclosed a picture of herself in her application. “It can show—you know—that she does not wear the Muslim head scarf”.

This advice clearly means that one cannot simply expect one’s cultural capital to be automatically convertible, not only to economic capital (e.g. getting a job), but also to symbolic capital. That is also to say that one’s value in the eyes of others can be a barrier to this conversion. Hence in one’s application, one has to enclose a picture showing that one is not “like the others”, needless to say, a process which in turn freezes the image of “others” even more.

Apart from the question of how much this risk-management strategy would help (which also diverts our attention to looking for the cause as the victim herself), this example summarizes how the situation quite often is when searching for a job as an immigrant, in trying to convert one’s cultural capital. In this context, Thorkild Simonsen, the Mayor of Aarhus, agreed when Morten Kjaerum, director of the Danish Center of Human Rights, said, while criticizing immigration policies of the Municipality of Aarhus, that one could do more to make firms employ more refugees and immigrants. The Mayor responded he did “not think that we should force them [the firms]. On the other hand, I would like to take part in arranging a campaign for encouraging firms to employ more [refugees and immigrants]” (Aarhus Stiftstidende, 4 October 1995). It is very interesting that precisely during those days when the Mayor was suggesting a campaign (that was never carried out) that would not “force” the firms, the municipality was running another campaign against its refugees and immigrants. It involved the need to “force” immigrants and refugees into work, which eo ipso makes their idea for running a soft campaign towards firms a bit curious.

In general, then, one big problem regarding Turks’ cultural capital in the Danish social space is the problem of convertibility. In this context, it must be mentioned that, quite often, “Turkish” culture as such does not carry much value as a form of capital that can be activated in the Danish social space. The Turkish language in Denmark is an interesting point in case. For example, Necef takes language as a form of cultural capital and gives the following example of a Turkish woman to show how aware Turks are of the position they occupy in the social space. This woman ran a shop situated in a business district of a Danish town. Necef would go there once in a while and speak to her in Turkish, which made her “a bit uneasy”. One day she asked him “to please speak Danish ... when there are Danes around”. She explained:
I have never told my customers that I was not Turkish, but I will neither tell them that I am Turkish. I think they think I come from southern Europe, possibly Italy, and as long as they do not directly ask, something they normally would not do, I try not to show my origin. If they know I am Turkish, my prestige as a shopkeeper would be harmed. (quoted in Necef 1996: 140)

Besides pointing out how actors are aware of their positions in the hierarchy of the social space, what she says above also draws attention to the fact that actors cannot just freely translate their forms of capital into one another, or in other words, they do not control the rules of the “game” in which they participate actively. There are always already structural constraints in the game because of actors’ positions. But nevertheless, players more often than not play the game, the realization of which requires their participation with their dispositions as well. This also means that structures as such are not imposed on the agent one-sidedly only by force, but rather they require the player’s active consent. Thus, especially when one consents rather than opposes the rules of the game, one can speak of power as something that resides in the assumed “rules” of the game. Thus, power or powerlessness must be attached not to the game itself but to what players take to be the “facts”.

One can add that, in general, any symbolic violence or any stigmatization is something inherently ambivalent (see Goffman 1990: 130) in that it requires simultaneous participation in the game both by victims, or “deviants”, and by those who are “normal”. This also amounts to saying that stigmatization cannot be simply imposed from above, say, as “prejudices”. Moreover, even pretensions, as if the rules of the game were not there, may strengthen the same game. This is, for example, what happens in the cases referred to before, regarding the companies that deny immigrants a position while, at the same time, trying to avoid speaking about discrimination. This is unlike the case of Café X, where a real and clear message was given (see chapter 3). Or recall how symbolic violence was accentuated when the municipality translated “ethnic” issues into “social” ones (see chapter 1).

Now, before I continue with symbolic capital and the position-takings of Turks in the social space more explicitly in the next section, I want to underline a couple of other ambivalences regarding Turks’ cultural capital.

Firstly, it should be touched upon that, even though Turks’ cultural capital, especially regarding educational capacities, has been rising, as mentioned before,
it is almost not reflected at all in their social positions, e.g. their ability to transform these educational qualifications into regular jobs. This situation resembles other cases in both European and American ghettos. For example, as Lash and Urry point out, regarding the extraordinary improvement in intergenerational educational mobility of American blacks, that “[h]owever, none of this is reflected in an increased success in obtaining regular full-time employment” (Lash & Urry 1994: 150-151). To a large extent, the situation seems to be the same in Aarhus. In contrast to the mainstream’s anticipation of social mobility on the basis of increasing educational, or more aptly, cultural capital, examples from Aarhus show that this is not the case. Contrary to this assumption, where cultural capital is taken as an independent variable and class position is taken as a dependent one (so that improvement in the first can mean improvement in the second, e.g. in the labour market), the case seems to be, as Lash and Urry (1994) show, that the formation of a new lower class can itself be an independent variable while educational mobility does not matter as much as wished or anticipated.

The missing awareness of this disproportionality between education and jobs is one of the factors that make the existing politics of immigration a kind of “politics of illusion”, simply because one of its most important premises—that education will bring jobs—already seems to be a problematic one. Moreover, “education” is never simply formal education, or a technical knowledge, as is assumed in the mainstream debate; as I tried to show here, there are many subtle details (e.g. hidden curricula) and “other things” (e.g. convertibility) related to “education” as such which are as relevant, such as the technical component of education, and which the immigration debate seems not to take notice of.

Secondly, regarding Turks’ cultural capital, another ambivalence must be pointed out. Even though Turks’ cultural capital is considerably weak in the Danish social space, this does not mean that it is weak as such in other contexts. For example, inside the group, there are rich cultural dynamics with respect to mixing different cultural backgrounds, producing cultural collage, translating between cultures, etc. Likewise, as I will show in the next chapter, Turks increasingly have “transnational”, or “global”, cultural relationships, which is not recognized in the Danish social space. In short, while Turkish culture is increasingly devalorized in the Danish social space, it has very intense communicational and cultural relationships to Turkey, especially Turkish mass culture. The satellite dishes and the Turkish TV channels are probably a good example of this. Thus, on the one hand, Turks are increasingly confronted with and follow “modern” trends in Turkey and in the internationalized Turkish media. But on the other hand, it seems that most Turkish families, for example, do not watch Danish channels now, which can mean that the
cultural communication with(in) Denmark gets weakened. Consequently, living in Denmark but watching Turkey and the world through Turkish channels can mean both a plus and a loss in different contexts. This is an important dimension regarding the Turks’ relationship to the social space, the understanding of which requires that we now include symbolic capital more explicitly in our analysis.

**Symbolic capital: Turks in the eyes of the others**

... our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, and reduced mode of being. (Taylor 1994: 25)

According to Bourdieu, symbolic capital is basically another form of capital, e.g. economic or cultural, which is “perceived and recognized as legitimate”, that is, recognized by others and known through the categories of perception that it imposes (Bourdieu 1990: 127, 134-135). In other words, symbolic capital has much to do with recognition, and it “only exists in the eyes of the others” (C. Joppke; quoted in Çağlar 1995: 311). Hence, it is the product of a process in which agents apply to their positions in the social space their individual or collective “structures of perception and appreciation which are issued out of these very structures and which tend to picture the world as evident”. Power based on symbolic capital, or symbolic power, is about being able to “name” the reality, or in other words, it is the power to picture one’s world as evident. In this “symbolic struggle for the common sense or, more precisely, for the monopoly over legitimate naming”, agents try both to change and/or to accept their positions in the social space, and these position-takings in relation to symbolic power tend to reproduce objective relations of power, or the positions in the social space (Bourdieu 1990: 134-135).

As shown in chapter 1, immigration occupies a dominated position in the field of power in general. The stakes of political struggle regarding symbolic power are, according to Bourdieu, “the words, the names which construct social reality as much as they express it” (Bourdieu 1990: 134). Their positions being weak, regarding political participation and constructions of realities in the power/knowledge relationship, immigrants are “categorized” and thus “publicly
accused" (which is the original meaning of the word “categorization” according to Bourdieu). As a consequence, they collectively hold an uncompromising deficit in symbolic power in urban politics in which they do not participate in ways other than by being its “objects”, generally speaking. To a large extent, they are people whom others gaze upon and talk about, and as such, at the political level, they do not have much power to resist the categories, which demonstrate their place in the eyes of the others. Although they have the right to vote and run for election in urban politics, the municipality maintains a vision of division regarding “them”. In any case, these rights do not extend to general elections, making immigrants more or less silent at the national political level.

Turks have a negative image, not only regarding politics, but in the social space in general. In this context, it is important to note that one of the relevant dimensions of symbolic capital is ethnic identity. Because of different names and colours, ethnic identity becomes a *percipi*, a being-seen-ness, and it functions as positive or negative symbolic capital in the hierarchy of the social space (Bourdieu 1994: 191). This makes it, also for those who have been more mobile in accumulating different species of capital, difficult to transform successes into symbolic capital. In this respect, the situation of Turks in Aarhus is similar to the situation of Turks in Germany, as Çaglar writes. According to her, in Germany, not only successful Turkish workers, but Turkish artists and entrepreneurs as well suffer from lack of recognition and complain, for example, about being treated as “ethnic” artists, writers or social workers (Çaglar 1995: 311). She goes on to note that the denial of social recognition for Turkish immigrants as a category also influences their relations among themselves in that those Turks who have success and prestige fail to become “significant others” for other Turks.

I think the pride of some German Turks in their denunciation of everything related to “Turkish culture” and some Turkish immigrants’ links with marginal but prestigious German groups might be seen as manifestations of this awareness.... This strategy, however, requires a high degree of cultural capital and can therefore only be adopted by very few Turks. The most widespread form that this attempted disassociation takes is to over-emphasise contacts and friendships with Germans, to shop in German shops, etc. Nalan’s answer to my compliments on her dress ... illustrates this. To my remark “Nalan, your dress is beautiful”, she answered, “We bought it from a German boutique”, as if this was a natural explanation of its beauty. (Çaglar 1995: 322)

In the context of Aarhus, this is correct, especially regarding the attitudes of a segment of second or third generation Turks toward the first generation. Thus,
these young people perceive first generation Turks as “peasants” or “bumpkins”, and they have difficulties in identifying themselves with the image of their position in the social space. In this context, it is important to take notice that, as Charles Taylor formulates it, “[p]eople do not acquire languages needed for self-definition on their own. Rather, we are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter to us—what George Herbert Mead called ‘significant others’. The genesis of human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical” (1994: 32). For some of these young people, since their sense of their place does not correspond with the image of their parents in the(ir) eyes, the escape route becomes to distance oneself from the first generation. They choose, so to say, to become “an assimilated Turk” and not to have anything to do with other Turks. But younger Turks who try this route find, interestingly, other Turks in similar positions and tend to group together. The consequence seems to be similar to the Jewish-German experiences with assimilation efforts, as Bauman tells:

In the no-win game of assimilation, the German-educated Jews found themselves transferred from the closely-knit territorial ghetto to the ghetto of social incongruity and cultural ambivalence. Unlike the old Jewish estate from which the assimilants wished to emancipate, the new class of assimilated Jews suffered a profound ambiguity of status, marked by the contradiction and continuous friction between the self-definition and socially binding classification. (Bauman 1991: 120-121)

According to Bauman, the paradoxical result of the assimilatory effort was, in contrast to the popular saying “be a Jew at home, man in the street”: “the would-be Germans felt truly German only at home, where they could undisturbed play their game of illusions protected from the unsympathetic, scrutinising gaze of the German street” (Bauman 1991: 121-122).

The very distances these groups try to overcome by the assimilatory strategy of “becoming like a Dane” are warranted in many ways. For example, some young persons mentioned in the interviews I held with them that it irritated them to hear Danes say “you do not look Turkish”; “even though you are Turkish, you are not like the others”, etc. Behind these “compliments”, they perceived that the symbolic negation of the distances paradoxically still implied a recognition of distances and reminded them that they were still “Turks”, which is the very thing they were escaping from.
Apart from a tiny group of “assimilated Turks” seeking recognition in the eyes of the Dane’s, the majority of Turks seek symbolic capital in the eyes of other Turks, or more aptly, inside the group. Consider, for example, the case of Ahmet.

He came to Denmark in 1989 after having been educated as a primary school teacher in Turkey. Shortly after he learned Danish, he found a job in a primary school in Gellerup teaching Turkish to Turkish children. I asked his wife, Kadriye, and him if his being a teacher had meant any improvement in their social positions among other Turks in Gellerup. They both said “no”. But my impression was that his status made a difference in Gellerup. Then, instead of forcing them to confess the “truth”, I tried the widespread method of conversation and communication used in Gellerup: gossiping. To see how they were seen in other’s eyes, I spoke with another Turk, Zeynep, who knew Ahmet and his wife well and who reflected on Ahmet’s status during an interview. I want to quote here at length:

... but it [being a teacher] does make a difference. He uses his status ... also against his wife.... [H]e participates in a superior world, and he has made her accept this fact.... He came here as a teacher, and when you come here this way you have a status. Kadriye was overwhelmed by his cultural background, in a very bad way. His diploma hung in the living room, even this was enough for Kadriye to feel inferior. I know this very well.... Kadriye was a very different girl at that time.... In that period, she had to catch up with him ... she had to fit him as a wife.... That diploma no longer hangs in the living room today because Mehmet [Zeynep’s husband] told Ahmet of its effect.

This narration of a Turkish woman, who herself is jobless, brings up some important aspects regarding Turks’ life in Gellerup. Firstly, it indirectly points out that there might be important differences regarding economic capital among Turks. Secondly, distinctions stemming from translation of cultural capital into economic or symbolic capital does not always run smoothly. In other words, in some cases, one can talk about a “symbolic violence” in the appropriation of symbolic capital. Thirdly, in contrast to an expectation that she (Kadriye) would have more cultural resources than Ahmet, because she had lived in Denmark much longer and spoke Danish perfectly, even though she could not match Ahmet’s Turkish, one sees that her capabilities and cultural capital in general did not count so much in Gellerup. This has to do with both gender inequalities and with the fact that the social space in Gellerup is very much constructed in “Turkish” terms, so that coming “later” need not matter so much, although one can also find counter-examples).
Kadriye and Ahmet bought a flat in Gellerup. Neither she nor he have any Danish friends. The group of teachers (and their families) whom they refer to as friends and whom they meet regularly are only other Turks. Their relations to Danes are characterized as tertiary contacts, which cannot be developed more intimately. Hence, distinctions in the social space are in their case mainly made in reference to “Turkish” standards; there are few references to the Danish social space in general. Their symbolic struggle has gone through distinctively Turkish paths. In other terms, it seems that a Turk’s, or a Turkish family’s symbolic capital “counts” most, if not exclusively, in a Turkish context.

Kadriye and Ahmet told me that they spend DKr30,000 on their five-week vacation in Turkey every year, in addition to the usual travel expenses of DKr10,000. Their main recreational activities in Denmark consist of those taking place exclusively in Turkish contexts. For example, they never go to movies, theatre, etc. as other middle-class Danes do. Hence, travelling to Turkey on vacation, “izin” in Turkish, occupies a special position in their leisure activities.

It is important to point out that tourism and leisure activities as a whole are based on the division between work and leisure. According to Urry (1990), this modern division was one of the most important pillars of mass tourism in the twentieth century. This aspect is also important for Turks who have work. Hence, they can afford using approximately twice as much money as they monthly earn on net to get away from work. But this tourism and leisure activity, their “izin”, gains even more importance when thought of in the context of the social space in which they are navigating. This is so especially if travelling to Turkey is seen in the context of symbolic capital (see also Çağlar 1995).

The DKr30,000 Kadriye and Ahmet describe as “pocket money” for their travel to Turkey is used mainly “to help friends” in Turkey. They buy presents for all the families they visit, or they share the expenses of the visited families, who normally earn much less in Turkey than they do in Denmark. “For example, if the daughter of my aunt should get married, I help her. Or if one of my relatives keeps talking about somebody who needs money for this or that purpose, I take money out of my pocket and give ...”. I asked Ahmet why he behaves so generously in Turkey while he does not in Denmark. One of his friends, Metin, visiting him at the moment answered: “You know, the others know you very well. They also have an image of you coming from Europe. You yourself also know that you have more money in your pocket than they have ....”. Ahmet adds that, “when we went to Marmaris [a tourist center in southwest Turkey], we only spent DKr1500. What makes you spend money is your relations to others”. That is, being an ordinary tourist costs less for them in Turkey.
This also means that their money is more easily convertible to “image” in the eyes of the others in Turkey. (Even though one lives predominantly in the “Turkish” social space in Denmark, one is from Europe when in Turkey).

Kadriye bought the chandeliers and the curtains in the living room while travelling in Turkey. Both these items signal very visibly that they are “cultural” goods and reflect the taste of the Turkish urban middle class. She said that these goods both better fit her taste and are much cheaper than the equivalent in Denmark.

Travelling to Turkey, and taking the burden of the expenses it brings, is related to both the fact that Turks are good household economists and that symbolic, or “post-materialistic” values play an increasing role in daily life. Besides, travel can be taken as a part and parcel of globalization tendencies, which we will be doing in the next chapter. Thus, the examples above show that “izin” is increasingly a form in which cultural hybridization related to travel finds expression.

This hybridization has now been partly institutionalized: many small travel agencies (often run by Turks) offer special arrangements with big representatives of the tourism industry (like SAS), which offer travel at reduced price. Thus, today, one can buy an SAS ticket to Turkey from these agencies, often paying less than the cost from SAS directly. In addition, these tendencies of hybridization and globalization also make some of the points mentioned before with respect to activities “inside the group” more ambivalent in that they show that the limits of some social activities extend far beyond the geographical limits of Gellerup.

Now that the focus has been on the “symbolic” importance of Turkey in Turks’ tourist travel and leisure activities, let us look at other cases where the relations with Turkey tend to be more permanent. For example, a Turkish couple recently moved back to Turkey, or more exactly, they spend eight months a year in Turkey working in a tourist center in Dalyan, southwest Turkey (names of places and persons have been changed). Nermin had lived for 27 years in Denmark, since she was 5-years-old, and Levent had lived for 13 years in Denmark, since he married Nermin. In Denmark they were both jobless. Levent had worked with woodwork for four years but was jobless the rest of his time. Nermin had worked as a translator for a couple of years, then as pedagogic assistant for several years. Then she applied to enter the teaching training college in Aarhus, but was rejected. Afterwards, she “gave up”. Three years ago, they raised Dkr400,000 in economic capital from all the money they had saved together and from some their families, who also lived in Denmark, contributed. They tried to invest part of this money in Aarhus in a pizzeria, but their project failed in the initial phase. So two years ago,
they went to Turkey and, with help from some friends in Izmir, opened a laundry in Dalyan. Nermin also began working in a luxurious hotel as a director. She says that, in addition to her English, her Danish was very useful in getting the job.

Dalyan is a small tourist area, which has become popular in the last 8-10 years. The local community is quite rural, and one cannot say that the local culture has yet been thoroughly “modernized”. But tourism has created a “nouveau-riche” community. In this context, Nermin (N) and I (B) talked about how life was for her in Dalyan after moving from Aarhus:

...

B. But you managed to move to Turkey without problems.

N. Well, I am aware that I was more successful than I thought I could be.

B. How come? What is your social life like in Dalyan?

N. [laughing] I don’t have a social life in Dalyan.... My first year there was terrible.... We could not participate in the way of life or established traditional order there.

B. Did you feel like an outsider to the local culture?

N. Yes, but I gradually found Dalyan interesting in itself. There are many hidden things going on, for example. But the first year was hard, I experienced it very hard as a woman. They found us strange, they were always looking at us with doubt. For example, in their eyes Levent and I were only pretending we were married to each other; we were going different places, we were making different friends.... At first I couldn’t make any contacts, there weren’t any possibilities.... They looked at us as if we were tourists, most of them did not want to accept that we were going to stay. That’s why people were distanced. We were Europeans for them ...

...

But with time, we got a place in their eyes and people began to accept us. Then they began to show a different kind of respect....

...

I feel more like a stranger in Turkey [than in Denmark]. Whatever I do to adapt myself, I am treated as a stranger. They said it too. They are irritated by my way of walking, my mimics, my looking into the eyes of others while I talk with them.... They say that it is very clear that I am a European, that I am very self-confident. It is always as if we are not one of them.

B. But it sounds as if they almost admire this kind of an outsider you are describing?

N. Precisely. They admire that we are open, tolerant and honest. They interpret this as our being Europeans. We act like individuals and so on.
As she clearly expressed, her social position, or her image, in the eyes of Dalyan’s people was not at all the worst it could be. Even if, in the beginning especially, her way of life created problems for being treated as “one of them”, it is not at all clear how much she really wished it, especially in consideration of her self-presentation above. At least, she positioned herself quite differently from other people in Dalyan. She also said that others in Dalyan positioned her symbolically and culturally above themselves, “as a European”. In short, even if it has not been totally free of problems, she has had no problems in establishing her “sense of place” at quite an high level in Dalyan, which also can explain why, in an almost purely “post-materialistic” manner, she accepted work in a hotel as a director with a salary 3-4 times lower than what she got in Aarhus when she was on social welfare. Next year, she plans to start her own business in Dalyan. This also explicitly shows the nature of an ambivalence mentioned above, namely between being on social welfare in Denmark and a member of the middle class in Turkey.

But interestingly, her middle-class position in Turkey is also ambivalent in that her position varies in tune with geographical movement, e.g. from rural to urban settings. For example, we talked about her social relations in the city of Izmir, where she has friends whom she and her husband met through a friend in Aarhus. When I asked about her social relations in Izmir, she said she “cannot explain it as clearly as her relations in Dalyan”. She was “annoyed” that her friends in Izmir “categorized” her. “In what way?”, I asked: “By behaviours, attitudes, the way of talking. In their world, I was treated as a curiosity object for the first years. It was as if I laid on an operating table and underwent surgery”.

What is clear in Nermin’s story is that her Turkish friends in Izmir were people placed considerably higher in the social hierarchy than the “others” in Dalyan, and Nermin complained that they positioned people with less cultural capital less advantageously in their daily life. For example, she did not mention that they perceive her as a European, as was the case in Dalyan, when using the same criteria, such as ways of talking, behaviours, etc. The lack of recognition she met and the insecurity that followed in positioning herself among these people also made her critical towards them, but in a different way compared to the way she was critical towards the people of Dalyan. Her narration about those in Izmir created a distance in a direction opposite to that created vis-à-vis Dalyan. Her social position in Izmir might also have had to do with being an “Almanci”, the denigrating concept used in Turkey (especially among the middle class) for defining workers in Europe, implying that they become nouveaux riches (indeed richer than themselves) without accumulating comparable cultural capital. In other words, the
Turks in Europe, unless they are academics, artists, etc., have difficulties in transforming their economic capital into symbolic capital and hence in getting recognition. But it must be remembered that Nermin referred to “friends” in the examples above. I asked her how the situation was in contexts outside these friendships or acquaintances:

In a city like Izmir, when, for example, I walk into a shop, first I meet delicately refined manners. They look at how I am dressed and think that I am a distinguished person. But this lasts only until I speak my first words.... You know, my Turkish is flat. As soon as I begin speaking, somehow something happens, and I feel her close up ... or something like that ... I feel it very deeply. But more in larger cities like Izmir and Istanbul.

Thus, even though she feels like an outsider in Dalyan, she is nevertheless recognized and positioned advantageously there, and her capacities are both needed and used. But in Izmir, it does not seem so and she meets a fate similar to that of other “Almancis”.

Her capacities activated in Dalyan could not be used in the labour market in Aarhus either. When we talked about this, I suggested it could perhaps be explained by discrimination in the labour market. She could, for example, have gotten a job in a travel agency in Aarhus and worked as a guide for them in Dalyan, where they arrange tours as well. But she intervened: “I don’t feel like a stranger in Denmark. You might find it absurd, but I haven’t felt racism or discrimination in my own body in Denmark. I don’t think I am treated as a stranger i Denmark”.

Construction of temporality and spatiality

These last remarks above are extremely interesting, and not at all absurd. Nermin says directly that she does not experience racism or discrimination in Aarhus. More precisely, she says she is not “affected by it”, while at the same time she accepts that it exists. I posed the same question to all I interviewed, and only a few of them openly talked about feeling discrimination and racism in their own bodies. Most answers resembled Nermin’s. They were all aware that the issue was popular “in the media”, but they did not think that “they” met discrimination or the problems mentioned in the media. As Nermin formulated it, the media “has to find something to write about”. That is, she believes that the media exaggerates it.
The interviewees referred to the media (and politicians) more clearly when they talked about the bad image of Gellerup.

Actually life in Gellerup is as ordinary as in other places. I don’t feel there are so many problems here. (Ali)

Whoever is bored comes and blames Gellerup for something.... This place has gained a bad reputation. It is difficult to live here. The problems of immigrants living in other places [more isolated] than Gellerup are actually greater.... (Mustafa)

Things happen everywhere else too, but it is not reflected in the newspapers. (Kalbiye)

It is not possible to assume that [everything written on Gellerup] has something to do with us.... All kinds of people live here. The media exaggerates and puffs the events up. (Ibrahim)

All these narrations on the role of the media point out, for example, that the persons above believe they live in “another Gellerup” than the one mentioned in the media and politics. They all underline that it is the media or the politicians who “puff up” the problems, and the bad image is the consequent product of the media’s activities. Regarding racism and discrimination, most of them admit that “other Turks” experience racism but say: “I don’t”; “I don’t get affected by it”; “I don’t believe it”. Why do they “deny the obvious”? As Bourdieu reminds us, the interviewees know well “that, in a situation whose stake is to impose the most favourable representation of one’s position, public admission of failure, as an act of recognition, is de facto impossible” (Bourdieu 1992b: 255-6). As I hope to show in the following, these people do not want to publicly accept a “failure”, which they do if they accept that they are discriminated against, or that they experience racism. Therefore, they impose a favourable representation on their positions.

It might be that the persons above are “displacing” some of what they are “seeing” if not experiencing; that is, in Freud’s terms, they are repressing a reality by trying to push aside the fact that they are discriminated against or that their territories are segregated and stigmatized. As Angelika Bammer states regarding the role of the concept of displacement in Freud’s and Derrida’s works, pushing aside (one meaning of displacement) is a “critical move” in the interpretative, that is, meaning-creating, processes. In other words, in the interpretative scheme that
the Turks employ above, the pushing aside of discrimination can be important in their meaning-creating processes in the social space. In this process, “meaning becomes différence—infinitely dispersed, indefinitely deferred”. And, “what is displaced—dispersed, deferred, repressed, pushed aside—is, significantly, still there: displaced, but not replaced, it remains a source of trouble, the shifting ground of signification that makes meaning tremble” (Bammer 1994: xiii).

How can one approach this “shifting” ground? In the following, I will try to illuminate this, building on Manuchehr Sanadjian’s analysis (1995) of German Iranians’ construction of temporality and spatiality.

The persons referred to above identify themselves as “foreigners”, “Turks” or alike; that is, they are aware that they are in a “Danish” social space. In other words, they are aware that they are “latecomers” to their Danish “Home”, which is, above all, “temporally” constructed. That is, it is the time lived in Denmark and being born Danish that matter most. As latecomers, they are also aware of the temporal construction of “otherness” with points of reference to this Danish “Home”. Thus, they reflexively calculate that engaging in the dichotomy of Danishness versus Foreignness in these temporal terms positions them as “outsiders”, what constantly takes place in the discourse of immigration.

Given this background, what happens when they negate that they experience discrimination in Denmark can be interpreted to mean they actually negate negotiating in terms of the temporality of Danish “Home”. They negate their “otherness” by claiming that they are not discriminated against, that is, they are not treated as “others” (and it is telling, in this context, that they are also extremely aware that it might sound “embarrassing” or “absurd” to the listener). In short, denying racism amounts to denying otherness. In Sanadjian’s words, they seek “invisibility”, and this is “not simply a subversive denial of hegemonic [Danishness] through the denial of its opposite, that is, the Other” (Sanadjian 1995: 20):

The elision of the eye, represented in a narrative of negation and repetition—no ... no ... never—insists that the phrase of identity cannot be spoken, except by putting the eye/I in the impossible position of enunciation.... What is interrogated is not simply the image of the person, but the discursive and disciplinary place from which questions of identity are strategically and institutionally posed. (Bhabha 1994: 47)

In other words, the interviewees above do not want to be the “subjects” of the discourses as “immigrants”, subjects who are, as mentioned in chapter 2, created
by linguistic interpellations. Here the strategy of invisibility seems to be the secret, or the cornerstone, of the Turks’ construction of their temporality and spatiality. By denying racism—“it does not affect me”—they deny the dichotomy of us/them; by denying a negotiation between “us” and “them”, between Danes and the ones that are discriminated, they strip the ubiquitous, all-pervasive and all-present Danishness of its point of reference, its marked other. In this, they deliberately do not allow the formation of a subject as “discriminated foreigners” outside “us”. And it seems that they are aware of the very fact that even if one allows the construction of such a subjectivity in positive terms (for example by criticizing discrimination), it will still position them outside “us”. In short, then, one can say that the Turks above try to “detemporalize” the social space.

But in this strategy of detemporalizing, which is aimed at “spatializing” their presence in the social space as would-be-equals, instead of positioning themselves as “latecomers”, their positions are very weak. If we take “spatializing” strategies as those aimed at inclusion and participation in the existing subsystems of society here and now (in contrast to “temporalizing” strategies that are constructed on “historical” points of references as shared past), then we must conclude that their economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital do not help them in obtaining a considerably high “place” in the social space, or at least that they have severe difficulties in this. Hence, in the strategy of spatializing the temporality of the Danish “Home”, they are in practice confronted with limits and barriers that result from their positions in a game the rules of which they do not have the necessary symbolic power to re-assemble.

Thus, another strategy, what Sanadjian calls “restoring another temporal dimension” by “narrativisation in the private sphere”, is activated (Sanadjian1995: 30). Since Turks are aware of their deficits in the public sphere, they are inclined to build another temporality. In other words, they privately mobilize their discourse to reduce the distance from the Danish centre. Thus, none of the Turks quoted before, Ali, Mustafa, Kalbiye, Hakan, Ibrahim, Kadriye... “personally” meet racism, even though they all refer to “others” experiencing it.

This conscious retreat from the public sphere (for example, by mentioning racism, etc.) into the private sphere is also what makes their “conversations” more “tactical” and “rhetorical” in the sense de Certeau describes the concepts (referred to earlier in chapter 3). As shown in chapter 1, Aarhus and Danish politics of immigration is “discursive” in the sense that it “strategically” builds upon a “Danish” base, the Danish “Home”, as “the proper place” from which it projects itself onto its targets, that is, the “foreigners”. All the above mentioned Turks are conscious of this strategic construction of the discourse of immigration, which they
meet in the newspapers, on TV, and when they talk with their caseworkers, researchers, and Danish acquaintances. In this social space where they lack the necessary symbolic power, they do not have an unambiguous base to argue for or against the conflicts in the context of immigration; and the stark majority of them do not even visibly participate in the public discussions about themselves.

Hence, when they are confronted with the official discourse on “them”, they tactically insinuate themselves “into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety, without being able to keep it a distance” (de Certeau 1984: xix) and by trying to subvert the discourse of the “Home”. Their tactical operation seems to be based on being “silent” about the dichotomy of us and them. In a social space where their position-takings are “disqualified”, they gradually take on the status of a “silent group” (Einarsdóttir 1992: 72).

What is it that makes a group muted? We ... become aware that it is muted simply because it does not form a part of the dominant communicative system expressed as it must be through the dominant ideology. (S. Ardener; quoted in Einarsdóttir 1992: 72)

But this silence must not only be perceived as a space of passivity; even though it can be an expression of passivity in the public sphere, it is an active area where subversion of dominant ideologies takes place, e.g. negating being represented in terms of its divisions, as shown before. At the same time, this position-taking also expresses negation of the identity imposed by the dominant discourses, e.g. being one of “them” as a subject. In this, by negating becoming the “subjects” and the subject-roles which the dominant discourses ascribe them (including my own), it seems that they choose what Baudrillard has called “the strategy of the object”.

Interestingly, Baudrillard mentions that the absolutely privileged position of the subject in our thinking is based on a fiction about a will, a consciousness or subconscious that is assumed to reside in the subject. That is, the privileging of the subject is often grounded in that the subject “desires”. But if we move on from this reassuring and tranquillizing philosophy of desire to a philosophy of “seduction”, which is “the object’s own power”, everything in our thinking will be turned upside down, since here what matters “is no longer the subject who desires, but the object that seduces” (Baudrillard 1987: 126-127; my translation; see also 1985).

Precisely because the Turks quoted above are so explicitly engaged in subversions of the dominant discourses regarding their subject-positions, one can say they know or feel that “the subject can only desire, only the object can seduce”. It seems that they do not want to desire becoming like Danes first by
accepting their subject position as “them” and then by striving to become like “us”, a process which easily might be a never-ending one. This strategy of becoming the object mainly builds on negating (imposed and/or offered) subjectivity and knowing that “they are not foreigners” (just as Baudrillard mentions with respect to children’s knowing that “they are not children” in their confrontation with modern pedagogy that interpellates them into this role—Baudrillard 1987: 126; my translation). In other words, they neither recognize themselves in the discourse of immigration (thus the “immigrant” of the official discourses does not really exist) nor do they accept the offer (of first becoming the immigrant and then ...). They operate with a daily-world experience and know that things are more ambivalent.

As a way of operating in daily life, their “silence” can also be interpreted as being “rhetorical”. As De Certeau says:

The discipline of rhetoric offers models for differentiating among the types of tactics. This is not surprising, since on the one hand, it describes the “turns” or tropes of which the language can be both the site and the object, and, on the other hand, these manipulations are related to the ways of changing (seducing, persuading, making use of) the will of the another (the audience). For these two reasons, rhetoric, the science of “the ways of speaking” offers an array of figure-types for the analysis of everyday ways of acting even though such analysis is in theory excluded from scientific discourse. (De Certeau 1984: xx)

In short, what I want to argue is that the Turks above “subvert” the “will of another”, that is, the Danish audience, by negating or by trying to escape participation in the “game” in the social space, as Boudieu defines it.

As a consequence of this strategy of escaping the temporality of the Danish “Home”, but not being successful in “spatializing” it, Turks seem to construct another temporality of “Turkishness” in a new way. This temporality of “Turkishness”, which will be mentioned in more detail in the context of globalization in the next chapter, plays a decisive role in daily life. Thus, in the discourse of most Turks I spoke with, Turkey is “the Home”, that is, another and more important point of reference than the Danish “centre”, whose temporality they seek to become “invisible” within. Needless to say, this is not to warm up the old good argument about immigrants’ so-called “dream” of turning back to origins, implying that they have not found out that they live in Denmark yet, etc. Rather, as I showed, especially regarding Turks’ symbolic capital, Turkey is here-and-now
reconstructed and re-imagined actively as a “Home”, something which also has diasporic dimensions. As James Clifford formulates:

diasporic forms of longing, memory and (dis)identification are shared by a broad spectrum of minority and immigrant populations. And dispersed peoples, once separated from homelands by vast oceans and political barriers, increasingly find themselves in border relations with the old country thanks to a to-and-fro made possible by modern technologies of transport, communication, and labour immigration. Airplanes, telephones, tape cassettes, camcorders, and mobile job markets reduce distances and facilitate two-way traffic, legal and illegal, between the world’s places. (Clifford 1994: 304)

In this diasporic traffic between Denmark and Turkey, one can easily find “a new symbolic novelty”, which develops when groups of people are “in a position to think themselves as living lives parallel to those of other substantial groups of people” (Anderson 1991: 188). According to Benedict Anderson, one of the conditions of this parallelism or simultaneity, which also creates the basis of “an imagined community”, is that “the distance between the parallel groups be large, and that the newer of them be substantial in size and permanently settled ...” (1991: 188).

**Autonomy versus different forms of heteronomy**

In the social space, Turks do not behave only as individuals, that is, the Turk as an individual is not a person whose actions and freedom of choice are uncompromised upon or totally autonomous against someone else’s choices and power. Thus, one can neither speak of Turks as autonomous individuals or as a totally “informal” Turkish community in Gellerup. There are both processes, aimed at making it more formal, and counter-processes, which question how “real” this Turkish community is. On some occasions and to important effects, these “normalizing” processes establish the Turkish community in Gellerup as a “collective” actor. Just to name some of the most important “collectivizing” (e.g. categorizing, demographizing, stereotyping) pressures of the environment, I want to dwell on three aspects here: firstly, the controlling effects of Turkish cultural and social networks; secondly, the effects of clientalization inscribed in the welfare
state regulation; and thirdly the expansion of neo-fundamentalist political organizations among the Turks in Gellerup.

*Internal networks and control*

Ahmet came to Denmark at the end of 1980s with the expectation of meeting the modern “Europe” in Denmark. But during one of his first days in Gellerup, when he “wanted to go hand in hand” with his wife, whom he had married only a couple of weeks before, she pulled her hands away as soon as she saw other Turks approaching. She explained by saying that “people do not do it in Gellerup”. In other words, she was aware of the eyes of other Turks. Ahmet says, “I could more easily understand this if it had happened in my old town in Turkey”. This is not the only story pointing toward the calculation of others’ expectations and considerations of oneself. Thus Levent says, “The environment exerts an incredible pressure on one. To break out of it is very difficult. How can I say it? It is just that, to change would mean to strip off your skin”.

Such conversations clearly reveal that in the interactions of individuals in Gellerup, the “others” are extremely important. Indeed, this seems to be a significant pillar under all processes and pressures behind “collectivizing” tendencies that stem from the internal dynamics of the Turkish “community” in Gellerup. It goes without saying that such conversations also reveal that persons involved reflect on what they do. Obviously, they set aside time for reflection, which in fact means that we cannot speak of an unreflective “traditionality” in Gellerup. None of the points in my conversations in Gellerup display as such a convention or tradition which people merely take over and do not reflect on.

*Welfare state and collectivization of identity*

As an external dynamic that structures the collectivization of the conduct of the individual Turk in Gellerup, the effect of “clientalization” by the welfare system must be mentioned in connection with the internal pressures mentioned above. Let us, for an example, look at Ayse’s case. She tells how her relations with the labour market ended the last time:
I have been at home [unemployed] since December 1995. I do not attend any courses either.... I had an appointment with a caseworker in the employment service. In January, we were going to talk about, and make plans for, my future. I did not hear anything form her, and then I called [the employment service], and I was told she was on maternity leave. I said I wanted to speak with somebody else and explained the situation. They told me that they would send me a letter. Two months passed and I called again, and they told me again that they would send me a letter.... It is quite boring [to be unemployed]. One wants to do something.... I don’t have a child either.... There is nothing.... You wake up in the morning, you clean up.... Afterwards there is nothing to do....

In her “Kafkaesque” story, one clearly sees the importance of the unemployment service, or rather how dependent she is on this institution for her relations with the labour market. She also totally accepts it as natural that her relationship to the labour market is regulated through this institution.

In 1988, a psychologist, Marianne Ørsted, interviewed social workers in Gellerup (Ørsted 1988):

Question: What is Turkish culture?
Answer: Family solidarity, a religion different from that of the majority of Danes and family reunification.

To this was added other “convincing” details about religious rituals, Turkish wedding ceremonies, etc. in classifying the “truth” about Turks. Then:

Question: What is Danish culture then?
Answer: Danish culture, it is things like cosiness....

Question: Which Danish norms would you give them [the Turkish children]?
Answer: If one has made an appointment, then it must be kept, for example....

As can be seen, the social workers from Gellerup operated with much clearer stereotypes about the “Turkish” culture, which is defined in very unambivalent terms and in a very self-certain way, than about the “Danish” one, something that also turns the project of truth-seeking constantly into an ambivalent one.
Very importantly, the institutional system pictures immigrants (and refugees) as persons “to be integrated”, or “not-yet-integrated”, thus as persons who should learn something about the way Danish society functions in order to become a part of it. As is crystal-clear in the first chapter, the politics of immigration is characterized by a will to “integrate” (even if it often means “assimilate” in practice, we need not concern ourselves with the content of the concept for the moment). One can also say that the system seems to operate on the basis of the assumption that integration as the system defines it is best independently of what immigrants themselves want. In other words, the system, in its relations to immigrants, more often than not enlists its own purposes (say integration) as the single immigrant’s purpose (to get integrated), that is, the systemic will to “integration” of the immigrant becomes pictured as the immigrant’s own purpose. This severely jeopardises one’s freedom of choice and actually means that one’s actions no longer are autonomous but heteronomous: “... what power amounts to is the ability to deploy other people’s actions as the means to one’s own end; more generally, it is the ability to reduce the constraint imposed by other people’s freedom on one’s own choice of ends and the calculation of means” (Bauman 1990: 115).

Perhaps much more than the economic relationship between the welfare state and its recipients, this heteronomous definition of the single “not-yet-integrated” immigrant’s aims and resources in Danish society, which is also increasingly combined with economic incitements and sanctions related to the social welfare system, plays a substantial role in transforming relationships between the single Turk and the system into a giver/recipient relationship. Thus, the one-sidedness of this relationship excludes first of all a social reciprocity, and a hierarchical structure is gradually established in which recipients are systematically disqualified, only to get supervised, commissioned and “brought up” later. In this disqualification, the above-mentioned importance of the temporality of the Danish “Home” plays a key role in picturing immigrants as “latecomers” and not capable of knowing Danish society well enough. Thus, for example, in language courses as they are reshaped today, any immigrant has to learn about “the Danish way of life”, whatever it is, as a necessary part of the curriculum (the question being, of course, what the “hidden” curriculum is). But nevertheless, as I try to show, both their conscious and “tacit” knowledge of society, especially with respect to the functioning of the social space, does not have limited capacity.

It seems that the hierarchy of the relationship between the caseworkers (or the welfare system as a whole) and the welfare recipients also establish a separated space from the rest of society. In this space, immigrants and refugees are
confronted with “immigrant experts” (most commonly social workers, or in the
different instances of the municipal or state bureaucracy, psychologists,
pedagogues, researchers, etc.) and are, as a group, classified in one way or
another (as, for example, “abnormal”, “socially burdened” or “not self-sustaining”) to
varying degrees with varying concepts. Thus, the space of immigration is in a
way constructed as an “outside”. Thus, in this outside space, an “immigrant
identity”, which is more or less stripped of other “normal” identities around and
which is more or less perceived as a “deviance” to be handled, also seems to be
established discursively. Additionally, this space is also a “controlled” space via
institutional instances. In these respects, the regulation of immigration brings to
mind what Goffman has called a “total institution”, because “the handling of many
human needs by the bureaucratic organization of whole blocks of people—
whether or not this is a necessary or effective means of social organization in the
circumstances—is the key fact of total institutions” (quoted in Einarsdóttir 1992:
89; see also Goffman 1978: 18).

One could say that the domain of immigration constitutes a “virtual” total
institution, but nevertheless “more real than real”. However, in this study, instead
of forcing this resemblance too much, I want to stick to the metaphor of
“panopticon” to underline that everything immigrants do is potentially an object
for the gaze of politics of immigration. Moreover, it must be underlined that it is
the above-mentioned “potentiality” that makes the concept of panopticon more
suitable compared to the “total institutions” which can be taken as an organized
and a very concrete generalization of panopticon.

What is especially significant in the present context is that this “control”, or
“regulation”, emanating from the politics of immigration in a broad scope, is also
an instance where individual autonomy diminishes. Thus, at stake in the politics of
immigration is often the individual and his or her moral capacities to make
decisions and responsibilities. It is, therefore, important to recall that the most
important variations in the mainstream politics of immigration, or dispersions in
the discourse of immigration, like assimilationism or integrationism, are silent
about this issue: in assimilationism, the main reference point of the individual
immigrant becomes the heteronomous “Danish society”, which is also conceived
of as being homogeneous; and in integrationism, while policies take into
consideration “group” autonomy, this group autonomy this time replaces the
individual autonomy in that one has to become like others in one’s own group.

The dilemmas and dead-ends in this dichotomization between politics of
assimilation and multiculturalist integration are grounded in that both only shift
the site of disablement and subordination from the individual self, in the case of assimilation, to the universalist state, or, in the latter case, to the “tribe”.

Islamic fundamentalism

To begin with, we can focus on an example. Today the municipality and the government are trying to cut expenses related to bilingual education by limiting it to the children of EU citizens. That is, to the degree they succeed, the children of immigrants and refugees from other origins will not be able to receive formal education in their mother tongue. Consequently, it may seem that the state and the municipality are “taking back” a part of their regulative mechanism, because mother tongue is viewed now as the family’s own business instead of the state’s responsibility. Thus, it also seems like a positive change concerning heteronomous aspects of state (over)regulation. But it must be noted that this development takes place at the same time an “inflation” of regulation is occurring and increasingly disciplinary politics are being practised in Aarhus (see chapter 1). Hence it seems that while immigrants are more and more set “in focus” via disciplinary policies, there also arise areas of de-regulation, which are obviously processes that can go hand in hand.

At the same time, one witnesses a growth of Islamic schools. Thus, more Turkish families are sending their children to Islamic private schools today. One may find this development positive. For example, Necef says in the context of Islamic schools, “I think we must support any attempt from the immigrants’ side to break off the dependence on the authorities.... It must be every parents’ right to choose which schools and which pedagogy their children are to be subject to” (Morgenposten Fyens Stiftstidende, 28 November 1995). Because the autonomy of the single family is better than the heteronomous control of the “authorities”, one can support the development of private Islamic schools. But the problem here is the a priori acceptance of the “autonomy” of the single family. In other words, the processes of collectivizing inside the Turkish “community” can make such a seemingly liberal presupposition inherently problematical. What follows privatization may be, for example, “tribalization”:

Ethnic herding and confessional flocking together take over when the collective responsibility of the polis fizzles out. The dissipation of the social rebounds in the consolidation of the tribal. As identities go, privatization means tribalization. (Bauman 1996: 57)
Since the middle of the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, Islamic groups have organized themselves to a considerable degree, and today they are a very powerful group inside the Turkish minority. This is a process that developed parallel to the development of neo-fundamentalism in Turkey, and given the importance of Turkey for the social space Turks navigate in, it can easily be understood that it has serious implications and consequences for European Turks. For example, in the last elections in Turkey (December 1995), approximately 300,000 Turkish immigrants in Europe travelled to Turkey to vote for the Welfare party, which is now an Islamic fundamentalist party with the largest voter base in Turkey.

The Welfare party is also talked about in Gellerup. I asked Döndü, quoted before, how her relations to “Refahists” (those supporting the Welfare party) are. She is a woman who defines herself as Muslim and, for example, uses the head scarf in her daily life:

B. Why are you afraid of the expansion of Refahists in Gellerup?
D. They group to that degree that... now they can exert pressure on us as well.... Because we don’t agree with them, they don’t even say hello to us.... I don’t know in which way they read those religious books, they defend them so extremely that....
...
B. If they increase in numbers, how will it change Gellerup?
D. ... at the least, they will say to people around “you are a Muslim, but you don’t practice what religion and the book says”... It will result in conflicts.... It is not going to be nice.

As a particularly political religious grouping, which, as a Turk said, “brings easy solutions to everything”, the people organizing in Refahist terms also exert pressure on other Turks, and most importantly, they refill the occasional political voids taking place after “de-regulation” and privatization. Thus, an extremely important question regarding the local community, which is generally held to be exclusively “informal”, is “Who is the culture?”; for “culture” is created by people, it is also about “who defines what for whom, and who is in the position to put power behind the words” (Wikan 1995: 34-37).

This dimension is significant also because by categories and stereotypes (like Turkish/Danish, etc.), the Turkish “community” in Gellerup is perceived as being homogeneous and autonomous in the discourse of immigration politics. But, as
Döndü above makes very clear, there are differences and hence different stakes in Gellerup. This also makes it dangerous to argue in a neo-liberal manner that anything against the state is good, simply because there are always other actors equally ambitious to make decisions on behalf of other Turks in Gellerup.

And, again significantly, there are interesting ambivalences. For example, while it seems that the majority of Turks in Gellerup would vote for the Welfare party in Turkey (an estimation shared by all those interviewed and Turkish local politicians in Aarhus), this same majority overwhelmingly would vote for the Social Democratic party in Danish local elections.
5 Hybridity, Globalization and the Stranger

A city is composed of different kinds of men; similar people cannot bring a city into existence. (Aristoteles; quoted in Sennett 1994)

Territorial and functional separation cease to suffice once the mere “unfamiliar” turns to be the true “stranger”, aptly described by Simmel as “the man who comes today and stays tomorrow”. The stranger is, indeed, someone who refuses to remain confined to the “far away” land or go away from our own and hence a priori defies the easy expedient of spatial and temporal segregation. The stranger comes into the life-world and settles here, and so—unlike the case of mere “unfamiliars”—it becomes “relevant” whether he is a friend or a foe.... If we press upon him the friend/enemy opposition, he would come out simultaneously under- and over-determined. And thus, by proxy, he would expose the failing of the opposition itself. He is a constant threat to the worlds of order. (Bauman 1991: 59)

In the discourse of immigration, terms like immigrant, refugee, foreigner, guest worker, etc. are sought to be used in a rather “unambivalent” way to define groups of people as accurately as possible. Thus, who is supposed to be an immigrant and, say, not a refugee, where one should come from to be considered an immigrant, etc. are defined legally in very clear terms that often amount to an easily recognizable category of “immigrant”. In Danish politics, an immigrant is legally defined as a person with non-Danish citizenship, but residing in Denmark. Nevertheless, as formulated in a white paper by the Danish government, the politics of immigration is oriented especially towards those “coming from third world countries”. This is because an immigrant coming from the Nordic countries, the EU or North America, for example, is “expected to manage living in Denmark” (Redegørelse 12, April 12, 1983). That is, you are more of an “immigrant” if you come from a “third world country”, which is quite resonant with the popular understanding of the term in daily life. What we have here is, in short, a quite
precise naming, which immediately helps us construct and recognize the immigrant. But what if this naming, or categorization, does not reflect social identities of people and thus hides more than it reveals? What if it merely produces more ambivalence, by forcing people into their “proper places”? 

Arguing in this chapter that this is most often the case, I want to view immigrants, foreigners, refugees, etc. all as “strangers”. In this, the concept of the stranger is a useful tool for going beneath these static significations, which are perhaps not much more than what Bauman once called “legal fictions” that aim to make the strangerhood in these categories neutral and recognizable (1994b). Concomitantly, I will try to combine the figure of stranger, as introduced by Simmel and redeveloped by Bauman, with the Danish debate on immigration. This is relevant also because, even in everyday life, we see that there is an ongoing struggle over whether “strangers” ought to be defined as “friends” or “enemies”. Some say, as already mentioned, they are “just like us”; others picture them as “enemies”. But what if we take the issue of ambivalence seriously? Then, strangers, being immanently ambivalent, may also pose disturbing questions regarding the premises of the ongoing debate. Furthermore, given this background, strangerhood increasingly becomes an ethical touchstone in several social negotiations.

The stranger and the ambiguity of immigration

Can one be a foreigner and happy? The foreigner calls forth a new idea of happiness. Between the fugue and the origin: a fragile limit, a temporary homeostasis. Posited, present, sometimes certain, that happiness knows nevertheless that it is passing by, like fire that shines only because it consumes. The strange happiness of the foreigner consists in maintaining that fleeting eternity or that perpetual transience. (Kristeva 1991: 4)

I agree with those who say that school children of foreigners do not always do well. I think they are split between two cultures, and that is why I also believe that, considering the children, it would be a big advantage if their parents ended this situation [by moving back]. (Helge Dohrmann; quoted in Sørensen 1988: 22; my translation)
Helge Dohrmann, publicly known already in the 1980s for his racist utterances in the Danish media, formulates the situation of those “split” children as a Neither/Nor, and thus as an “identity problem” that can only be resolved by moving back to the country of origin. But he is not original at all. It has been the mainstream approach in the discourse of immigration to picture strangers only by their deficits, their split identities, experience of cultural shock, the pity of homesickness, etc.

This one-sided perception of the uprooting of the stranger from his or her origins can be historically cited. Socrates found that “even death as a citizen was more honorable than exile”. Thucydides said that “foreigners have no speech”; and having no right to vote in the polis, their speech was in his eyes “the chattering of those who can’t vote” (Sennett 1996: 185). In contrast with this line of thinking, Sennett asserts that being a foreigner or a stranger is indeed a rich experience and has a considerable positive value. Being a foreigner means first and foremost being “dis-placed” and experiencing the disturbances this condition causes.

If one is not inclined to the nostalgia of returning to a “Home”, which is becoming more and more common, especially in nationalistic versions of the critique of modernity, displacement and the following disturbances have above all a positive reflexive value regarding personal development and social life. This is so simply because we can only become “centred” persons by experiencing problems and confrontations as well as peaceful togetherness with others. As Simmel would put it, conflicts are also important means of sociability and cohesion; only with those we share nothing in life do we not have conflicts with. According to Sennett, this fact makes “the art of exposure” to outer life, to the world of strangers, an unavoidable and indispensable component of social life. Without will and courage to exposure, we simply do not grow up, says Sennett. Importantly, exposure does not only mean seeing and being seen by others, in what Balzac called “the gastronomy of the eye”, exposure is also letting one’s body and soul become vulnerable. “Vulnerable bodies” is the metaphor Sennett uses to underline the importance of “touching”, which we have mentioned. But, again importantly, “touching” does not only refer to the principle of pleasure; pain also plays a constructive role for vulnerable bodies (Sennett 1990; 1994). Displacements, of both the self and the outer context, are constructive precisely because of their disturbing or, one could say deconstructing, character; they show that “the solidity of undisplaced things, as of selves which have not experienced displacement, may indeed be the greatest of illusions” (Sennett 1996: 176). Displacement is the “distorting mirror” which, for example, destabilizes Dohrmann’s above quoted
assumptive and illusory picture of “two cultures” as solid and thus “invulnerable” wholes outside each other.

The experience of seeing oneself somewhere else or in a new situation, where the familiarity and the solidity of given surroundings increasingly diminish and get relativized, also makes the stranger a special figure in modern and postmodern life conditions where almost all people are in one way or another displaced, or become immigrants because of globalization, increasing mobility, urbanization, tourism, etc. In other words, new time/space relationships emerge following displacements on a global scale; the world becomes more and more worlds of displacements and naturally of re-placements generated by increasing universalization of strangerhood. Hence, interest increases in hybridity, globalization, complexity, “travelling cultures” (see for example Bhabha 1994; Clifford 1992) and in the figure of the stranger as a whole in contemporary social thought.

The figure of the stranger is also extremely important with respect to urban complexity and the way we use and imagine cities, or regarding our “conceived” and “lived” spaces. This is so to such an extent that urbanists even define the city itself as “a human settlement in which strangers are likely to meet” (Sennett 1986: 39).

Urban life is living with strangers. If urban life presupposes strangers, then, as Zygmunt Bauman writes, also modernity can be defined as living with strangers, because modernity is dependent upon urban life. The modern person navigates among others whose actions she or he has to calculate with respect to risk and adventure, and strangerhood arises precisely at this moment as a gap between the knowledge of one’s own motives and actions and the uncertainty related to others’ motives and actions. Thus, all “[c]ity life is carried on by strangers among strangers” (Bauman 1995: 126).

Life without strangers could definitely not be an urban life; the only place where there is no stranger is thus the almost bygone not-yet-globalized village. But, even though this remark could be considered banal, the politics of immigration seems to be failing to notice this banality and its importance, while urban policies are constantly trying, in John Rex’s words, quoted before, “to save the city from the immigrants”.

This fear that eats up “the spirit of Aarhus” relates to the fact that the figure of the stranger is an ambivalent one. In the sociological tradition, spanning from Simmel to Bauman, the stranger is seen as the prototypical example of ambivalence, which means the “possibility of assigning an object or an event to more than one category” (Bauman 1991: 1). Belonging to more than one category
means ambivalence, contingency, inconsistency and indeterminacy as long as the search for definitions based on “either/or” is present. On the other hand, belonging to one side of “either/or” means order. “Building and keeping order means making friends and enemies, first and foremost, however, it means purging ambivalence” (Bauman 1992b: 120). Hence, as long as the stranger rejects belonging to “us” or “them”, he or she is a “constant threat to the worlds of order”:

So where we are now is that a whole country of people believe I’m a “nigger,” and I don’t, and the battle is on! Because if I am not what I’ve been told I am, then it means that you’re not what you thought you were either! And that is the crisis. (Baldwin 1988: 8)

Opposing the very opposition of us/them, the stranger also relativizes the familiarity of “us” and shows the imaginary character of the boundaries we operate with (Bauman 1990: 54). Signalling the impossibility of being located at only one definite territory, which is identical with itself, the stranger blurs, problematizes and removes the limits drawn unambiguously as borders. Seen in this way, the ambivalence of the stranger is both the source and the consequence of “naming”, which Baldwin nicely questions above.

This signifying activity, naming, emphasizes that strangerhood is a social construction. If so, then “we” as a unity is also a social construction as well as its opposite, “them”. Thus we cannot define or take the “we” for granted either. If the discourse of immigration constructs “Danishness” by constantly pointing out, separating, naming and fixing its “Other”, e.g. the immigrant, this operation reifies and petrifies not only the immigrant/stranger, but also what is defined as Danishness, as “us”.

When or if stripped of this reification, “we” also become “strangers to ourselves”. This point, provocatively asserted by Julie Kristeva, takes the view that accepting the stranger in us, as individuals, is necessary to be able to tolerate the stranger outside us. “How”, asks Kristeva, “could one tolerate a foreigner if one did not know that one was a stranger to oneself?” (1991: 182). Psychoanalytically, let alone “knowing” strangers, we cannot even know ourselves, which is due to the strange operation of the unconscious:

With the Freudian notion of the unconscious the involution of the strange in the psyche loses its pathological aspect and integrates within the assumed unity of human beings
an *otherness* that is both biological *and* symbolic and becomes an integral part of the *same*.... Uncanny, foreignness is within us, we are divided....

By recognizing our uncanny strangeness we shall neither suffer from it nor enjoy it from the outside. The foreigner is within me, hence we are all foreigners. If I am a foreigner, there are no foreigners. (Kristeva 1991: 81, 192)

The stranger sociologically symbolizes being at the same time attached to and detached from a spatially given point, or being both close to and remote from the context in which he comes today and stays tomorrow (Simmel 1971: 143). Thus, the stranger is “both inside and outside”, a territory that seems to be a zone in-between the same and the other; the stranger is “both/and”. Importantly, this “both/and” is also precisely what Dohrmann’s discourse (see the quotation at the beginning of this section) negates by devalorizing it as “neither/nor” and by assuming that the anthropological (let us recall that “culture” instead of “biology” is the cornerstone of neo-racism) draws the borderlines of us/them and that one has to identify with one of these two sides, two cultures, not to have or become a problem. But:

The admonition, “participate, but do not identify” is a way for a foreigner to defeat the game of pluralism. The impulse to participate is an assertion that one has the rights as a political animal, a *zoon politikon*, wherever one lives... [This] is one way to force the dominant society to acknowledge that there is ... a public sphere beyond the borders of anthropology. It is also the only way to survive being personally imprisoned in a Balkanized, unequal city of differences. (Sennett 1996: 193)

Politically speaking, an immigrant in Denmark has the right to vote in local elections, but not in general elections. It seems to be legitimate and natural to many, at least formally, that immigrants are allowed to be a *zoon politikon* in a single city while prohibited from participating in the “national” elections, even though the confused assertion “when in Rome do as the Romans do” is repeatedly thrown into the debate. This is again a form (albeit quite a negative form) of being both inside and outside, which is only very seldomly problematized in the discourse of immigration. In this way, the politics of immigration, which is determined to “order” the ambivalence of the stranger by defining, naming and regulating, itself creates and preserves more ambivalence. And, as Lars Adam Rehof has convincingly and disturbingly argued, there is another dimension to this: that the
Danish constitution does not unambiguously prohibit racial discrimination either (Rehof 1995: 56-58; 1996).

The above mentioned simultaneous closeness and remoteness of strangers are clearly reflected in the lives of immigrants regarding both their daily practices in many European countries and discursive conceptualizations about “them” in politics and research. Concerning daily life, I mentioned before, for example, that in urban spaces, immigrants articulate different spatial practices and memories of other places with a new environment; they “read” the city in other ways, etc. Regarding discursive practices, clearest expressions of an ambivalence are perhaps related to how immigrants are perceived in the mainstream immigration debate. Thus, any reading of newspapers can easily reveal that immigrants are perceived both as outsiders, as the others who do not belong to our time and, at the same time, as those who are dangerously within, among us, as invaders.

As a consequence, some embrace them as “friends”, and sometimes they do this possessively, which often amounts to what Necef has called “ethnic kitsch” (1992). Some others want to see them as “enemies”, which often amounts to different variants of racism. But it is interesting that, regarding the first case, immigrants are idealized because they are not ordinary friends, they are latecomers. Regarding the latter case, immigrants are dangerous because they are not like those unambiguous enemies outside, somewhere in the world without any connection to our life-world, or as Simmel says, “beyond being far and near” (Simmel 1971: 144).

The construction of the immigrant constantly oscillates between these different uses while pointing to, and furthermore directly producing, an ambivalence, which definitions and policies constantly attempt to control.

Ambivalence leaves its trace on many other aspects of the life of the stranger. Economically or with respect to class positions, as mentioned before, one can observe a grey area between the Turkish immigrant as a member of the “underclass” in many Western countries and as a member of the middle class in Turkey. Furthermore, their belonging both to the underclass in Denmark and to the middle class in Turkey is an inherently ambivalent phenomenon; in the first case, because they have some outlets like “travel”, in the second, they meet stigmatizing and exclusive strategies of the Turkish middle classes. This was mentioned before. Here it can be added that some hybrid articulations contribute to these instances of ambivalence.

For example, different conceptions of economic positionings are articulated in the single Turkish household as well. At the household level, as I showed in the
previous chapter, many Turkish families mix up and articulate the welfare system benefits with informal (mostly consumptive but sometimes also productive) economic activities. The service activities and small businesses, especially those which immigrants are involved in, build predominantly on articulations between formal and informal work; male and female labour (especially when the family network is activated as labour-power); welfare state subsidies and informal work, etc.

I do not want to make the list any longer here, for we will have that opportunity later in this chapter, but I want to stress the point that in face of such in-betweenness, belonging to more than one context simultaneously, in the face of “mix and betwixt”, for example, between the Danish welfare system and other socio-spatial memories, interesting mixtures take place in the confrontation of strangers with Denmark. In the following, I will try to illuminate different forms of ambivalence these mixed strategies involve in terms of globalization and hybridization. In this context, I will also discuss Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, trying to relate it to globalization.

One major leitmotiv characterizing the picture in this chapter will be the assumption that it is difficult to find clear-cut contours in the analysis of life conditions of immigrant/strangers. This is an area full of ambivalence, hybridity and juxtapositions. But nevertheless, I do not want to argue that this is severely interesting in itself. Ambivalence and hybridity is not limited to immigrants’ or strangers’ lives. After all, when pulled to the extreme, all identities and all cultures are hybrids. Likewise, one could add, the whole being and all life is existentially ambivalent, for example, in that, being mortal human beings, we are actually every second “living with death”, as Bauman puts it (Bauman 1992: 12). Or as Kristeva puts it, “the fear of death dictates an ambivalent attitude: we imagine ourselves surviving (religions promise immortality), but death just the same remains the survivor’s enemy, and it accompanies him in his new existence. Apparitions and ghosts represent that ambiguity and fill with uncanny strangeness our confrontations with the image of death” (Kristeva 1991: 185). Seen in this way, the will to order or to exterminate ambivalence can perhaps psychoanalytically be grounded in an implicit will to die, because only with(in) death one can be totally free of ambivalence (or, as was the case for Nazism, this will can result in extermination of “others” who represent ambivalence).

The more interesting point in our context could be, then, the concrete manifestations of ambivalence in the social space and strategies of coping, or of living, with it and/or strategies of denying, denigrating and “ordering” it. Therefore
it is also of profound importance to pay attention to how the politics of immigration perceive ambivalence and hybridity and cope with it.

“Domestication” of ambivalence

In the *Phenomenology of the Social World* (1972), Schutz argues that, in social life, we operate with oceans of “typifications” about other people, even though in their presence, that is, in concrete life situations, we cannot bracket their individualities. This naturally applies to the stranger as well. Thus, even if we take the view that the stranger is ambivalent, he is, on the other hand, often transformed into an unambivalent “type” in the host country. And there are some mechanisms that function to this end. For example, Simmel says that, in confrontation with strangers, “a peculiar tension arises, since the consciousness of having only the absolutely general in common has exactly the effect of putting a special emphasis on that which is not common”. A consequence of this tension is that, “having only the absolutely general in common” with the stranger, what is underlined by the immigrant-receiving country, race or culture is “nothing individual, but alien origin, a quality which he has, or could have, in common with many other strangers. For this reason strangers are not really perceived as individuals, but as strangers of a certain type. Their remoteness is no less general than their nearness” (Simmel 1971: 148; my emphasis).

For those strangers we like and welcome, these typifications can be nice. But for those we do not welcome, they take quite another form. In the relationship between Denmark and “third world immigrants”, it seems that categorizing differences as the absolutely different, drawing unambivalent typifications, classifications and boundaries between “us” and “them”, so that the grey ambivalence of the stranger is “neutralized”, made familiar as a “known” category, is the most important element in the “pragmatics of warfare” against strangers (see Bauman 1990: 55).

Bauman shows that we can speak of some quite widespread rational, but self-contradictory strategies of “living with strangers”, or of coping with their ambivalence and indeterminacy. These strategies aim at reducing or eliminating the element of surprise in the conduct of strangers and at rendering the element of contingency itself, which is a part of the world of strangers, irrelevant (Bauman 1995: 126-138):
They aim, in other words, at creating a “routine world of strangers” (a concept Bauman borrows from Lyn Lofland), that is, a world free of ambivalence and contingency. This will expresses itself in very concrete terms, especially in architecture and planning, which seek order and intend to regulate human life by controlling its physical framework. Grids and zoning in modern planning are examples of those instruments used to create homogeneous spaces. In this sense, Bauman perceives modern urban planning as “a war declared on strangers”. According to him, “what directed the gaze of the dreamers of order to architecture ... was the belief—tacit or explicit—that men and women behave as prompted by the world they inhabit.... Eliminate from that world everything accidental and unplanned—and you will cut the roots of all waywardness and erratic conduct” (Bauman 1995: 128). This also explains why modernity seeking order has needed spatial forms of regulation and why those who criticized modernity, as Foucault did, did this especially by focusing on some spatial arrangements as panopticon, a modern instrument developed to bring order to the social conduct of “deviants”.

Bauman argues that this ambition, which has been a dominant one in the history of modern planning, has not been unambiguously successful, and even cities, which were planned according to grid and zoning principles, have become heterogeneous because of peoples’ “unplanned and erratic design”, or as de Certeau would put it, because of spatial practices, like tactical ways of “walking” in a city, which manipulate the plans and the representations of the space they emphasize.

Thus, because of differing spatial practices, thoroughly modernized cities paradoxically become aggregates of qualitatively specific areas with selective attraction powers. In this respect, the strangerhood of the strangers also becomes a question of degree, changing from area to area, from category (of strangers) to category, a development that also creates different no-go-in and no-go-out areas in urban landscapes. “The network of inner-city motorways, thoroughfares and throughways, and of course the secure fortresses of burglar-proof private cars with reinforced glass and anti-theft locks allow them [the city dwellers] to bypass the spaces where such strangers [e.g. ghetto-dwellers] are likely to be met without actually entering or visiting them” (Bauman 1995: 131). Concomitantly, freedom to move, without “touching” the environment and pretending as if the strangers are non-existent, becomes the main factor behind any stratification of the urban population. What gains in importance here is also the fact that the urban contexts in this way begin to mean different things to different people, that is, no-go-in areas for some become at the same time, like in the case of ghettos, no-go-out areas for some others.
Such rational strategies of “ordering” ambivalence, which Bauman mentions, are also in accordance with what Sennett perceives as the greatest achievement of modern urban planning, that is, “walling off the differences between people” (Sennett 1990: xii), which aims at holding strangers apart. In Sennett’s view, the fears related to exposure and touching in modern public life and the way cities are imagined and planned reflect this achievement. Closely related to this state of affairs, he claims that today public life has become “a matter of formal obligation”. The “resigned” public man, his enervation, does not only mean that political affairs are generally devoid of interest, but significantly, the scope of importance of “the fall of public man” is much broader: in modern city life today, says Sennett, “[m]anners and ritual interchanges with strangers are looked on as at best formal and dry, at worst as phoney. The stranger himself is a threatening figure, and few people can take great pleasure in that world of strangers ...” (Sennett 1986: 3).

Sennett’s analysis in The Fall of Public Man and in The Conscience of the Eye can be read as strategies of simplification of the social and physical environment for “domesticating” diversity, ambivalence and strangerhood, all of which are characteristic of modern city life. While he defines the city and city life based on the stranger, Sennett develops in this context the interesting concept, “the neutral city” (1990), where “terror and doubts” of outer life (civic, or public life, or “the world of strangers”) are isolated, or segregated, by “zoning”, that is, by functionally separating parts of social life and urban areas from each other. This is also a social and physical design ideology that has specialized itself in turning heterogeneous places full of life into homogeneous, neutral and abstract spaces. Thus, Lefebvre says that segregation is a decisive matter in the planning of most modern settings. Moreover, “[w]herever an organized action has attempted to mix social strata and classes, a spontaneous decantation soon follows.... Segregation always wins over” (Lefebvre 1996: 140). Barriers against “others”, barriers that are indispensable for segregation processes, all sterilize social and physical space, and this “assures people that nothing disturbing or demanding is happening ‘out there’. You build neutrality in order to legitimate withdrawal” (Sennett 1990: 65). Interestingly, in this process of neutralization, where diversity of strangerhood is constantly sterilized into neutrality, the decisive role is played by visuality or, one could say, by “the gastronomy of the eye”:

Silence in public became the only way one could experience public life, especially street life, without feeling overwhelmed. In the mid-nineteenth Century there grew ... up the notion that strangers had no right to speak to each other, that each man possessed as a public right an invisible shield, a right to be left alone. Public behaviour was a matter of
observation, of passive participation, of a certain kind of voyeurism. The “gastronomy of the eye” Balzac called it; one is open to everything, one rejects nothing a priori from one’s purview, provided one needn’t become a participant, enmeshed in a scene. This invisible wall of silence as a right meant that knowledge in public was a matter of observation—of scenes, of other men and women, of locales. Knowledge was no longer to be produced by social intercourse. (Sennett 1986: 27)

Sennett shows that in modernization, the silent gastronomy of the eye has gradually replaced intercourse between people, a point which also can be related to Norbert Elias’ work on the “civilizing process”. Here he underlines that the development of strong norms, such as the avoidance of contact and interference with others’ personality, has been an important element in this process (see Elias 1978).

When cities become “places of the gaze” rather than “scenes of discourse” (Sennett 1994: 358) because of the fear of touching, then we are able to ignore the presence of strangers, or to keep them off limits. Sennett importantly underlines that this neutralization also makes, by creating segregated and neutral spaces, power’s evasive operations easier and free of responsibility (see Sennett 1994: 303-4).

These (rational) strategies, which Bauman and Sennett focus upon, are most general ways of socio-spatially walling off strangers and their strangerhood and ambivalence in different territories. If this is achieved, and when strangers are undifferentiated into some “types”, the stranger ceases to be a true stranger. Via these strategies his ambivalence is dried out, or, so to say, “coped with”.

Before I proceed to another strategy of living with strangers, I want to insert one more example, which again points to another type of ambivalence regarding immigration and the ghetto debate. As I tried to make clear, ghettos can be seen as social and physical territories that ideally neutralize the strangerhood “outside”. Immigrant ghettos can in this respect be considered sites into which the host society, culture or race pushes the immigrant/stranger. And as I will dwell on in detail in chapter 7, there are also other factors, such as the functioning of social and economic systems, that by excluding push minorities into ghettos.

Thus, immigrants do not live in ghettos simply because they wish so (which would amount to saying that they have themselves to blame). But on the other hand, there are also strong tendencies from within immigrant minorities to agglomerate in ghettos. Thus, even though the ghetto can socially be interpreted as a disadvantage and a barrier against social mobility for minorities in general,
especially when cultural dimensions related to modernity are taken into account, it is also a very attractive space to “neutralize” what and whom they themselves perceive as “strangers” from their point of view. Consequently, there is no reason for assuming that immigrants are more successful in living “with” (their own) strangers than the host countries are. It seems simply so because, as long as they are “modern”, they also use the mentioned techniques of neutralizing outer life, the city, public life, etc.

Having said this, we can now concentrate on another strategy that is deployed on important scales in immigrant-receiving countries and that widely supports and develops the above-mentioned ways of coping with strangers. This strategy, as summed up by Bauman, is “to burn out the uncertainty in effigy—to focus the abhorrence of indetermination on a selected category of strangers”, a strategy which especially selects and focuses on vagrants, travellers, homeless, members of subcultures, immigrants and ethnic minorities as strangers (Bauman 1995: 128). This strategy is less “rational” than the previous ones mentioned above and is closely related to images and representation.

Burning the uncertainty of the immigrant/stranger in images is realized by processes of scapegoating and stigmatization. In this, one’s difference, identity and culture is frozen and reduced to an easily recognizable category, “immigrant”, which is then associated with what is problematized, unwanted, alien. In addition, in most typical cases, one’s “culture”, analogous with “original identities”, is transformed into a “territory” which one cannot come out of (Feuchtwang 1990: 4).

’And what about your origins? Tell us about them, it must be fascinating!’ Blundering fools never fail to ask the question. The surface kindness hides the sticky clumsiness that so exasperates the foreigner.... He has fled from that origin ... the foreigner is its courageous and melancholy betrayer.... He is a foreigner: he is from nowhere, from everywhere.... Do not send him back to his origins. If you are dying to ask the question, go put it to your own mother ... (Kristeva 1991: 29-30)

An interesting point in this context could be that, in face of the presence of so many strangers around in the late 20th century’s increasingly globalized world and thus the increasingly visible impossibility of total routinization of whole strangerhood, this strategy, which is both an easy and an effective way of neutralizing the “uncanny” strangeness, becomes an augmenting option in many contexts. Hence, why not select some symbolic categories among strangers to
resemble the stranger-in-general? There are several very strong societal incentives and stimulants for this strategy.

For example, in globalized conditions of modern and postmodern urban life, we are all “doomed to” live with and navigate among many kinds of strangers. Besides, as Simmel, Bauman, Sennett and other writers underline, strangers offer not only incalculable dangers, but also adventure, pleasure, surprise and so on. So we actually both like and welcome many kinds of strangers, for example tourists, and we all, increasingly, for instance, by way of travelling, become strangers in some ways. It is interesting in this context to note that today tourism is gradually becoming the largest industry in the world (Lash & Urry 1994: 194) and that an important element of tourism activities is in fact “enjoying” strangerhood, both one’s own and others’. Moreover, according to Urry, mass tourists increasingly sweep off their old “modern” habits of seeing “named scenes through a frame”. The distinctiveness of the “tourist gaze” is thus increasingly lost as gazes become parts of a postmodern popular culture. Here it is no longer authenticity, but playfulness that counts while tourists increasingly become aware of the multitude of possible changes and choices, a tendency that goes hand in hand with the development of alternative forms of tourism (such as eco-tourism, alternative tourism, academic travel, etc.). As a result, Urry speaks of the emergence of the “post-tourists” who know “that they are a tourist and that tourism is a game, or rather a whole series of games with multiple texts and no single, authentic tourist experience” (Urry 1990: 100).

Knowing that going somewhere historic is not time-travel and that one cannot “manage to get backstage and overcome the position of outsider”, the post-tourist has “no need to make a fetish out of the correct interpretation” (Urry 1990: 100-101). In other words, the post-tourist recognizes strangerhood as something to play upon rather than as something to be neutralized. One could perhaps add that the post-tourists recognize Kristeva’s dictum that we are all “strangers to ourselves” and that it is impossible to “know” the other person or place totally to render it familiar. Furthermore, Urry proposes the thesis that the gaze of the post-tourist, which actively turns the social and physical world into a spectacle, also means a democratization (of the tourist gaze):

contemporary societies are developing less on the basis of surveillance and the normalization of individuals, and more on the basis of the democratisation of the tourist gaze and the spectacle-isation of place. (Urry 1990: 156)
In this spectacle-ized society of post-tourists, it is as if most people simply do not want to be free from strangers, at any rate from “all” strangers. What we can argue is, therefore, that even though modern social and architectural design (e.g. functional separation and neutralization) is geared to keeping strangers out (which is still true in many cases, like that of the immigrant ghetto as a no-go-out area or that of any gentrified, homogeneous housing district as a no-go-in area), there are other important tendencies in contemporary societies which, rather than neutralizing it, approve and celebrate strangerhood as something to play upon aesthetically.

Hence, we have to adapt a differentiated view of the stranger. For example, as I tried to show, when the tourist is the welcomed stranger, it seems that the immigrant is, to a higher degree, associated with the unwelcomed stranger and, for some, almost with the “invader”.

At this point, I think, we need further clarification. Simmel’s stranger is ambivalent; he is constantly “both/and”, but he is still a generalized city dweller. As opposed to this, Bauman’s focus is on how different kinds of city dwellers move or cannot move in the city. Thus, in his framework, the city is composed of different territories that compete and clash with each other. So to say, Bauman’s stranger is on the move, not in an “abstract” space, but in a territorialized city of no-go-in and no-go-out areas. With respect to the post-tourist, Bauman’s stranger is, again, more ambivalent: he is not only “fascinating”, but also feared and formidable. It is, above all, this mixture that counts for the ambivalence of Bauman’s, like Simmel’s, stranger. Hence, in comparison with this stranger, the (post)tourist would be, even though there are striking similarities with respect to spatial mobility, much less ambivalent due to that we are not afraid of him because his field of action is commercialized to a high degree and because he, more often than not, “leaves tomorrow”. If strangerhood is, as we saw, a social construction, the tourist seems, to a high degree, to carry with him his own strangerhood; that is, his strangerhood is not so much a social construction as an internalization of strangerhood.

This brings us back to those “unwanted” strangers who are more strangers than others. Here it must be noted that even Danish legislation, which defines “real” immigrants as those who are not “expected to manage living in Denmark”, unlike immigrants from the US or the EU, cements this differentiation in that it formulates, somewhat vaguely, the very “fear” that makes some more strangers than others.

In addition, in today’s world, it seems that those who are more strangers than others are also likely to be those who are less welcomed, of course, unless they are
truly “guests”. This category of guests was, interestingly, one used for decades to define the immigrant, something that perhaps also explains a deep and (un)conscious desire in the immigration debate, that is, a desire to see the stranger as a guest: “guest worker”.

To conclude, it seems very arguable to assert in the society of post-tourists that all strangers are categorically avoided. Instead, what happens is that some categories of strangers are selected out to condense and concretize the undesirable sides of the stranger-in-general as unambivalent images. Concomitantly, surveillance still seems to be the predominant instrument of regulation regarding these unwanted strangers. In other words, whereas the post-tourist can be associated with a playful and ironic aesthetization, which has democratizing potentials in the society of spectacle, the situation of the denizen still seems to come closer to disciplinary individuation; here panopticon replaces the spectacle just as aesthetization functions as stigmatization. Thus, in the spectacle-ized consumer society, seduction and repression are co-existent, which also gradually becomes the most important division in postmodernity (see Bauman 1988 and 1992b: 198).

**Globalization—glocalization**

An alternative geography begins to emerge from the margins which challenges the self-definition of “centres”, deconstructing cultural sovereignty and remapping the universalised and homogeneous spatialisation of Western modernity to reveal heterogeneous places, a cartography of fractures which emphasises the relations between differently valorised sites and spaces sutured together under masks of unity such as the nation-state. (Shields 1991: 278)

Globalization is roughly defined by Anthony Giddens as “the intensification of worldwide social relations that link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (quoted in Pieterse 1995: 48). According to Giddens, our day-to-day activities are increasingly shaped by global events. Hence globalization does not only involve creation of worldwide systems, e.g. economic relations, but also the transformation of local contexts of social relations, including personal conduct. In turn, “local lifestyle habits have become globally consequential”. In light of this, globalization means “action at a distance”, especially due to the development of
global communication technologies and mass transportation. Thus, globalization is “really about the transformation of time and space” (Giddens 1994b: 4-5).

To see what globalization means in our context, we can focus our attention initially on the satellite dishes hanging from the balconies of the flats of most of the Turkish families in the “ghetto”. The satellite dish signals that these families have relations to the outside, e.g. they follow what is happening in international channels. Already at this point one can assert that:

Impoverished groups may be structurally “hidden away” from the more affluent, who rarely if ever visit the areas where poverty is concentrated; but in globalized social conditions their lives are not culturally isolated. Ethnic differences from the majority population are often bound up with the development of underclass, and such differences may become a focus of cultural exclusion. However, these very differences often directly connect the poor to globalized cultural settings—in matters of custom, religion, dress or music. For immigrant populations, these may be attachments sustained with countries and cultures of origin; but they often form cultural diasporas, which may stretch very widely. (Giddens 1994b: 148)

There is an immigrant life outside the walls of the ghetto or ghetto-resembling localities. As I mentioned in the last chapter, Turkey plays an important role in immigrants’ construction of temporality and spatiality. In this context, the satellite dish can be taken as an artefact of their collective memory, whereas travel to Turkey underlines the transnational character of the Turkish habitus in Gellerup. Thus, even though Gellerup is a “wild-zone”, due to the low density of communication networks in the Danish context, that is, even though Gellerup is socially much further away from the financial, informational and industrial nodes of the city, which makes it “a socially strained area” in official language, it is also a place where a small population of immigrants has, paradoxically, much denser relations outside Denmark than with many predominantly “Danish” settlements in the vicinity.

The satellite dish can be taken as a “chronotope” in Bakhtinian sense, “that is, a means by which temporal and spatial relationships are interconnected” (Naficy 1993: 164). In its original sense, a chronotope refers to particular combinations of time and space in narrative forms, and it is a characteristic of “dialogism”, which, without promising a synthesis, reveals the co-presence of different and paradoxical elements in any representation (Holquist 1990: 109; Shields 1996: 241). What I want to argue is that the satellite dish, or other similar examples, can be thought of
as a motif, a function or a device, or in short a chronotope, that can serve us, firstly, to perceive time/space relations of the particular, Gellerup, in a larger set of time/space relations, which themselves can be used to read Gellerup’s landscape. Secondly, by the metaphor of chronotope, we can also perceive the paradoxically grounded character of Gellerup in a broader context. Thus, at the same time, the satellite dish can be an image of Gellerup’s isolation from the rest of the city (for example, turning its attention away from Denmark) and its overarching transnational cultural framework without this tension being resolved in a dialectic arrangement.

In short, in this chapter, we need to speak of “a global sense of place”, which Dorian Massey has defined as “the specificity of place which derives from the fact that each place is the focus of distinct mixture of wider and more local social relations” (quoted in Pieterse 1995: 61). This wider context in which the Turkish minority creates its own modernity and postmodernity is globalization. But to be able to understand the Turkish habitus in this context, one has to, first of all, dismiss from the beginning misconceptions related to the idea of globalization. Thus, before we concentrate on the hybrid habitus, let us review some of them.

Firstly, one must question the idea that globalization and modernization equals “Westernalization”; that is, both modernization and globalization stem from a “centre” that is characteristically Western. In this scenario, there is only one path to globalization. As I already mentioned, such an assumption, which is closely related to classic “modernization theory”, has also been reactualized in the conceptualization of “traditional” immigrant cultures in the context of “modern” Danish culture during the 1990s in Denmark. In this, terms like modernity and tradition, or the more neutral term, the non-modern, are characteristically used as homological entities. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that, in the face of these dualistic perceptions, most theories of postmodernity also share the same fate in becoming a full-fledged social condition (Jallinoya 1995). Hence, I hold the view that there is not only one, but multiple roots of and routes to modernization and postmodernization:

Different entities, such as nation-states, multi-national corporations and international organizations, approach the global field with different resources (economic and cultural) and seek to set different agendas.... Today we cannot only speak of Europeanization and Americanization, but also of Japanization and even Brazilianization (the latter to refer ironically to the re-emergence of fortress motifs and the spatial segregation of various social groups in global cities). The range and pluralization of responses to
modernity means that it may well be preferable to refer to global modernities. (Featherstone & Lash 1995: 3)

Secondly, and closely related to the first point above, the idea that globalization means increasing “homogenization” must be dismissed. Globalization does not necessarily imply an increasingly homogenized and universal world community, or any other kind of “progress” related to the ideals of the Enlightenment. Today, it can be ascertained that, for example, the gap between the rich and the poor of the world has grown more than ever in the last few decades with increasing velocity together with increasing globalization. Thus, in the world economy, “from 1975 to 1990, the richest 1 per cent of the population increased its share of wealth from 20 per cent to 36 per cent.... In OECD countries as a whole, more than 100 million people live under the poverty line. There are 30 million unemployed and 5 million homeless” (Sørensen 1996; see also UNDP 1996).

Culturally, in the last decades, the world has not become more homogeneous, but more heterogeneous. Hence, in stark contrast to the classic theory of modernization, today it seems that globalization does not unify but diversify and create a more and more fragmentary world picture where even the old model of “centre-periphery” increasingly gives way to relations proliferating between increasingly discontinuous spaces. Globalization must, therefore, be distinguished from universality, which has characterized homogenizing visions of modernity before. In Bauman’s words, “modernity once deemed itself universal. It now thinks of itself global” (Bauman 1995: 24).

In Bauman’s view, globalization means increasing differentiation and fragmentation, as opposed to theories seeking an organizing principle, like a “world-system” behind it. For example, the economic system increasingly cuts itself from other aspects of systemic coordination, while there seems to be no political equivalent of global economy. But:

Paradoxically, in the present era of cosmopolitan economy the splintering of political sovereignty becomes itself a major factor facilitating free movement of capital and commodities. The more fragmented the sovereign units, the weaker and narrower in scope is their grip over their respective territories, the freer still the global flow of capital and merchandise. World capital is no more interested in large, powerful, well armed states. The globalization of the economy and information and the fragmentation—indeed a ‘re-parochialization’ of sorts—of political sovereignty are not, contrary to appearances, opposite and hence mutually conflicting and incongruent
trends; they are rather factors in the ongoing rearrangement of various aspects of systemic integration. (Bauman 1995: 251)

This also signals that globalization and fragmentation are, far from being conflicting trends, taking place at the same time, the logic of which can probably best be expressed by Roland Robertson’s term “glocalization”, referring to both disembedding from and re-embedding in local contexts in the processes of globalization (Robertson 1995). This term also applies to culture: today, cultural artefacts are both globally available, which results in that different localities are inescapably tied together, and the uses of these artefacts are increasingly localized. This is also to say that globalization would not be possible without diversification. In other words, globalization and fragmentation seem to be two sides of the same coin (Bauman 1996c).

The last point, again related to the first two, is that the commonly and rather unproblematically assumed interconnection between globalization and individualization tendencies in social theory (which will be elaborated on in detail in the next chapter) seems to be misleading, especially in our context, in that it precludes seeing other equally relevant tendencies in contemporary societies. This is not to say that the individualization or detraditionalization thesis (for example, put forth by Giddens 1994) is “wrong” as such, but rather that we have to focus on parallel tendencies running in opposite directions as well. One such tendency is what Michel Maffesoli has called “tribalization”.

This concept problematizes in an interesting way any direct relationship between increasing globalization and individualization. For Maffesoli, postmodernity very much seems to be “the time of the tribes”. He argues, for example, referring to Japan, that in postmodernity, even in the economic sphere which still remains the “main fetish of the dominant ideology”, it increasingly “becomes clear that the communal tendency can go hand in hand with advanced technological and economic performance”, and thus “these examples are at least as relevant as those that give greater importance to the current narcissism” (Maffesoli 1996: 15). To Maffesoli, what characterized the project of modernity most was the inextricable linking of the individual and the political as the two most important constructions with each other, in other words, “the principium individuationis” (Maffesoli 1996: 64). Thus, he says, together with “the end of politics”, or what other writers refer to as “the end of society” (that is, an “explosion” of “society” as a closed homogeneous unity and territory due to increasingly global flows of capital and cultures, and simultaneously its “implosion”
into regions and localities which increasingly gain importance), one could also speak of “the end of the individual”. His discussions draw an interesting contrast to one-sided assertions of “increasing individualism”:

it is fallacious to draw a parallel between the end of politics and the withdrawal into the self, or what is called the return of narcissism ... the saturation of political form goes hand in hand with the saturation of individualism. Paying attention to this fact is another way of investigating the masses.... what we are witnessing is the loss of the idea of the individual in favour of a much less distinct mass. (Maffesoli 1996: 64)

Maffesoli’s idea of “tribes”, as this distinct mass, relates itself importantly to an “intersubjective” social form, which is a middle ground for the structural (the “social”) and the individual and which is exemplified by the concepts of habitus and collective memory serving “as a revelation of individual acts, intentions and experiences” (Maffesoli 1996: 68-69). If we, in the context of the end of modernity or postmodernity, not only witness increasing individualization but also neo-tribes, Maffesoli radically asserts that what happens is that the autonomy of the modern individual becomes surpassed by the heteronomy of tribalism. “Whatever it may be called—neighbourhoods, varied interest groups, networks—we are witnessing the return of an affective, passational investment whose structurally ambiguous and ambivalent aspects are well known” (Maffesoli 1996: 127).

As Maffesoli also accepts above, the concept of the tribe is an ambivalent one. The other side of the concept, or its other sense, thus signifies an obsessive desire for building communities and, consequently, being entrapped in one’s own cultural turf, or ghetto. Tribalism in this sense is strongly associated with the politics of exclusion, which intensively makes use of cultural terminologies (see Bauman 1995: 254). Thus, such tribalism is closely related to the “fear of touching”, ambitions of unambiguous boundary-drawing and zoning, avoidance of mixing with strangers, and so on. To avoid an unnecessary conflation of the two senses of the concept mentioned thus far, in the following, I will mostly use the terms tribe and tribalization to refer to this second sense.

Hybridization and mimicry
Gellerup is a place where both transnational interactions and strong tendencies of localization are to be found simultaneously. If the Turkish habitus in Gellerup is on the move towards increasing globalization on its own route, this route is characterized by numerous forms of hybridity. Immigrant life is to live by juxtaposing and comparing (at least) two different geographical and cultural contexts at the same time. One could also say that, with its economic base as underclass and middle class at the same time, by both being on social welfare in the modern welfare state and re-intensifying extended family relations in a “tribal” community, by culturally mixing, as Rushdie says, “a bit of this and a bit of that” (quoted in Naficy 1993: 1991), the Turkish habitus in Gellerup is living in hybridized times: in tradition, modernity and postmodernity simultaneously.

Immigrant cultures are deeply conscious about travelling between different cultures and boundaries. They have particularly the place-bounded consciousness that things are, were or could be “different” somewhere else. They have come to Denmark on economic grounds, and it seems that they have tried to separate the economic from the broader cultural/social contexts and have tried to live in Denmark without be(com)ing “Danish”; hence they are aware of the plurality of points of references. In other words, they try “to participate without identifying”, which is also in a way being or feeling “both inside and outside”.

In the meantime, avoided or not, wished or escaped from, what happens, however, is that Turkish and Danish languages, traditional and modern lifestyles become displaced and constantly cut and mixed with each other, producing several forms of collage and hybridities. Turks in the Danish social space, “never quite existing, never quite vanishing”, like Octavio Paz’s definition of the American chicanos (quoted in Lipsitz 1987: 157), live on the boundaries of Denmark. They are never quite integrated, never quite out of sight. But boundaries are important sites, both metaphorically and literally. As Heidegger says, “[a] boundary is not that something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its essential unfolding” (Heidegger 1993: 356).

The story of immigration, the story of the immigrant/stranger, must also start from ambivalent boundaries. Spatio-culturally, the ambivalence of the stranger/immigrant can be observed in immigrant settlements, which are increasingly places where many different cultures can be found in juxtaposition and simultaneity. In this respect, Gellerup in Aarhus, with its many nationalities and ethnic groups, exemplifies Foucault’s diagnosis when he says, “[t]he present epoch will perhaps be the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity, the epoch of near and far, of the side by side, of the dispersed” (Foucault 1986: 22). Turkish culture in Gellerup is a “both/and” culture, which contains elements of both
(Turkish and Danish) traditions and Turkish, Danish and global modernities. Modern cultural traits are not only received from Danish society, but also from Turkish urban mass-culture (which is influenced by both European and Oriental, both urban and rural cultures) by way of video films, tapes, TV channels, and many other cultural artefacts. Neither Turkish nor Danish modernity can, however, erase all “traditional” elements in the Turkish culture in Gellerup. Some traditions evaporate and some become “icons” of identification (like not eating pork) in the process of imagining and re-inventing the Turkish community both as a locality and as a nation.

That some women wear both jeans and a head scarf is a good example of a mixture that is not necessarily a synthesis, at least in the sense of a well-known and recognized synthesis. Another example is the language-use of Turkish immigrants in Gellerup. It often contains at least two referential systems (Turkish/Danish) that partly overlap and partly stay in juxtaposition (for example, when Danish words are used in a Turkish conversation, or when people create a Turkish word as a substitute for a Danish word). Given these kinds of examples, the “Turkish” culture in Gellerup could be conceived of more as a “collage” than as a monolithic unity in the form of, for example, an authentic traditional rural culture (whatever that is).

They are, needless to say, no longer what they were before they came from Turkey to Denmark. One could assert that they still inhabit another junction in the same globalized world and, to a degree, use the same items with others from their “origins”. But a closer look reveals that those items are used in different forms and to relatively different ends in different settings. Consequently, the cultural lives of Turks, for example in Gellerup, are not the same as that of other Turkish immigrants’ in other European countries. Even though there are some important similarities, differences with respect to physical and social space, languages etc. mean that different contexts become different congestions, or discontinuous spaces, where different, kaleidoscopic “Turkish” identities, hybridized in differing forms and degrees, are sutured. Furthermore, the socio-political differences regarding these contexts, like differing welfare state regimes, contribute a lot to this kaleidoscopic differentiation. Thus, Lash and Urry write that in contemporary postindustrial economies, “immigrant patterns ... are characterized, not by convergence, but by divergence” (Lash & Urry 1994: 179).

To exemplify the logic of this hybridization we could use the metaphor of the pizza, made and served by Turkish restaurants in Aarhus. A considerable number of the pizzerias in Denmark are run by Turks today. Some of the owners of these deliberately choose Italian names for their pizzerias and some do not reveal their “Turkishness”. Others directly pretend to be Italians, which could be interpreted as
a consequence of their deficit in symbolic capital as “Turks”. In many cases, the product is advertised as “Italian pizza”. But the pizza they make is actually a mixture of Turkish “pide”, that is Turkish pizza, which is normally made with ingredients other than those used for “Italian” pizza.

The Turkish pizzerias symbolize a denial of both assimilationist and integrationist, or multiculturalist, ambitions all at once. The desire for assimilation is normally bound together with a deep “sense of shame about oneself” (Sennett 1996: 189). Any Turkish desire to assimilate meets a barrier related to the severe deficit in their forms of capital in social space. But the most important ingredient of an assimilationist strategy is “a self-censor, screening out the full range of experiences and observations which he or she has lived” to be able to keep from others something one is ashamed of, which also weakens one’s strength of judgement (Sennett 1996: 189). In this sense, the Turkish pizza is not an “imitation” of the Italian one; on the contrary, it is by way of “mimicry” a creation of some third thing. The strategy of mimicry is defined by Bhabha as:

the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite. Which is to say that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. (quoted in Naficy 1993: 178; see also Bhabha 1985)

The strategy in the creation of the pizza is ambivalent towards both the Italian pizza and the Turkish “pide”. Thus it is neither an assimilation of the difference (imitation) nor a repetition of the Turkishness of the pide which could be integrated into a multiculturalist mosaic, where differences are not mixed up but walled off. The “third” product is the product of an “intercultural” movement, of a “touching”.

One could add that the Turks have improved upon an old formula for recreating the Italian pizza, along with others, for example, South Americans selling “Mexican” pizza and Iranians selling “Italian” pizza in the city centre. These pizzerias also sell “Italian” pasta, and given that pasta originally came from China to Italy (Friedman 1995: 74), things get even more complex: Turks and Iranians who pretend to be Italians and who sell a mixture which is “originally” Chinese as something originally Italian in competition with Mexicans and Iranians and Lebanese, etc., who also make pizza again in different ways.

The satellite dishes hanging from the balconies of the ghetto, the pizza, and other cultural mixtures mentioned before are all parts of a globalization process,
which culturally means not a homogenization but a fragmentation and a hybridization. At this point, I want to relate the issue of hybridity to the issue of social space by using Bourdieu’s concept habitus.

Previously I mentioned “social space” and “field” in Bourdieu’s sense. As we saw, to be able to speak of a field, one must be able to identify a group of people who operate with and through a “game”. Typically, this gaming presupposes or requires a degree of “specialization”, as in the case of circles of artists, scientists, politicians, etc., that is, social groupings with rather tough admission requirements, which also signify that a relatively autonomous group of people has acquired a definite form of capital. As such, the concept of field has a generic relationship to the concept of habitus. According to Bourdieu, there must be a homology between habitus and the the field(s) in which it operates for the habitus to be able to function consistently.

Since the 1960s, Turkish immigrants have come to the Danish social space with a habitus already established in a Turkish social space, and this geographical movement caused hybridization and heterogenization even if the habitus was maintained. Concomitantly, the question here is if a corresponding field is or was found in Denmark for such an already established habitus (in Turkey). The answer is no. It seems, in retrospect, that the already established habitus the Turks came with only partly corresponded with and partly resisted the established fields and the general structure of the Danish social space. And this tendency continued in later stages of immigration.

Habitus is a very tough concept in that it is very much about the primary socialization and growing up of a person. The establishment of habitus requires immense work and it is constructed in a conscious way. Hence, it is difficult to rid oneself of one’s habitus. It is very determinant for one’s biography. As such, the concept of habitus does not seem to be especially congruent with the “flowing” of identities, ambivalence or hybridization, etc., which we are occupied with in this chapter. But what is interesting in our context is the relationship between the increasingly heterogeneous Turkish habitus and the “homogenizing” Danish social space.

Today the Turkish habitus in Aarhus operates simultaneously in (at least) two different social spaces, which both have their own stakes. As a consequence, one can today speak of a relatively independent (from both Danish and Turkish social space) habitus that has established itself by use of different mechanisms through the 30 years immigration has taken place. Thus, this habitus cannot be conceived
of by focusing on the Danish or Turkish social space alone, but must be conceived of on its own terms.

When a second generation Turkish girl studies at the university (participating in the Danish social space), still preserves her Turkish network and intense family relations, and marries a Turk from Turkey in the tradition of her parents, one could speak of a relatively consistent, well-functioning, but nevertheless hybrid habitus. This habitus, which is a relatively consistent mixture, requires colossal energy and effort from both the person and the family, and at the same time, it expresses a successful articulation between the habitus of the parents and the second and third generations. The sustained relationships to Turkey, many of the so-called “successful integration” cases, are indeed also cases where the hybrid habitus can be established consistently with respect to interrelationships between the two different social spaces.

But the Turkish habitus, which operates in both the Turkish and Danish social spaces, need not be consistent. It can also function weakly. It can be split into, what Durkheim called, anomaly where the relationship between self-perception and the social space loses its form and becomes increasingly ambivalent. In this case, one could talk of a kind of “inconsistent habitus”.

In either case, the important question is still how the hybrid habitus (consistent or inconsistent) is related to the established fields of the social space, or if there is a field which such a habitus is homologous with? My argument in the following will be that this is not the case, and that intense communicative, cultural and economic relationships with Turkey (for example, as mentioned in chapter 3 with respect to the woman who was jobless in Denmark but a hotel director in Turkey) are what fills the gap between the hybrid habitus and the homogenizing Danish social space. In other words, I want to argue that the established fields of Danish social space mentioned so far did not and do not correspond to the Turkish habitus.

I want to discuss this idea in two contexts. Firstly, there is a discrepancy between the hybrid habitus and the social space in which it operates. That is, the hybridity of the Turkish habitus is neither recognized nor taken into account nor allowed to manifest itself in the systemic functioning of the social space, which does not conceive of the transnational character of the habitus as something existing positively rather than as a problem. And secondly, there is a discrepancy between the “identity” and the hybridized operational logic of the Turkish habitus, on the one hand, and its self-perceptions, or “identifications”, on the other.
Hybrid habitus, homogenizing social space

The cultural hybridization discussed in this chapter faces both structural and cultural barriers. Regarding the first, it can be said that the social space does not allow it to manifest itself. And regarding the latter, the problem, or “paradox” if you like, is that neither the temporality of the Danish “Home” nor self-identifications of the Turkish habitus recognize hybridity; most identification is with “purity”.

In the preceding pages, I mentioned the ways in which the stranger and the ambivalence he or she symbolizes is neutralized in a “routine world of strangers”. There are other factors which are partly variations upon this routinization, but also can be more directly related to the theme of globalization.

Globalization brings forth increasingly hybrid and transnational cultural relationships. At the same time, it creates some new structural, institutional forms. That is, globalization brings a process which Pieterse (1995) has called “structural hybridization”. Thus, for example, citizenship rights become increasingly transnational in character. As Urry says, “citizenship rights increasingly involve claims to consume other cultures and places throughout the world. A modern person is one who is able to exercise those rights and who conceives him or herself as a consumer of other cultures and places” (Urry 1995: 165). Another example of increasing institutionalization of structural hybridization could be international conventions against racial discrimination, the scope of which goes beyond the borders of a single nation-state. As such, one could assert that these conventions are both a consequence and an affirmation of the existence of cultural hybridization. Hence for different “travelling” groups, such as tourists and immigrants, the right to participate in cultures, places and authority structures and public life across borders is an important issue that boldly questions “national” citizenship. In a globalizing world, “transnational” rights become more and more “natural” as those rights bound up with the membership of territorial nation-state (see Soysal 1994 for a detailed discussion of this issue in the context of immigration).

But in face of globalization and the increasing importance of structural hybridization, the existing politics of immigration is indeed, as I showed in the first chapter, trying to resist precisely those conventions (e.g. by insisting on the right not to allot flats to immigrants to avoid “ghettoization”). In other words, even if Denmark has signed these conventions, and even if Danish MPs can be critical of versions of democracy found in other countries, these transnational conventions
create tension in Danish municipalities, and this in turn shows the lack of, or the immature character of, structural hybridization.

Ambivalence and hybridization are still horrifying to most European governments, and this is so especially with respect to citizenship rights. For example, Lash and Urry write about German Turks that “the accumulation of citizenship rights ... is not based on time lived in Germany, nor contribution to the commonweal as an earner and taxpayer, but is instead based on ethnicity.... The constitution of Germany is ambivalent as to the rights of non-German ethnics to citizenship, but it is quite clear in including as citizens refugees or deportees with German Volkszugehörigkeit, including ethnic Germans who settled in Romania in the twelfth century!” German Turks are “foreigners” in Germany, and “by ‘foreign’ this includes third generation Turks” (Lash & Urry 1994: 187). The situation is the same for Danish denizens: one is not automatically Danish being a third generation Turk, whereas one born abroad to Danish parents without ever having lived in Denmark is still Danish. Once more: *Jus sanguinis*.

There are several other examples of the missing structural hybridization. Just as third generation immigrants are born as denizens, and just as immigrants do not have the right to vote in general elections, many other aspects just go unnoticed in Denmark. These aim at preventing immigrants from having loyalties and belonging to more than one context. Thus, increasingly many immigrants apply for Danish citizenship and try to maintain their Turkish citizenship as well. But in Denmark, double citizenship is not allowed. In an age when the EU, globalization, etc. assert pressures on the nation-state, which increasingly means “the end of society” defined as a nation, immigrants listen to politicians shouting “when in Denmark, do as the Danes do” while their participation, e.g. in politics, is perceived of as a contamiNation. Immigrants remain, so to say, just like Simmel’s strangers, both inside and outside. The problem in this context is that immigrants seem to want participation without identification, while the Danish state demands identification without participation.

A recent, “insignificant” example of how double loyalties are denied involves what is called the “maintenance-contract” (forsørgerkontrakt). Until the beginning of 1996, an immigrant had the right to send up to DKK 10,000 tax-free per year to his or her parents or another family member in need in his country of origin. This right evaporated recently with no visible opposition from any party or organization or individual. And it took place in a “criminalizing” manner: for example, the reason given for the change was that many immigrants were using this right “as if” they were sending money, which was also right in some cases. But there were also many who used the system to realize their transnational loyalties. Furthermore, as
mentioned before, many Turks used money in Turkey totally independently of this contract to support their relatives or families. However, now this right is gone, and it was done by politicians and civil servants in a “disciplinary” way, making it feel like political revenge. That is, many immigrants, who could not document that they actually sent the money in the last four or five years, had to pay money back. But again, there were anomalies. For example, even though it appeared in both Turkish and Danish on the standard contract signed that the money should be sent via post offices or banks, a special sort of letter (called “value-letter”) was not accepted as a “valid” form on the grounds that the envelopes could be empty inside despite a receipt. But, according to my reading, it is impossible for anybody to know that a value-letter sent from a post office does not count as “via post office”. Thus, in a telephone call I made to the tax authorities in Aarhus, the civil servant answering called the issue “a political matter”. That meant there was no need to engage in a “technical” discussion about the character of value-letters. In short, revenge policies are specifically blind to differences between the faker and the immigrant. And national regulation does not allow either for transnational commitments and loyalties.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse writes that “also in political economy we can identify a range of hybrid formations” (1995: 59). In this context, he draws attention to interpenetrations and articulations, that is, hybridization processes, that take place between formal and informal economy. This is also interesting in our context and I want to give another example showing how economic hybridization is confronted or dealt with in the Danish social space. On 29 February 1996, a raid was made on 22 pizzerias and restaurants (most of which are owned by immigrants) in Copenhagen. It was arranged by the tax authorities, the police force and a TV station (Danmarks Radio). The 21.00 p.m. news showed the authorities and the TV camera storming these small businesses. They asked everybody working there about their residence and work permits and checked to see if they had paid their taxes regularly. The results were just what the TV team had obviously hoped for: “sensational”. Only one-third of the workforce they met in these businesses had regularly paid their taxes. On the evening news, the authorities added that this was not the first time they had met this phenomenon. Another third of the group were formally on welfare benefits, and the last third were receiving unemployment benefits. That is, two-thirds of the people “caught” by the camera and the authorities were either receiving social benefits and/or making extra “black” money. The Social Democratic Minister of Labour, Jytte Andersen, referred to the “work ethic” and characterized this situation as “unacceptable” and as something that “ridicules the others” who pay their taxes regularly. It is this “informal” work
especially that was not recognized by the dominant regulation moral; and on TV, it was consistently called “black” work.

The first issue here is that we know that we are already on the way to creating a “two-thirds society”, and we can realistically guess that in 20 years it will be much worse. Many social theorists say we will move even further away from the work society in the foreseeable future. Already today, there are simply not enough jobs, and there is probably no need for more work either, a relevant point especially when issues related to ecology are taken into account. Thus, some social theorists discuss basic income as the only alternative if an increasing part of the population is not to be marginalized (see Offe 1996). Thus, others discuss the importance of less radical proposals, such as job sharing and leave schemes, which Denmark successfully experimented with in 1993 and 1994. But these were not continued because of later policy changes (see Lind 1995). Besides, it can be argued that in the postindustrial society, the “work ethic” is not only inflated, it is also illusory.

Such issues and related arguments will be developed in detail in chapter 7. But here we can point out that what is thought and done in the politics of immigration is opposite to participating in a debate about such issues in the context of immigration. Without arguing for or against one form of work ethic or regulative moral here, what I want to underline is that, as far as I can see, the above-mentioned small-scale examples of “informal” work have been the only feasible strategy immigrants have been able to develop in Denmark in relation to the economic system. Besides, this form of work is quite commonly based on the family structure as the most important pillar, or in other words, they are overwhelmingly “family businesses”. Thus, as often is the case, they exploit women and sometimes children as free labour power, and when this is not directly the case, one can speak of underpaid employment. Most importantly, these businesses are characterized by a severe deficit of individual and social reflexivity. But, not mentioning the serious issues that require in-depth ethical and political negotiations, the only way in which the existing regulation moral has been able to respond to the cultural and economic hybridization in the single pizzeria is by making a raid on it, preferably with a TV camera in cooperation with the police and tax authorities. (The three are seemingly becoming the “Trinity” of the postmodern times.) It goes without saying that in this way authorities unnecessarily and dangerously “racialize” the topic at hand, because everyone knows that everyone knows that “black work” is today increasing as a national sport in Denmark, just as it is in other countries.

The existing social order does not feel at home with hybridity and ambivalence. These are dangerous to modern order because they specify non-commitment as a
value and thus threaten what modernity needs most: the commitment of inner nature (Cushman 1995: 6).

There is an extreme example of “Danish” resistance to hybridization, this time more explicitly cultural. According to a news article, the “Danish Union” (Den Danske Forening), known as an extreme right-wing nationalist group, decided to boycott chickens produced by the Danish firm, Danpo, because the chickens were “halal-slaughtered” (Aarhus Stiftstidende, 1 February 1996). The director of Danpo confirmed for the reporter that a Muslim was working in the slaughtering process, but added that the way of slaughtering had nothing to do with Islam: “our methods are those practised throughout the world”. The moral of this somewhat absurd news story can be paraphrased from the title of Paul Gilroy’s book (1987): “there is no hybrid in the Union Danish”.

Paul Gilroy has approached hybrid development of black cultures by using the concept of “double consciousness”. Even though the concept of double consciousness “was initially used to convey special difficulties arising from black internalization of an American identity”, Gilroy, following W.E.B. Du Bois, uses it to interpret the experiences of post-slave populations in general, which can partly be applied to immigrant populations as well. “The Black Atlantic” is the spatial metaphor for a double consciousness expressing a “desire to transcend both the structures of the nation-state and the constraints of ethnicity and nationality”. But this development is also what the “Union Jack” denies to accept (Gilroy 1993: 19, 126).

Of course the above example about the “Union Danish” is an extreme story of the extreme right, which at best shows the boundaries of the absurd. But it must not be forgotten that the story does not differ much from the immigration debate except for political colours and tastes. Regarding hybridization, e.g. double loyalties to more than one country, one can still assert in general that these are not recognized. This is perhaps so mostly because the debate is predominantly made in “Danish” terms, and questions are asked from the Danish social space in which immigrants are devoid of a history. It is as if their biographies begin in Denmark, or maybe more aptly, the immigration debate does not really take into consideration their more deep-going hybrid social and spatial practices, of course except to point out, in a restrictive way, that immigrants have a “peasant” mentality even though they live in Danish cities. Most importantly, answers are sought in Danish terms even though Denmark is moving towards the EU with increasing velocity. But ironically, “the more we forbid ourselves to conceive of hybrids, the more possible their interbreeding becomes” (Latour 1993: 12). The more the social space closes
itself against or denies and denigrates the proliferation of hybrids, the more visible they become.

In Denmark, Flemming Røgilds argues,

funny enough, there isn’t yet anybody who is so blasphemous that he mixes passages from the Koran with elements of noise of the metropolis.... That is, in Denmark we have not yet seen Turks from Aarhus or Pakistanis from Vesterbro who, with their special choice of musical style and rhythm, attempt to catch the attention of “white Denmark”.... (Røgilds 1996: 35; my translation)

Nevertheless, the manifest hybridity is found mostly in areas other than aesthetics, which is, I think, especially due to immigrants’ deficits in cultural and symbolic capital. But this is not recognized by “white Denmark”, which seems to be busy with a conservative gardening against immigrant cultures. Denial of hybridity, and the fear of touching, bring only formulations resembling “kitsch” in the context of the politics of immigration.

I want to use kitsch as a metaphor that counterposes hybridity. Metaphors of hybridity are usually ambivalence, indeterminacy, incongruity, irrationality, dirt, illogicality, undecidability, or as Derrida has suggested, the term “pharmakon”, a word that generically embraces both remedy and poison. In Derrida’s words, the pharmakon “is neither remedy nor poison, neither good nor evil, neither the inside nor outside”; Bauman adds that the pharmakon overrides the possibility of binary opposition, and hence it “is powerful because ambivalent and ambivalent because powerful” (Bauman 1991: 55).

As a term associated with ambivalent, hybrid denies any totality as inside and outside. Thus there could be no complete “Danish” or “Turkish” identity in its world. In the world of purity and order, on the other hand, the ambivalent and the hybrid are “disquieting”. What kitsch does is, in this context, creating “quiteness” (see Tester 1995: 133-5). Quiteness is created in the politics of immigration through the easily recognizable categories, stereotypes, binary oppositions between whole identities and easy-going, unquestioned territorial and temporal divisions. They all help the actors and the audiences in feeling at ease with formulations of both problems and solutions. In short, we feel “at home” in the established frameworks of thinking and acting, especially if they help us avoid critical encounters outside the walls of the “ghetto” of the immigration debate. In this debate, I want to argue, many concepts have already attained a function more or less similar to that of kitsch (e.g. the concept of “integration”). As kitsch,
integration is the “happy ending” of a much wishful scenario. In this context, the stark deficit of critical reasoning in the increasingly one-sided Danish immigration debate must be taken seriously, because:

whenever a single political movement corners power, we find ourselves in the realm of totalitarian kitsch. When I say ‘totalitarian’, what I mean is that everything that infringes on kitsch must be banished for life: every display of individualism ... every doubt ... all irony. (Kundera 1985: 251-2)

Kitsch is the art of living without doubt, it is a “categorical agreement with being”; in kitsch, says Kundera, “shit” is denied and “everyone acts as though it did not exist” (1985: 248). Kitsch functions as “an avoidance of the shit which life might often be” (Tester 1995: 135). In our present context, the words “pharmakon”, ambivalence, hybridity, or “shit”, can easily be replaced with each other. As such, they all point out other sensibilities and “realities” opposed to the categorical, pink, pre-reflexive and shared agreement with the outside world which kitsch serves.

At this point, regarding how the discourse of immigration narrates “kitsch”, we can get aid from another metaphor, that is, “comedy” as a style of narration. Savasir (1984) summarizes some characteristics of comedy as a narrative model. Comedy has a happy ending. The order, which is disrupted in the beginning, is reconstituted in the end. “This characteristic lends a particular polemical aim to any historical account that adopts comedy as its narrative format. The end of the story shows up all the dangers that have threatened the portrayed order as having been ineffectual and incidental; therefore the end is a moment of reconciliation, both for the characters in the story and for the readers”. The second characteristic of comedy is that it “deals with types, that is with characters whose actions can and should be attributed to their social/institutional positions”, and the problematics of comedy arises either when characters are not conscious of their situations or when they do not play their role according to their “type”. But nevertheless, “[i]n both cases they are bound to appear to be ‘less than’ the audience” (Savasir 1984: 226).

I want to argue that in much mainstream research on immigration, especially policy-oriented research conducted at the level of local or central governments, the story-line is very similar to that of comedy. Firstly, in the beginning, the focused topic is either “the immigrant problem”, “the problems in ethnic relations”, or racism, discrimination, etc. Problematizations all point to a “disorder”, and we all agree that we have immigrants and problems. “Comedies are always imitations of persons below the average”, Aristoteles reminds us (quoted in Savasir 1984: 217;
my translation), and this is also true for the way of staging the immigrant in much research. He is always “less”: less educated, less able to speak our language, jobless, etc..

Then the texts proceed to “alternatives”, solutions, etc., that is, the possibilities of “reconciliation”, where the reader is made “conscious” and lead to imagine a happy ending, while parallelisms between the “type-immigrant” and concrete persons are also firmly established. Generally speaking, even in the most pessimistic observations, a “solution” is also signalled, say multicultural solutions, integration, etc., and an attempt is made in some way to neutralize the threat of ambivalence, or of disorder, by placing the observed phenomena firmly inside the discourses, nothing being capable of escaping the gaze of the researcher.

Against these ways of reconciliation, we can once more assert that the immigrant, which the politics of immigration assumes, does not exist: no identity is, nor can be, very “Turkish” after 30 years of experience with the routes of displacement far away from one’s roots. Instead, hybrids and kaleidoscopic identities proliferate, which order and purity seeking gazes cannot perceive. Has even the most conservative Muslim Turk in Europe not tasted pork at least indirectly? Can one even eat chips or cakes not “contaminated” by pork fat in one way or another? This of course also explains why, in Europe, “mosque organizations demonstrate an obsessive fascination with detail.... They distribute lists of food products commonly found in most supermarkets, lists which indicate products thought to contain pork, fat from pork or alcohol” (Yalçin-Heckmann 1994: 190; see also Ahmed 1992: 25-6). But in spite of this management of hybridity, Turks “reshape many religious concepts and practices, albeit with ambivalences”, as in the case of new year’s celebrations, fireworks displays. Likewise, in school classrooms, children “supplement” the cross with Turkish flags, a map of Turkey, etc. These are only some of the many examples Yalçin-Heckmann gives with respect to hybridization between Islamic and Christian rituals in the daily life of immigrants (1994: 183).

To conclude this section, one can say that where war is waged against “others”, there is hybridity. Furthermore, the fact that hybridity exists does not necessarily mean that “hybrids” identify with it. And this is the topic of the following section.

**Hybrid identity but “pure” identification**
The man who finds his homeland sweet is still a tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong; but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land. The tender soul has fixed his love on one spot in the world; the strong man has extended his love to all places; the perfect man has extinguished his. (Hugo of St. Victor; quoted in Said 1994: 365)

As mentioned before, migration, exile, or strangerhood in general means displacement, which is basically an enriching experience in spite of, or rather because of, many disturbances. Thus, the modern age, which Edward Said has called “the age of the refugee”, is typically characterized by displaced artists. For example, James Joyce, in his search for the unfamiliar, constantly “picked a quarrel with Ireland and kept it alive so as to sustain the strictest opposition to what was familiar” (Said 1994: 363). He was aware of the chances of reflexivity, which displacement and the loss of the home bring.

But the disappearance of the “Home” and furthermore the danger of the disappearance of the self in a new society can be experienced differently from how Joyce experienced it, that is, it can be associated with something more horrible, which is also an inseparable part of the experience of displacement. Therefore, next to the cosmopolitans of “the age of the refugee”, we also have the nationalists in exile seeking refuge from the refuge: “Exiles feel ... an urgent need to reconstitute their broken lives, usually by choosing to see themselves as part of a triumphant ideology or a restored people. The crucial thing is that a state of exile free from this triumphant ideology—designed to reassemble an exile’s broken history into a new whole—is virtually unbearable and virtually impossible in today’s world. Look at the fate of the Jews, the Palestinians and the Armenians” (Said 1994: 360).

Thus, we need not operate with a one-sided, romanticized “fetish of exile”. If the twentieth century is characterized as “the age of camps” (by Bauman 1995: 192-206), symbolizing the search for purity in concentration camps, then Said’s characterization of the fate of modern strangers as “to have been exiled by exiles” makes much sense (“look at the fate of the Jews, the Palestinians and the Armenians”). Displacement opens up possibilities of intercultural overlap and promotes cosmopolitanisms; but it also, at the same time, contains the germ of a search for fixed centres like a “Home”. Displacement is, therefore, significantly an ambiguous and open-ended phenomenon: its consequence can beget the possibilities of reflexivity, but it can also mean the repression of those possibilities. Not only “cosmopolitanism” in a civic culture, but also “tribalism” in one’s own turf
may follow displacement. Displacements in the first and second senses go hand in hand.

In the case of immigration, which is closely related to an experience of loss of home, displacement can be followed by a fetishization of that home by way of substitutes building on images of the past and the homeland. In this case, the nostalgia of the home stabilizes the liminal identity flowing in the grey ambivalence caused by displacement (see Naficy 1993).

In dealing with these questions in this section, I will maintain the view that the Turkish habitus in Aarhus is a hybrid one. But I now want to further argue that this hybridity is an open-ended, contingent one; that is, the ambivalence prevalent in it can relate to both meanings of displacement, depending on the actors’ choices and structural constraints. In chapter 8, I will further differentiate between “ordered” and “chaotic” hybridity. In the present context, suffice it to point out that the hybrid habitus, especially what I called the “consistent” hybrid habitus, can become more syncretistic, that is, more consciously articulate of different referential systems, or it can become a more “nostalgic” hybrid habitus. Naficy approaches the latter case, that is, the reactive cultural responses to immigration and exile, with the concepts of nostalgia and “fetish”.

In psychoanalysis, fetishism is defined as a form of perversion that results from the threat of castration posed by the absence of penis in the mother. Two contradictory attitudes arise in the male child. One is a recognition of a lack. The second is a disavowal of the lack through fetishization of the difference, resulting in the splitting of the ego.... The fetish blocks the view of the lack but, paradoxically and inevitably, in its own existence it points to the absence, it becomes an index of the absence”. (Naficy 1993: 128; my emphasis)

In this approach, separation from the mother(land) in the host society of the immigrant resembles a liminal state of mind. In Lacanian terminology, the movement of the exile or the immigrant is a movement from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, which strengthens the desire for “returning to the narcissism of the Imaginary” and unification with the mother(land). Among other things, for the immigrant, this means taking power over “there” and “then” (of the motherland), which in turn helps her or him control the “here” and “now” of the host society (Naficy 1993: 131-132).

The examples Naficy gives in this context concentrate on nostalgic fetish objects like Iranian TV productions in Los Angeles, which memorialize and authenticate the
past by discrediting the present. In this process, fetish, or "manufactured identity", plays a crucial but contradictory role; by creating a substitute for the homeland, it both means stability for the formation and consolidation of the immigrant’s identity and produces instability in the form of hybridization and syncretization (Naficy 1993: 129).

The main source of this instability is, again, “mimicry”. That is, even if Iranian TV in Los Angeles predominantly creates nostalgic fetishes of the homeland, Naficy points out that “Iranian women adapting American styles to pass as Americans” or “white women in Iranian dress” in these programmes, nevertheless, defamiliarize the stereotypes by playing with the “other” and creating slippages and excesses (Naficy 1993: 179-180).

If we consider the Turkish situation in Aarhus in this framework, we will see a similar process of “manufacturing” the Turkish identity. To begin with, it is almost banal to note that Turks “found out” or rather “remembered” they were Turks only after coming to Denmark, that is, after confronting their “others”. The framework of the immigration discourse, significantly occupied with categorizing them via dualizations based on the concepts of assimilation and integration, was powerful in setting them apart and thus allowing (re)creation of the “other” from their side. The Turks, displaced and trying to participate in “modernity” in the earlier years of immigration, began “re-traditionalizing” in this process, which also went hand in hand with, or was a response to, the discrimination in the physical and social space. As presented in the interviews, they were confronted during meetings with social worker with a racializing culturalism, which did not recognize them outside the sphere of culture and which sought solutions for their problems by focusing more and more on their “identity”. In such a process, it is not surprising that, with the help of a special sort of opportunism related to getting a “name” with which political representation of Turks (by themselves or by others) was made possible, Turks began adapting “otherness”. That is, they began establishing, or rather “re-establishing”, the “Turkish” identity and a new “Home”. As Tester remarks, “[a]fter all, a home is a fabrication that tends to become a reification” (1995: 130).

They were first alien workers, then guest workers, then immigrants, etc. But significantly, they also became Turks and Muslims in the process of immigration. They re-invented the tradition, which turned out to be a powerful weapon in immigration politics when they tried to argue against discrimination (especially against “assimilationist” policies and for “integration”). Besides, Turkishness was also an answer to the liminality of being an immigrant—at any rate, for those “tender beginners”.
Until the end of the 1970s, they decorated their houses with ornaments from Turkey. Each family had collected pictures from the homes they came from and had established a detailed photo album. Their curtains, some of their furniture, ingredients of their daily food, pictures of Mustafa Kemal or religious symbols hanging on the walls of their flats, or rather their private museums, or “Homes”, had been “collected”. The names of their clubs (like the Anatolian Cultural Association), their resistance to pork, a commitment which quickly became an icon of identity, were all “organized”. These all effectively “stabilized” their Turkishness.

In short, nostalgia and fetish (of the motherland) were set in motion, and gradually, “becoming similar” became the rule in the “ghetto”. Turkish identity significantly excluded its own others and its own strangers. Danes became “them”, some other minorities became “the Arabs”, and importantly, they altogether became uninteresting as “strangers”. Today, in spoken Turkish in Gellerup, the Turkish word “yabancı” (=stranger) is used to refer to Danes, and Gellerup is in the process of becoming a “neutral city” from the inside as well.

Recently, political Islam arrived. It reminded “Turks” that they were also Muslims. What it sought was a specific synthesis of Turkishness and Islam, which as an ideology has deep and painful roots in Turkish history. This has been the latest step in the politics of identity, which has tried to separate Turkishness from its outside using a fear of contamination, which is large in scale and deep in scope.

Once stigmatized, set apart and discriminated, the immigrants got more and more interested in political Islam, which advertised a powerful identity for their broken hopes and a re-shaping of the walls separating them from the outside. Ironically, perceiving what was happening with its one-eyed perspective, the discourse of immigration and specifically the politicians who were afraid of “fundamentalism” still blamed it upon its already discriminated victims. Indeed, this made the rise of political Islam only easier in the ghetto. At any rate, the Islamic ideology was obviously the only one that openly talked to the ghetto-dwellers of the city as “us”.

Today, it seems that, with globalization, the ghetto populations have not become cosmopolitans, but rather cultural tribes. In contrast to the diagnosis of immigration research, which thought that immigrants would be more individualized in the process of modernization, they have been tribalized in the process of postmodernization.

In his dictionary (The Art of the Novel), Milan Kundera has defined the “European” as one who feels nostalgia for Europe (Batur 1993: 30). In a similar way, we can say that the Dane and the Danish immigrant are those who feel
nostalgia for a cultural “Home” that disappeared and belongs to the past, if it ever existed. Perhaps precisely therefore, we are immensely busy with constructing unbridgeable and unmistakable boundaries around our identities and territories.

Given this background, fetishism seems to be a “reactive” variant of the experience of displacement “in today’s world”. But this does not necessarily mean that these variants are the only consequences of displacement. Thus, we need not necessarily give credit to the more or less automatic problematization or disqualification of the displaced person (with concepts such as split identity, culture shock neither-nor, etc.), as is the case with much of the literature engaged in solving “problems” of displaced cultures or persons by legitimizing this engagement with a therapeutic morality. On the contrary, what is needed most is perhaps an affirmation of ambivalence and hybridity, that is, being open toward and having an eye for the open-endedness and both/and of situations.

In this context, the hybrid habitus resembles ambivalence and indeterminacy. If a more “intercultural” habitus, or a nostalgic one, will come depends on the actors in the social space. Here, significantly, the “identifications” and the positionings of the actors are more important than their “identities”. The concept of identity refers in this context to what is static. In other words, it is the domain of “objects”, not of the active subjects. This dimension is important in the discussion of hybridity because the concept very often, or with few exceptions, refers only to the juxtaposition of different cultural “elements” from different cultural contexts that were originally separated from each other.

This perception of hybridity is congruent with a dichotomic logic that conceptualizes cultures as being outside each other in essentialist terms and assumes that cultures get “mixed” with each other “afterwards”. As Çaglar remarks, in this use, the concept of hybridity risks the danger of reifying cultures once more. Thus, it is important to recall that cultures and identities are intrinsically “hybrid”, and that to “spatialize” cultures by “mapping cultures on peoples” can be inherently problematic. Furthermore, using the concept of hybridization without questioning these presuppositions can mean risking a further “ethnicization” of immigrants, especially when we understand hybridity solely as hybrid “ethnic” identity. An obvious consequence of these assumptions is to define researched groups as ontological, a priori entities before describing what they are doing (Çaglar 1994).

A possible way out of such problems seems to be the one offered by Jonathan Friedman’s criticism of the theories of hybridization in the context of globalization. In his view, cultural globalization, or hybridization, cannot be conceived of
separately from the systemic dynamics of globalization processes. Thus, he underlines that one must not confuse the “products” of globalization with globalization itself. For example, “Balkanization is not globalization, but it is certainly a global phenomenon” (Friedman 1995: 75).

In other words, to be able to speak of “hybridization”, it is not enough to look at the “products” of mixtures of cultures, or to ask “what” questions about hybridity. It is equally important to pay attention to the “how” questions: how people identify and how they attribute meaning to what they are “doing” in the practice of socialization, authorization and identity formation.

Until relatively recently, African cloth was made primarily in Holland and Germany. The production was targeted to specific “tribes”, that is, based on specific patterns, and the cloth was not obtainable in Europe. The production of local difference on a global scale is proof of a global relation in production and consumption. It is not, of course, the globalization of culture, of meaning, but of the global control over local consumption via product differentiation. This is clearly a global systemic relation, but is it also globalization? (Friedman 1995: 87)

Only if culture is limited to “the museological definition of ethnographic objects” and thus conceived of as a “matter” that can be “mixed”, can hybridity, creolization, etc. be talked of, but still only as an “identification of others” by the cosmopolitan anthropologist (Friedman 1995: 82). This is importantly also a typical attribute of Western modernity in that it “consists in transforming difference into essence”, such as “race, text, paradigm, code, structure, without ever needing to examine the actual process by which specificity comes to be and is reproduced” (Friedman 1995: 80).

It can be argued that Friedman operates with a rather restricted understanding of hybridization only as identification. Therefore, it is important to recall that hybridization also takes place “in spite of” identifications; as is the case in the context of “hybridization between enemies” (see Pieterse 1995). Thus, instead of a wholesale denial and denigration of theories of hybridization by limiting it to identification—even though it is an extremely important dimension, we can still fruitfully investigate hybridization processes which take place in spite of pure identification because even this denial itself is grounded in existing hybridity. Ex-Yugoslavia, as the latest example, the most racist response to hybridity, or the most severe ambition to ethnic cleansing, is raised in the most hybrid contexts. As Said says, today, we are “exiled by the exiles”.
However, the points Friedman underlines are important in consideration of the hybridity of the Turkish habitus. They explicitly remind us that the objects, the products and the elements combined and mixed in the production of the habitus are only half the story regarding the processes of hybridization. At least equally important is the question of how and to what degree this hybridization is (not) recognized in the social space, which seems determined to order “anomalies” and to discipline human and non-human actors producing hybrids, a topic which we will approach from different angles in chapter 8.

So far, we can say that, with respect to “identifications” in the Danish social space, it is not easy to find hybrid ones. It is one thing to be hybrid, and it is something else to “affirm” it in one’s identifications. The most important question in the present context is, I believe, in which direction the hybrid habitus will tend to navigate, e.g. toward an affirmation of itself and its hybridity or toward denial of it through nationalism and fundamentalism. The choice is, of course, up to “us”, all actors.
6 Tradition, (Post)Modernity and Ambivalence

Older epistemes do not disappear; rather, they continue as substrata valid for organizing restricted spheres of experience. When I drive to the store or play volleyball, for example, I am a Newtonian, never doubting that the laws of motion apply unequivocally. When I wander why the price of gasoline has risen ten cents this week, I contemplate the complex mutual interactions most economically expressed through the field concept that also serves as a metaphor for global society. When I watch fractal forms being constructed on a computer screen, I am aware of yet another kind of thinking, distinct from the other two, with a wide domain of applicability to natural forms and complex systems. In what episteme do I live? Not in a single epistemology, but in a complex space characterized by multiple strata and marked by innumerable fissures. (Katherine Hayles; quoted in Adam 1996: 144)

As already mentioned, the cultures of immigrants in Denmark are generally associated with the metaphor of “tradition” while Danish culture is largely pictured as being “modern”, that is, detraditionalized and individualized. In this way, the binary opposition of tradition and modernity has been central to both the knowledge and politics of immigration. Hence, problems arising in the field of immigration are generally seen as backdrops of a presumed confrontation between traditional and modern forms of life.

On the basis of this common assumption, one also finds a differentiation and furthermore a polarization. On the one hand, those “difference multiculturalists” who criticize modernity conceive of modernity as a sort of “disorder” that lays pressure on or directly breaks immigrants’ “traditional” forms of life that resemble an “order”. In certain circumstances, then, the idea becomes to “protect” immigrant cultures from this chaos-creating modernity, which is a priori negatively defined. In contrast to tradition, which is imagined as order, modernity is here conceived of one-sidedly as a metaphor of normlessness, fragmentation and the loss of simplicity, authenticity and spontaneity. Hence, in this version of the discourse of immigration, immigrants have
what “we” have lost: “they” are more “natural”, they have the “ethnic community” and “solidarity” and “feeling of security” in the ghetto and so on. The transition from the traditional to the modern is understood as a decline from a Golden Age, a frame of thinking which Stauth and Turner have named “the nostalgic paradigm”, related to the critique of modernity (1988: 511; see also Necef 1992: 38-59 and Schierup 1993: 168-170).

But on the other hand, in reference to the same duality, we have what can be called an anti-nostalgic, “modernist” discourse that perceives immigrant cultures still as traditional: “What makes, for instance, the Turkish immigrants so radically different is, to sum up, not that they are Turks and Muslims, but that they live, until further and temporarily one could say, in a traditional universe” (Necef 1994: 30; my translation). This view directly speaks to “the impossibility of tradition in the modern society”—what is traditional is conceived of as something doomed to evaporate (Necef 1992: 10; 1994: 69-70). Thus immigrants’ deficits in modernity, disadvantages in the physical and social space etc., seem solvable if only immigrants become individualized or “modernized” and leave their traditional bonds behind, that is, if they are assimilated into modernity. In accordance herewith, all the related issues, like the “ghetto”, are predominantly conceived of as barriers or as a “counter-factors” “delaying” this modernization, and it is assumed that, for example, the ghetto also will diminish in the process of modernization (Necef 1992: 22; 1994: 70). Besides, the critique of modernity, because of its “universalism”, “civilizing pretensions” and “ethnocentrism”, a critique that social theorists, such as Zygmunt Bauman, have accentuated, is found “without justification and contradictory”, because such discussions implicitly presuppose modernity in the form of democracy, freedom of expression, etc. (Necef 1992: 95-96). In other words, to be able to criticize modernity, one must first be modern. As such, with this “inside” view of modernity, only a one-way ticket is served; the linear, historical progression from tradition to modernity is not retrievable, and hence it follows that we need not or cannot imagine something external to modernity. From this second point of view, one can conceive of tradition either as an order other than one of modernity or as something ambivalent in the sense that it is the weeds, the remains, or simply the not-yet-modern, and thus “abnormal”, in a society that is thoroughly and homogeneously modernized.

In this chapter, I want to question these two approaches, which deeply characterize the Danish immigration debate. They also occasionally dissolve in the debate on integration, that is, the idea that traditional life forms can live “next to” modernity and hence should be protected, versus assimilation, that is, the idea that they do not have a chance against maelstrom of modernity and thus should not be
protected, which is also best for themselves. In this context, my main point of departure will be that tradition and modernity are not mutually exclusive, monolithic entities.

No doubt, this binary opposition of tradition and modernity is an old story. That is why it is worth looking at its historical roots, for instance, in the modernization theory. But it is equally important to look at its routes in newer social theory. For example, the juxtapositions of modernity and postmodernity (or late modernity, reflexive modernization, surmodernity, etc.) as exclusive entities or periods and the discussions of “detraditionalization” regarding contemporary societies seem to bear heavy traces of this old framework. Thus, instead of looking at tradition only in the context of modernity, as is common in the two approaches mentioned above, I also want to look at the concepts of tradition and modernity in the context of postmodernity.

My main purpose is to show that it is more useful in our context to use the three concepts of tradition, modernity and postmodernity as perspectives rather than as historical periods in a chronological time-line. My thesis is that we are living simultaneously in different realities and that periodization is a distinctly modern idea that imposes clarity and purity on human conditions that are intrinsically more ambivalent.

Social theory, time, ambivalence and order

Mainstream modern social theory imagines itself as a mirror of the social which it holds to be extra-textually constructed. This mainstream, by and large, also strives after coherence. Thus, according to Ann Game, even “the notions of conflict function in a unifying manner” in mainstream social theory. This is because, for instance, notions like class, gender, ethnicity are seen in the end as the basis of a social unity, and in this context, “conflict operates as a means of neutralizing difference” (Game 1991: 24-25). Mainstream social theorists:

ask ‘why’-type questions, and both forms of answer, functional and historical, assume causal determination.... Historical explanation, for example, consists in a periodisation: where we are now is an end point, each period or stage being an inevitable move in this direction.... Each moment is understood as an identity in a causal relation to other
moments; each moment or element, past, present or future, is understood as a presence, on a line marked by cause-effect relations. (Game 1991: 26)

This search for totality, linearity and a cause is significantly also “a demand for certainty”, a point which will be very central in our context. Such an ambition, or in Game’s words, the “desire for identity and a whole” in social theory, is closely related to historical periodizations and representations of time. In this context, it is important that social theory most often conceives of time as a homogeneous, abstract and empty entity (Game 1991: 26). “Each moment in this time is understood as a discrete element or presence, and it is presumed that it can be represented as such. Only if we spatialise time we come to such a view” (Game 1991: 93).

What does “spatializing” time mean then? Above all, it means an imagination of time passing linearly and “naturally” along clock-time. But, as John Urry points out, even though social science has taken clock-time as the defining feature of “natural” time, it is paradoxically “not generalised through nature” but it is itself a “social” invention (Urry 1995: 18). Clock-time is both Cartesian, in that it is premised upon dichotomies, and Newtonian, in that it is based on the notion of absolute time which is “infinitely divisible into space-like units, measurable in length, expressible as a number” (ibid, 18). As a modern invention, clock-time has historically meant an increased synchronisation of life across local and national territories and a disembedding of time from social activities, by measuring it universally and hence emptying out the meaning of lived time in temporal and local contexts (Lash & Urry 1994: 229).

In spatializing time, different periods, phases, etc. are “placed” on the homogeneous line of clock-time. Moreover, spatializing time draws on dualisms consisting of exclusive parts, like that of tradition, on the one hand, and modernity, on the other. So to say, spatializing time requires an “either/or” thinking. In our context, the immigrant cultures, the ghetto, etc. are spatialized as a more backward stage or level than modernity on the time-line of politics and knowledge of immigration (and popularly, it is in general assumed that “time” will solve problems, like modernization, integration of future generations, etc.). On this time-line, immigrants and Danes are either traditional or modern.

It is ironic that this desire to periodize the social in chronological time through spatializing and dualisms amounts to a negation of the very temporality of the social phenomena. This negation takes place due to overlooking heterogeneities and continuities related to the here-and-now of lived time or, in Game’s words, by “putting oneself outside, as an observer, duration” (Game 1991: 95). Duration is a
Bergsonian concept referring to “lived” in contrast to “abstract” (chronological) time. Two most fundamental characteristics of duration is continuity and heterogeneity (Deleuze 1991: 37). It is thus characterized not by a number or a space, but by a qualitative multiplicity. “Pure duration is lived, as opposed to a separation of states as points on a line, or presences; in duration, past and present melt into each other without distinction ... as soon as we fix on a moment, abstract it, it no longer endures; it is solidified, spatialised and impenetrable” (Game 1991: 94). In duration, the human body and memory are actively involved, and on this account, memory is viewed temporally and not spatially (Lash & Urry 1994: 239).

Abstract time and duration are thus two different concepts of time and are related importantly to two different attitudes toward meaning and life in general. Abstract time is associated with a “naturalistic” notion of time, for which the points or periods on the time-line are fixed, or spatialized, in the sense that, for example, an observer can “reflect” upon them by stepping outside. So, a distanced “reflective attitude” to social phenomena and abstract time are closely interrelated. Duration, lived time, is by contrast associated with a phenomenological notion of meaning, where the observer is not taken as external to and reflecting over a spatialized, fixed time. In other words, abstract time is related to reflection and thus representation; duration is related to “becoming”, presentation and transformation, of which memory, multiplicity and contamination play a crucial role. Thus duration is understood as “consisting of a movement and permeation of elements”, which makes it impossible for any single element to be only itself, that is, an independent identity. And “the movement in relations between elements undermines notions of causality, totality, and the end” (Game 1991: 91).

When one periodizes and totalizes concepts like tradition, modernity and postmodernity as monolithic and coherent identities, the price is overlooking duration, a temporal “time-touch” between different elements. This “spatialization” is also what allows for imagining these “entities” as “replacing” each other. Thus, in mainstream approaches, the “end” of tradition means the “beginning” of modernity, etc. But Ann Game, following Bergson, says:

> Duration is not ‘one instant replacing each other’, but a prolongation of the past, a movement of the virtual into the actual. Otherwise there would be nothing but the present, a repetition of the same.... The memory of duration is not the memory of images: any representation consists in a spatialisation, a cutting out, an immobilisation. Representation of past, present or future is a denial of time. (Game 1991: 97-98)
In this chapter, in contrast with the “coherent” pictures based on the spatialization of time, I want to view tradition, modernity and postmodernity as temporal. In this context, it is important to underline that duration, as it is understood in the above framework, cannot be depicted or “represented” as such (which would amount to another version of the “metaphysics of presence”; see chapter 2). Duration is already past and fixed when it is represented. Thus, we always already operate with second-order concepts when we speak of duration of lived time, just as it is also the case with lived space. But nevertheless, it is a useful concept for keeping an eye on the continuities and heterogeneities between what is held apart in monolithic and “spatial” thinking.

There is another important point about the relationship between temporality and space. If we want to understand duration as a negation of abstract time and spatialization, it must also be pointed out that abstract time is “spatial” only in the sense of “abstract space” and not in the sense of “lived space” (some concepts which we dwelled on at length in chapter 3). Given this background, lived time and lived space must be thought of together. Hence the approach I adapt does not mean that time is more important than space for social theory, but it means that it is lived time and lived space that matter (see also Lash & Urry 1994: 239). Thus there is no necessary contradiction between what Game points out regarding duration, and what, for example, Foucault underlines in the following, arguing that:

The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: With its themes of development and of suspension, of crisis and cycle, themes of the ever accumulating past, with its great preponderances of dead men and the menacing glaciation of the world.... The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side by side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein. (Foucault 1986: 22)

Needless to say, the “history” Foucault speaks of above is that of abstract time and progressivist periodization. Following his insight on simultaneity and juxtaposition, I want to argue in this chapter that tradition, modernity and postmodernity as perspectives can and do coexist in contemporary societies. Thus, I do not initially want to “periodize” these concepts, for example, by arguing that modernity or postmodernity are the cultural logic of different sorts of societies or that they follow each other in linear chronological time, etc. (a social theoretical periodization will be undertaken in the next chapter). On the contrary, I want in the
present context to look at these concepts on a more “ontological” level, that is, in terms of relationships between order (or systemness) and inconsistency (or ambivalence), which define some of the basic conditions of human existence.

Concepts of ambivalence and order are useful to differentiate between some views of tradition, modernity and postmodernity and to point out some continuities as well as discontinuities among them. That is also to say, we can detect some predominantly ordered and some other predominantly ambivalent views on each of these concepts. Schematically, this can be summarized on the basis of Albertsen (1996), as follows:

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<td>tradition-as-order</td>
<td>modernity-as-ambivalence</td>
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<td>modernity-as-order</td>
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I take these concepts not as realities themselves, but as perspectives or theories about these realities. Even though tradition, modernity and postmodernity cannot be understood via “spatial” entities and dichotomies, theories about these are usually built upon dichotomies by using each other as counter-images. This is why they are placed on their respective sides in the diagram. But the diagram will be used to go beyond these very dichotomies, for example, by arguing that each of these concepts, that is, tradition, modernity and postmodernity, can be viewed as expressions of both ambivalence and order. These concepts, order and ambivalence, form a basis in the following considerations, and they indicate what the perspectives we will be dwelling on affirm and prioritize most. I assume that there is a constant tension between ambivalence and order, which affects both modern and postmodern societies and their sociological paradigms. For example, in early modern sociology, the conceptual pair of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft indicated such a tension, of which tradition was perceived as order while modernity seemed and sounded more ambivalent, e.g. in the case of the “dissolution” of traditions. The tension in postmodern sociology and society seems to be between modernity-as-order and the ambivalence
postmodernization imposes. The two concepts can also be taken as negatives of each other in the photographic sense in that they respectively point out what is not mentioned in each other. For example, in relation to a perspective conceiving modernity-as-order, the concepts of equality and liberty are identical with modernity, whereas a perspective more sensitive to ambivalence would point toward Holocaust as the negative of the picture of modernity-as-order, that is, as the “other side” of modernity.

Concomitantly, I seek some “horizontal” connections between notions like tradition, modernity and postmodernity. Instead of following a historical periodization, which places these concepts in different historical phases as more or less monolithic entities in a before-and-after scheme, I want to draw attention to their coexistence as perspectives in contemporary societies. In this, the concept of ambivalence is useful for holding together many different conceptual elements coming from different sources. This conceptual centrality of ambivalence is also grounded in that the problems we have been facing in this study are, just like the strangers themselves, ambivalent in character. The problem is, thus, if one can imagine a way of preserving the ambivalences mentioned in previous chapters in the theoretical approach itself without setting the scene for a linear theory of change in chronological phases that also “explains” the ambivalences away.

It is important to underline in this context that the concept of ambivalence does not refer to chaos understood as the complete lack or negativity of order, but on the contrary, to an interrelationship and interdependence, or a continuum, between chaos and order. Order and chaos presuppose each other, and they cannot be defined without each other:

Chaos, ‘the other of order’ is pure negativity. It is a denial of all that the order strives to be. It is against that negativity that the positivity of order constitutes itself. But the negativity of chaos is a product of order’s self-constitution: its side-effect, its waste, and yet the condition sine qua non of its (reflective) possibility. Without the negativity of chaos, there is no positivity of order; without chaos, no order. (Bauman 1991: 7)

What we face here is a conflictual balance between chaos and order. Ambivalence is not only chaos or absolute indeterminacy, but an intricate intermixture of both chaos and order, contingency and systemness, an intermixture where both sides are present and constantly touch each other in temporality and space. Thus, Bauman
presents what may be the basic contradiction at the heart of human existence. This contradiction comprises on the one hand, ‘systemness’ as a set of ersatz instincts for our species, whether as custom, religious ritual and precepts or legal-rational norms. It comprises, on the other hand, ‘contingency’, the open-ended more ‘existential’ side of la condition humaine…. Gehlen, and following him Peter Berger, believed that systemness of the resurgence of order is always inevitable. Bauman disagrees and propounds that any sort of contemporary ethical thought must champion neither systemness nor contingency, but recognize that ‘man’ is a complex amalgam of both, and must instead learn to live with this ‘ambivalence’. (Featherstone & Lash 1995: 11-12)

There may be an existential paradox between contingency and systemness. Paralleling this point of view, I want to argue that in our framework we have to deal with both systemness and ambivalence simultaneously. For example, we can simultaneously, on the one hand, work with a systematic-analytical tradition, which does not allow considerable space for ambivalence, and on the other, with a deconstructivist tradition, which is keen on finding and demonstrating ambivalences in systematic thinking. In other words, when one is confronted with a “complex amalgam” of both systemness and ambivalence, the problem remains of how to go on without choosing between the one or the other extreme, without giving up either of the two. If one adopts only a deconstructive framework, the problem becomes that much systematic thought can be seen merely as philosophical metaphysics in that one can always find and demonstrate ambivalences in it. In such a deconstructivist approach, there will not be any space for systemness or order. But to say “everything is ambivalent” amounts in itself to saying something unambiguous and absolute, which is, for example, a problem of relativism. On the other hand, adopting exclusively a systematic theoretical approach that prioritizes coherence and consistency would cause what is ambivalent in the issue to be overlooked and thus to disappear from our horizon. If we only focus on systemness, we get the false impression that we can totally understand what is ambivalent. In contrast, if we only build upon ambivalence, we risk becoming blind to what is systematically ordered. So, one has to keep in touch with the continuity or balance between systemness and ambivalence. But how?

Chapter 8 will elaborate on this issue at length and in depth. Here I will demonstrate an introductory attempt to think about order and ambivalence together by adopting a simultaneously “eclectic” and “post-deconstructivist” approach, which, without necessarily striving for an unambiguous coherence or consistency, can make use of different theoretical bodies to illuminate different aspects of the social phenomena. To be sure, in such an eclectic search for balance and continuity as well
As discontinuities between systemness and ambivalence, one is confronted with the problem of inconsistency. But it is important to point out that this problem arises mainly because one side of the ambivalence-systemness amalgam becomes criteria for the other. In contrast, what I want to do is to keep the tension and the dialogue between systemness and ambivalence alive rather than to try to establish a forced reconciliation between them.

**Post-traditional order, reflexivity and individualization**

The past is never past.

(W. Faulkner)

... for the hero time is heroic, for the whore time is just another trick.... we are the creators of time, victims of time, and the killers of time. Time is timeless.... You are the clock. (W. Wenders, *So far so Near*)

According to some of the most influential contemporary sociologists, such as Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, we live in post-traditional times. For example, Giddens speaks of the emergence of a *post-traditional social order*. This order is closely related to the demise of traditions and, as is the case with globalization tendencies mentioned in the last chapter, it is one of the most important pillars of *reflexive modernization*, which he together with other social theorists means is the current phase of modernity (Giddens 1994a; 1994b).

Thus, according to this periodization of history, one can speak of a succession of different orders. That is, after tradition, the phase of *simple* modernization came, and then it was succeeded by *reflexive* modernization. It is held that simple modernization “runs within the framework of categories and principles of industrial society” (Beck 1992: 121). One big difference between reflexive modernity, on the one hand, and both simple modernity and traditional order, on the other, is the thoroughly detraditionalized and individualized character of social conduct in reflexive modernity. Seen from the individual’s standpoint, both Giddens and Beck assert that the world of the classical industrial society, or the world of simple modernity, although in earlier stages it meant the demise of what was perceived as tradition, still built upon a variety of “invented traditions”, such as nationalism, reformed religions, the institution of family, gender roles etc. (Giddens 1994b: 5).
In other words, they speak of modernity itself as a sort of tradition. *Simple* modernity was still dependent on traditions, albeit new ones. Even science became a tradition in the phase of simple modernity. As was the case with traditional authority, which was (according to Giddens) unquestionable and external to the people of the traditional order, science became in the name of progress one of unquestioning ways of confronting dilemmas and risks in simple modernity. In this context, the grand utopic and optimistic narratives of the Enlightenment and industrial society were one-eyed with respects to the “risks” that were perceived as predictable; hence, risks were seen as a result of human mismanagement stemming from deficits of cognitive knowledge about a finite, thus knowable world. The assumption was that in the end we could know this world. In other words, the world of simple modernity was self-contentious but not self-confronting and hence did not thematize and problematize itself as a factor creating risks.

Especially in light of ecological dangers and dilemmas, Beck asserts that today “the recognition of unpredictability of the threats provoked by the techno-industrial development necessitates self-reflection”, and thus society becomes “a theme and a problem for itself” (1994: 8). In other words, in the time of ecological disasters, the burden of which cannot be located on the shoulders of a definite and segregated group of people any longer, we are all potentially hostages in the face of the immense scope of imminent risks, which we no longer dare to dream of mastering. So we also perceive and define risks in a new way, as “manufactured” risks, which are created by human intervention itself and are thus social in origin. “We live today in a world of manufactured uncertainty, where risk differs sharply from earlier periods in the development of modern institutions” (Giddens 1994b: 78).

Today, economic and individual risks “increasingly tend to escape the institutions of monitoring and protection in the industrial society” (Beck 1994: 5). Transition from the condition of predictability to that of unpredictability of risk marks the transition from simple to reflexive modernization. In this phase, the simple modernity itself is perceived as a tradition which is to be de-mystified, just as simple modernity sought to demystify pre-modern traditions. “Today people are not being ‘released’ from feudal and religious-transcendental certainties into the world of industrial society, but rather from industrial society into the turbulence of the global risk society” (Beck 1994: 7). The concept of reflexive modernity, interestingly, problematizes in this way any necessary dichotomy of tradition and modernity as two completely different and exclusive entities, simply because simple modernity becomes a tradition in modernity.

According to Beck and Giddens, simple modernity accentuated the individualization processes, but it is first in the phase of reflexive modernity that
agents explicitly reflect both upon themselves (self-reflexivity) and society (social reflexivity). Demands for political reconstruction, dissatisfaction with old bureaucratic systems, which are increasingly seen as “the dinosaurs of the post-traditional age”, the widespread use of flexible production techniques, which mean that greater autonomy of action is recognized in economic relations, are all partly expressions of this social reflexivity (Giddens 1994b: 7). As other theoreticians (such as Luhmann and Habermas) have also stressed, social reflexivity means that increasingly more domains of life become discursive and rationally disputable in contemporary societies. Concomitantly, the consciousness develops that many social relations could be different, even if they do not change.

Next to social reflexivity, we also individually live today in a world in which our daily life has become more reflexive and more “experimental”. Thus, according to Giddens, not traditions but individuals themselves decide today whether to marry, whom to marry or whether to have children, and they even “settle” their own sexuality independently (1994b: 83). Agents of reflexive modernization, as a consequence of individualization and detraditionalization, are increasingly free from the heteronomy of modern institutions, such as class, family and trade unions, all of which are built on “shared interests”.

The increasing disintegration of these “previously existing” social forms make possible new forms of life in which individuals alone choose “until further notice” what to choose in creating their own reflexive biographies. This is something that gradually gives birth to what Bauman called “vagrant’s morality”, which among other things announces the end of lifelong projects known from the time of simple modernity (e.g. lifelong jobs or husbands and wives, etc.). In this process, even the welfare state becomes “an experimental apparatus for conditioning ego-related lifestyles”, since for modern welfare advantages, “one has to do something” to constitute him or herself as an individual. In this sense of self-construction, individualization also means a set of new tasks of and pressures on the individual with respect to thinking and planning of one’s reflexive biography, in contrast to older times when people did not ask such big and burdensome questions (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 1996: 24-27). Thus the discussion of reflexive modernity is very much that one both has to constantly choose and has to take the responsibility of the choices alone.

If, in reflexive modernity, individuals also become more reflexive towards social structures, of which expert systems are the most important ones, this is because reflexive modernity is more about flows of knowledge and information than about commodity production. Hence the possession of knowledge has a determinant role in this society. One direct consequence of this is an awareness of the manufactured
character of risks and a growing scepticism towards scientific expert systems and technology at large. And this requires, so to say, knowledge against knowledge. So far, reflexivity involves first and foremost a "self-confrontation", and reflexive modernization means self-confrontation of modernization with its own consequences (Beck 1994: 5).

Since agents are increasingly emancipated from traditions (both pre-modern and modern), reflexive modernity is also a post-traditional social order. Given this introductory background, let us look closer at the thesis of post-traditional order in the way Giddens has defined it.

Post-traditional order does not necessarily mean for Giddens that traditions disappear as such. On the contrary, one sees an increasing proliferation of traditions, but with a decisive difference: today, traditions increasingly have to explain themselves and enter into dialogue both with other traditions and other political, economic and cultural systems of the society. He says that "[t]radition more and more must be contemplated, defended, sifted through, in relation to the awareness that there exists a variety of other ways of doing things" (Giddens 1994b: 83). In short, just like individuals of reflexive modernity, traditions also become more and more reflexive.

He adds that the interesting point about traditions as such is that "you don’t really have to justify them" since they contain their own "ritual truth" (Giddens 1994b: 6). That is to say, if a tradition manoeuvres in any way to justify itself, then it actually ceases to be a tradition in the old way. Since our traditions today are "chosen" or "invented" and they cannot insist on an a priori truth without the need for dialogue, Giddens maintains we can speak of a post-traditional society. Conversely, if a tradition insists on its own ritual truth by refusing the dialogue to explain itself—an attitude Giddens calls "defending the tradition in the traditional way"—then we have to do with "fundamentalism". Fundamentalism means in this context, rather than a defence of tradition as such, a doctrinaire manner of refusing discursive engagements and encounters to protect a principle (Giddens 1994b: 85).

As this short summary suggests, Giddens seems to be saying that in post-traditional social order, we have many traditions but they are actually not traditions anyway. Or if they are traditions, then they are at the same time fundamentalisms as well, because they do not have any trace of reflexivity. Tradition as such is “spatialized” by Giddens, and it is doomed to melt away because it belongs to another period; hence, it is denied a place in the world of reflexivity.

Putting its unarguable merits for an analysis of contemporary social relations aside, this framework seems rather restrictive regarding the conceptualization and
understanding of tradition, on the one hand, and individualization, on the other. As to the latter, for example, one could say that the theory of reflexive modernization (especially in Giddens’ version) underplays the importance of some ordering mechanisms, which considerably restrict and constrain individual freedoms to choose in contemporary societies. No doubt that, in contemporary societies which are characterized by differentiation of domains of life and correspondingly of systems, individualization plays a very important role. For example, according to Luhmann, even though modern life is surrounded by differentiated systems (like economy, politics, arts, legal systems, and so on), which constitute highly autonomous and reflexive orders, a single individual can participate in different systems at once, which also means that the individual becomes the main agent who holds autonomously differentiated systems together. But nevertheless, these systems operate with the principle of ordering and exert pressures on the individuals by including or excluding them (see chapter 7 for details). Likewise, as we have seen in chapter 4, where we dwelled on Bourdieu’s sociology, the social space is hierarchically constructed, and one’s position in this vertical hierarchy, again, exerts pressures on and actively determine one’s domain of choices, or one’s dispositions. Thus, in summary, modern individuals are also subject to external ordering pressures. My argument is, then, that the phenomenon of individualization must be conceived of in a more detailed framework by taking into account these and other similar aspects, an issue which we will return to.

The following section will develop a criticism more focused on the issue of “tradition”. We can begin here by underlining that for the theory of reflexive modernization, tradition seems to resemble first of all a sort of static order, a dogma not requiring justification and dialogue, as opposed to reflexive modernity, which resembles risk, uncertainty, choice and thus ambivalence.

But at the same time, the theory of reflexive modernization gives quite an orderly view of contemporary societies in which the arrow of time points to further development and continuous change from phase to phase. Towards a more homogeneous future in which, for example, tradition (but not fundamentalism!) has no place. I will argue that this is a typical Enlightenment view of a society in progress and wishing homogenization.

What is this thing called “tradition” anyway?
Significantly, to be able to speak about any post-traditional order, we need a notion of tradition. At the same time, there is very little literature that defines tradition without contrasting it with what is non-traditional or “new”. We normally seek other points of references to define these concepts against. For example, many times we define modernity as opposed to tradition or vice versa. Hence, modernity (or detraditionalization, postmodernity, etc.) and tradition become for each other what can be called a “supplement” (in Derrida’s sense) without which the identity of any one of them cannot do.

Likewise, Giddens writes, to understand what it means to live in a post-traditional order, we have to consider two interrelated questions: “what tradition actually is and what the generic characteristics of a ‘traditional society are’”. Then he embarks on the definition of tradition. Firstly, it is a means of controlling and regulating time based on repetition and (collective) memory. What repetition and memory do in this context is “to return the future to the past, while drawing on the past also to reconstruct the future”. In other words, tradition means regulation of the present by organizing and reconstructing the past. According to Giddens, traditions “resist change”, and hence “the integrity and authenticity of a tradition”, the main vehicles of its endurance, are more important than how long it lasts (Giddens 1994: 62). Secondly, tradition involves rituals, which are associated not only with “mindless” or “automation-like character” but also with active interpretative processes, something which binds traditions closely with practical means of preservation. But nevertheless, he suggests elsewhere that in a traditional culture “it is entirely reasonable to suppose that what one did yesterday offers a guide to how one should act today and tomorrow, however fast traditions might change” (Giddens 1994b: 176).

Thirdly, Giddens connects tradition with what he calls a “formulaic notion of truth”. The formulaic truths, which are “not communicable to the outsider”, are performative and based on ritual speech. It “makes no sense to disagree with or contradict” the ritual speech of traditions, that is, the possibility of dissent is excluded by the formulaic truth, which is non-reflexive in its character. Those who have access to formulaic truths are only the “guardians” of traditional society, and their power is not based on “competence” (as is the case with the “experts” of “modern” society), but on their “status” in the traditional order. Finally, traditions have “a normative or moral content which gives them a binding character”. This binding character is closely related to the orientation of traditions to questions of what “should be” done as well as questions of what “is” done in societies (Giddens 1994: 64-65). And importantly, authority of tradition relates to its “external” relationship to the individual: “Tradition, like nature, used to be an ‘external’ context of social life, something that was given and largely unchallengeable” (Giddens 1994b: 85).
To be sure, one can enlist numerous other characteristics of what is called tradition. In general, it can be said that for much social theorizing (including Giddens’s and mainstream immigration research in Denmark), tradition represents a sort of closedness to the outer world and the repetitive and ritual character of social conduct in this closed world without a considerable input of conscious thought. The past exerts a heavy influence on the present, and fate functioning as a pre-ordering mechanism in the interpretation of social relations is a central concept to this traditional order, which is thus by its inhabitants perceived as an unchangeable “necessity”. Furthermore, in such a society, the issue of security is embedded in social solidarities without relying on more general or institutionalized instances. Traditional society is also a society of “virtue”, which is the main reference point for individuals in the lack of concepts, such as “preferences”, etc. Already at this point, one wonders: Giddens perceives tradition not as a construction of modernity (and, for example, speaks of “what tradition actually is”). He does not say anything about “when” traditional society took place the way he describes it. And, likewise, the concept of “ritual”, which seemingly consists of no more than a repetition of the sacral and the “truths” of “traditional” society, seems to be curious (one wonders if modernity was not equally such a world where people went around and believed in some “truths”). And lastly, one wonders if fundamentalism cannot really be reflexive at all, recalling that its criticism of the West bears similarities to other lines of “Western” criticism of Western civilization.

As Barbara Adam underlines, in mainstream descriptions of tradition, what is significantly not mentioned is the creative and temporal dimensions of tradition; for example, Weber, emphasizing “the habitual and automatic aspect” of it, saw tradition as something pointing to the borders of meaningfully oriented action. This is also the way much theorizing on detraditionalization and individualization builds: “Pre-given unalterable authority, power located external to the individual, information transfer across time and space, as well as unquestioned and unthinking action are thus the backcloth against which the contours of detraditionalization are drawn and defined” (Adam 1996: 137).

Another problem is the “thing-like quality assigned to tradition” in these approaches, whereas it is always active and reflexive subjects who “read” and interpret the tradition in their daily lives. Thus according to Timothy W. Lukes, “traditions also must be seen as very dynamic, contemporary, and forward-looking” (Lukes 1996: 114-116). Also Adam points out that the concept of tradition, which stems from the Latin word “tradere” meaning “to hand over or deliver”, implies a temporality, an active process in which something new is “created afresh at each moment of renewal” (Adam 1996: 137).
One can say that, in social theory, tradition has traditionally been diagnosed from a post-traditional point of view, or so to say, from a point of view which locates itself outside (if not always above) tradition in one way or another. Hence, regarding tradition, there has always been a fixation on the past, whereas social theory has attempted to understand the present state of the social in terms of “before-and-after” schemes, where “before” is often associated with a caricature-like version of reality, perceived as a “simpler” and “less developed” order. Tradition has always been “once there was” in contra-distinction to “now there is”, which is, for instance, modern, postmodern or post-traditional order. Such dichotomic perceptions implicitly also invite us to choose, for example, between either (pre-given) tradition or (reflexive) modernity. Thus where one meets the concept of tradition, there is always something else which replaces it. In other words, tradition is, as a rule, the other of something else (Adam 1996: 135).

This also explains why oppositions are so often employed in both mainstream and critical approaches. For example, as long as tradition is or can be defined in the above mentioned terms, of closedness, fate, necessity, externality, authority, certainty, embeddedness, virtues etc., we can define (simple or reflexive) modernity or detraditionalization as openness, as a movement from fate to choice, from necessity to contingency, from certainty to uncertainty, etc. (Heelas 1996: 3).

I want to argue that, for further engagement with alternative accounts of tradition, modernity and postmodernity, these dichotomies must be deconstructed. One way of doing this is to look at modernity (both simple and reflexive) in tradition and tradition in modernity, or modernity-as-tradition, as Luke names it.

Adam points out several issues in this context (Adam 1996: 138-140). She maintains, firstly, that all societies always had and will have traditions. For example, as Thomas Kuhn observed in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, even science, which is otherwise perceived as building on “universal” criteria, needs and actually makes use of traditions, and scientific communities have enduring functions in producing more or less local criteria for validity (Adam 1996: 138).

Adam underlines, secondly, that the more the future predetermines our present, the more concern we tend to have with the past. Trying to revitalize cultural life of cities via urban planning, collection of art(efacts), the countless new museums in almost all cities of the developed world, the heritage industry are the best examples of this tendency in “post-traditional” times characterized by an “explosion of collective memory”. As Piet Hein has expressed it in a Danish poem, “We Moderns” (Vi Moderne), even if people think they become more and more modern, the case is that “our time has more past than our past” (my translation).
One can ascertain here that the work of theoreticians, such as Bourdieu, constantly points out that there are always and already “other” instances than, for example, capitalist, economic or modern rationalities at work in modern societies. The detraditionalized, rational, modern systems function to “non-symbolize” social exchanges, where everything tends to be commodified in measurable terms like money. But at the same time, in all social fields, mechanisms function that are similar to traditions (e.g. family relations, symbolic power, honour) and which work counter to that of the rationalist systems based on cost-benefit calculations. For example, “the constitution of the economy as economy, which has operated progressively in the European societies, is followed by the negative constitution of islands of pre-capitalist economy which perpetuate themselves in the universe of the economy constituted as such” (Bourdieu 1994: 192; my translation). That is, modernization always meets counter-tendencies that are easily recognizable if one, for example, recalls the functions of symbolic and cultural capital or symbolic exchanges by which actors negate the pure economic rationality. Thus the world Bourdieu describes is not a world of full-sale modernization totally independent of so-called “traditional” powers or ways of seeing. Bourdieu’s theory allows more space for “tradition” than does Giddens’ (see also Lash 1990: 237-65).

Adam’s third point is that reflexivity is indeed ontological to human reality and all humanity always engage in redefining situations. For example, the practical, tactical, manipulative subversions of systems in daily life, which de Certeau mentions without needing a periodization, such as reflexive modernity or else, can be evaluated in the context of this ontological character of reflexivity.

Fourthly, she reminds us that all social orders, including traditional ones are “constructed”. There is not much to add to this point. She emphasizes that, as the shift from traditional “external” authorities to the “internal” authority of the individual in reflexive modernity takes place, another equally identifiable tendency is the one from tradition to other new and different external authorities in reflexive modernity (just as it was the case with the movement from traditional order to simple modernity). The media, expert systems and the power of money in contemporary consumer society are the best examples of this. Adam also implies that to decide on the question of “which expert to choose ” in contemporary society is not and cannot be only an individual decision, as the thesis of detraditionalization suggests.

Hence it follows that, by not denying detraditionalization tendencies at a substantial level, we can equally convincingly speak of “re-traditionalization” tendencies in contemporary societies in which “the age of uncertainty, contingency
and flux seems to bring with it a yearning for the stability of tradition” (Adam 1996: 139-140).

To sum up, I want to emphasize that “either/or” views give a more orderly, but at the same time also an uncompromisingly one-sided, picture of what is called tradition in contemporary societies. On the other hand, “both/and” views, like those of Adam and Luke quoted at length above, are more concerned with the ambivalences in this picture, and they also show the other side and the unquestioned assumptions associated with theorizing on the issue.

If we, following the discussions above, return back to Aarhus, we can say that the concepts of tradition and reflexivity overlap with each other regarding the daily life of Turks, and one can find many examples of this. The examples given in the previous chapters, regarding the different forms of reflexivity to be found in the social space of immigration, also testify to this point. Besides, the mainstream chronological assumption, that one is first traditional and then becomes modernized, does not hold strictly either. One interesting example is that, even though some first generation Turkish couples went to restaurants and cafés together “in the old days” (at the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s), for the most part, this is no longer the case. This may be due to increasing unemployment, but to me, it seems that it is also because of increasing social control and tribalization in the community.

Another example is of the women who come to Denmark after they have been emancipated from “traditional” Turkish dress. In Denmark, they begin using or reusing the head scarf (also because of political Islam). In other words, they found out that “things could be different”. Even “fundamentalism”, which re-enters the scene at this point, can be taken as a reflexive alternative among other alternatives in Gellerup. (As I showed in chapter 4, people have often serious negotiations about fundamentalism.) And even when fundamentalism operates in a direction opposite to what we called individual and social reflexivity, it can do this on the basis of a reflexive re-traditionalization, which means an intensified social heteronomy for the individual and which the authorities have difficulties in perceiving because they conflate it with “culture”, “informal relations”, “life forms” of individual families, and so on.

In short, a traditionalization follows after a former modernization process in Gellerup, hence it is called re-traditionalization. This all means that it is virtually impossible to talk about an exotic, static, unambiguous and unreflective traditionality that remains the same all the time. Here we have “quotations” from the past in the collage of the present, even if traditions or conventions that are quoted are not especially reflexive in themselves.
To conclude, then, the concepts of tradition and modernity penetrate each other to such an extent that this distinction becomes problematic as an instrument of observation in the case of immigrants unless hybrid articulations can be established between them (including postmodernity). I want to argue that this must be the basis if one is supposed to understand immigrant cultures. To go deeper into the criticism of the ironically “traditional” views on tradition and modernity, we have to move to the issues of modernity and postmodernity.

**Modernity-as-ambivalence**

Marshall Berman has convincingly characterized the modernists of the nineteenth century as “simultaneously enthusiasts and enemies of modern life, wrestling inexhaustibly with its ambiguities and contradictions” (Berman 1983: 24). The experience of modernity was for the “early moderns” a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it brought hope for emancipation from “traditions” withstanding the expansion of capitalist production and modern forms of life. But, on the other hand, and at the same time, the modernists constantly watched the malices of modern life. For example, in the “Spleen de Paris”, Baudelaire sat in a modern café located along a planned Parisian boulevard, a café which allowed people to see each other better and to develop new types of social relations that were hitherto constrained by the “halo” of tradition. But he was also a spectator to “the eyes of the poor”, who looked into the café from the outside without being able to come inside. For the early modernists, the light and “heat” of modernity made freedoms as well as malices of the other side of modernity, like the exclusion of the poor in Baudelaire’s eyes, all too visible (Baudelaire 1956; Berman 1983).

New possibilities, new fears, new liberties and new uncertainties appeared obviously in the wake of each other. No doubt that the experience of modernity was a simultaneous experience of detraditionalization and the still alive memories of the now diminishing tradition. This explains the tensions of and paradoxes and ambivalent attitudes towards modernity, which the busy involvement of early modern sociology, with concepts like Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, also reminds us of.

In the nineteenth century, Marx and Engels wrote that the development of the modern bourgeoisie, which they also praised as a historical revolution, “has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his ‘natural superiors’, and has
left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment’” (Marx & Engels 1991: 516). As Berman points out, this detraditionalization resembled the “heat”, and the disappearance of those “holy” ties meant for them a *melting* away. On the contrary, the tradition, the past, was what was *solid*, and as quoted many times before, in modernity, they saw that “[a]ll that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind” (ibid, 517).

As Berman emphasized, modernity meant for Marx and Engels an experience of contingency, crisis-phrone development of capitalist relations, a “constant battle” between different classes and so on. Thus, theirs was a world full of contradictions, which the simultaneous rise of bourgeois freedoms and the rise of the proletariat and its misery also was an expression of. In this “tragic” world towards which they adopted tragic forms of explication, they founded the utopia of communism that was, ironically, “nostalgic”. The contradictory and crises-phrone development of the system would result in that “other classes [than proletariat] decay and finally disappear in the face of modern industry” (Marx & Engels 1991: 520). As Stauth and Turner have argued, this future utopia has “involved the absence of differentiation, of the division of labour and ultimately of human inequalities” in the “end” (Stauth & Turner 1988: 514). In this picture, the “homeliness of socialism” was very much inspired by the view of the past as “order”, or tradition-as-order, and the coming of the final phase of history was thus depicted as a “back to the future” movement.

Thus, with the advent of modernity, we also see proliferations of two perspectives that are also interrelated: modernity-as-ambivalence and tradition-as-order. Historically, Benjamin’s interpretation of Klee’s *Angelus Novus*, showing “an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating”, probably best expresses this backward-looking (“His face is turned toward the past”), but forward-moving attitude (“a storm is blowing”) to be found in ambivalent perspectives of modernity where tension, contingency and paradoxes are prevalent (Benjamin 1973: 259). The “fixedly contemplating” attitude is also what “fixes” the past, or tradition. This ambivalence was very well reflected in the modern artists’ conceptualization of modernity, or in aesthetic modernity as a whole, which we can also call “modernism”. For example, Baudelaire expressed this attitude towards modernity when he defined modernity as “the ephemeral, the contingent, the half of the art whose other half is eternal and immutable” (quoted in Berman 1983: 133). The transitory, the evaporating, but at the same time the eternal, that is, the search for the absolute, the unchanging, were simultaneously involved in his view
of modernity-as-ambivalence. Thus “Baudelaire wanted to be read like a classical poet” (Benjamin 1983: 90).

Later, in the twentieth century, this “fixing” gaze in search of the “eternal” was to become much more visible in modern art. For example, Paul Gauguin said, “I only desire to make a simple, very simple act. In order to do this it is necessary for me to immerse myself in virgin nature, see no one but savages, live their life...” (quoted in Jordan & Weedon 1995: 320). What he was searching for was a universality linking “us”, the civilized, and “them”, the noble savages. Primitivism of modern art was, according to Daniel Miller, “based on the assumption that there exists a form of humanity which is integral, is cohesive, and works as a totality. Since this totality is always defined as a critical opposite to the present, it is always a representation of the primitive ‘other’” (quoted in Jordan & Weedon 1995: 320). Tradition, which now was “spatialized” in the “primitive” sites of the world, was the solid, the eternal, and the universal, while modernity was ephemeral and ambivalent. Thus primitivism, as a romantic version of modernity, expresses very well the ambivalent attitude towards modernity itself in search of both the ephemeral and the eternal, which was also paralleled by early ethnographic studies in search of the other and eternity in deep and dark Africa. This ambivalent attitude towards modernity entailed a search for unambiguous truths or centres that can hold (as the “primitive”).

Modern art was characteristically self-reflexive, and its aesthetic self-consciousness was reflected in its interest in its own tools of representation and hence the constructed character of the work of art. Van Gogh did not erase the “traces” of his brush; Brecht’s epic theatre was self-reflexively trying to bracket the mimetic illusions of reality by showing the guests that what was going on was a play and that they were spectators, etc. Art was, so to speak, “artificial”. In contrast to realism, which built upon the principle of mimesis, that is, the possibility of representing the reality in a one-to-one correspondence between representation (or the sign) and reality (the referent), the modernist in art was more attracted to the spatial idea of montage where the past, the present and the future went into an interplay, which also “decentres” the subject. Thus, for James Joyce, the idea of the subject was difficult to attain: “He thought that he thought that he was a Jew whereas he knew that he knew that he knew that he was not” (Joyce 1986: 558). Thus, in his preface to Miss Julie (published in 1888), Strindberg explains why he deliberately constructed his figures as disintegrated and uncertain persons in the following way: “My characters are conglomerations of past and present stages of civilization, bits from books and newspapers, scraps of humanity, rags and tatters of fine clothing, patched together as is the human soul” (quoted in Kumar 1995: 95).
Georg Simmel, whom David Frisby (1985) argued is “the first sociologist of modernity”, was very occupied with the paradoxes and ambivalences of modernity. For him, the city dweller as a modern person was somebody “decentred” mainly because of the overstimulating effects of the all too many kinds of sensual pressures of life in the metropolis on his mental life. An intellectualizing, psychological distance to this overstimulating metropolis, or a “blasé attitude”, was the individual’s response in his defence against city life, that is, modernity. Thus, for Simmel, living in the intersection of multiple and conflicting cultural pressures was the fate of the modern human being. In this way, Simmel perceived modernity as “both/and”. On the one hand, modernity of city life makes life infinitely easy because the individual’s impulses, interests and means at his or her disposal to enrich his or her time and consciousness are richly supplied, and this also attracts the individual into a “stream” in which he or she almost needs not do anything special to be able to swim. But on the other hand, the impersonal forms of this city life repress the personal nuances and, following this, individuals exaggerate their “originality”, or the “atrophy” of the individual culture against the “hypertrophy” of the objective culture, to be able to make their voice heard. Modernity meant, at the same time, both liberty and impersonality in the “stream” (Simmel 1992: 83).

His contemporary, Sigmund Freud, similarly had an ambivalent perception of modern civilization: “During the last few generations mankind has made an extraordinary advance in the natural sciences.... Men are proud of those achievements, and have a right to be. But they seem to have observed that this newly-won power over space and time, this subjugation of the forces of nature ... has not increased the amount of pleasurable satisfaction which they may expect from life and has not made them feel happier” (Freud 1963: 25)

This “unhappiness” of the modern man was grounded in the constant tension between individual instincts (the pleasure principle) and requirements of the modern social order (the reality principle). As a result of this tension, people “trade off part of their freedom (and happiness) for a degree of security, grounded in a hygienically safe, clean and peaceful environment”. This trade-off meant for the civilized, modern person also a suppression of drives and a painful imposition of patterns of “civilized” behaviour. In other words, in the Freudian perspective towards modernity, “civilization breeds its own discontents and sets the individual in a permanent—potential or overt—conflict with society”. Beauty, purity and order is what is imposed on the freedom of choice of the individual by the civilizatory efforts in making them more secure against the nightmares of disorder, imposed, because it was assumed that nothing makes human beings naturally desire the three cornerstones of civilization. In other words, according to Freud, we exchange security by constraining
our instincts in modern civilization, and thus “unhappiness” is born inevitably out of modernity as an “excess” of order, regulation suppression and security, all of which makes modernity an ambivalent project (Bauman 1987: 113-114; 1996).

To sum up, we can easily discern a perspective of modernity-as-ambivalence. The important point in our context is that it, as is explicit in the case of modernist primitivism, tends to spatialize and fix the tradition and the past, which I argued against in the preceding section by showing the dynamic aspects of tradition. Another important point is that this perspective of modernity-as-ambivalence is partly adopted in the discourse of immigration as well. For example, Necef has convincingly argued, that in a “tolerant” difference-multiculturalism, “immigrants only represent our projections of an authentic natural state that is not polluted by civilization and modernity”, a frame that also fixes and maintains immigrants in the “reserves of low status” by idealizing them, or by nostalgic “ethnic kitsch” (Weekendavisen, 12-19 March 1992; see also Necef 1992; my translation). In addition, other versions or clichés based on the binary opposition of tradition and modernity can serve the same purpose, and these can be, both materially and symbolically, as damaging as ethnic kitsch. But to see these, we have to dwell on perspectives that perceive modernity as order as well.

**Modernity-as-order**

Berman reserves the honour of “wrestling inexhaustibly” with ambiguities of modernity for the modernists of the nineteenth century. According to him, conceptions of modernity later came to be based on “rigid polarities and flat totalizations”. Because of this, in the twentieth century, “modernity is either embraced by a blind and uncritical enthusiasm or else it is condemned with a neo-Olympian remoteness and contempt; in either case, it is conceived as a closed monolith.... Open visions of modern life have been supplanted by closed ones, Both/And by Either/Or” (Berman 1983: 24).

In this context, one can speak of largely used, broad and “orderly” periodizations and categorizations which miss the ambivalent, as was the case with the detraditionalization theses, which cannot perceive tradition-in-modernity or modernity-as-tradition. Or one can recall theories announcing that we were once modern and now we are in a postmodern period. These either/or pictures merely exemplify Berman’s point above.
The perspective of modernity-as-order is related to these inclinations in social theory. The term modernity-as-order indicates both the self-perception of a definite version of modernity and criticisms of modernity based on this perception. The stress in this context is not upon the decentring and liberating effects of modernity on the subject, but on the contrary, on the very creation of the subject, or “individuation”, instead of the heroic modernity of Baudelaire. The modernity we speak of here is much closer to the modernity of rationalization, bureaucratization, universalism, ethnocentrism or, in one phrase, almost all what “modernization” connotes. Above all, modernity in this sense is related to: firstly, the French Revolution, which formed its consciousness; secondly, the Industrial Revolution, which provided modernity with a material substance; and thirdly, processes of Westernization, which have sought to assure the rest of the world that the West was the best and added a dimension of expansion to modernity (Kumar 1995: 82-83).

More or less acknowledging that “the period of modernity is also the period of democratic transformations” (Rattansi 1994: 21), what is critically underlined in the perception of modernity-as-order or as a project of order, is primarily its “other” side, which also directly relates modernity to concentration camps and slavery. As Tony Morrison expressed it, “modern life begins with slavery” (quoted in Gilroy 1993: 221). Bauman, writing about modernity with a focus on its “other side”, takes modernity to be a project of order and sums up the most important characteristics of this project in the following way. Firstly, all modernists have “assumed, whether explicitly or implicitly, the irreversible character of the changes modernity signified or brought in its wake ... but they hardly ever questioned the superiority of modernity in the sense of subordinating, marginalizing, evicting or annihilating its pre-modern alternatives”. “Secondly all ... visions conceived modernity in processual terms: as essentially an unfinished project”. And thirdly, “all visions were inside views of modernity ... nothing visible beyond it, nothing which could relativize or objectivize the phenomenon itself.... In a sense, modernity was ... self-referential and self-validating” (Bauman 1987: 115-116).

I want argue that this characterization of modernity as modernity-as-order is very relevant and extremely important in our context. This issue is also closely related to the themes of rationalization, universalism, progressivism and perception of order as a social “design”, which the concept of “modernization”, referring among other things to human intentionality, also expresses.

Bureaucracy, which Weber analyzed at length, is perhaps the best metaphor for a coherent totality, which modernity sought via employment of rationality. In one sense, the rationality of bureaucracy meant maximized technical efficiency by defining the rules and means as homogeneous and as strictly as possible to avoid
the intervention of heterogeneous factors in regulation. In another sense, bureaucracy was a legal, rational, value system and hence a system of social control and authority. However, the major quality of bureaucracy lies in its “predictable” character (Abercrombie, et al 1994: 38).

In Bauman’s view (1996c), predicting and avoiding risks, securing the social environment and clearing the distortions and accidents in the way of “progress” was the main ambition of modernity as a project, or modernity-as-order. The human subjects could transform nature and society, both of which had now become the objects of human rationality and desire to order, thanks to technological development. The whole world was a “workshop” for this perception, which was no longer content with “interpreting” the world but had decided to “change” it. The only barriers to this were either not-yet-assimilated or not-yet-modernized “residuals” as traditions, which were seen as inferior and non-rational, or our own mismanagement and lack of knowledge which can be bettered via more knowledge: more knowledge, more progress, more change and this all pointing to better ends for the whole humanity.

This view was essentially “humanist” in that the human being was the centre of this world to be “manufactured”. It was also, necessarily, progressivist and universalist. In a way, progress meant indexation of history to chronological time and hence an experience of change as a time-arrow piling forward. Benjamin says, in his criticism of German social democracy, that progress meant first of all “the progress of mankind itself” and not just “advances in men’s ability and knowledge”. “Secondly, it was something boundless, in keeping with the infinite perfectibility of mankind. Thirdly, progress was regarded as irresistible, something that automatically pursued a straight or spiral course”. What these perceptions all had in common was that “[t]he concept of historical progress of mankind cannot be sundered from the concept of its progression through a homogeneous, empty time” (Benjamin 1973: 262-3).

Universalism is what intellectuals with the ambitions of “legislating” what is good and bad for people spoke of before the term globalization was invented. It connotated that “everything” was doomed to be modern(ized), and when this end was reached, human conditions were to be happily unified. Universalization was supposed to start in the “centre”, that is, in the West, and the periphery, the rest, which also belonged to other historic times as well as geographic sites because of its “less developed” character, would become like “us” in the process of progress.

This world view, only briefly summarized here, was the cornerstone of modernity-as-order. But arguing this, I do not want to present a unifying and thus repressive interpretation of this topic. Indeed, to be sure, even the minor parts of the summary
above involve huge ambivalences. To give only a single example, as Stanley Rosen
says, the Enlightenment is “far from being a homogeneous phenomenon” and, for
example, philosophers like Kant were well aware of the fundamental conflicts
between rationality, on the one hand, and individual and political freedom, on the
other. He shows that “[t]he now fashionable thesis of the link between scientific
rationalism and domination was already well understood by Kant. If knowledge is
enlightenment and science is knowledge, it follows that to be enlightened is either to
endure self-ignorance or to undergo reification. In either case, the pursuit of freedom
leads directly to slavery” (Rosen 1987: 3-4). In other words, a view of modernity-as-
ambivalence was already to be discerned in Kant’s writings, Rosen argues. Hence he
finds that “[c]ontemporary attacks on the Enlightenment thus illustrate two main
characteristics of the Enlightenment itself: the self-destruction of an exclusively or
predominantly formalist rationalism, and the celebration of freedom as spontaneity”
(Rosen 1987: 5).

What I want to ascertain, being inspired by Bauman’s work, is however that in
spite of these ambivalences, the urge to attain an “orderly” and optimistic view of
modernity was poignantly present in modernity itself, which also has had many
concrete political and personal consequences for many people’s lives; and this is
what I want to draw attention to by the term “modernity-as-order”. But nevertheless,
it remains now to be shown that, even if Kant and other philosophers may have had
more ambivalent views of modernity, there was an ordering project of modernity,
which importantly ended in the concentration camps in the twentieth century.

In this context, Bauman’s seminal work on Modernity and the Holocaust (1989)
informs us that the Holocaust was not a symptom of any kind of deficit of modernity
understood as rationality. The Holocaust did not happen because they were Germans
who did it, and what was done was done not because they were Jews. On the
contrary, Bauman provocatively argues that what happened was a consequence of
modernity itself and its ambitions of order, which it sought to establish via a social
and physical “design”, or planning. It had much to do with the project of creating the
German nation-state, which included “us” but not “them”, the strangers, that is, first
of all, the Jews. Thus, in this social engineering activity about which Bauman also uses
the metaphor of “gardening”, the nation-state was the main actor. And the “targets”
of this gardening activity were those who were perceived as “weeds”. They were to
be exterminated since order, being busy with making friends and enemies, had no
place for the ambivalence which the “stranger” represented. But Bauman’s main
point is that you need a modern bureaucracy and a military power to be able to
slaughter millions of people in such a short time. Hence massextermination
techniques were developed in the concentration camps paralleling the modern
technology of the time, the Tayloristic assembly line, which was an ideal mass-production technique. Without modernity-as-order, without modernization, the Holocaust as an economy of extermination would not have been possible on the scale and scope it took place. Bauman’s next main point is that modernity made the Holocaust possible, not only technologically, but also ethically. Contrary to popular views that defined Nazi officers as maniac personalities, or scientific views about the “authoritarian personality”, Bauman underlines that people who were actively involved in the Holocaust were also good family fathers and mothers who, after having breakfast with their children, went to “work” in the camps without feeling a considerable sense of disorder. This could happen because they were only performing their “duty”: their individual moral responsibility was codified and externalized by the state, that is, the gardeners had prepared an “ethical code” that left executors only the option of “doing their duty”. The lightness of doing one’s duty in a bureaucratically organized system was also a way of escaping from one’s own moral responsibility, and this heteronomous mechanism could be established only after the invention of an ambitious project of modernity seeking unambiguous order.

Modernity-as-order conceived of itself predominantly as a cognitive, rational project whose empirical measurement was “modernization”. Thus the modern nation-state first of all was built on the idea of modernizing the infrastructure by technological means and the populations by normalizing techniques, as Foucault has showed. As Maffesoli writes, modernity was a project that combined the individual and the political, so that “the principium individuationis was the very thing determining the whole political-economic and techno-structural organization” in modernity (Maffesoli 1996: 64). At the micro level of body-politics, modernity meant the creation of the modern subject, who is thus, Foucault says, only “a recent invention”. He underlines in most of his books that this modern ordering project not only created the modern subject in spite of himself, by use of sanctioning disciplinary techniques, but by the use of positive, constitutive power, which meant that the subjects repressed their own subjectivity. Modernity, “the time of confessions” as he named it, was therefore also “seductive” for the individuals. Hence they made themselves transparent for the functioning of power. For Foucault, because modernity meant individuation, the modern individual increasingly became an ambivalent site of struggle: in his later work, he thus became interested in subjectivity as a site of resistance to power as well. But in general, Foucault’s work has primarily focused on the individual as the receiving end of modern power/knowledge, or what we call here modernity-as-order.

Masses were to be integrated or assimilated into modernity, which was conceived of as an all-encompassing project. At the macro-sociological level, this meant the
creation of modern political order via rationalization and assimilation politics. In this process, where the nation-state was also “imagined” and “invented” as an identity, the insiders and outsiders were to become separated from each other to create a unified totality, that is, a national culture. This was the very source of waging war against ambivalence of the “strangers” as well: Bauman draws attention to that this type of modernity was necessarily assimilationist. In this respect, modernity was for Bauman “a cultural crusade against the other” (Bauman 1993: 59), a crusade which tried to “temporalize” the other by picturing it as a transitory phenomenon (Bauman 1993: 38). This temporalizing crusade always went hand in hand with “a demand for converting” against other cultures that were perceived to have “outlived their time, and live presently but on borrowed time—and their carriers as in actual fact already dead, zombies that ought to be buried as soon as possible for their own and everybody else’s sake” (Bauman 1993: 38).

Significantly, modernity-as-order has both in politics and in aesthetics conceived of itself as the “architect” of society, which it held to be a matter of social design. Thus it was possibly no coincidence that this modernity has found its best expressions in architecture or architecture-related issues. Mussolini was proud that he had never been to a museum, and he declared that his was a government of “speed” while his message to the people was, as if flirting with the futurists, that they “should negate living with memories” (Bumin 1990: 108). Mussolini wanted to be the designer of a would-be society.

Expunging historical time from the city, trying to obliterate nature through modern design, and directly “killing the street” to create an urban machine where one could watch the city from the car ... these were the manifested aims of the modernist architect Le Corbusier, who hated all traditions including those to be found in cities. Le Corbusier’s art was an art for industrial society, which it also affirmed. According to Sennett, “he set himself against the ways time is usually felt in urban space”. His most notorious example was his Plan Voisin contrived in 1925 for Paris:

The plan Voisin would have gutted the medieval quarter of the Marais, leveled it flat to the ground. In place of this thousand years of building, Le Corbusier would have placed enormous X-shaped towers on a grid plan.... [which] are meant as architectural expressions of mechanical production; they can be repeated again and again and again. In this they compose a grid in its modern, indeterminate form; the Plan Voisin has no necessary boundaries.... the Plan Voisin is the very emblem of a disembodied, neutral city. (Sennett 1990: 170-171)
What spatial image can be more applicable and more suitable for an organized, bureaucratic, universalist and progressive modernity than that of the grid? And what made the revolutionary modernist architect Le Corbusier come so close to the dictator whose political visions and values were so different? This was, to be sure, a faith in progress and, more importantly, a faith in modern design as an order creating activity. But Le Corbusier was certainly not the only artist who tried to design a revolutionary architectural machine for a reformist society. Since the old socialist utopias, which required proper architectural frameworks to regulate every minute for their inhabitants, the “designers” of the “good” society believed that to change life, it was necessary to change its spatial framework, which is also the reason why Foucault chose Bentham’s “panopticon” as a metaphor for the ordered modern society.

At this point, we can say that contradictory tendencies are to be found even in aesthetic modernism. On the one hand, we have Baudelaire’s heroic modernism, which points to a split between modernity understood as order and ambivalence and rejects any periodization of modernity, thus combining modernity to any definite social order. For Baudelaire, “it is possible to make romantics of Romans and Greeks if one is a romantic oneself” (quoted in Kumar 1995: 89). That is, to be romantic, or modern, does not necessarily mean belonging to a historical period, but it is more related to a state of mind or to a perspective. On the other hand, we have in modern art also gratifying attitudes towards modernity, understood as social order, like Le Corbusier’s architecture.

This is aesthetic modernity’s ambivalence towards modernity, which is nicely summarized by Kumar:

It could attack reason and science, as in Dadaism and Surrealism, and it could embrace them with passion, as in Malevitch’s Suprematism and the de stijl and Bauhaus projects. It could at once reject modern technology and the industrial way of life, as in the primitivist painting of Henri Rousseau and the novels of D. H. Lawrence, and at the same time glory in them, as in Futurism and modernist architecture. It could celebrate the life of the modern city ... and equally find there desolation, isolation and alienation.... (Kumar 1995: 99)

From my point of view, this split also summarizes the differentiation of two perspectives on modernity. The first one is what I called modernity-as-ambivalence, which operates with a conception of tradition-as-order while modernity symbolizes a “melting away”, an ambivalence. It either enters into a critical dialogue with tradition-as-order (as is the case with Berman’s nineteenth century modernists) or turns upon itself by idealizing orderly views of traditions (as in the cases of primitivism,
difference-multiculturalism or nostalgic critique of modernity in general). The second perspective is modernity-as-order. This time, the non-modern, e.g. the tradition, becomes ambivalence, which its will to order tries to temporalize and assimilate by “modernizing”.

In this context, I want to insert that we can conceive of a considerable part of the politics of immigration in Denmark as a search for order, or in terms of modernity-as-order. Behind so much debate about the question of “how can we integrate the immigrants?”, especially in cultural terms, as is most often the case, it seems that there is an often unreckoned ambition to “modernize” and to “convert” immigrants into the orderly picture of Danish culture. Especially in the context of politics and planning, it is remarkable that many initiatives that would be found undemocratic regarding other groups can easily be undertaken when the issue is immigrants. For example, even though Denmark is one of the first countries, if not the first in the world, where participation (at least formally) is involved in planning, the immigrants, as I showed in the first chapter, politically constitute a “residual category” in planning processes. Moreover, if the municipalities happen to make plans regarding their relations to the social and physical space, immigrants are treated one-sidedly, as the “objects” of planning; thus the municipality tries “to plan the immigrants” rather than to plan for them. It is also relevant in this context that one does not find considerable “self-reflexivity” on the side of the municipality regarding either its ideology or its instruments as social and physical planning (except that they reflect over how “tolerant” they have been in the past toward immigrants!). The instrument of planning is used quite unreflexively and almost as a gardening tool. Furthermore, metaphors the local politicians use, in the context of, for example, the “dispersion of the ghetto” and their busy efforts “to save the city from the immigrants”, make one think that immigrants are perceived as “weeds” to be weeded away. Thus, wherever immigrants are “concentrated”, there is a “social problem”. Consequently, all the available social engineering is put into use for the purpose of “cleansing”, and in this, the municipality is not afraid of coming into conflict with international laws against racial discrimination or unequal treatment. Politicians and intellectuals with legislative ambitions know best what is good for immigrants in order to “activate” them; and politicians and intellectuals believe that they can manipulate the “curious” behaviours of the immigrants (Mogens Lykketoft, Information, 6 September 1993)—or they “just want to help” the immigrants, as the Mayor of Aarhus expressed it (see chapter 1).

Consequently, it must be ascertained that in Aarhus, or rather in the immigrants’ Aarhus, living seems to be as it was during the Enlightenment in many respects. And it is as if postmodernity has not yet passed by the corridors of the municipality
regarding the politics of immigration, which is actually not true, because in other areas, for example, regarding the planning of the city centre, the municipality carries a distinctively postmodernized form for planning. But in the field of immigration, it still has firm beliefs regarding both its social engineering machine and its own art of using it.

To conclude, it is deeply problematic today to argue for “modernization” of immigrants not only because they are not so traditional anyway, but also because modernity-as-order (which has itself become a tradition today) is not unproblematically desirable. In the following, I will argue that postmodern perspectives are mainly a reaction against modernity-as-order. Here I will also hold the view that mainly because of this reaction to “ordering” modernity, the postmodern perspectives search for alliances both in modernity and tradition as ambivalence.

Postmodernity-as-ambivalence

Periodization in a positivistic chronology is the main enemy of postmodernity. Thus Jorge Luis Borges lets one of his figures, the writer Jaromir Hladik, a Jew who is to be executed by the Nazi soldiers after their invasion in Prague, to finish his book in a period of chronological two minutes, which Hladik experienced as a year because he could establish his own “invisible labyrinth” in chronological time (Borges 1985: 7-15).

Umberto Eco is one of the writers who has directly attacked the concept of postmodernism understood as a period. According to him, like mannerism, postmodernism is a Kunstwollen, or a “way of operating”, and hence one can say that “every period has its own postmodernism” as is the case with mannerism as a “metahistorical category” (Eco 1995: 31-32). That is to say, in our context, postmodernity is first of all a perspective.

If one, contrary to this view, tried to periodize it in unambiguous terms, problems would arise. A typical one is demonstrated by the architectural critic, Charles Jenks, who ironically declared that:

Modern architecture died in St Louis, Missouri on July 15, 1972 at 3.32 pm (or thereabouts) when the infamous Pruitt-Igoe scheme, or rather several of its slab blocks, were given the final coup de grace by dynamite. (quoted in Kumar 1995: 105)
What was typical of Pruitt-Igoe’s urban landscape was its ambitious modernist urban ideals, which paralleled those of the Le Corbusian demiurge mentioned above (see Møller, et al 1995: 90-91). But even if one can agree with Jenks metaphorically, what I want to point out here is that “on the 15th of July 1972 at 3.32 p.m.” no less modernistic architecture was actually being built all over the world. For instance, it was precisely on this date that Gellerup was being built. And Gellerup is still there. Moreover, many countries around the globe are still mainly building such modern architecture.

Thus, postmodernity must be understood as a perspective that is possible today because we now can see the consequences of modernity and limits of its ambitions better and at a distance. As Matei Calinescu put it, postmodernity is “not a new name for a new ‘reality’, or ‘mental structure’, or ‘world view’, but a perspective from which one can ask certain questions about modernity in its general incarnations” (quoted in Kumar 1995: 140). As Bauman says, postmodernity is modernity without illusions. “Postmodernity does not necessarily mean the end, the discreditation or the rejection of modernity.... Postmodernity is modernity coming to terms with its own impossibility”. In other words, postmodernity is a perspective, a way of looking of modernity at itself, and analyzing from a distance its own facile gestures (Bauman 1991: 272).

But wasn’t modernity itself (understood as modernity-as-ambivalence or aesthetic modernity) concerned with malices of modernity and wasn’t it reflexive towards itself? To be sure it was. As mentioned above, aesthetic modernism had problematized “realist” representation because it “had clearly differentiated and autonomized the roles of signifier, signified and referent” (Lash 1990: 12). The modern work of art was radical in its affirmation of revolutionary change and the shock of the new. Thus, as long as modernity is understood as experimentation, negation of realism and affirmation of the ambivalent against the bureaucratized and orderly world views, postmodernity is “modern”. Given this background, Lyotard defined postmodernity as not the “end” of modernity but as its “nascent state”. That is, today a work of art can be modern (and can create an avant-garde shock effect) only if it is first postmodern (Lyotard 1987: 19). That is also to say that Lyotard does not see an iron curtain between modern and postmodern art. He finds a relationship, or continuity, between modern and postmodern works of art: the “sublime”. Both modernist and postmodernist artists hint something in their works that cannot made present. But he nevertheless takes the view that even if the modern aesthetics is the aesthetics of the sublime, it is still “nostalgic”; that is, it still refers to the non-representable, the sublime, as a nonpresent content while the artistic form of the
work comfort and console the reader by its recognizable consistence. In this context, postmodern art is to refer to the sublime in the representation itself, by negating the comforts of the form which make us “feel the nostalgia of the impossible” (Lyotard 1987: 21-22; my translation).

One could say that, for Lyotard, postmodern art is the art without modernist nostalgic illusions. Thus postmodern work of art both continues and transcends the modern. “Postmodernism is the form that modernism takes when it has lost its revolutionary élan. It is the aspect of modernism that constantly reminds it of its essentially subversive and disruptive purpose” (Kumar 1995: 110).

Another “illusion” that separates the modern and postmodern despite continuities is that while modern art de-stabilized and problematized representation, postmodern art destabilizes and problematizes, not only representation, but also the reality itself, which modern art still looked for behind representations. Scott Lash takes the view that modernity first of all meant “differentiation”; in modernity, the cultural and the social, the sacral and the scientific, were differentiated from each other. But postmodernity means an increasing de-differentiation of these spheres. For example, it is characteristic for postmodernity that the signifier and the referent lose contact with each other (Lash 1990: 12).

If realism promises stability and order in both representation and reality, then modernist autonomization and self-legislation effectively destabilizes the representation. Postmodernist de-differentiation on the other hand puts chaos, flimsiness, and instability in our experience of reality itself. (Lash 1990: 15)

The most lively and “speedy” analyses of this uncertain and unstable world is perhaps Baudrillard’s. In his de-differentiated postmodern world, for example, TV no longer mirrors a reality outside itself but creates it, and in turn it is the reality which “simulates” the TV and not the other way around. In this world, where “You no longer watch TV, it is TV that watches you”, the meaning, understood as the relationship between the referent and the signifier, “implodes”, and this is the point where simulation begins and “reality” becomes a “hyper-reality” (Baudrillard 1994: 29): “Today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal” (Baudrillard 1994: 1).

In this simulated world, “the sign aims to be the thing, to abolish the distinction of the reference, the mechanism of the replacement” and “the completely real becomes
identified with the *completely fake*” (Eco 1987: 7). One can neither speak of “authentic” referents nor signs in the simulacra. The loss of the “unique” that modernity always sought is characteristic for postmodernity. Benjamin says that “[t]he presence of the original is the prerequisite to the concept of authenticity” and “even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be”. Thus reproduction “substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence” (Benjamin 1973: 222-3).

Authenticity also meant the shock of the new which made modernity hostile to the past. Postmodernity is more friendly towards the past and the tradition. For example, Eco writes that, in contrast to the avant-garde modern idea which wants to destroy and deface the past, “the postmodern reply to the modern consists of recognizing that the past, since it cannot really be destroyed, because its destruction leads to silence, must be revisited: but with irony, not innocently”. Irony seems to be a way of living with paradoxes for Eco. The example he gives is the situation of the man who wants to say “I love you madly” to a woman, but he cannot, “because he knows that she knows (and that she knows that he knows) that these words have been already written by Barbara Cartland”. But still there is a way to go on; he could say, “As Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly”, an ironic way of speaking that both avoids pretension of innocence and authenticity and still carries the serious message he wants to communicate (Eco 1995: 32).

This irony is necessary for postmodernity to live with ambivalence and paradoxes. Here it can be pointed out that perspectives on postmodernity which accentuate ambivalence (or, postmodernity-as-ambivalence as opposed to postmodernity-as-order) are clearly inclined to alliances with both tradition and modernity as ambivalence, but not the orderly doubles of them. For example, the Middle Ages, which is pictured as “dark” and static since the Enlightenment and which has been the equivalent of “tradition” in sociological thinking for a long time—for instance, for Tönnies religion (Christianity) pervades the whole social structure in the Middle Ages—is conceived by Umberto Eco as an ambivalent period characterized by plurality, for example of religious sects, and regionalized cultural heterogeneities (Eco 1987: 59-87 and his novels). The Middle ages, or “traditional” society, was surely a period when Shakespeare’s English was only a fragmented local dialect. In short, one can say that Eco shows that what was perceived as order in the optics of the classic sociology can also be pictured as disorder. Hence postmodernity becomes for him “the return of the Middle Ages”.

Baudrillard is also a thinker who was broadly opposed to modernity-as-order and elaborated the pre-modern in conjunction with the postmodern. For example, in his
criticism of the concept of “exchange value” in political economy, he draws attention to the productivist tendency in the capitalist system, which only dreams of “growth”. In this context, he focuses on “the primitive society” and says that the answer to why there is no accumulation, even if there could be in the primitive society, is because it was organized around “symbolic exchange”, in which things were not valued in themselves but were attributed symbols, and in which exchanges were reversible in contrast to the irreversibility of exchanges in the political economy of modern society. His example is Marcel Mauss’s gift-exchange: here a logic of overuse and challenge is built into the exchange, which makes it come close to a duel. The gift is not a need as such, but it has more to do with social prestige, and it necessitates the receiver to receive it while he does not necessarily have to give something else back unless he accepts to lose face. Only the more powerful can give a gift which cannot be returned. Importantly, in this “giving”, Baudrillard finds the opposite of the logic of accumulation, that is, the logic of disaccumulation, which is not to be found in modern exchange. “The reversibility of the gift in the countergift, of exchange in the sacrifice, of time in the cycle, of production in destruction, of life in death... in all domains, reversibility—cyclical reversal, annulment—is the one encompassing norm” in the primitive society (Baudrillard 1988b: 120). In this system of symbolic exchange in which life and death intrudes into each other (which is also the symbolic meaning of cannibalism), Baudrillard finds that everything is symbolized and there is no reality as such.

In his sociology of the present, Baudrillard resurrects and reassesses precisely these aspects of the primitive society in contra-distinction to the “modern” political economy (1975; 1988b). The postmodernity Baudrillard pictures by way of concepts like seduction, symbolic exchange and simulacra is clearly related to an understanding of the primitive society (or in our context “tradition-as-ambivalence”) as the gift-exchange example suggests. In other words, the “semiotic” life of primitive society is to be rediscovered in the semiotics of postmodernity, which defeated the previous capitalist system of political economy, which negated symbolism. As such, postmodernity means for Baudrillard a “re-symbolization” or a “re-semiotization” of daily life. For example, “seduction”, which has always been there as a more powerful source than modern “love” or “sexuality” (which builds upon the principle of equivalence and return and thus is a variation of exchange value), is again coming to play an increasingly central role in postmodernity. Seduction is, according to Baudrillard, the main source of power in contemporary society; it is artificial, superficial, ritualistic, feminine (whereas “sexuality” is masculine) and directly “challenging”. That is, it is a logic which does not dissolve itself in the logic of accumulation. Seduction is as such counterposed to that of the normalizing power of
modernity, which is a masculine, theoretical, subjectivistic and a rationalist will to order. In other terms, seduction is the strategy of the “object”, whereas the rationalist subject cannot seduce but can only “desire” (Baudrillard 1975; 1985; 1987).

What we can learn from Baudrillard in our context is that the ambivalent and the uncertain has always been with us, and that postmodernity means, at least to a certain degree, a re-uncertainty. Baudrillard’s perspective is a reaction against modernity-as-order, which it constantly deconstructs. It is indeed a common characteristic of other post-structuralist thinkers, such as Foucault and Derrida. As mentioned in detail in chapter 2, both showed that modern knowledge and rationality were intrinsically related to disciplinary power (Foucault), and that modern logo-centrism and its pretensions of the presence of truth are illusory (Derrida).

What is characteristic of postmodernity as an ambivalent perspective is a deep distrust with the will to truth and systematization. This dimension owes much to Nietzsche’s work: “I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity”, he said (Nietzsche 1990: 35). What did Nietzsche understand by systemness? In Nietzsche’s eyes, “[h]uman life is paradoxical at its core, while modern reason, penetrating into new corners of life, strives to eliminate every paradox it encounters. This is a dangerous combination, with repressive potentialities” (Connolly 1989: 139). For him, the organizing principle of the world was not rationality but will; and along with Schopenhauer, he thus diagnosed the tragic conflict between the world as an object for the desiring will and the world as an object for intellectual, cognitive, thought. For Nietzsche, “the European philosophical tradition is after all the history of illusions” (Hass 1982: 10; my translation). This is simply because the modern man denies ambivalence and dreams of a state of order without it. But since the lived world is ambivalent, this denial amounts to “nihilism” of not being able to accept the world as it is, a nihilism which haunts modernity. Nihilism is an “inability to accept the contingent character of the principles which govern the life of an individual or of a people” (Connolly: 1989: 138). Hence the “integrity” Nietzsche speaks of is not a unity of the subject defined in Enlightenment terms—the “I” is a grammatical illusion for Nietzsche—but, paradoxically, a sort of living with ambivalence.

Postmodernity, ambivalence and solidarity
Postmodernity as uncompromising ambivalence and without any “illusions” and furthermore without any necessary prophecy about codifying “new values” can be found in Bauman’s work. For Bauman (1996c), criticism of modernity from a postmodern perspective is not so much about changing values but, on the contrary, about the existence of a “polyphony” of perspectives and values. As such, in contrast to a generally held idea, postmodernity does not mean nihilism, that is, non-belief in anything. Rather we are confronted with a dense variety of beliefs and perspectives in postmodernity. In his view, since human existence is characterized by ambiguity, both modernity and postmodernity have the problem of ambivalence; that is, the nature of the problem is the same in both cases. But there is, however, a difference between modern and postmodern perspectives and it regards the way of tackling the ambivalence, which also makes a huge difference regarding the strategies adapted to live with ambivalence. In other words, strategies with or without illusions makes the difference. Modernity with illusions meant that the solution could be sought, for instance, in Bentham’s panopticon, which simplifies ambivalence, disorder and hence choices to be taken by individuals by creating an unambivalent, or overregulated microcosm. In such an “order”, learning the norms, conforming to them and living up to conformities is the cornerstone of socialization. Hence the only fear from the point of view of the individual placed in such a modern normative system of regulation is the fear of falling aside.

But in postmodernity, the situation is radically different, Bauman says. Postmodernity means, for the single individual, growing uncertainty with respect to life strategies (due to the gradual disappearance of old guardians of certainties, such as the nation-state, political deregulation, privatization tendencies, the emergence of the “new-world-disorder”, etc.). We no longer (can) choose jobs or partners on the basis of a lifelong “project”, which can just be taken for granted, and we know that there is no radical remedy or hope against this uncertainty. Thus people on social welfare do not know when the next cut comes, and people having a job can hardly be sure that their jobs will not soon be “rationalized” away. But the novel thing is that these issues often cease to be considered social issues. “Uncertainty must now be overcome by one’s own means; the scarcity of because-ofs must be compensated for by home-made in-order-tos” (Bauman 1995: 113). In accordance herewith, individual choices increasingly replace supra-individual regulations or measurement of life strategies. In postmodernity, one’s identity, lifestyle, attachments and solidarities are increasingly matters of “choice”, and thus one’s successes or failures are individualized as well. This privatization is also what has rendered postmodern society immune to systemic critique and radical social dissent: “In the postmodern society of
consumers, failure rebounds in guilt and shame, not in political protest” (Bauman 1991: 261).

The systemic consequence of ambivalence is not “felt like dependence at all” but experienced as “a triumph of individual autonomy”. But the freedom of choosing in the consumer society does not imply a “freedom from the market”. Thus for Bauman, postmodern privatization of ambivalence and choice goes hand in hand with a depolitization (Bauman 1991: 261-2).

Metaphorically, Bauman uses the concept of “fitness” to explain the role of individual choice in postmodernity as opposed to the modern metaphor of “health”. Health was objectively measurable by the modern medicine, but fitness cannot be measured objectively because it is related to senses, and this “sensational” character, its built-in elusive subjectivity, makes it principally infinite and thus unmeasurable by objective standards. In “fitness”, there is no code to conform to just as there is no limit to perfection, which also means a constantly changing experience of the body. Thus postmodern fitness, which is associated with permanent dynamism and a built-in infinity of sensations, stands in stark contrast to the modern conception of health, which is associated more with “human needs” that are—or so it is assumed—satisfied by removal of tensions and barriers on the way to becoming “healthy” (Bauman 1995: 105-126; 1996).

Following Bauman’s trace, in contrast to Freud’s diagnosis of the “discontents” (or ambivalence) of modern civilization as an “excess of order”, the ambivalence of postmodern civilization takes the form of an “excess of choice” (see Bauman 1996d: 1-4). Modern social structures are falling apart, and without the hope of a radical remedy (or, living in modernity without illusions), people today live in the de-regularized postmodern condition of plurality, a polyphony which Bauman also sees as the best guarantee against the ordering and singularizing ambitions of modernity. But this situation does not only bring with it interesting adventures and freedom, but also undisturbing and unintelligible uncertainty for the individual. Postmodernity thus resembles not only a disentangling of the “modern fears”, but proliferation of new “postmodern fears”.

Importantly, in such a world of “freedom” of individual choice, “[t]he hub of postmodern life strategy is not identity building, but avoidance of being fixed” (Bauman 1995: 89). Hence, choice and fixation, a postmodern fear, are simultaneously two sides of postmodernity, which also makes it, again, an ambivalent blessing. Very interestingly, as opposed to unambivalent blueprints picturing postmodernity as the end of all sorts of unfreedoms or as an one-sided adventurous “play” of differences and identities, Bauman’s postmodernity is still ambivalent.
Postmodernity may, depending on actors, mean both solidarity and indifference toward the Other.

In Bauman’s view, since we actually live contingent lives, we can transform this contingency into our “destiny”; that is, abandoning modernist ambitions of universality, certainty and transparency, we can deliberately choose to accept it by transforming our fate into our destiny. This choice entails first of all “the acceptance that there are other places and other times that may be with equal justification ... preferred by members of other societies, and that, however different they are, the choices cannot be disputed by reference to anything more solid and binding than preference and the determination to stick to the preferred” (Bauman 1991: 235). Such a reflexive stance also signals an emancipation from cultural crusades and politics of conversion and thus “the end to the horror of alterity and the abhorrence of ambivalence” (1991: 235).

The relationship opened up by this sort of an emancipation is marked by “tolerance”. In Bauman’s framework, the three values of modernity—liberty, equality and brotherhood—are increasingly replaced by another tripartite—liberty, diversity and tolerance—in postmodernity. Experiencing equality as “uniformity” and brotherhood as a “unity”, constantly tending to sacrifice individuality by interfering differences, such as abnormality and deviation in the name of common cause, and creating lots of “wastes” in the conquest of nature in the name of growth, has been important in this shift of values. But things are not so clear-cut anyway, and where and how the destination of these three values of postmodern “mentality” are going to end in “practice” is an open question. Bauman says that liberty, diversity and tolerance can easily degenerate into consumer freedom, social domination and indifference, respectively. Even though the understanding of liberty in postmodernity differs in that we, for example, cannot buy a freedom from ecological risks (because they are common), in practice, it is still largely defined by consumer freedoms and “[a]s throughout the modern era, in the postmodern world poverty disqualifies” (1991: 273). In postmodern practice, the fate of diversity is similar in that it thrives as long as the market allows and benefits from it, which is again, as was the case with the nation-state, a development that “abhors” individual and communal self-management and autonomy. In a similar way, tolerance (towards the other) may translate into an indifference in a philosophy of “let’s live and let others live” by privatizing differences (1991: 272-4).

Tolerance means, first of all, accepting the difference and the subjectivity of the “other”. However, the acceptance of the other is necessary, but not enough for tolerance:
Tolerance reaches its full potential only when it offers more than the acceptance of diversity and coexistence; when it calls for the emphatic admission of the equivalence of knowledge-producing discourses; when it calls for a dialog, vigilantly protected against monologistic temptations; when it acknowledges not just the otherness of the other, but the legitimacy of the other’s interests and the other’s right to have such interests respected.... (Bauman 1992b: xxi)

Only a universal recognition that the difference of the “other” is the only universality, only such a form of tolerance, can be transformed into solidarity with the “other(s)” in postmodernity. According to Bauman, mere tolerance is moribund, and it can only survive if it can become solidarity. “Solidarity, unlike tolerance, its weaker version, means readiness to fight: and joining the battle for the sake of the other’s difference, not one’s own” (1991: 256). Hence solidarity is a very “chancy” matter:

Postmodernity is a chance of modernity. Tolerance is a chance of postmodernity. Solidarity is the chance of tolerance. Solidarity is a third degree chance. (Bauman 1991: 257)

Thus it is no surprise that Bauman is not an especially optimistic and one-eyed clapper of postmodernity. Postmodernity, while it is the chance for new forms of solidarity (affirming ambivalence), can be translated into practice as indifference.

Urban life and the contemporary city can be revealing in this context. As was mentioned earlier, referring to Sennett’s urban sociology, in the physical space of immigration, diversity and difference are easily visualized and turned into an indifference, while differences are “tolerated” but ghettoized and walled-off without the possibilities of touching one another and the outer world. In this sense, a sort of “difference-multiculturalism”, which places every culture on its own turf in a cultural mosaic bereft of chances of intercultural touching and solidarity, is a very good picture of “mere tolerance” or of tolerance not becoming solidarity or of contingency not becoming a destiny, but an indifference.

Hence, once more, the challenge of postmodernity is two-folded and open-ended: on the one hand, we can make our cities more intercultural, with parts and different functions overlapping each other creating third places where we can displace our identities and meet the strangers. On the other hand, we can wall off the differences even more as we still tend to do. The first is the city of interculturalism; now we can
also call it the city of “disorder”. In such a city, disorder and ambivalence are conceived of as a resource. Parts of the city of disorder are open to different and polyvalent interpretations of its users; it is not ghettoized and thus gives the possibility of taking choices without avoiding responsibility by hiding behind the “ghetto walls”. In the disordered city, the uniformity of the grid, neutrality and segregation are the main enemies precisely because they make it impossible, by defining others before they are met, to confront others and to take choices. A city of disorder makes use of the beneficial anarchy of communication between urban parts and groups instead of segmentation and differentiation in ghettoes (Sennett 1971; Bauman 1996c).

The second is the city of multiculturalism, of visual contact without touching. The city of multiculturalism is also the city of tribalism where groups become more and more “diverse” on their own turfs, avoiding each other. Where differences are translated into separate enclaves and their mutual indifference, what emerges is the city of “order”. Recalling the heterogeneous effects of globalization (see chapter 5), we can add that the city of order also can become a city of tribes.

There are examples for both tendencies in architecture and planning, but I think the second tendency, that of the city of tribalism, is more dominant in all major European cities today. Needless to say, this is also an uneven process. Some tribal neighbourhoods, like the gentrified Yuppie settlements in the central cities, tend to become more no-go-in areas, while some others, like immigrant ghettoes, more tend to become no-go-out areas.

**Postmodernity-as-order**

Having mentioned postmodernity as an ambivalent and open-ended perspective, it becomes clear that postmodernity also can be viewed as order. As the contemporary processes of increasing ghettoization and consequently intensifying social domination and exclusion imply, and as Bauman’s characterization of postmodernity as a “chancy” phenomenon underlines, one can find much evidence that postmodernity does not only mean play of diversity, liberties of choosing and tolerance toward differences for non-egocentric reasons.

At this point, we approach the domain of perspectives that will be called postmodernity-as-order. Using two examples, only a brief introduction will be made to this topic, which, in turn, will be used to direct our attention to the relationship
between postmodernity and order. The next chapter will develop this issue by concentrating on the ordered aspects of contemporary societies.

Firstly, as opposed to postmodernity-as-ambivalence, “neo-conservative postmodernism” can be mentioned in the context of postmodernity-as-order. As Niels Albertsen summarized it, this postmodern strategy “presupposes precisely what is repudiated by poststructuralist or resistant postmodernism, namely that tradition and history are just ‘out there’ to be captured for an understandable quotation, that the referential status of images and meanings can be taken for granted” (1988: 341). Thus, for instance, Charles Jenks conceives of postmodernity as a synthesis or as an order; indeed it very much resembles religion when Jenks defines postmodernism as “a shared symbolic order of the kind that a religion provides” (quoted in Albertsen 1988: 341). Against this ordered view of postmodernism, resistant or poststructuralist postmodernism “is concerned with a critique of origins, not a return to them; it questions rather than exploits cultural codes” (Albertsen 1988: 341).

But postmodernity can be viewed as an order in a poststructuralist frame as well. Then, as our second example, Mark Poster’s work is of special interest. In line with Foucault’s metaphor of panopticon to express modernity-as-order, he calls the new forms of domination embodied in the contemporary mode of information, for instance, to be found in databases, “superpanopticon”. His approach is Foucauldian in that he conceives of databases as discourses (re)constructing the subject. As such, these discourses are closely related to power. He points out that “databases are configurations of language” (1996: 278) and that “[s]urveillance by means of digitally encoded information constitutes new subjects by the language employed in databases” (1992: 94). He notes, for instance, that today bank transactions are monitored to detect criminal activity and that retailers selling by modem regard the information they accumulate about their customers as their own property in the sense of a by-product of the sale (Poster 1996: 284).

In these informational activities the distinction between private and public spheres, which is a very modern distinction, is eroded, which also shows the de-differentiating postmodern character of databases. Furthermore, databases have very little to do with modern conceptions of rational subjective autonomy, because they “constitute” the subject in new forms in that “electronic lists become additional social identities”: “Computerized databases are nothing but performative machines, engines for producing retrievable identities” (Poster 1996: 286-287). These additional identities can be constructed because the information stored about the consumers can be redivided and rearranged in endlessly new ways. Poster’s example is a database called “Prizm”, which is an identity construction system that divides the population up into “clusters” that are fitted into “types” defined by income, per cent
of the population, age, class, size of household, etc. In this process, new definitions of social identity, previously unknowable, can be attained (1996: 287-88). Thus, postmodernized information technology not only “liberates” the individual from disciplinary mechanisms, the apparent assumption, for example, in the detraditionalization thesis, but also constructs the individual in absentia and subjects him or her to domination. In this way, Poster approaches the spread of consumerist activities not only as an economic change toward the consumer society or as a semiological change toward a world of freely floating signs, but also as “a political change, as part of the reciprocal control of the population itself”:

Today’s “circuits of communication” and the databases they generate constitute a Superpanopticon, a system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers or guards…. The populace has been disciplined to surveillance and to participating in the process. Social security cards, drivers’ licences, credit cards, library cards and the like—the individual must apply for them, have them ready at all times, use them continuously. Each transaction is recorded, encoded and added to databases. Individuals themselves in many cases fill out the forms; they are at once the source of information and the recorder of the information. Home networking constitutes the streamlined culmination of this phenomenon: the consumer, by ordering products through a modem connected to the producer’s database, enters data about himself or herself into produce’s database in the very act of purchase. (Poster 1992: 93)

Most importantly, databases can constitute the individual “in absentia”, that is, without the individual consumer even knowing how the information gathered about oneself is being used (Poster 1996: 288). This also marks an important difference between modern panopticon and postmodern superpanopticon, because the process of subject constitution in modernity was “subjectification”, that is, “producing individuals with a false sense of interiority”. “With the superpanopticon, on the contrary, subject constitution takes an opposing course of ‘objectification’, of producing individuals with dispersed identities, identities the individuals might not even be aware of” (Poster 1996: 291).

The points Poster raises are extremely relevant, and very importantly they problematize, firstly, the unnecessarily optimistic assumptions about postmodern “detraditionalized” times and, secondly, the notion of reflexive modernization as far as it is coupled with the notion of a totally detraditionalized reflexive self that welcomes and luxuriates in individual autonomy far away from traditional and “simple modern” heteronomies. Poster’s notion of superpanopticon problematizes precisely the dichotomy between autonomy and heteronomy (1996: 279).
So far, we have distinguished tradition, modernity and postmodernity with respect to order and ambivalence. For the moment, we need not draw explicit conclusions from the above arguments with respect to social theory. To do this we must first focus on postmodernity-as-order in more detail. This is the topic in the next chapter, where I especially make use of Lash and Urry’s works on “disorganized capitalism” and Luhmann’s systems theory. In accordance with its interests, the temporality adapted in the next chapter is the longue durée characteristic of the lifetime of societal institutions. In chapter 8, the issues related to this chapter and the next one will be placed more firmly in the context of what I want to call an “ambivalent social theory”. To do this, the relationship between order and ambivalence will be explored in more detail and combined with an interest in the relationship between hybridity and purity. Now, let us look more systematically at what is ordered and in which ways this is done in contemporary Western societies and see what this means in the context of immigration.
7 “Economies of Signs and Space” and Immigration

... the main problem of this society is indifference or neglect.... We will have, apparently, in the next century a large mass of, say, bodies which have to survive somehow by their own, and not so much as a kind of parts, or kind of persons used for whatever purpose in function systems. So the problem, then, is no longer exploitation, suppression but neglect and then, of course, it is not possible to make revolution any more. There is no aim, no objective, no centre, or no top of the system which you could eliminate and then you would have a good society. There is rather the question to what extent function systems can be mobilized and can use their enormous amount of structure, flexibility to be less indifferent, or have the capacity to handle more information about their environment than is normally seen in their own history. (Luhmann 1994: 4)

With Niklas Luhmann, the idea is that our contemporary society is, as a “system”, functionally differentiated through specialization and division of labour, and thus it consists of some “subsystems”, such as the economy, politics, law, morality, science, art, the media, and so forth. Each subsystem performs certain functions that are not necessarily compatible with functions of other subsystems. For example, ideological wishes produced in the semantics of the political subsystem, like those central or local government policies of “creating jobs” for immigrants who are increasingly perceived as a burden for the welfare system, may be perceived as a disturbance, an irritation, or can be neglected by the economic subsystem, which does not need immigrants’ labour power today. Thus, according to Luhmann, these functional subsystems are separated from and closed to each other to a high degree, which make them highly autonomous. They have their own memories and their own types of operation in the natural and social environment (Luhmann 1994: 4).

Subsystems operate with binary values: for example, in economics, it is decisive if one pays or not; in politics, it is decisive if one has power or not, etc. (Luhmann
For a subsystem, these binary values, or “codes”, are also the means of an operational closure against their environment (that is, the world that the subsystems try to understand by reducing its complexity and the other subsystems). Accordingly, a subsystem can only operate in itself. The paradox in this operation is that subsystems not only make use of their codes, but are themselves constructed by the very application of these codes; in other words, it is the codes themselves which determine what they can and cannot see in their environment. For instance, the economic subsystem remains indifferent to relationships that cannot be perceived by its binary code of paying or not paying. Hence each subsystem creates its own picture of the world through internal operations. In this context, it is important to underline that, for Luhmann, differentiation does not mean a parcelling out of society or the world into different areas of meaning and knowledge, but rather a differentiation of perspectives and ways of handling the differences (between subsystems and their environments). This multiplicity also means that the world no longer has a centre which can be grasped by a single subsystem and that it is dissolved into different perspectives of different subsystems. The conclusion is necessarily that one cannot find a unity in a differentiated society and thus “revolution” becomes impossible. In such a differentiated society, there are only subsystems that observe a unity in the way they picture the world, and following this, what matters is not the unity in society, but rather who, or which subsystem, observes an assumed unity. This plurality of perspectives also creates a contingency because the world can per definition be observed in different ways by other subsystems. Thus, the unity any subsystem finds in society is nothing else than differences in the subsystems (Luhmann 1989; Kneer & Nassehi 1993).

In our context, we can view immigration from different perspectives related to different subsystems. It can be argued that the problems related to immigration do not emanate from a definite centre once and for all, and we can perceive different problems relating to different subsystems. In this chapter, I will try to focus on the economy and politics as different subsystems for understanding immigration in more systemic terms. As to the relationships between different subsystems, or in other words, as to the question of “order” relating to the regulation between different subsystems, one can ask how these “autonomous” subsystems simultaneously can coexist or relate to each other. Firstly, different subsystems experience each other as limits; for example, political regulation and economy limit each other in using exclusively their own binary codes. Secondly, what Luhmann calls “programs” (see 1989: 45-50), that is, organizations which are operational agents for the functioning of the binary codes, can function in bridging subsystems;
for instance, environmental laws can dictate the conditions of the operation of the economy. In this way, different subsystems can adjust themselves to each other without changing their own binary codes or without thus having common perspectives. To say it in a different way, it is the mutual limitations of subsystems that define to what extent we can speak of order (Luhmann 1989; Kneer & Nassehi 1993).

Another aspect from Luhmann’s system theory that is useful in our context is the role of the single person. As Luhmann mentions in the quotation above, increasingly many people are excluded from the systemic functioning of societies, e.g. the labour market, the institutions of economic and spatial governance, the communication and information networks, etc., and hence are reduced to “bodies”. It is in this context important that in Luhmann’s view, as is the case with society, the single person does not constitute a unity. Depending on social differentiation and thus the communication of subsystems, a single person may simultaneously have different roles in different social subsystems. In other words, if a person is different persons or the same person all the time depends on his or her relations to subsystems. In this respect, the concept of “inclusion”, that is, participation in the communication of a subsystem, is important in deciding what one can communicate (in the given structures) and who can communicate (conditions of access to subsystems). In this understanding, persons can simultaneously belong to different subsystems; they are so to say social hybrids. Simultaneous inclusion into different subsystems importantly replaces any principle of solidarity that builds upon the assumption that one belongs to one single “group” (Kneer & Nassehi 1993). In our context, the relevant question is to what degree, and which, subsystems are “indifferent” to immigrants or to what degree a single immigrant becomes one of the excluded, a “body”, in relation to these subsystems.

If inclusion in and exclusion from subsystems is related to the traditional concept of “integration”, the question can be reformulated as to what degree the immigrants are integrated in the two subsystems we will dwell on, the economy and politics. Integration means being an essential part of a system, that is, playing an indispensable role for the functioning of that system. In this respect, one can also speak of different “integrative mechanisms”, such as force, political power, bureaucracy, markets, cultural community, religion, democratic institutional processes, language, trust, etc. The logical opposite of integration is “disintegration”, examples of which are functional inconsistencies, contradictions, failures, interest-conflicts, class-conflicts, discrimination, separation and so forth (Mortensen 1995: 19-20).
To be able to look at the two subsystems, the economy and politics, with a special focus on processes of ghettoization and underclass formation, we will also concentrate on the issue of social change. Western societies are significantly different today compared with, roughly speaking, 30 years ago, and this difference has important effects on the changing nature of immigration and ghetto and underclass formations. Therefore, it is interesting to ask how this shift occurred and which consequences and political challenges it brought with it.

Giddens identifies three forms of temporality regarding social change: firstly, the *longue durée*, which means that human social existence is basically historical and related to macro-level institutional development processes; secondly, *Dasein*, which means individual lifetime, including such dimensions as life-course, consciousness formation and the finality of the human body; and thirdly, the *durée* of day-to-day life, including such dimensions as repetitiveness and time consumption in daily life (Giddens 1981: 19-20; Simonsen 1993: 154-155; Lash & Urry 1994: 241). Lash and Urry add “glacial” or “evolutionary” time, which expresses the longest and imperceptibly changing time horizon in human existence, and the “instant” time of the computer, which is, again, imperceptible for human senses because of its speed. They stress that perceptions of time according to these two forms of temporality become increasingly important in contemporary societies (for example, ecological risks force us to think in terms of glacial time, whereas dissemination of electronic communication brings an increased awareness toward instant time; see Lash & Urry 1994: 241-51). Dasein and durée as forms of temporality were focused on in chapters 3 and 4, and the focus in chapter 6 was predominantly on longer time spans similar to “glacial” time. In this chapter, the focus will be on the longue durée, and I will concentrate on social change related to immigration, the ghettoes and underclass formations in a broad context of institutional organization.

The longue durée has profound implications for the topic of immigration as a middle-range temporal level between glacial time, on the one hand, and the temporality of daily life and the individual lifetime, on the other. The main idea is that societies are systematically and socially organized differently in different spatial and temporal contexts in the longue durée. One could say that different societies also give way to different sorts of ghetto and underclass formation processes. In other words, the ghetto and the underclass have much to do with the nature of the society in which they emerge. Thus to understand the contemporary ghettoes and processes of underclass formation, we also have to look at the main features of change in contemporary societies.

To contextualize my arguments in this chapter, I want to identify three main periods of immigration in Denmark since the late 1960s. The first phase roughly
spans from the late 1960s, that is, the first years Turkish immigrants began coming to Denmark, until the beginning of the 1970s. This short period is characterized by a high integration of immigrants into the economic system. However, politically and culturally, they were almost completely on the margin because of a laissez-faire type of regulation. Thus I will call this first phase “disorganized” immigration. The second phase spans from the first half of the 1970s to roughly the 1990s. In this phase, immigrants became integrated into, or included in, the political system to a higher degree and universalistic policies of the Danish welfare state played an important role. Thus immigration became “organized” to a considerable degree. On the other hand, during this period, the economic subsystem began to exclude immigrants, which began already in the middle of the 1970s. But this disintegration was offset by the welfare state policies, which ensured integration in the other subsystems; hence, the welfare system reduced the speed of immigrants’ absolute marginalization and reduction to “bodies” induced by the increasing exclusion from the labour market. The third period, from the late 1980s to the middle of the 1990s, is characterized by tendencies of exclusion of immigrants from both subsystems. In the economy, the need for them has disappeared. Consequently, many immigrants are excluded from the economic subsystem together with other segments of the labour force, especially unskilled workers. In politics, as I showed in chapter 1, they become more and more targets of problematization and thereby devalorization. But importantly, their exclusion from the political system consists overwhelmingly of an “over-regulation” rather than a total neglect, which has been more or less the case for the economic subsystem. Today, the overall result of the exclusion of increasing numbers of immigrants simultaneously from some of the most important subsystems, such as economy and politics, alarmingly points toward the gradual creation of a Danish underclass.

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THE FIRST PHASE OF IMMIGRATION: VERTICAL INEQUALITY

A context for the three phases of immigration can be created using the work of Lash and Urry (1987), who analyze major changes in Western societies by a tripartite periodization: firstly, “liberal capitalism”, which roughly characterized the period after the industrial revolution up to the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century; secondly, “organized capitalism” of the twentieth century; and thirdly, “disorganized capitalism” since the late 1960s. In their later work (1994),
they have renamed the last phase “economies of signs and space” as well. In our context, then, organized capitalism is the broader context in which the first phase of immigration took place. That is, when immigrants from Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia and Pakistan first came in the 1960s, Denmark was an “organized” capitalist country. The process of “disorganization” (of the “organized” capitalism) is the broader context in which the second phase of immigration took place. And the proliferation and consolidation of economies of signs and space is the broader context in which the third phase of immigration took place.

Liberal capitalism and some socio-spatial inequalities

Liberal capitalism was distinguished by a tiny growth of industry, the emergence of weak nation-states (after the collapsing empires) and an operation of circuits of capital mostly on the local and regional levels with little overlap and interconnection between. In general, the functioning and regulation of liberal capitalism were mostly local and regional phenomena. Thus the rise of commercial cities and the growth of new urban centres in rural areas characterized the spatial organization of the liberal capitalist societies. Liberal capitalism was that form of capitalism, for example, Marx was occupied with; the system was characterized by feudal ties gradually “torn asunder”, a steadfastly expanding market, the emergence of a proletariat selling its labour power to survive and a concomitantly increasing, but still weak importance of trade unions. Improved means of communication were an important vehicle for this development, but in liberal capitalism, for example, printing was not very much developed and thus handwriting and word of mouth was overwhelmingly dominant both in business contracts and in cultural relationships (Lash & Urry 1987: 1-16).

The best metaphor for liberal capitalism is probably Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”. Free competition in the market as a dominant ideology meant that the roles of the state and the labour unions were very limited in economic regulation. The main role of the state was to organize the juridical framework within which economic activities took place, and the main regulative instance in this liberal competitive economy was the “reserve army” of the unemployed. Wage contracts were individual and based on free competition. Thus collective wage relations were not wide-spread, and most importantly, labour power had not yet become the consumers of the produced industrial items as in later periods. In this economy, the most important form of surplus value was “absolute surplus value”, a method of creating profit by prolonging the length of working time on the basis of existing
technology. Hence time was a major source of conflict (between workers and capital owners) and a major factor behind the crisis tendencies together with the unregulated competition among capitalists.

This “free competition” was reflected quite harshly in the spatial structures of liberal capitalism, which were characterized by severe inequalities and powerful mechanisms of segregation. Manchester in the nineteenth century, which Engels wrote about in *The Condition of the Working Class in England* (published in 1845), can be mentioned here as a paradigmatic example of social and territorial segregation in the urban life of liberal capitalism. In many respects, Manchester was “less built according to a plan, after official regulations” and it was therefore, as if the ideal liberal capitalist city, “more an outgrowth of accident, than any other city” (Engels 1996: 50). But in this unregulated city there was, however, more or less systematic segregation, for example, in the case of the working-class housing districts. Engels thus mentioned that the working-people’s quarters were “sharply separated from the sections of the city reserved for the middle class” (ibid, 49). Miserable, grimy, wretched, damp, filthy, unwholesome, badly built are some of the images with which he characterized the “imprisoned atmosphere” of these working-class quarters (ibid, 51-55).

Society, composed fully of atoms, does not trouble itself about them; leaves them to care for themselves and their families, yet supplies them no means of doing this in an efficient and permanent manner. Every working man, even the best, is therefore constantly exposed to loss of work and food.... (Engels 1996: 55)

In nineteenth century liberal capitalism, in addition to the spatial segregation of the working class, which Engels focused on above, worries about “dangerous classes” were especially widespread. The working class was only a part of this. Lydia Morris writes that, in England, by “the middle of the nineteenth century the separation of the respectable working class from a substratum of social outcasts had become a major concern” (Morris 1994: 16). Because casual and seasonal employment was endemic, there was an abundance of people called “street folk”, “lumpen proletariat”, “redundant population”, “social outcasts” etc. Morris says that these images of “dangerous classes” pictured a stratum of the population as a threatening residual category in liberal capitalism and “[t]hrough the construction of a category of outsiders, this threat is located outside of society” That is, their definition as outsiders helped the imagination of an otherwise normal society. The emphasis of this stigmatizing construction was on moral failure and the poor
socialization of these groups, and the same categories were later taken up by the
eugenics movement and the social engineering ideals of the European states (Morris
1994: 2). Morris also implies that the notion of “the underclass”, still widely used
today, owes much to these historical roots, an issue which we will dwell on in more
detail. But first we have to look at the development of organized capitalism.

Organized capitalism and immigration to Europe

Proliferation of an organized (and later disorganized) capitalism has not occurred at
the same time and in the same way in all countries. Lash and Urry have detected
many variations and national divergences regarding the specific structural
characteristics of each country and the different roles of different agents in the
emergence of organized capitalism in each national context (see especially 1987).
But they nevertheless point to some common systemic and paradigmatic
characteristics, which will be of main interest in the following.

Generally speaking, organized capitalism as an economic system was
characterized by the flow of money, the means of production, consumer
commodities and labour power, most significantly on a national scale (Lash & Urry
1994: 2). It was further distinguished by: the concentration and centralization of
industrial, banking and commercial capital; increasing regulation of markets by the
state; bureaucratization and establishment of managerial hierarchies; the growth of
scientific/managerial/technological intelligentsia; the increasing role of collective
organizations in the labour market (trade unions, professional organizations, etc.);
an increasing inter-articulation between the state and large monopolies;
concentration of industrial relations within a few industrial sectors; dominance of
manufacturing industry with large numbers of workers employed; concentration of
different industries within different regions and the rise of industrial regions; the
expansion of large industrial cities; and “modernism” as the dominant cultural and
ideological configuration, on the one hand, and aesthetic modernism and
nationalism, on the other (Lash & Urry 1987: 3-4).

We naturally do not have space for a thorough discussion of all these elements,
but we can briefly mention some of them to clear the picture, which will be helpful
before proceeding to contemporary phenomena.

Economic regulation in organized capitalism, which was predominantly industry-
centred, was characterized by the Taylorist technological paradigm and Fordist mass
production. Taylorism roughly meant production of “relative surplus value” by improving scientific management of work processes that intended to transform the industrial production process “from an organic to a more mechanical, routinized series of tasks controlled by a central planning office” (Cooke 1990: 60). This ideal method to mass-produce on an assembly line using unskilled labour power also meant an increase in productivity in the time used by the single worker. Thus relative surplus value increased even though the work time spent by the worker remained the same. What “Fordism” (a word Gramsci used to characterize the Tayloristic production techniques used first in Ford’s factories in the US) added to Taylorism was, as a way of stabilizing and regulating the relationship between capital and labour, to combine mass production with mass consumption. Thus the dominating industries of organized capitalism, like the auto industry, became organized for mass production, which aimed at internal scale economies, the logic of which was to make the production costs per unit fall by producing more of the same, that is, without changing, or standardizing the type of the product (Storper & Scott: 1988).

In combining mass production with mass consumption, which could not be realized internally by the firms and thus required an external agent, the state became an “interventionist” national agent by engaging in regulation of wage relations and investing directly in areas where private capital was weak. The state also became a “welfare state”, the basic premise of which was to expand the labour market by regulating demand and protecting and supporting people outside the labour market against poverty. Thus, aiming at full-employment, the welfare state significantly meant a break with the regulation mechanism of liberal capitalism, which was based on a reserve army of labour.

Giddens names three structural sources of the welfare state. Firstly, it has its beginnings in the effort to create a “work society”, that is, a society in which work, in the sense of paid labour in industry, has a central and defining role. Secondly, welfare state has been, on the part of the authorities, related to a desire to create national solidarity, thus the welfare state has always been a national state. And thirdly, from its origins, the welfare state has been concerned with risk management efforts to deal with “predictable” hazards; thus Giddens sees welfare schemes as a form of social insurance regarding “those risks that are not ‘subsumed’ in the wage-labour relation” (Giddens 1994b: 137).

This reflected the encounter of “simple” modernity with pre-existing forms of social order that were perceived as ambivalent or disordered. The keywords in this system were “organization” of collective actors at a national level, “formalization” of previously informal economic and social activities and “modernization” and planning
of the infrastructure. Industrial production was perceived as being the central motor of this society and thus, in tune with this, “growth” was the main aim of the organizing, formalizing and planning activities. As Giddens points out, better conditions for the working classes and generalized social insurance gave a new twist to the idea of continuous progress and prosperity.

Because of the increasing importance of state intervention in organized capitalism, basic social and spatial inequalities naturally became a topic for discussion which focused especially on consumption-related issues. For example, as Savage and Warde write, the new urban sociology of the 1970s “can be seen as a theoretical reflection on the significance of state welfare provision both for capitalism as a system, and also for urban politics and conflict” (Savage & Warde 1993: 153). According to Manuel Castells’ early writing in the beginning of 1970s, consumption activities, which were related to the reproduction of labour power and which were now characterized by intensive state intervention, took place especially at an urban level. Thus “collective consumption”, consisting of welfare provisions in kind (collective non-market investments, such as schools or public transportation) and in cash (subsidies to individuals, e.g. welfare support, flat purchase subsidies, etc.) was for Castells both the defining characteristic of the city and the field where one could see new social inequalities and thus new potential possibilities for class struggle, such as tenants’ movements, neighbourhood campaigns, etc., in organized capitalism (Castells 1977; Savage & Warde 1993).

The “industrial city” of organized capitalism was an expanding city; industries were growing, the rich were flowing out to the suburbs; immigrants were flowing into the inner city areas and to the industrial centres. But because of growth, until the first half of the 1970s, there was plenty of work, also for immigrants willing to take “poorly paid, dirty and unhealthy work” (Hjarnø 1994: 2). Thus, even if one can effectively discuss the labour market or other structural inequalities related to immigrants in organized capitalism, immigrants were not totally excluded from the labour market. Even though their positionings in the labour market were not similar to the more privileged collectively organized workers of the host countries, they were nevertheless “workers”, an “inclusion” in the labour market, which makes the Marxist arguments related to growth, job situations and economic inequalities valid. As to ethnic minorities and immigrants, neo-Marxist researchers discussed mostly production-related structural factors causing fundamental inequalities in the labour market. For example according to Castles and Kosack, immigrants were part of the working class, which was now divided against itself and consisted of a secured and privileged “white” segment, on the one hand, and unskilled workers of colour who also constituted a reserve army of labour, on the other (Lash & Urry 1994: 147).
While most neo-Marxist researchers focused more on production-related and structural factors in explaining immigration, neo-Weberians, such as John Rex, discussed consumption and actor-related issues more explicitly by pointing out the importance of housing market conditions for different urban groups and the importance of urban management in general. Rex saw the organized city as a product of bureaucratic action, and thus he emphasized the role of urban managers (e.g. local politicians, developers, planners) and “gate-keepers” in urban politics to explain basic social and spatial inequalities. The cause of urban segregation could no longer be found solely in the positions of economic class, but in their positions in the housing market. He thus argued, using the concept of “housing classes”, that there was a class struggle over housing because of differential access to it by different groups. Housing depends partly upon income and thus labour market position, but people in the same labour situation can have different access to housing, and this produces conflicts different from those in the economic class conflict (Rex: 1988: 62-75; Savage & Warde 1993: 68-69).

“Disorganized immigration” to an organized country

They are not born: they are not brought up: they do not age: they do not get tired: they do not die. They have a single function—to work. All other functions of their lives are the responsibility of the country they come from. (John Berger; quoted in Horst 1980)

The first phase of immigration, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, was of single men, whom Berger dramatically describes above. In this phase, immigration was conceived of dominantly as a labour immigration, and it took place in a laissez-faire system, that is, without a special mechanism of control, so that one could freely come to Denmark and stay simply by registering with the local authorities (Horst 1980: 149). The only regulation regarding immigration was of a political character and was based on the issuance of residence and work permits. A work permit was not a general right to look for jobs in the country but was a permit for a specific job for a specific employer, and this made the immigrants vulnerable to economic exploitation during this phase. Similarly, a residence permit was only temporary, which meant that their residence was juridically on shaky grounds. That is, they had no right to stay in Denmark independent of these permits, which made them very vulnerable regarding any form of deportation because there were no authorities higher than those in immigration control to whom they could appeal their rights.
And thirdly, they had no political rights; for example, they could not vote in local or general elections (Horst 1980: 105-107). In my interviews, the memory of those times for Turkish ex-workers mainly relate to production-related inequalities, typically in the form of overtime work without pay.

These general characteristics indicate that, during this first phase of immigration, workers were systemically integrated into the economic subsystem (predominantly in unskilled jobs) while their systemic integration into the political subsystem (e.g. in the welfare state) and their social integration in general were very poor. Hence this phase of immigration was not “organized”.

But it is significant that this immigration was made to an organized capitalist country. After the economic boom in the late 1940s and 1950s in Denmark, one could already see growth reflected in the consolidation of the welfare state and employment policies, which in part were begun earlier in the 1930s by “a social democratic breakthrough”. Although not united to the same degree as in Sweden and Norway, strong universalist trade unions and a dominating labour party permitted a social democratic ascendance in Denmark (Esping-Andersen 1990: 167). Although it is important to point out that the Taylorist organization of work processes and Fordist industries never became dominant in Denmark, where craft-based and smaller scale industries were significant, the prevailing accumulation system in Scandinavia and the rest of Europe up until the crisis in the mid-1970s could be considered Fordist (Møller 1995: 139). In other words, even if the Danish industrial structure with its many craft-based firms were not especially Fordist, one could still say that both the industrial paradigm and political regulation, especially because of the powerful development of the Danish social democracy and the trade unions, were highly organized. The area of consumption also illustrates the effects of the social democratic breakthrough. Until the early 1970s, most workers had become owners of single family houses; their wives were pulled into the labour market, and the families become the consumers of mass products (see Albertsen 1988). In short, Denmark’s immigrants came to an organized capitalist Denmark.

To encourage further growth, Danish capital was interested in foreign labour power, and thus immigrants, predominantly Turkish, ex-Yugoslavian and Pakistani “foreign workers”, were literally invited. In this first phase of immigration, unskilled immigrants were useful as industrial labour power on the assembly line and other craft-based work processes that did not require much reflexivity on the worker’s side. These immigrants took the qualitatively least valued jobs in the labour market. In the early 1970s, almost 90 per cent of them had unskilled manufacturing industrial jobs (Schierup 1993: 99). They were nevertheless content with their
situation because they compared their relative poorness in a rich country with their earlier absolute poorness.

In this initial phase, while neo-Marxist researchers criticized Danish immigration politics, because it perceived immigrants as a “commodity” rather than as human beings (see for example Horst 1980), neo-Weberian social processes were also at work. For instance, in the first years of their immigration and in stark contrast to the majority of Danish workers, Turkish workers lived collectively in “Heims”, generally 8-10 people sharing a poor-quality basement or ceiling flat in the city centres. Of the housing situation of immigrant workers during this period, Hjarnø observed that “in order to maximise their possibilities of saving, their demands for accommodation were very low. They tried to rent the cheapest and worst accommodation, and they crowded in” (Hjarnø 1994: 11).

Importantly, in these years, the immigrants’ lives were “work-centred”, just as the phenomenon of immigration itself was: they had come to work. Even the restructuration of their family forms, as temporarily split families (the wives of most workers were still living in Turkey and began coming to Denmark first in the middle of 1970s), were conditioned by their work situation.

Until the beginning of the 1970s, the geography of industrial relations in Denmark was organized in a centre-periphery model, where the centre (Copenhagen and big cities in East Jutland, such as Aarhus) was characterized by high wages and in-migration and the periphery by low wages and out-migration (Albertsen 1986: 10). Thus, in the first phase of immigration, immigrants predominantly flowed to the “centre” where there were jobs.

In Aarhus, Turkish immigrants worked generally in the construction, metal and wood-processing industries. Only a few workers, especially those coming to Denmark from Germany, were skilled. Their wives, when they came, worked predominantly in the food-processing industries (chicken, fish), in forestry (collecting flowers and mushroom) and in gardening. In these first years, the Turks in Aarhus did not know very much about the Danish system, and they were not members of trade unions and unemployment funds—their social network consisted only of other workers in the same situation. The trade unions, which had always been opposed to labour immigration, were afraid of immigrants’ potentially negative role as the reserve army of cheap labour. Trade unions were also the main actors behind the Danish stop on immigration in 1973 (Hamburger 1992: 308).

To sum up, one can say that both neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian processes were at work in the first phase of immigration. Looking at this first phase of immigration today in retrospect, what seems most important is that Turks began coming to
Denmark when the system was thoroughly “organized”, but the phenomenon of immigration itself was somewhat “disorganized”, the main reason being that immigration had been perceived as a “temporary” phenomenon. Questions such as who was to come, to which sectors, etc. were exclusively the responsibility of employers, and because these immigrant workers were not unionized as Danish workers were, the labour unions were afraid of this phenomenon. The immigrants’ lack of social and cultural integration during this phase intensified this disorganized character.

-II-

ORGANIZED IMMIGRATION AND DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM:
HORIZONTAL INEQUALITY

This “disorganized immigration” in Denmark did not last longer than a few years. Quite early, already in the beginning of the 1970s, the second, “organized” phase of immigration began taking place, although its consolidation took several years. For instance, as early as 1970, a report issued by the Ministry of Labour raised the issue of the poor standards of foreign workers’ accommodations. It concluded that “one must aim for a standard similar to that of Danish labourers” (quoted in Hjarnø 1994: 11). In 1971, the Ministry of Labour focused on juridical equal opportunity of immigrants and Danes, and a law was passed against discrimination on the grounds of racial difference (Lov nr. 289; 1971).

Probably the most important event on the way to organization of immigration was the permanent immigration stop in 1973. The immigration stop and the organization of immigrants already inside the country went hand in hand, and in this context, the stop meant that immigrants had achieved some formal rights quite early. In 1975, the Ministry of Social Affairs issued a report, “Social Integration of Foreign Workers” (Udenlanske arbejderes sociale og samfundsmæssige tilpasning), in which immigration was mentioned officially for the first time as something *permanent*, in stark contrast to former semantics. It was recommended that
immigrants with three years of residence in Denmark should have the right to vote in local elections, something that was first realized in 1981 (Socialministeriet: Betænkning nr. 761; 1975). In 1976, the “Danish Guest Workers Council” (Gæstarbejdernes Fællesraad i Danmark), a collective organization of Turkish, Pakistani and ex-Yugoslavian immigrants, the first of its kind, was established. In reality, the main effect of this development was not the attainment of equal opportunity for immigrants, as I will show in the following. However, these steps were very important for the formal organization of immigration, which meant the beginning of a gradual social integration following on the economic integration of immigrants. Thus, at least formally, systemic and social integration were becoming bound together, and this was an important difference from the first phase, in which immigrants were exclusively reduced to labour power.

Two steps in the organization of immigration seem to have been especially important and consequential in retrospect. The first one was the right of immigrants to join unemployment funds and the right to collect welfare benefits. The second one was their movement into public housing communities in large numbers in the early 1970s, a move motivated by urban managers (e.g. local politicians, planners and social workers).

Already in 1970, every immigrant in Denmark was required to join an unemployment fund and immigrants were entitled to welfare benefits, both of which were especially important for the systemic integration of immigrants. Because membership in unemployment funds was (and is) closely tied to labour union membership in Denmark, in practice, the unemployed were also strongly organized (Andersen 1996: 50). Membership in unemployment funds was also very important for developing non-work-centred life strategies, for both immigrants as well as other groups, especially in the 1980s. This will be discussed later, but the point here is that, in “organized” immigration, authorities had formally accepted that immigrants should have equal rights to welfare provisions and protection. One could thus say that the Danish welfare state had become “universalist” toward immigrants at quite an early stage in the immigration process.

The other important development relates to housing. In the beginning of the 1970s, some newly-built housing communities in suburban areas (such as Ishøj) had difficulties in renting out the flats, because, even if the new areas were built in the image of the industrial boom and located close to industrial sites outside of the inner cities, things had not gone as expected. The recession at the beginning of the 1970s and the high level of rents had made the flats unattractive for many people. It was in this context that urban managers, especially municipal authorities, invited immigrants into these suburban areas. Thus, ironically, for example, the Municipality
of Ishøj, probably best known for its restrictive immigration politics in Denmark already in the 1980s, at this earlier time advertised the flats in the “Foreign Workers’ Newspaper”, inviting those interested to see the model versions. The movement to these housing communities coincided with, or rather was the result of, the family reunification of immigrants. The families needed accommodations to “fit in with family life”, as they said in the interviews, and the only real opportunities were these advertised flats, which their caseworkers, having an important intermediary position between them and the system, brought up as a first alternative. So, they moved to these suburban areas in groups, in just the way the chain-immigration took place. In this context, one cannot underestimate the role of urban managers—local politicians, planners and social workers—in having deliberately steered immigrants to these suburban settlements. (It was at this time that Social Democratic municipalities were eagerly discussing the need for “positive discrimination” regarding immigrants.) Indeed, immigrants were almost “placed” in the housing communities (see Horst 1990 and Hjarnø 1994 for further interesting details).

These tendencies are only some of the most important ones regarding immigration during the first half of the 1970s. But they are enough to show how, in a relatively short time, immigrants had become socially integrated to a considerable degree and how the phenomenon of immigration had become “organized”. This organizational tendency indeed seems to have reached exaggerated levels in some cases. For example, one Turkish interviewee said that, in 1978, when he had become old enough for military service, he was called in by the Danish authorities for a “session”, an examination of men liable for military service, even though he was Turkish citizen.

But the odd thing about this organized period of immigration is that this binding together of systemic integration (in the labour market) and relative social integration (via welfare state) did not last long, because, at the top, the system itself began to get “disorganized”, and at the bottom, immigrants’ lifestyles began getting increasingly less work-centred. The second phase of immigration thus meant organization for a short while, but only until disorganization began to set in. The result was a fast transformation of the new suburban housing areas concentrated with immigrants to “welfare state ghettos” because of increasing unemployment and thus the increasing systemic disintegration of immigrants. In the second phase of immigration, this disintegration from the economy was not accompanied by the same degree of social and political disintegration we see today. Hence, the second phase of immigration, characterized by exclusion (from the economy) and relative social and political inclusion (via the welfare state), lasted until the 1990s, when the currently on-going third phase took over.
Deindustrialization and economic disintegration

In the beginning of the 1970s, the organized capitalism was already evolving toward a systemic crisis. At the same time, as Lash and Urry point out, the debate on ethnic relations stagnated and ended in a stand-off between Marxists and Weberians because neither of the groups paid considerable attention to social change in a broader context. Following William Wilson (1987), Lash and Urry argue that the Marxist model “is more or less valid until the beginning of 1970s, that is roughly during the period of organized capitalism with blacks making up a significant fraction of the working class. But with the decline of industry and the rise of services, with the disappearance of jobs for the ghetto-blacks in recent decades, and with the concomitant shift of lifestyle from job-related to non-job-related practices, the Weberian model is now more applicable” (Lash & Urry 1994: 147). But Lash and Urry ascertain that, significantly, this shift of validity came about because of the eminent Marxist processes of structural socio-economic change, that is, the transition from organized to disorganized capitalism.

If, for example, we focus briefly on the changes in the economic system regarding the technological paradigm, one can say that a new “technological revolution” took place in the late 1960s, when electronics invaded production systems and labour processes. Flexible machines could produce a range of product types, adapt to several functions without sacrificing economies of scale (which aimed at increases in return of capital by increasing size and capacity of the firm given identical product and technology mixes), and reduce demand for labour, saving time in the production process (Lipietz 1987; Leborgne & Lipietz 1988). With computer-aided design and new manufacturing methods (which optimized the processes between different work stations, possibilities of management, etc.), flexible technology meant important economies of fixed and circulating capital, on the one hand, and the spread of new time-saving competitive strategies, on the other. A faster change in product/process configuration, greater product differentiation and specialization in a shorter time and thus an ability to more quickly react to market changes were some of the most important results in this context (see, for example, Schoenberger 1988).

Since competition based on flexible technologies, in contrast to Fordist mass production, is made, to a greater extent, on the basis of quality, innovation and time, rather than price, firms specialize and produce a restricted scope of
differentiated goods. Thus, according to Leborgne & Lipietz (1988), “networks of specialized firms” were established in the late 1980s, and according to Scott (1988), Fordist internal economies of scale tended toward horizontal and vertical disintegration already in the late 1960s. This involved subcontracting formerly in-house production to other firms and new independent start-ups, respectively. But this disintegration had some disadvantages: transport, communication, information exchange and research and indirect financial costs were increasing, and this gave way to the need for re-integration and the spatial agglomeration of firms. The new re-integration was different from the former integration of Fordist firms: it was neither Fordist vertical integration (it did not involve an absorption of an existing firm within the corporate hierarchy of the main firm) nor horizontal integration (it did not involve cross-licensing or joint ventures between firms producing similar products). Cooke called this form of integration “flexible integration” which, as the centrepiece of post-Fordist accumulation, implied: firstly, an intrafirm reorganization of Fordism’s now decentralized tasks by maximizing innovation and minimizing bureaucratic rigidities; secondly, flexible manufacturing systems, computer-aided engineering and manufacturing to maximize scale economies and competition; thirdly, joint ventures and strategic alliances (as subcontracting) at the interfirm level that were becoming more widespread between nations than within nations. These developments also implied an internal occupational restructuring in that it gave way to a three-layered proliferation of a multi-skilled core that consisted of functionally flexible workers, a semi-periphery that was both functionally and numerically flexible and a third group of peripheral workers who were numerically flexibilized, that is, they could be employed or re-employed at different time intervals (Cooke 1988).

In a broad framework, Lash and Urry considered these changes related to the economic sphere as a part of disorganized capitalism that is most generally characterized by: the growth of a world market, which is less regulated nationally than organized capitalism; the absolute and relative decline in the manufacturing industry and hence a decline in the size and power of the working class; the expansion of a service class; the decline of national bargaining processes between labour, capital and the state and hence increasing independence of large monopolies from control by single nation-states (Lash & Urry 1987: 5-6). As a consequence of these major changes, the spatial organization of the system also changed fundamentally. Most importantly, distinct regional and national economies and formerly industrial cities started to decline in the late 1960s; industry in smaller cities and on the periphery were expanding; and post-industrial and re-structured cities were witnessing growth (Lash & Urry 1987: 16).
These economic changes in the 1970s and the 1980s can be related to our context. In Denmark, until 1978, employment fell for both skilled and unskilled workers, but there was a counter-tendency as well. At the end of the 1980s, one could see that employment in firms with numerically directed, flexible machinery and skilled workers was increasing (Albertsen 1986: 10). But this increase in skilled industrial employment did not balance the decline in employment of unskilled labour. As an aggregate result, the capacity of industrial employment decreased in the country as a whole.

Table 7.1: Employment structure in Denmark 1966-1990, in per cent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industry, construction, other</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Services</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Public services*</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Private sector services</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Andersen 1996: 40.

*The explosion in the public service sector is due to the economic boom and the increasing labour market participation of women.
This decline in industrial employment was more concentrated in branches of the manufacturing industry to which unskilled or semi-skilled immigrant workers were a part. Until the late 1980s, the main reaction of Danish manufacturing industry to this downturn was spatial dispersion, and this changed the regional structure of the manufacturing industry. During these years, some firms moved out to the periphery, where cheaper and more stable unskilled labour was to be found. This dispersion of industry stopped almost completely at the end of the 1980s, but the bigger capital-intensive firms, characterized by high wages and stable employment of semi-skilled labour, and the less capital-intensive firms, characterized by skilled labour, continued to move out to the periphery. The period was thus characterized by a continuous “peripheralization” of the manufacturing industry, which resulted in a decline of industrial employment in larger cities, the most severely hit the Copenhagen region, which lost 48 per cent of the industrial jobs and 46 per cent of its enterprises between 1972 and 1982 (Albertsen 1986: 11-12). The increase in the service sector (see table 7.1.), especially in public services, is remarkable in showing the increasing importance of services in economic terms. This will be mentioned in more detail later.

The first impact of this development on immigrants was increased unemployment in larger cities because of the decline in the number of work-places in manufacturing, especially in the number of unskilled jobs in the branches they were working. This was most visible in Copenhagen and Aarhus. The second impact was that some immigrants, especially Turkish immigrants, who are today geographically the most spread minority in the country, also moved out to where the new jobs were, that is, to the periphery. The best examples of this peripheral immigrant concentration can be seen in the new industrial regions in central Jutland (such as the Herning-Ikast textile region, which experienced an expansion during the crises) and cities in West Denmark (such as Esbjerg). For instance, in Herning and Ikast, Turkish workers became numerically flexible, unskilled labour power during the 1970s and 1980s (see Diken 1995 for more detail).

In Aarhus, the most important tendency regarding immigrants’ relation to the economic system during the period 1970-1993 was deindustrialization. In Aarhus, during this time, the total number employed increased from 107,690 to 135,356; but during the same period, the total number employed in manufacturing industries fell from 31,402 to 19,197. The same tendency is visible in the construction industry, the branch with the second largest concentration of Turkish workers, in which the number employed fell from 8,895 to 5,506. The fundamental shift was felt specifically in those sectors in which immigrants came to work and generally in the employment structure of the municipality. This relates to the class structure of the
city as well. In the same period, the total number of blue-collar workers in all sectors fell from approximately 47,000 to 36,000.

If we look exclusively at the manufacturing and construction industries in Aarhus in which immigrants were concentrated, things are even more striking. For instance, between 1984 and 1993, manufacturing industries lost 2,644 unskilled work places, while they lost “only” 1,400 skilled work places. In the same period, the construction industry lost 1,672 unskilled and 2,792 skilled work places (calculations are based on Statistisk Aarbog for Aarhus 1988, 1996 and 10-års oversigt, Aarhus Kommune, 1981).

To sum up, these figures tell that just between 1984 and 1993, the sectors in which immigrants were most concentrated lost approximately 400 unskilled work places per year, making immigrants superfluous for these industries, which also partly explains the background for their disintegration from the economic subsystem during the period.

But this only partly explains the disintegration, because it was not distributed evenly among unskilled workers as a whole. As Schierup points out, even if the labour unions of unskilled workers had the highest rates of unemployment, the figures were even higher for their immigrant members. For example, in all of Denmark in 1990, while unemployment among members of SID, consisting typically of unskilled workers, was 19 per cent, it was 39 per cent for its immigrant members. At the same time, one cannot automatically assume that if immigrants had been skilled labour power that their employment rates would have risen. For example, in the union of metallic industries, whose members largely consist of skilled workers, the average unemployment rate was 7 per cent while that for immigrant members was 19 per cent. Thus, unemployment was even more unevenly distributed among skilled workers (Schierup 1993: 99-101). These two points emphasize that even if the restructuring in the economic subsystem was a major cause for immigrants’ unemployment, there were, at the same time, other factors—like structural ethnic discrimination in the labour market—contributing to an uneven distribution of the effects of systemic transformations. That is, one can also speak of a “horizontal inequality”, which means that immigrants can be more affected than can non-immigrants at the same level of the industrial hierarchy (for example, as skilled or unskilled workers).

With increasing disintegration, the economic “vertical inequality”, which was characteristic of the first phase of immigration because of immigrants’ places at the bottom of the industrial hierarchy, took the shape of “exclusion” in Luhmann’s sense to a considerable degree. Accordingly, since the second phase of immigration, it no
longer makes sense to speak of “inequality” regarding many immigrants’ relationship to the economic subsystem because inequality (e.g. economic exploitation) necessitates participation.

Already in the middle of the 1980s, as a consequence of deindustrialization and ethnic discrimination, many immigrants in Aarhus were no longer workers and no longer constituted a fraction, albeit a disadvantaged and more exploited fraction, of the Danish working class. Because of the simultaneous technological improvement and serious decline in activities in the branches, most of the unskilled jobs for immigrants disappeared. As I showed above, this was most visible in the manufacturing and construction industries. But some of the jobs they held in the food-processing industry (and textile industry, in which some Turks were employed to a lesser degree) were also rationalized or flexibilized; and by the end of the 1980s, only a limited number of Turkish workers were left in these branches. What happened in Aarhus was undoubtedly a part of the generalized international crisis and restructuring in the systemic organization that began in the 1970s.

But the overall effect of this deindustrialization on Aarhus as a whole has been relatively small, mainly because Aarhus has never been dependent solely upon manufacturing industries. After the 1930s, it became a university town. In the 1960s and 1970s, the two big hospitals (Kommunehospital and Amtsygehuset) made public services an important part of Aarhus. Today there are a considerable number of high-tech industrial firms; the largest sector in the city is the service sector; and it has become a harbour city with the largest transport facilities in the country. That is, Aarhus has become a typical “welfare city”. If we look at the development of the service sector together with deindustrialization, this predominance of services becomes remarkable:

\[\text{Table 7.2 Employment structure in Aarhus in 1970 and 1993}\]
In contrast to a typical industrial city, the economy of Aarhus is a conglomerate of many diverse economic activities and is not dependent on any single one of them. As a general consequence, Aarhus successfully restructured itself in the period of crises, becoming more and more a post-industrial city. On the other hand, as should be clear by now, immigrants were dependent on the unskilled jobs in the manufacturing industry. Thus, deindustrialization meant for them a disintegration from the economic subsystem. At this point, it is important to look at how mobile they have been in moving to sectors other than manufacturing. But to understand the strategies adapted by immigrants against deindustrialization and the growth in the service sector, we first have to look at their social integration into the political subsystem during the period of organized immigration, for this had important consequences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1970 (absolute)</th>
<th>In %</th>
<th>1993 (absolute)</th>
<th>In %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agriculture</td>
<td>3.519</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.401</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manufacturing ind.</td>
<td>31.402</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>22.081</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>construction ind.</td>
<td>8.895</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.912</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>businesses</td>
<td>18.678</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>27.577</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transport</td>
<td>8.255</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14.441</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>service (priv./publ.)</td>
<td>33.538</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>68.416</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>3.403</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>11.141</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>107.690</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>153.977</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Why “work” is no longer a central category for immigrants?

While systemic disintegration continued, Turkish families, now concentrated in the suburban housing areas created by organized capitalism and having the right to
unemployment and welfare benefits, developed non-work-centred lifestyles. There were some who moved from industrial to public and private service sector jobs. But in contrast to the first phase of immigration, during which the workers neither wanted to be isolated from work nor were excluded from it, the main tendency during the second phase was the development of hybridized strategies articulating unemployment support and informal activities building on household economy. For example, many of the wives who came to Denmark via family reunification systematically chose to work only long enough to get the maximum unemployment benefit afterwards, which they could as a member of an unemployment fund.

Until 1995, the special characteristics of the Danish unemployment benefit system were roughly the following. Firstly, benefits could be granted on the conditions that membership in an unemployment fund had been on-going for at least one year and that employment during this period had lasted at least 26 weeks. Secondly, the normal duration for unemployment benefits could last up to seven years. If one worked 26 weeks during this time, one could restart the seven-year period. Thirdly, the compensation level was very high, amounting to 90 per cent of one’s wage if the salary had been low, or from an unskilled job. Fourthly, the degree to which control mechanisms functioned, regarding who was available for the labour market while receiving unemployment benefits, was relatively low (Andersen 1996: 12). In general, this system was highly effective in maintaining high political and social integration for those who were marginalized from the labour market. Thus some research has convincingly shown that unemployment in Denmark has not automatically meant exclusion from political participation and social disintegration (Møller 1995; Andersen 1996). The high compensation level, which is important especially for low-wage earners, has meant that disintegration from the labour market did not mean extreme economic poverty either. This system, which came considerably close to a basic income systems (Andersen 1996), and which, since 1995, has been restricted in several ways, was accessible and attractive for Turkish and other immigrant families, and it was important in maintaining their (partial) social and political integration.

As I mentioned before, the jobs Turks had or could get were not the best jobs in the market. Given the unattractive character of these available jobs, it must have been just as “rational” from their side to rely on informal consumption and welfare benefits (mentioned in chapter 4). Thus, for many Turks (and other unskilled immigrant and Danish workers), a general strategy seems to have been to work only as long as necessary and then to establish several forms of articulation between the highly organized, work-centred system of welfare capitalism and the non-work-centred, consumption-oriented, “informal” activities of the household. At later
stages, especially at the end of 1980s and in the 1990s, articulation between welfare support and informal productive activity also increased in importance. As a consequence of this development, and although most of the workers who had a permanent and satisfying job continued to work, what can be called “work-ethic”, that is, an individual’s worldview placing work as the centre, was “decentred” to a high degree already during the second phase of immigration for most immigrants in two senses. Firstly, work, understood as “industrial” work, largely disappeared; and secondly, unemployment increased astronomically for immigrants. As a first response to deindustrialization, Turkish immigrants developed non-work-centred lifestyles using the above mentioned articulation. So to say, while the system was disorganizing at the top, the immigrants were now also “disorganizing” with respect to work life at the bottom in their own specific ways.

The decentring of work as a major organizing category and thus also the decentring of the “work society” of organized capitalism in general has been a major tendency in all Western welfare systems since the end of the 1960s. We can look at this phenomenon in general terms by dwelling on Claus Offe’s research (1985, 1996) in which he extensively elaborates on the decentring of work and thus on the crisis of the work society. According to Offe, one of the basic reasons for disorganization tendencies since the end of the 1960s is that wage labour lost its key position in social and sociological experience. Classical social theory had conceptualized work as something separate from other activities and spheres, like household and property, and had defined it as the result of a purposive (technical and economic) rationality. Following this, the old hierarchy between “vulgar” and “noble” activities was duplicated in the organized industrial society as a distinction between “productive” and “unproductive” work. Consequently, wage labour and contradictions related to wage labour had a determining power, both in the daily experience and in the organization of social structures. But, according to Offe, this assumption of the centrality of work is today deeply problematic because of two sets of developments, that is, subdivisions in the sphere of work and the general decentring of what was called “work ethic”.

Sub-divisions in the sphere of work and immigrants

Today, work as such has a vast empirical heterogeneity and thus the centrality of the category of work “seems more doubtful the more particular work situations are marked by a wide variation in income, qualifications, job security, social visibility and recognition, stress, career opportunities, communication possibilities and autonomy” (Offe 1985: 135). Some of the most important heterogenizing factors
that gradually reduce the category of work to a highly abstract and descriptive statistical category are: differentiation of primary and secondary labour markets; vertical splits within the groups of wage-earners; the increase in the extent to which production of goods and services takes place in households or compulsory institutions, such as the army and prisons or in a semi-legal or criminalized underground economy; and very importantly the growth in “service” forms of labour.

Primary labour markets are normally composed of high wage and career-offering jobs that usually permit the wage earner to acquire skills and offer stable and secure employment. Secondary labour market jobs, on the other hand, are characterized by low wages, lower possibilities of skill acquirement and unstable and insecure employment. The material presented earlier shows that most Turks in Aarhus have belonged to the secondary labour markets, typically as unskilled workers with low wages, which also explains why they were first to become disintegrated from the economic subsystem. This issue also points toward some vertical splits inside the group of wage-earners. For example, the presented material suggests that the labour market has been segmented with respect to worker qualifications and working conditions. Thus “the place of Turks” is quite different from that of other wage earners in the labour market, and already here we are confronted with a heterogeneity related to the meaning of work for Turkish immigrants. The labour market is also ethnically segmented, hence a greater percentage of third world immigrant ex-workers belong to the secondary labour market than do other minorities (such as EU citizens) and Danes. For these immigrants, speaking of the concept of “work” as a single category is deceitful, especially when some politicians assert that “immigrants do not want to work”.

Another subdivision in the sphere of work, the household economy has a very important and extending role for Turkish families (as mentioned in chapter 4). Many women especially are very intensively involved in domestic, or “informal”, activities in the household. This trend is also increasingly visible in Denmark as a whole. Bent Jensen reports that the value of household work in Denmark has grown 15 per cent from 1970 to 1990 (Jensen 1995: 66). Here the problem arises regarding the status of “informal” or household work. Traditionally, it is not conceived of as “work”, because it falls outside the category of wage labour. But today it seems problematic to treat, for example, formal and informal economic activities as self-contained and mutually exclusive categories (see for example Redclift 1985: 97). Even if it is not paid for, household work has important functions for systemic and social reproduction. The important thing in our context is that, Turkish families, because of the declining capacity of the labour market to absorb them, increasingly orient
themselves toward the household and hence to different forms of non-paid work, and as a consequence, there is a growing gap between paid work in the labour market and non-paid work in the household. This factor, which also points toward other non-market related cleavages, such as the sexual division of labour, puts doubt on the centrality of paid work for them.

In Denmark, even though research has documented that people bringing in money income on the basis of unreported work has risen considerably from 8.3 per cent in 1980 to 15.4 per cent in 1990, it has been mostly skilled workers making their earnings in this way. The data show that 40 per cent and 33 per cent of skilled workers in 1990 and 1994, respectively, had participated in the “black” economy. Other groups, such as the unemployed and single mothers, have had considerably less informal earnings. For example, the unemployed constituted only 11 per cent of the total number bringing in informal income in 1991. This means that, even if the “‘black’ economy has become a national sport” in Denmark, as Ole Lange writes in *Politiken* (12 May 1996), there is not so much “‘black’ unemployment culture”, or in other words, the “black” economy is much more widespread among those already in the labour market (Jensen 1995: 65-78). In addition, as is the case regarding the gender of “black” work (in 1994, 20 per cent of men had informal incomes from “black” work; the figure is only 8.9 per cent for women; Jensen 1995: 74-75), one can assume that “black” informal work is also ethnically segregated. My field work and interviews support this conclusion, but there is also evidence that the access to “black” work is not homogeneously distributed for the whole group of immigrants. Immigrants engaged in private sector service businesses, most typically pizzerias, restaurants, cleaning firms or greengrocers, have greater access to “black” work, an issue that also relates to the growth in service sector employment and the special characteristics of this form of labour.

With regard to the declining importance of the category of industrial work as the organizing principle of social structures, Offe mentions the growth of service labour and related forms of work as one of the most important aspects. Service work differs considerably from “productive” industrial work mainly because of the heterogeneity of the cases processed and the lack of a clear-cut criteria of economic efficiency (Offe 1985: 138). Here we can dwell on some forms of service labour which have had considerable impact on immigrants’ relations to the labour market: (a) immigrants’ small but increasing tendency toward employment in both private and public service sector; (b) the importance of service work in the context of “ethnic relations industry”; and (c) the importance of the welfare state in this context.
The number of Turks in Denmark employed in the private service sector increased especially between 1986 and 1994: while in 1986, while only 3 per cent of Turks active in the labour market were engaged in this sector (Schierup 1993: 108), in 1990, the figure became 4 per cent (Arbejdsmarkedstyrelsen 1993: 29). By 1994, it has risen to 6.5 per cent (Danmarks Statistik, Arbejdsmarked 1994; 12). This increase was experienced mainly in a few areas, such as pizzerias, restaurants, greengrocers and kiosks, but also in a few professional services (such as translation offices and travel agencies). Lash and Urry write that the work in services implied by this scale is generally characterized by: an erosion of the symbolic boundaries of “work” (that is, what is classified as paid work and elements of leisure interpenetrate each other to a high degree and thus “work” and lifestyle come quite close to each other in these branches); the predominance of work rhythms outside normal, paid-work time schedules, because the staff is freer to organize the activities; and the important role of socializing with customers, which means that the production of services have a semiotic character in that the social composition of the producer directly affects their marketing success. This service work is also importantly characterized by the need to minimize labour costs because it represents a higher proportion of total costs and the quality of delivery (Lash & Urry 1994: 199-200).

Most of these characteristics are easy to detect in the employment of Turks in the private service sector. For example, regarding the pizzerias and restaurants, it can be said that they are design-intensive in the management of each outlet (producing hot and cheap pizza every hour of the day) and in the organization of the physical framework of the service, in that places mostly signal “ethnic” signs consciously and owners build upon a socialization with the consumers as “ethnic immigrants”. An emotional labour is naturally involved in this. In some cases, where a part of the service demands more skill (like communication and chatting with customers) or when there is need for a foot soldier to create an image other than Turkishness (for example in the case of a Turkish pizzeria’s mimicry of an Italian one), Danish waitresses can be employed and the Turkish staff can be drawn back into the kitchen (which sometimes is visibly aestheticized as a view for the customers).

Besides these semiotizing ones, there have been two additional general characteristics regarding the involvement of Turks in this form of work in the private sector. Firstly, these workplaces have, to a large extent, been run by “black” work to make the labour costs cheaper—as an interviewee said “without minimizing the salaries of the staff considerably, one cannot begin to attempt such a business”. This quite often results in the employment either of one’s family members or other staff
who already have incomes in the form of unemployment or social benefits. And secondly, speculative purposes seem to have been a decisive motivation in some cases in that turnover rates of owners in such businesses are very high. For example, owners profit more by turning a place into a pizzeria and then selling it further to somebody else. To give a concrete example, one interviewee who started a pizzeria in Aarhus sold it to another Turk three months later and earned approximately DKr200,000 in the process, although this business had demanded considerable capital, which meant he had borrowed money from all his acquaintances, that he and his employees had had to work very hard, and that success “dictated” the use of cheap “black” labour. Now he runs another pizzeria. The important thing in our context is that this form of private service work builds partly on the unemployment and welfare benefits of the people involved, and thus one can also say that the welfare state “in reality” helps to avoid the complete disintegration from the economic subsystem. It is, therefore, important to rethink the welfare state also in this context, a discussion very related to the third phase of immigration.

Regarding public service, the biggest sector in Aarhus, the participation rates of those with “non-European” citizenship (a category including Turks) is only 17 per cent compared to the general level of 48 per cent of the labour force in Aarhus. Some Turks are employed as pedagogue assistants, day-care staff members, translators, transport sector workers (e.g. bus drivers) etc. Because of their intermediary cultural positions, some of these people (especially those better educated) function predominantly as “cultural brokers” between other Turks and institutions, a role which sometimes gives them some influence regarding, for example, the decisions about who else to employ in similar jobs in the municipal regi, etc. In this respect, they easily become “gate-keepers” in the eyes of other Turks. Otherwise, the most widespread category of public service work for Turkish immigrants is cleaning and kitchen work. In the 1980s, an important driving force behind this development was the “job-offer system” (job-tilbud) organized by the local authorities, which resulted in placing many immigrants in these jobs temporarily. During the second phase of immigration, this system has channelled the largest portion of jobless Turkish immigrants, in most cases temporarily, to the low level (unskilled) service jobs.

In this respect, it is also important to underline that the intervention of the Danish welfare state vis-à-vis unemployment, by drawing mainly on maintenance (unemployment benefits) and activating schemes (training and employment schemes), has traditionally not been designed to reduce unemployment significantly, and thus it has been “passive”. In other words, the Danish system can be characterized as a way of “administrating unemployment”, which has hitherto
resulted in “20 years of impotence” (Lind 1995: 190-199). This diagnosis does not exaggerate if one considers the job offers given unemployed immigrants. In most cases, the jobs offered were temporary, low paid and unrewarding, which many considered as meaningless or doleful work. But nevertheless, taking part in these subsidized job offer schemes were, until 1995, necessary to re-qualify for unemployment benefits, and thus they were important as a tool for avoiding welfare benefits. Consequently, immigrants were more than willing to take them. One can also say that, even if these jobs were formally “offered”, they were, in practice, a sort of “compulsory” work used to retain the right to unemployment benefits (in 1995, this policy changed considerably but only for the worse). That this work was so doleful played a central role in decentring Turks’ relationship to work in general. The result seems to have started a “destructive spiral”, which Giddens aptly summarizes below:

... a sort of destructive spiral, which welfare programmes may sometimes contribute to rather than counteract.... Individuals become dependent on systems of provision which they recognize as alien and over which they have little control; it isn’t surprising that they might tend to take a manipulative attitude towards them and may not feel in the least bit grateful for what the wider society has provided. For their dependence on that wider community is bracketed with exclusion from full participation in it. (Giddens 1994b: 147)

Regarding the importance of service work in the “ethnic relations industry”, a considerable part of the growth in services in Denmark during the 1980s consisted of lower strata service class jobs which built on the representation in institutions supplying symbolic services. The areas these types of services was related to were, most typically, ethnic relations, day-care institutions, cultural production and so on. The service jobs involved with symbolic production in these areas often produced a need and demand for themselves by pointing out “problems” and by offering “projects” with a view to solutions; in other words, they legitimized themselves by a “therapeutic morality” (see Lash & Urry 1987: 292-296). In Denmark, the development of what is sometimes sarcastically called the “ethnic relations industry” is closely related to the second phase of immigration. But since these jobs required a considerable amount of cultural capital, the immigrants’ own access to this field was quite limited and consisted of integrating into frameworks already established (by Danes). Today, although statistical data about the exact quantity is not available, a considerable number of people are engaged in teaching in language courses and professional education, caseworking and consulting in institutions, making labour market-related projects for immigrants, etc. This all aims at the
“integration” of the immigrant and at the same time creates jobs for a group of people, including a small proportion of them who are sometimes called “immigrant elites”. These people have joined the ranks of the gate-keeper with respect to minorities’ relationships to the greater society, and they have considerable influence upon local politics in the context of immigration. For example, almost all active immigrant local politicians who have had serious success in town councils have gone through this channel.

To sum up, these developments relating to the subdivisions in the sphere of work were the first set of reasons behind the erosion (and heterogenization) of the category of “work” for immigrants. The second set of developments relate more directly to lifestyles.

Decentring the work ethic

Here the important issue is the significance of wage labour for people’s lifestyles and consciousness and orientations toward work. Offe emphasizes a paradox in this regard: “while an ever greater part of the population participates in dependent wage labour, there is a decline in the extent to which wage labour as it were ‘participates’ in the lives of individuals by involving and shaping them in distinctive ways. The decentring of work relative to other spheres of life, its confinement to the margins of biography, is confirmed by many contemporary diagnosis” (Offe 1985: 141). This is also what seems to have happened to immigrants during the second phase of immigration. According to Offe, the two principal mechanisms that ensure that work plays a central role for personal existence are: (1) sanctioning work as a “duty” for a “correct and morally good” life at the level of social integration, and (2) installation of work as a “necessity” for physical survival at the level of system integration. Some factors have hindered the operation of these mechanisms in Western societies.

Firstly, regarding work as “duty”, strong disorganizing tendencies, such as the erosion of the absorption capacity of the labour market, the decline of cultural traditions and the development of consumer-centred hedonism, have been effective in reducing the importance of work as a socially organizing category in general. But Offe also underlines that the work ethic can only function under conditions in which workers “participate in their work as recognized, morally acting persons”. For example, the elimination of the human factor in rationalized and de-skilling work
processes, as in the case of the Tayloristic assembly line, reduce the space for one’s moral orientation to work. In addition, reductions in work time (which extended time available for other purposes) and biographical discontinuities “between what one is trained for and what one is actually doing as a job” have reduced work to “one concern among others” for many people (Offe 1985: 141-142).

These factors are overwhelmingly visible regarding Turks’ relations to work. Naturally, deindustrialization accentuated the decline in the absorption capacity of the labour market, but another factor that seems equally important is that the types of work Turks in general have had were either unskilled assembly-line work or other forms of doleful work, which did not allow for establishment of a moral space for individual reflexivity. Besides, the most de-skilled jobs the Turks held were low paid, manual jobs (such as cleaning) that are normally devalorized and degraded even though they are as important as jobs at other levels for the functioning of the economy (see Sassen 1994: 122). In other words, immigrants’ “sense of place” in the social hierarchy was an important factor behind the decentring of their relations to the kind of work they had. In accordance herewith, other areas seem to have been more important for their life projects than the work itself. It can be argued that in a labour immigration, such as that which the Turks experienced, the role of work was tendentially reduced to earning money, that is, the work itself was tendentially experienced through an instrumental rationality which also could erode other meanings (than money) that might be related to work. Thus work has, for a long time, been a “means” for other purposes, typically like starting independently in Turkey or in Denmark. Turks’ relations to work might have been more instrumental partly because of the character of the jobs they had.

Secondly, work as “necessity” has been profoundly challenged in the welfare state’s ghetto. Offe notes that in disorganized capitalism, the struggle for improved working conditions was replaced by “a struggle against work” because of “the subjectively experienced disutility attached to work”. Thus the traditional union call for the right to work was either replaced, or was in the process of being replaced, by the “right to useful and meaningful work”(Offe 1985: 144). In this, the welfare state has played an important role, because “to the degree that immediate feedback between individual work and individual income is dissolved into collectivized relations and sanctioned by welfare-state institutions and legal claims, as well as by large enterprises and collective wage bargaining, there inevitably develops a classic problem of collective goods”, that is, “the individual’s escape from the (ideally) market-imposed compulsion to work is no longer automatically punished” (Offe 1985: 145).
Immigrants’ integration into the welfare state has meant that working was no longer a means of survival. Thus, as I mentioned above, one explicit life strategy beginning in the period of organized immigration was to work only as long as necessary to receive unemployment benefits and then to build on informal consumption strategies. Let us also recall that for unskilled workers, the unemployment benefit could amount to 90 per cent of their former salary and in some cases, for example, if they had some small children requiring them to pay for day-care while at work, it was economically even more “rational” not to work; at least the economic incentive to work was almost non-existent (see also Andersen 1996: 25). Therefore, combined with the crisis of the work ethic as a “duty”, the decline in its importance as “necessity” meant a decentring of the work ethic for immigrants in the period of organized immigration, and as such it was possibly itself a part of the disorganization tendencies in the system.

-III-
THE THIRD PHASE: ECONOMIES OF SIGNS AND SPACE
— FROM INEQUALITY TO EXCLUSION

Thus, the first period of immigration was predominantly characterized by economic integration and a lack of social integration. The second period was characterized by diminishing integration in the economic subsystem and increasing social integration in the welfare state’s ghetto, which was born at the beginning of this second phase. But the character of the ghetto changes in the third phase. In the second phase, the ghetto was similar to what Lash and Urry call the “classic ghetto”, where “a minority ethnic group was forced to inhabit a particular space containing a reduplication of the central institutions of the wider space of the dominant ethnic group” (Lash & Urry 1994: 18). But in the third phase, most contemporary ghettos, according to Lash and Urry, no longer have these characteristics, mainly because governing institutions, that is, economic institutions, markets and welfare state institutions are increasingly emptying out of the ghetto, and an outflow of population is following, especially the part of the population having the chance for upward mobility. This emptying out, or “disorganization” of the classic ghetto in contemporary societies, is an important dimension regarding any systemic analysis of Gellerup in a broader context.
Economies of signs and space

According to Lash and Urry, the contemporary disorganized phase of capitalism is first and foremost characterized by flows of objects and subjects at an ever greater velocity, that is, by an ever greater mobility of objects, such as money, productive capital and commodities, and of subjects, such as labour power, immigrants, tourists and so on (Lash & Urry 1994: 2).

“Mobile objects” of disorganized capitalism in the late twentieth century include not only industrial commodities, as was predominantly the case in organized capitalism, but also, and importantly, information and images. The disorganization thesis is largely related to how these objects consist of symbolic and material content at the same time. Informational objects have a substantial cognitive content in that they are to a large degree knowledge-intensive, which also makes them “post-industrial” goods. In addition to post-industrial objects, images, or signs, which are substantially based on an aesthetic content (like music, cinema or leisure activities as tourism), also circulate at a great velocity because of globalization.

Lash and Urry underline that, together with post-industrial (knowledge-based) and postmodern (sign-based) objects, classic industrial commodities have also increasingly an aesthetic and cognitive component. That is, production of industrial goods is today to a large degree dependent on knowledge (as pointed out by: the increasing importance of research and development departments in the single firms; the increasing significance of information exchange and communication in interfirm alliances, etc.) and signs (e.g. the multiplying growth of advertisement and design components in the production of goods). Consequently, the expansion of information flow and knowledge accumulation and the increasing significance of the value of signs embodied in material objects intensively characterize the given production systems of contemporary economies. Thus, post-organized economies are largely based on services, and today information and knowledge are fundamental for economic growth to such an extent that even production is grounded in discursive knowledge. At the same time, both production and consumption are increasingly penetrated by culture, that is, by symbolic processes that have aesthetic components (ibid, 60-61). In other words, contemporary political economies are increasingly characterized by “semiotization”; they are increasingly economies of signs.

Another main characteristic of contemporary societies is spatialization, or an increasing importance of space. According to Lash and Urry, disembedded
postmodern objects do not flow in a haphazard manner. The flow of objects and subjects in post-organized capitalism is determined by economic institutions of governance, such as the market, the state, trade unions, corporatist mechanisms and communities, which at the same time are institutions of spatial governance channelling the flow. The information-saturated, service-rich, communication-laden “core” of this post-organized economy “is clustered around information, communications and advanced producer services, as well as other services, such as telecommunications, airlines and important parts of tourism and leisure. Spatially, many of these services are centred around global cities, located in vast agglomerations, whose industries feed these services” (ibid, 17). This development gives rise to an extensive service class and, furthermore, it is mostly in this new core, and not in older manufacturing centres, that important processes of flexible specialization, globalization and localization are developing (ibid, 12).

Whatever form of institutional governance is dominant, the mobility of subjects and objects is realized through networks based on fibre-optic cables, satellite communications and air transport (ibid, 24-25). Hence the core in post-organized capitalism consists of heavily networked areas, doing the transmitting itself and exercising power by classifying information. The “receiving” end of these communication and information structures is the periphery, and “information communicated from the core ... affects not so much what those on the periphery will classify, but their very classificatory categories themselves” (ibid, 29). “Isolated areas” and “wild zones”, such as ghetto areas of advanced countries and eastern Europe are included in this periphery: they all suffer from both a deficit of regulation and an outflow of an economically better-off population (ibid, 28-29).

In this development, earlier “social structures” of organized capitalism characterized by flows at a national level have largely been disorganized and replaced by global “information and communication structures”. What is especially significant in this context is the importance of these structures for increasing individual and social reflexivity. Thus, Lash and Urry agree with the reflexive modernization thesis, proposed by Giddens and Beck (mentioned in the preceding chapter), that social agents are increasingly free from the institutions of organized capitalism (or simple modernity) and thus become more “reflexive”. But they assert that the structural basis for this growth of reflexivity is the economies of signs and space (ibid, 6).

Reflexivity: cognitive, aesthetic and hermeneutic
Lash and Urry write that the implications of the semiotization and spatialization of contemporary political economies are in part a disembedding, or an emptying out, of meaning of the objects: with the quickening circulation of objects and cultural artefacts of consumer capitalism, people receive more signs than they can cope with, and thus the “subjects” become more and more overloaded with images and develop “blasé” attitudes in the way Simmel has described. But this pessimistic situation is, according to Lash and Urry, only one side of economies of signs and space, because another set of radically divergent processes is taking place, though mostly for the “winners” of the economy of signs and space. The optimistic side primarily emanates from increasing social and individual reflexivity.

For example, in the economy, flexibility and the emergence of post-Fordism to a high degree entails reflexivity. In this respect, the “economies of signs and space” seem to come very close to the thesis of reflexive modernization in Giddens’ and Beck’s versions. But in some important respects, Lash and Urry’s work differs considerably from the reflexive modernization thesis as it is put forth by Giddens and Beck. According to reflexive modernization thesis, it will be recalled that an increasing detraditionalization that sets individuals free from the heteronomy and control of earlier social structures is an important element in contemporary social change. Also understood as social reflexivity, there is to be sure an increase in the opportunities of reflection, and expert-systems especially have a significant role in risk management in today’s “risk society”. In accordance with this, today “[r]isk expertise fast becomes an important branch of the professional world, and itself turns into big business” (Bauman 1993: 207). But as long as the growing individual and social reflexivity is only related to “knowledge” in cognitive terms, the thesis of reflexive modernization is highly problematic in that it overtones an Enlightenment ideal, namely the “self-monitoring nature of social systems” (Lash 1993: 2-4).

By criticizing the theory of reflexive modernization because it understands reflexivity only in cognitive terms, Lash and Urry underline the significance of aesthetic and hermeneutic reflexivity. Cognitive reflexivity is basically a “subject-object” thinking; it has its origins in the rationalist and Cartesian assumptions and presumes a subject who is not situated in the world. The aesthetic and hermeneutic forms of reflexivity have, on the other hand, origins in aesthetic modernity and in situated background practices. “If cognitive reflexivity assumes a subject-object relationship of the self to itself and to the world, then aesthetic and hermeneutic reflexivity assumes a self which is at the same time a being-in-the-world” (Lash & Urry 1994: 5-6).
Lash further distinguishes hermeneutic reflexivity from cognitive and aesthetic reflexivity as “dwelling among” the things and the people who are reflected upon. While cognitive reflexivity is related to ego and utilitarian individualism, and while aesthetic reflexivity is more about desire and expressive individualism, hermeneutic reflexivity above all focuses on an interpretation of “intersubjective” relations and background practices (Lash 1994: 158). In this context, Lash contrasts Beck’s and Giddens’ understandings of reflexivity with that of Bourdieu’s: “For Beck and Giddens it [reflexivity] tends to involve the bracketing of the life-world to arrive at individualized, subject-object forms of knowledge. For reflexive anthropology it involves bracketing subject-object knowledge and situating knowers in the life-world”, and that is why reflexive anthropology entails “a partial fusion of horizons with the world of one’s ‘respondents’” (Lash 1994: 156).

Importantly, the economies of signs and space are closely tied to these three forms of reflexivity at once. For example, in production, especially of information and signs, the role of the expressive component in post-industrial and postmodern goods is decisive, which is also the structural base of aesthetic reflexivity. Thus Lash and Urry call the new mode of accumulation not “flexible accumulation” but “reflexive accumulation” to underline the extent to which services characterize contemporary socio-economies and the importance of discursive knowledge (e.g. research and development) in post-Fordist flexible production methods (Lash & Urry 1994: 60). Reflexivity and thus culture and symbolic processes have also penetrated the sphere of consumption, and hence, what is consumed, for instance, in tourism activities today is increasingly images of places or “place-myths”.

Given this background, Lash and Urry address three ideal types of reflexive accumulation. Firstly, there are the Japanese-form systems that involve collective reflexivity, that is, information and risk-sharing and collective decision-making which takes place in autonomous work groups, between units of production and between shareholders, the firm and the employees of the firm. Secondly, there are the German-form systems that involve practical reflexivity, which is characterized by an output having a comparatively high ration of mechanical to electronic components and by a regulation based on craft and corporatist forms of administration. These systems largely operate via the notion of Beruf, incorporating profession and trade, and resembling the idea of craft administration (Lash 1994: 63-64). Lash has further called the industrial route taken by Japan and partly by Germany “reflexive traditionalization”, pointing out that the traditionalization at issue here is more a commitment, “not to the self (which we see in Anglo-American production systems) but to the community, this community being the firm in the Japanese case and the Beruf in the German case” (Lash 1994: 126). Thus, interestingly, the way Lash and
Urry interpret reflexive modernization, it is not a linear and progressivistic view of history (toward total detraditionalization) that is presented, and for example, a new “modernization without individualization”, as in the Japanese case, is possible. And thirdly, there are the Anglo-American systems involving discursive reflexivity. Discursive reflexivity means “a greater centrality of expert-systems, especially of abstract knowledge” with respect to the managerial component of the workforce, the intrafirm division of labour, interfirm network relations and the labour markets. It is most evident in highly informationalized sectors, in high-technology manufacturing and in advanced services. These sectors involve a very high professional–managerial component of the workforce and a deep social division of labour (Lash & Urry 1994: 64).

This divergence of reflexive accumulation models is also important with respect to the “losers” of reflexivity, that is, the ghettoized underclass of contemporary systemic development, which we will now focus on.

The periphery: the ghetto and the underclass

According to Lash and Urry, the new trends in reflexive economic and social development in Western societies have another side:

... the same process of reflexive accumulation that gives rise to an extensive service class also gives rise to what is becoming the bottom and excluded third of the ‘two-thirds society’.... the new lower class represents a sort of structural downward mobility for substantial sections of the organized-capitalist working class, as well as a set of structural social places into which large numbers of immigrants flow. (Lash & Urry 1994: 145)

Following William J. Wilson (1987), Lash and Urry call the new lower class of post-organized capitalism “the underclass”, which to a considerable degree consists of immigrants and is not mobile, that is, largely out of reach of the information and communication structures. In the economies of signs and space, in the mobile world of objects and subjects, they “do not circulate but move. And they tend, with the occasional trip back to the origin, to stay” (Lash & Urry 1994: 30). They are, at large, not included in the semiotization processes of reflexive modernization, and spatially they are placed on the periphery of post-organized order, or, in other words, in areas that lack information and communication structures that enable the flow of
information. The replacement of “live zones” by “wild zones” is what takes place on the periphery (ibid, 111). Localized in these “wild zones”, what the underclass, or the ghettoized poor experiences is “individuation and normalization” rather than reflexive individualization. Thus “wild zones are characterized by a collapsing (or collapsed) civil society, a weakly developed ‘civilizing process’, and flight to ‘tame zones’ for those that are able to escape” (ibid, 324).

A significant example of the wild zones of post-organized capitalism is what Lash and Urry call “impacted ghettos”, whose population are characterized by: (1) residence in a space isolated from other social classes; (2) a long-term joblessness; (3) female-headed households; (4) absence of training and skills with respect to the labour market; (5) long spells of poverty and welfare dependency; (6) widespread street crime; and lastly (7) moving out of the middle-class residents together with community organizations and their role as “the models” of the cultural learning of the community, leaving behind anomie and social isolation (Lash & Urry 1994: 148; see also Wilson 1987). Furthermore, the impacted ghetto is also closely related to the disappearance of manufacturing jobs created during the period of organized capitalism and the movement of industry to suburban and ex-urban locations. At a more abstract level, the two most important characteristics of these ghettos are the emptying out of the mobile subjects (middle class residents) and objects (institutions of regulation), which gives way to a deficit of regulation.

Lash and Urry argue that, along with the importance of changing structures, the agency plays an important role in the formation processes of impacted ghettos. For example, on American ghettos, they write: “It is as if American blacks, acting as agents, followed certain rules in order to take their successful place in US society, and then somebody moved the very structures to which they were moving” (1994: 156). Thus, the transition to the economies of signs and space moved the industrial jobs which they had become skilled for, and when the blacks got better educated, the education levels were transformed. In this context, Lash and Urry do not totally dismiss the “culture of poverty” thesis (which by way of culturalistic explanations maintains that the cultural values of the poor are responsible for the formation of ghettos), but accept it with a qualification; along with Wilson, they partly accept the conservatives’ culture of poverty argument to underline the role of culture in the ghetto formation processes, but again for imminently structural reasons. In other words, it is the structural change, or the demise of organized capitalism, that creates the conditions of existence for cultures of poverty (ibid, 147).
Is Gellerup an “impacted” or “overregulated” ghetto?

Let us now return to Gellerup with the concept of the impacted ghetto as the other side of the post-industrial or postmodern societies. To begin with, one of the strongest similarities between Gellerup and impacted ghettos is that Gellerup is increasingly a space isolated from other social classes. Thus I used the metaphor of “fear of touching” to express this aspect (see chapter 3). The economic dimension of this isolation, that is, long-term joblessness and absence of training and skills, is especially visible regarding most immigrant families in Gellerup.

The hollowing out of economic resources is especially striking when the incomes of Gellerup’s population (including the three areas: Gellerupparken, Toveshøj and Skovgaardsparken) are compared to those of the average resident of Aarhus, as is done in Figure 7.3.

Table 7.3. Average gross income 1992-1993 in Skovgaardsparken, Gellerupparken and Toveshøj and Aarhus in Dkr *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Skovgaard</th>
<th>G.-parken</th>
<th>Toveshøj</th>
<th>Gellerup (average)</th>
<th>Aarhus (average)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newcomers</td>
<td>83.607</td>
<td>43.080</td>
<td>48.017</td>
<td>58.234</td>
<td>107.980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out movers</td>
<td>75.198</td>
<td>89.942</td>
<td>138.243</td>
<td>101.127</td>
<td>129.704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population average</td>
<td>99.893</td>
<td>57.884</td>
<td>67.042</td>
<td>74.939</td>
<td>152.929</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brabrand Boligforening 1994b.

*The average for Gellerup is calculated and added as a medium of averages for Skovgaardsparken, Gellerupparken and Toveshøj, which differ regarding their number of inhabitants. Thus the table only gives a general idea for Gellerup as a whole to be able to compare it to average for Aarhus.

As can be seen in table 7.3., the population of Gellerup normally has half the economic resources compared to average for Aarhus, and newcomers to the area have considerably less resources than those moving out, which gives a very clear picture of this “hollowing out”. The situation in Gellerupparken, the part of Gellerup with the highest (65 per cent) concentration of immigrants in the country, is even
more striking: the average income of newcomers is less than one-half of that of those moving out and approximately one-third of the average for Aarhus. This information strongly correlates with the number of welfare-dependent people in Gellerup (see Brabrand Boligforening 1994b).

Regarding the absence of skills, Gellerup is again an impacted locality. As an average of the three areas, only 1.6 per cent (among people over the age of 15) are independent, only 2.6 per cent are skilled workers, and only 8.4 per cent are civil servants employed in the service sector in comparison with average figures from Aarhus: 4.2 per cent, 5.4 per cent and 33.3 per cent, respectively, in 1993 (calculations are based on statistics found in Brabrand Boligforening 1994b). If one focuses exclusively on Gellerupparken, the figures are even worse: respectively, 1.5 per cent, 2.2 per cent and 6.9 per cent; (ibid.). That is also to say that, as long as the percentage of immigrants increases, so will the indicators of impactedness as well.

In the mid-1990s, these trends continued to worsen, and two important developments contributed to impactedness. Firstly, as mentioned in chapter 3, some “normal” institutions (such as banks and municipal institutions), which had the role of duplicating institutions of the broader society in Gellerup, moved out of Gellerup. Secondly, Danish families with resources moved out, and following this, some middle class immigrant families also moved out, essentially emptying Gellerup of significant “subjects”, or “significant others”. Parallel to this development, at the end of 1980s and in the 1990s, some small Turkish enclaves formed outside Gellerup (mostly in other suburban areas like Galten and Trige) to which many of those Turks who had “escaped” from Gellerup moved to.

The hollowing out of the area by socially stronger groups and families means a reduction of social and cultural capital inside the area, which is, for example, mirrored in the situation of the primary schools. In one of the three schools in Gellerup, Nørregaardskolen, more than 90 per cent of the pupils are immigrant children, and they do not learn enough Danish because of the “deficit” of Danish children in the classes. The families of the small number of Danish children (and some of the immigrant families) are more than willing to find other schools for their children—a process resulting in a further worsening of the image of the place and in a further hollowing out.

In short, then, there seem to be significant convergences between “impacted ghettos” and Gellerup. But there are some important differences, or divergences, as well, and these mainly concern family structure and the institutional mix in Gellerup. For example, female-headed households are only common for Danes in Gellerup. Thus, in 1994 while the percentage of single parents among all families in
Aarhus was 4.9 per cent, the figure was 8.8 per cent in Gellerup (an average of the three areas). If one considers that the figure is 5.7 per cent for Gellerupparken, that is, the part of Gellerup with highest immigrant concentration, one can say that the relative percentage of Danish single parents in Gellerupparken is quite higher than the average for Aarhus. Hence, one of the main differences between Gellerup and impacted ghettos regards the survival of the family as an important institution among immigrants.

Another important dissimilarity between impacted ghettos and Gellerup is that in Gellerup, even if some institutions already have moved out, institutions of governance have not emptied out to the same degree as they have in impacted ghettos. As I mentioned before, many “special” institutions still exist in Gellerup and, importantly, Gellerup still receives considerable support from both the municipality and the state (for example, from the Urban Committee) for renovation and other incentives “to avoid ghetto formations”, as the aim is officially pronounced.

Thus, in general it can be held that a totally impacted ghetto, which is associated with a stark deficit of regulation or “neglect”, does not describe Gellerup (or the Danish ghetto), and this is true especially in comparison to British and American ghettos. But this avoidance of impacted ghetto formation has an important price: to avoid impactedness, Gellerup has accepted the formation of an “overregulated ghetto”, as I will argue in the following.

The three worlds of the underclass

In this context, it must initially be stressed that “immigrant patterns after organized capitalism are characterized, not by convergence, but by divergence” (Lash & Urry 1994: 179). To understand the specific character of the Danish ghetto, we can, as Lash and Urry do, begin with Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s three-layered model of post-industrial trajectories based on different welfare regimes. As Esping-Andersen says, “welfare state regime-types offer a fruitful starting point for explaining why we are heading towards divergent trajectories in employment and social stratification and, in the last analysis, towards new conflict-scenarios” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 222).

Welfare-state regimes have mainly three different forms. Firstly, the “liberal” welfare state, in which means-tested assistance and modest or minimal social insurance plans predominate. This type of regime, which is found in countries like
the US, Canada and the UK, “erects an order of stratification that is a blend of a relative equality of poverty among state-welfare recipients, market-differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-political dualism between the two” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). According to Lash and Urry, it is generally these types of welfare systems that give way to impacted ghetto formations, which suffer more from neglect and deficit of regulation.

Secondly, regime-type clustering nations, such as Germany, Austria and France, are conservative and strongly “corporatist”. Rights are closely attached to class and status; and traditional familyhood is preserved in that social insurance “typically excludes non-working wives, and family benefits encourage motherhood” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). Thus family services are typically underdeveloped and the state interferes when the capacity of the family in servicing its members is exhausted. In this context, Lash and Urry stress that this welfare regime, especially in its German version, is characterized by low female labour-market participation; high productivity of the small proportion of the total population participating actively in the labour force; production of many welfare services at home by women; and finally low level of employment in public services (Lash & Urry 1994: 182). Importantly, this welfare-regime type has avoided impacted ghetto formations, but the price has been a rigid institutional stratification: thus, alternatively, exclusion of immigrants and new lower class formations are based largely on an exclusion from corporatist institutions (including the state, unions, chambers of commerce, employers’ associations, the craft training system, the welfare state, the family) and from a fundamentally national economy dominated by industrial sectors. In the “German model”, each of the corporatist institutions reinforces the other in a complex network of activities that excludes immigrants (ibid, 180).

The third model, the Scandinavian “universalist” welfare state, which Esping-Andersen also calls “social-democratic regime-type”, is strongly characterized by an ideal to maximize individual independence without assuming family benefits or attaching rights to traditional class or status differences as in corporatist regimes. At the same time, in opposition to the “liberal” welfare-regimes, “[t]his model crowds out the market, and consequently constructs an essentially universal solidarity in favor of the welfare state” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 28).

To paint an idealotypical picture, one can say that liberal welfare regimes build on the market, corporatist regimes on the family, and Scandinavian ones on the state as the main unit of regulation (Lash & Urry 1994: 171-91). Now we can look at the three different types of ghettos in these “three worlds of welfare capitalism” today. In this context, I want to mention three different types of ghettoized Turkish settlements in three countries to clarify the points made above: namely Hackney...
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(Douston) in London; Kreuzberg in Berlin; and Rinkeby in Stockholm. Then I want to compare these areas with Gellerup to explain its specific character.

The impacted ghetto and indifference

Hackney, in northern London, is an illustration of the ideal type “impacted” ghetto formation (albeit a much richer one than most American ghettos). Half of the total population of 180,000 in Hackney are immigrants and refugees, and 15,000 Turkish (and Kurdish) people are concentrated around Stoke Newington Road. Here, one can see that institutions have moved out for the most part; for example, it is difficult to find banks, governmental institutions, and there is no hospital or a metro link to the rest of London. Thus the deficit of regulation is overwhelmingly present and the built environment has a character of a “slum” in the traditional sense of the word. After the Thatcherian privatization waves, problems were also extensively privatized in Hackney, and immigrants were left to their own devices, “minimal” welfare benefits being much less than the “substantial” levels in Denmark. Those having a job worked quite often under third world conditions, sometimes earning only Dkr20 per hour in “black” work, most commonly in textile firms, where many illegal immigrants work. Lash and Urry’s comments on this are: “these employees undoubtedly do comprise a new lower-class beneath the working class because the secondary labour market that they constitute is one that on most indicators is structurally downwardly mobile from the organized-capitalist secondary labour market... Indeed few will finally even be legalized into the formal labour market” (Lash & Urry 1994: 180).

In their view, the strongest deficit these immigrants have is related to their distance from individualization and the differentiation processes involved in reflexive modernization, because the “traditional” family structures of these immigrants take upon themselves functions like welfare, unemployment insurance, health care functions, which are normally offloaded to public bodies in the modern societies. Even economic functions are imploded into the family itself because, for example, wives’ sewing skills often become determinant for the functioning of the small immigrant firms (Lash & Urry 1994: 179).

In stark contrast, the “indifference” characterizing Hackney is not predominant in Gellerup to the same degree, and this is owed especially to the special characteristics of the Danish welfare state, which has been closest to the “universalist” type, especially until the 1990s. Thus, Iver Hornemann Møller writes that, in Denmark, “the measures taken by the welfare state institutions, which per se is a part of the social system, maintain a high degree of social integration among...
those who are system-disintegrated through labour market marginalisation. The services of the welfare institutions, although reduced since the 1980s, are still important preconditions for the social integration of the labour market marginalised” (Møller 1995: 130). In the same way, Jørgen Goul Andersen (1996) shows that marginalization in the labour market has generally not been followed by social and political marginalization in Denmark. In accordance with this, a widespread consensus about the necessity of a (mostly social democratic) protectionist attitude toward the unemployed has been dominant in Denmark, which is also in stark contrast to the neo-conservative indifference characterizing the British and American ghettoes.

Nevertheless, looking from Gellerup, there might be some points making Hackney a relatively more attractive space. These points relate to urban qualities and informal job opportunities. As to the urban qualities, it can be said that Hackney is a very lively place where differences can meet each other to a much higher degree than is the case in the “silent” Gellerup (see chapter 3). Importantly, the area in which Turks are concentrated in Hackney overlaps more with surrounding areas with different physical and social qualities. Thus, even though the metro line does not intersect with the area, and even though the area could be characterized as a slum with respect to building quality, the energetic street life is still a very stark and important contrast to the reduced urban life of Gellerup.

As to formal and informal job opportunities, it can be said that the existence of approximately 200 manufacturing firms, generally small textile companies, which employ unskilled immigrant labour power very cheaply, are undeniably very problematic with respect to reflexive modernization, as Lash and Urry point out above. But in comparison with Gellerup I think it is still important to underline that a social environment like Hackney “at least” gives immigrants the chance to “participate”, albeit in the “secondary”, labour market. Thus, as to the third world working conditions in Hackney, it is worth discussing whether this might be, in some cases, better than being totally excluded from the labour market, as is the case for most of the immigrant ex-workers or young unemployed people in Gellerup. But, interestingly, it seems that the Hackney model would not function in Gellerup precisely because “work” is not a “necessity” to the same degree in Gellerup as it is in Hackney; there are almost no illegal immigrants; and functions, such as welfare, health care, unemployment insurance, are not loaded onto the family. In other words, Turks in Gellerup would be too reflexive against the exploitation in Hackney. The only exception to this can be the case of similar but smaller (both in scale and in scope) Turkish businesses drawing on family economies in Aarhus. But still, these are reflexively articulating welfare benefits and informal work in contrast to the case of
Hackney, where it is less the case and welfare benefits are much lesser, or “minimal”.

The “overregulated” ghetto

The above mentioned differences between impacted ghettos and Gellerup mean that the Danish ghetto resembles more the German one. There are again substantial differences between Danish and German welfare models: the Danish social democratic welfare state has been more universalistic, there is higher female participation in the labour market and the family is not an instance of a regulation, as is the case in Germany where the assumption of the intact family with a single wage earner is dominant. Furthermore, Danish society is more a public post-organized society (because of large numbers of people employed in social services) compared with Germany, which is still an industrial society (see Lash & Urry 1994: 180-190 for details). But similarities as to ghetto formations are more striking.

The most important of these are related to the institutional stratification of immigration, corporatist exclusion (from citizenship by *jus sanguinis*, from the labour market and from democratic processes) and the more panoptic mechanisms of knowledge and power functioning in the context of immigration. These were all mentioned in detail earlier; here I want to add some points regarding the recent development of the Danish welfare state. It has become significantly less universalistic and more disciplinary toward immigrants during the 1990s, and this development brings the Danish ghetto considerably closer to the “overregulated ghettos” of corporatist welfare regimes.

In today’s Denmark, the disintegration of immigrants from the economic subsystem seems to be rather consolidated; at the same time, realistic opportunities of labour market inclusion do not seem to exist for many of them in the near future. Thus, remembering that the recent history of Europe does not show any signs of a systemic restructuring capable of avoiding mass unemployment, Lind says in the Danish context:

After having waited for economic growth for so many years, the question now must be asked if it is realistic to expect significantly reduced unemployment or whether this is a mere illusion that is kept alive to legitimise the traditional ways of interpreting and acting both at the policy level and in the minds of the citizens when they count on a future as employees in the labour market. (Lind 1995: 183)
As pointed out in chapter 1, the same “illusion” is kept alive in the politics of immigration by endlessly repeating the cliché of “creating jobs” and by reducing the explanation of structural phenomena, such as unemployment, to specific characteristics of immigrants, e.g. their culture. Thus, regarding immigrants’ integration into the economic subsystem, the politics of immigration is more than anything a “politics of illusion”.

While many immigrants increasingly find themselves outside the economic subsystem, and while illusions sustain an important role in the discourse of immigration, there are some crucial recent political trends which also increasingly isolate immigrants from the political subsystem. In this context, it is of special significance to look at the changes in welfare policies which, in the second phase of immigration, sustained a considerable degree of social integration of immigrants despite their systemic disintegration. Of course, this is not to say that immigrants had become fully integrated into society or the political system in the second phase of immigration, but the point is that, to the degree they had become integrated, they are being disintegrated now.

Some of the recent changes which have already had and will have an impact on immigrants are related to the nature of unemployment insurance and activating measures designed for the unemployed, including immigrants. Regarding unemployment insurance, the criteria for access to the system has become considerably more difficult, the period in which one can get unemployment benefits (before slipping to the level of welfare benefits) being reduced from seven years (or nine years if one uses “leave schemes”) to five years without possibility of a “leave”. Importantly, three years of this five-year period should now be used in activation schemes. But, a job taken through an activation scheme is no longer conceived of as “normal” work: a job under these schemes yields the same pay as unemployment benefits and, unlike a job from the previous job-offer system, a job through an activation scheme no longer guarantees the retention of rights to unemployment benefits. A parallel development to this is the increasing control over what determines availability to work while one receives unemployment benefits (Andersen 1996: 11, 33)

These changes have several practical implications for unemployed immigrants. Firstly, if they cannot find a job themselves, then they “have to” find work through activation schemes, which negates the rights to unemployment support, which then will means many will slip to the level of welfare benefits automatically. Many immigrants now receiving unemployment benefits can realistically expect this fate in the near future because both the weakness of their networks in the labour market (or, their deficits in social capital) and discrimination (deficits in symbolic capital) are
very strong barriers they have to deal with. With limited opportunities for informal work (based on money income) and for starting independently in the private service sector, this fate also will possibly bring a further welfare dependency and will contribute to the creation of an underclass.

Secondly, “compulsory” work already seems to have acquired new meanings for Turks: one can no longer in job-training and activation schemes re-qualify for rights regarding unemployment benefits, and furthermore, one cannot receive an ordinary salary for work performed in these positions. While the official meaning of these schemes is that one has to offer something back to receive unemployment and welfare benefits (which is, of course, reasonable), the contradiction in this compulsion is: if it is ordinary work, why does one not get a normal salary for the job performed? On the other hand, if not it is an ordinary job, how can one expect these jobs to integrate the jobless into the labour market in other ways than “administrating unemployment”? It seems to me that the new activation schemes will at best serve for a continuation of the “politics of illusion” and at worst will legitimize compulsory, doleful work in ways that will further decentre immigrants’ and other excluded people’s relationship to work. Furthermore, “[i]n a detraditionalizing society, one can say, the chief enemy of happiness is compulsiveness” (Giddens 1994b: 175).

“Compulsory” work often goes hand in hand with the problematization and stigmatization of excluded people: “they do not want to work” and then “disciplinary” mechanisms can be employed to stop their “parasitic” relation to the welfare system. In other words, it is no longer considered a “right” to receive benefits without giving something back. In this respect, it is unarguably important to develop relationships of “reciprocity” between the welfare state and recipients, but the problem is that, until today, reciprocity has not been based on meaningful work or other positive incentives. On the contrary, the use of disciplinary techniques, for example, checking immigrants’ relationships to unemployment support or welfare benefits at the border so that they cannot “misuse” the system, are employed increasingly more. A social worker alarmingly expresses this change in the following way:

Formerly, many clients would just receive money for maintenance. But it is no longer the case—they have to be activated, they have to make action plans, etc. ...

We now have to control our clients more than ever. It is horrible that the scope of control grows and grows, because the authorities do not trust our clients. We have to control where they live, what they earn, and so
What I want to argue is that this development points toward a change with respect to immigrants’ relations to subsystems. As their disintegration from the economic system becomes more and more consolidated, their social disintegration also seems to be more consolidated in that the recent tendencies increasingly give way to a new underclass of immigrants and “overregulated” ghettoes. It is also this context that creates the background for similarities between the German and the Danish-style ghettoes.

One of the most striking similarities that emerged after the recent changes in the labour market law (1995) and the immigration law (1993) is that now people who come to Denmark via marriage become directly dependent on the economic situation of their spouses. That is, if their spouses work and earn enough, they are not entitled to, or are excluded from, welfare benefits; and if their spouses do not earn enough, they cannot enter the country, which is also to say that if you are on social welfare, for example, you cannot marry a non-Dane. These new changes take the system miles away from being “universalist” and bring it very close to the conservative/corporatist welfare regimes. In our context, this means firstly that, especially regarding immigrants, the differences between the Danish and the German welfare state regimes must not be exaggerated. And secondly, it shows that the dimension of citizenship, or denizenship, is especially important with respect to the analysis of welfare systems in the context of immigration, which is also an issue by and large neglected in the Danish research on welfare state and underclass formations.

But again, looking at the German ghetto from Gellerup, there are some points which require further attention. Walking around Kotbusserstrasse, in Berlin-Kreuzberg, is a lively urban experience in that one finds a complex city life; here diversity and complexity in architecture, an energetic business life, a stimulating urban “disorder” makes one feel like one is in a city. This is physically reinforced by the age of Kreuzberg. In contrast to Gellerup, Kreuzberg is an old urban settlement, which is not built after a total modernist plan, and this strengthens its urban identity. Besides, since 1989 there have been many architectural projects just around Kreuzberg, and this enriches its physical quality. As Hämer says, Kreuzberg is an “urban laboratory” (1991: 56). The area is heavily characterized by ecological, social, and urban design-related experiments, which give it an open status. In contrast, Gellerup is administered very strictly, and even the smallest urban details are regulated in a rigid local planning system (see chapter 9 for more on local
planning). These differences also explain why Kreuzberg is not isolated from the rest of Berlin physically to the same degree as Gellerup is from its surroundings. Thus, even though the urban diversity in Kreuzberg seems, socially, to be neutralized even though it constitutes a multicultural city of visual agoras, although it is not especially an “intercultural” city of “touching”, and even though a considerable part of it is predominantly Turkish, Kreuzberg nevertheless has much Gellerup does not have. (It must be added that the area is today also increasingly gentrified, which may result in an out-movement of the Turks).

Is Rinkeby the future of the Danish ghetto?

What physically comes closest to the Danish ghetto in Europe is the Swedish ghetto (and some French suburbs). In a similar way to Gellerup, the Swedish suburban ghetto Rinkeby has been much problematized, and the authorities have tried to change the inhabitant mix of the area where immigrants are concentrated by making the area look more attractive to Swedish families. But it already seems that the implementation of planning has resulted in the opposite of what was planned, so that its population increasingly consists of immigrants (see Jensfelt 1995: 18 and Abrahamson 1992). But meanwhile, Rinkeby has become more “multicultural” in that there are relatively many ethnic businesses inside the area as a consequence of experiments realized with respect to immigration. Except for this, Rinkeby is still a typical “suburban” ghetto largely segregated from other urban areas and activities. In this context, it is important to recall that Stockholm is one of the first, if not the first, European cities which was built up on the principle of the satellite town.

For immigrants, the suburban character of Rinkeby means that living in Rinkeby (which is approximately ten km to the central city) is different than living in Stockholm, and the more or less complete physical and social isolation makes Rinkeby look like an island, just as it is the case with Gellerup. While this is probably the strongest physical similarity, the sharpest contrast is for the moment the “multiculturalist” and experimentalist character of Rinkeby, especially regarding its ethnic businesses. But this will probably change in the near future because today an ethnic “bazaar” is under construction in the northern part of Gellerup, creating at least a minimal symbolic space for immigrants. However, because the existing business centre, Gellerupcenter, is in the southern part of Gellerup, the moral interpretation of this effort might be that the “bazaar” is located in the “backyard”. Thus the bazaar project seems to be ambivalent until further notice: it can mean both further isolation for immigrants as well as the opposite. In both cases, one can conclude that Rinkeby could be the future of Gellerup. But at the same time, the
third phase of immigration is tendentially replacing welfare statist inclusion characteristic of the 1980s with a sort of disciplinary “overregulation”, which places it somewhat closer to the German one.

**Deficits of reflexivity: revisiting ambivalence**

It is time to more explicitly relate immigration to the issue of reflexivity and to touch upon ambivalence stemming from globalization in this context. Turkish immigrants’ deficits of reflexivity are most dramatic when one focuses on their relationships with the economic system. The “core” of working Turks employed in industry are “unskilled” and work on the Taylorist assembly line or with other standardized production processes, which neither increase their accumulation of information regarding the work they perform nor their manual skills. Concomitantly, most Turkish workers generally do not have any form of autonomy, which would allow them some flexibility in relation to work performed. Thus, with minimal skills, severely restricted possibilities for flexibility in the workplace and minimal informational content in their work, the distance between possibilities for reflexivity and Turkish industrial workers is very far.

Low level service workers, especially public employees in branches such as cleaning, face similar problems. As one woman said, the work is both drudgery and robot-like, and its symbolic content is severely restricted, especially regarding the image of the worker. These dimensions are only worsened when the work is “compulsory”. While this form of public work does not allow for reflexivity, a small minority of immigrants employed in public service jobs as pedagogue assistants, multicultural caseworkers, translators, advisers (and local politicians) perform highly reflexive work in that their “services” are characterized by both informational (cultural mediation) and symbolic (therapeutic morality) components. But the reflexivity of this small group of “immigrant elites” is contested in several areas. For example, Necef (1994) has underlined their often unreflexive incorporation into the official “multiculturalist” discourse, and Hamburger and I have drawn attention to their functioning as an “extended arm of the authorities” and as “gate-keepers” (Diken & Hamburger 1993).

This contested issue being open to debate, an area of the economy in which Turks’ reflexivity can be detected is the private sector “ethnic businesses”: pizzerias, restaurants, greengrocers, tourism agencies etc. These businesses are in some ways
characterized by an aesthetic component in products and in relationships to their consumers. The degree and content of this “aesthetic” reflexivity can be seen as limited, because their work processes often contain problematic elements, such as the employment of workers earning low “black” wages and their building on “family economies”, which causes serious deficits in reflexivity regarding employees and women (sometimes also children). But at the same time, these businesses can also be pictured as highly reflexive because they “creatively” articulate different forms of work and leisure by building on welfare benefits, which no doubt requires certain forms of cognitive, aesthetic and hermeneutic reflexivity. Here the question must be then, regarding any policy formulation, how this creativity and reflexivity can be stimulated instead of stifled through “raids” on them (see chapter 5).

While deficits of reflexivity related to “production” are a serious problem for Turkish immigrants, except for a small number of entrepreneurs and “immigrant elites”, the situation does not change much if we focus on the sphere of consumption. Here the dominance of what was called “informal consumption” in chapter 4 is especially striking in that the Turkish household economy in general builds on strategies for making living cheaper, or for reducing daily consumption expenses. In the context of reflexivity, it seems important that, generally speaking, informational or aesthetic items of both “high” and “mass” culture, such as books, films, travel (except to Turkey), computers, are not consumed to a great degree. Thus, in my interviews, no respondents had gone to a movie in the last year, none of them (except one, who was a student) had bought a book in the near past, nobody had travelled to another country (except on their way from Denmark to Turkey), and only one single family had a personal computer.

Thus, “reflexive consumption” also seems to be an area heavily characterized by deficits. But this is so only in the Danish social space. As soon as we look at relationships vis-à-vis Turkey, the picture changes. For example, items not bought in Denmark are bought in Turkey, and people there go to movies, buy books and travel increasingly to the tourist areas. All these issues have to do with reflexivity. Thus we can conclude that ambivalence relating to the effects of globalization and symbolic capital is relevant regarding Turks’ reflexive consumption. Even in the ghetto, exclusion from the economies of signs and space—as I mentioned, Gellerup is a “wild zone” regarding information and communication structures in Aarhus—is to a large extent compensated for with satellite dishes, which could be considered a part, though a modest part, of international communication networks. Globalization produces diasporas, and this seems to be a prime resource regarding Turks’ relations to reflexive economies of signs and space. But, even if it is extremely
important for Turks, this ambivalent resource does not count as cultural or symbolic capital in the Danish social space (see chapter 5).

The concept of the “underclass”

I want to use the term “underclass” to express the situation of Turkish immigrants characterized by economic exclusion ("neglect" and indifference of the economic subsystem) and increasing political exclusion (in the form of overregulation), along with several forms of deficits regarding their positions in the social space.

In this context, it is of prime significance to keep in mind the problematic, or contested, history of concepts like underclass. For example, Herbert Gans points out that the term underclass was first used by the sociologist Gunnar Myrdal in 1962 to point toward the “structural” and “colour blind” factors forcing large portions of populations into conditions of unemployment and underemployment. That is not entirely the case today. As Gans say, “Although sociologists such as William J. Wilson ... continued to define the black underclass in a basically Myrdalian fashion, the journalistic tide flowed strongly toward the behavioural definition, helping thereby to turn it into the popular American term it is today. In its behavioural form, ‘underclass’ is also the successor to such earlier terms as pauper, tramp, feebleminded and shiftless, becoming the latest idiom in a venerable general category: the undeserving poor”. Thus, one should remember that in some versions, the concept of underclass is simply used to blame the victim instead of underlying structural factors that give way to the very processes making the underclass. Ironically, as Gans adds, “[i]f past US history is any guide, the greater the level of poverty and joblessness, the more the poor and the jobless are labelled as undeserving”. On this backdrop, Gans proposes the concept of “undercaste” instead of underclass (Gans 1993: 328, 331).

No doubt one should be aware of the fundamental ambivalence related to the concept of underclass; that is, its meaning depends on who uses the concept and in what way. Above, I used this concept primarily to draw attention to structural factors, such as social, institutional and economic isolation, and their interrelationship with the responses of immigrants. That is, the formation of a Danish underclass is not caused by the behaviours of immigrants. In this context, it is important to recall that politics of immigration does not mention structural factors, which lay at the root of what is called “immigrant problems” in this country. And because this is so, I want to stress that, among other merits (and problems), the concept of underclass may have an important political rhetorical purpose in arguing
against this indifference. In addition, regarding the ambivalence of the concept, I want to argue that it can be fruitful to try to live with this ambivalence instead of throwing the concept away and coining new concepts like “undercaste” which is a no less an ambivalent “umbrella term” and which is “open to anyone who wishes to place new meanings, or a variety of stereotypes, accusations and stigmas under it”, as Gans himself remarks (1993: 334).

While I agree that most of the concepts in the field of immigration can be used to stigmatizing ends and that they should be deconstructed, what I want to underline is that one can still use such concepts, such as “underclass”, to politicize the debate without necessarily stigmatizing the “victims”. A wholesale negation of the concept in the name of a naive version of political correctness risks the illusion that the concept has a self-contained “essence”, which is the very thing deconstructivists target against.

But there are further, and substantial, problems with the concept of underclass. Here we can look at another powerful line of criticism against the concept launched by Norman Fainstein, a criticism which, to summarize, stresses basically three dimensions. Firstly, he points out that the term underclass perceives issues like race in a language of class, and thus implicitly rejects the importance of racial differences. Secondly, much of the underclass literature focuses on the behaviours of a category of unemployed population separated and concentrated in “ghettoes”, and such an approach “allows the researcher to avoid highly politicized questions about wage structure, the condition of millions of poor blacks and others who are fully employed at poverty wages, or about the ways in which public finance and services affect the life chances of low-income populations”. Thirdly, the underclass literature focuses on the “ghetto poor” but “does not need to tell the story of African Americans who are in a ‘stable’ working and middle class”, the problem here being that the concept overstates the importance of the exodus of the middle class black populations from the ghetto in that it gives way to falsely positive assumptions about their situations as if they do not have similar problems elsewhere, for example regarding racial exclusion (Fainstein 1993: 385-387).

It is easy to agree with the first criticism, at least partly. Thus I showed that the structural forces causing unemployment affect immigrants unevenly, and hence the unemployment rates are higher for immigrants than non-immigrants in every sector. That is also to say that “race”, or ethnicity, has an indubitable impact on the redistribution of economic risks. But this nevertheless does not mean that the structural factors directly relating to the economic subsystem (as deindustrialization) are secondary or unimportant, because, in the Danish case, ethnic factors played (regarding systemic exclusion from the economy) a dominant
role first when economic factors rearranged the rules of the game in the field of immigration. Thus I want to hold the view that it is the interrelationship of class and ethnicity that matters in the creation of the underclass. This relates importantly to the second and third criticisms Fainstein addresses, which I find more compelling: focusing on the “ghetto poor” can blind the researcher toward broader political issues, on the one hand, and the non-ghetto poor (both economically and symbolically), on the other. But in our case, the term underclass is used precisely to draw attention to the political issues in a broader context and, regarding the focus on the “ghetto”, it can be argued that this can precisely be the merit of the underclass concept (in the sense Wilson and later Lash and Urry have used it) in that it points toward the spatial forms of governance in postindustrial economies. But nevertheless, I agree with Fainstein that any Turkish “exit” from the Danish ghetto does not automatically mean the end of problems (otherwise one could easily agree with the Municipality of Aarhus that the solution is a quick dispersion of the ghetto). Thus, if we recall the deficits of Turks in the social space, which was the topic in chapter 4, we can easily say that the non-ghetto Turks share fates similar to those of the ghetto Turks (the point regarding Gellerup still being that it is an “extreme case” regarding underclass formation and that this has an important spatial dimension).

One aspect I want to mention in passing is that research on underclass formations generally focuses too narrowly only on absolute “economic” poverty, which may be especially deceiving regarding relatively rich countries, such as Germany and Denmark. To be sure, economic isolation is one of the most important, maybe even the most important, dimension of poverty in consumer societies, because “once people are totally out of the economy, it is possible that friends and even relatives may desert them” (Gans 1993: 331). But to discuss the existence of an underclass one might equally focus on cultural, symbolic and social capital as well. Seen in this relational perspective, the “poverty” of immigrants in social space seems to be even more striking. Such a relational perspective can also be related to the increasingly visible tendency that poverty and underclass membership is, just like one’s habitus, hereditary: thus, recent research shows that the children of the unemployed in Denmark have a seriously higher risk of becoming themselves unemployed (see Christoffersen 1996). In other words, unemployment tends to become a habitus, and one has a greater risk of becoming unemployed if one is born into an unemployed habitus.

**Basic income?**
Not surprisingly, the debate about the welfare state in the 1990s has been polarized between the Neo-Liberals and Social Democrats, and this is true also in Denmark. In areas related to welfare benefits, the Neo-Liberals (and Conservatives) are more than willing to disentangle the welfare state in favour of the market. The Neo-Liberals go even further to propose that the welfare system be replaced by an insurance system (see also Andersen & Larsen 1995). Concerning the processes giving way to ghetto and underclass formations, this pole thinks it is the welfare system itself that passivizes people who then become dependent on benefits. In this context, there have even been proposals regarding the level of welfare benefits immigrants get: “The Danish welfare system transforms refugees and immigrants into clients, because, as a matter of course, they get the same amount of money as Danes as soon as they get a residence permit…. Instead, one should give them an absolute minimum amount” (Necef; Jyllands-Posten, 26 July 1995; my translation).

On the other hand, while the Social Democrats argue for the need for solidarity with the unemployed and the excluded, their labour market policy mainly builds on creating more growth and hence more jobs without limiting working time for those who have jobs or without other options for job-sharing. The implementation of this bold “growth ideology” solely results in activation and training schemes and educational offers for the unemployed. But in the 1990s, Social Democratic policies have become more “disciplinary” regarding the unemployed (e.g. the 1995 changes in the provision of benefits), and when the issue is immigrants, Social Democrat policies often become directly discriminative. The gross result is more like a stigmatizing “overregulation” than “solidarity”.

To sum up, it seems that the welfare state debate is squeezed between two undesirable ends, on the one hand, a Neo-Liberal, market-based “indifference” and on the other, a Social Democratic state-based “overregulation” regarding immigrants (and others unemployed). Thus, any fresh consideration of the topic at hand must be able to go beyond Neo-Liberal and Social Democratic offers or, more aptly, “threats”. An important issue in this context is to look at what these poles share, as well as how they differ.

What Neo-Liberal and Social Democratic policies both share is, above all, the assumption of a “work society”, centred around production and work as the main organizing principle of society. But, as Mückenberger, Offe and Ostner argue, this model is neither economically desirable, ecologically defensible nor socially acceptable. Economically because: “If growth rates which can be secured by the continuous, expansive reproduction of capital are uncertain, then those which
would reproduce full employment are wholly unthinkable”. Likewise, a work society meets some ecological barriers in that increased consumption of raw material, land and energy accompanies it. In addition, they point out that the idea of “environmental protection”, as it is practised today, is mainly based on “halting of certain forms of production and types of product” and not an “allegedly labor-intensive ‘cleaning-up operation’”, which means that any reconciliation of economy and ecology cannot be taken for granted yet. And thirdly, they underline that, even if work still plays a central role for many people today, the idea of work society discriminates towards nonmarket activities, forms of work, individual orientations and “post-material” values, a discrimination that culminates especially against those outside the labour market (Mückenberger, et al 1996: 209).

On this basis, determined by the crisis of the labour market and the social state, which cannot be solved by the continuation of existing policies, Mückenberger, Offe and Ostner argue for a basic income system “decoupled from actual income-earning activity” (1996: 210). Basic income is defined by four principles. Firstly, it is guaranteed by the state and financed by taxes, and will result in a “clear redistribution of capital and peak incomes toward those on low incomes or without means”. Secondly, it guarantees a social security that is no longer dependent on the wage-earning biography of the claimants or on their “willingness to make themselves available” in the labour market, as is the case now. Thirdly, its measure of size is the “principle of need” in that it loosens the connection between income and size of transfer benefit. And lastly, it is based on the “principle of the individual” to neutralize control and dependence among family members (Mückenberger, et al 1996: 211).

In Denmark as elsewhere, there are some well-articulated suspicions about basic income. For example, while it is possible that the use of basic incomes can “put an end to socio-economic exclusion of the large categories of people now being marginalized” (Vilrokx; quoted in Lind 1995: 202), it “can also result in a more extreme detachment form working life ... where some groups are working and some are not. This will tend to create an even more uneven society than currently exists” (Lind 1995: 202). Thus, basic income can mean a further division of the already divided society. Furthermore, according to both Neo-Liberals and Social Democrats, basic income can mean a “right to laziness”. It can also mean an increased responsibility for the state and a further institutionalization of heteronomy, which weaker-positioned people already suffer from.

But Mückenberger, Offe and Ostner have powerful defences against these points. Regarding the question if basic income will mean increased marginalization, they say, firstly, that advocates of this criticism are “caught up in nostalgic,
nebulous, or utopian ideas about the possibility of full employment”. Secondly, they add that such a division between employed and non-employed can “safely be avoided by allied strategies the goal of which would be to open up real possibilities of choice between income earning and other forms of activity, and which would be bound up with a basic income as part of a package of measures” (Mückenberger, et al 1996: 213). The “package” they speak of is a combination of basic income schemes with reduction in working hours and political stimulation of informal activities. In contrast to Social Democratic fears, reduction in working hours can distribute access to work more evenly and level off the difference between full and part-time work, and work sharing can make “all” people participate in the labour market even if they participate “less” (Mückenberger, et al 1996: 215). Next to this, the stimulation of informal work can mean that channels outside the labour market, which are considered “deviations”, can be “freed of the stigma of work”: “Given falling labour market demand, the explicit purpose of a basic income is to rid employees of the need to tie themselves to the labour market and to seek employment through it” (Mückenberger, et al 1996: 216). In our context, such an approach can, for example, mean a recognition of “housework” as “work”: immigrant women especially perform a lot of “work without income” in the household economy, and in general, much do-it-yourself work characterizes the functioning of the Turkish household. If a “formalization” or political legitimation of such activities takes place via basic income schemes, it can be argued that this can stimulate activity levels in both consumption and production.

Regarding the question if basic income schemes will lead to a deepened crisis in the labour market because of an induced “laziness”, Mückenberger, Offe and Ostner write that basic income schemes are proposed “precisely to prevent the labour market crisis and the disappearance of the goal of full employment from undermining those bases and levels of social security and social justice that have already been achieved”. Regarding libertarian suspicions about a potential increase in the responsibility of the state, they argue that this can only happen if basic income remains restricted to a “minority” of legitimate claimants standing opposed to a “majority” of payers. But if the majority benefits from a basic income, then it will not be in the self-interest of parties and voters to reject it (Mückenberger, et al 1996: 212-214).

Here I want to stress that in Denmark, it is generally held that the Danish welfare system is a system similar to one of basic incomes, but the necessity of being available for the labour market in periods one receives welfare or unemployment benefits makes an important difference. Thus, groups can easily be stigmatized. Good examples of this are the TV programmes or newspaper articles reporting on
immigrants (or others) travelling abroad while receiving benefits, etc., while nobody mentions the years they have waited to be contacted by the authorities.

Another point is of course how willing the Neo-Liberals, Conservatives and Social Democrats are with respect to a basic income system. Recent development shows that even less radical schemes, such as “leave schemes”, proposed after the labour market reform in 1993, were cancelled even though many were interested in them. And even if it can be argued that job-sharing will not contribute considerably to solving unemployment problems, at least it was solidaristic on a temporal basis among haves and have-nots (Lind 1995; Andersen & Larsen 1995).

As should be clear, my purpose in the above discussion was not necessarily to put forth policy proposals but rather to underline topics that are overlooked and/or repressed in the Danish immigration debate regarding systemic and social exclusion. I want to conclude by underlining that the problem of “unemployment” regarding immigrants is a big issue and that real solutions require broader and more flexible perspectives than those found today. Furthermore, any possible solution to these problems unavoidably brush up against the issue of “solidarity” which is, as we saw, a very “chancy” matter. Especially for “denizens”.
8 Towards an “Ambivalent” Social Theory

Personal life, expression, knowledge, and history advance obliquely, and not directly, toward ends or toward concepts. That which is sought too deliberately is not obtained. (Maurice Merleau-Ponty; quoted in Canclini 1995)

The concept of integration is not unambiguous. It is used in many different meanings. What distinguishes different meanings of the concept is the choice of goal one makes for integration and the choice of means employed to reach the goal. (Municipality of Aarhus 1995b: 19)

In stark contrast to Merleau-Ponty’s affirmation of ambivalence and contingency above, the second quotation reveals the way the Municipality of Aarhus perceives the problems related to immigration: one sees in the quotation how ambivalence is perceived in the issue and how this ambivalence is immediately neutralized by taking an instrumentalist stance towards it in terms of a technology of means and ends. In other words, both ambivalence and the will to order is present in the second quotation. A question that is significantly not raised about the ambivalence of integration is, for example, in which frameworks of meaning the question of integration is or can be posed. One could also say that what distinguishes different conceptions of integration is not primarily means and ends but the meaning attributed to the concept.

In contrast to the approach taken by the municipality, I want in this chapter to give an account of what a more ambivalent approach towards immigration can look like, that is, an approach that does not initially seek to neutralize or order what is ambivalent in the debate. For this purpose, we will firstly dwell on some introductory issues which, as position-taking, can establish some pathways of an ambivalent social theory. Based on this, the second part of the chapter will more directly enter the field of social theory and more explicitly consider how a more ambivalent social theory can move to and “settle” on some issues in the field of
immigration. The next chapter reconsiders the topics raised here by relating them explicitly to the question of “action”, that is, planning in the face of ambivalence.

- I -

INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR A MORE “MOBILE” THEORIZING

If we rethink culture and its science, anthropology, in terms of travel, then the organic, naturalizing bias of the term culture—seen as a rooted body that grows, lives, dies, etc.—is questioned. Constructed and disputed historicities, sites of displacement, interference, and interaction, come more sharply into view. (Clifford 1992: 101)

As discussed earlier, immigrants move between different geographical settings, cultures and social spaces. So, initially, I want to argue that a theoretical approach in the context of immigration must be as mobile as the research object.

Jean Baudrillard says in another context that a theory on simulation should be simulatory; any theory about seduction should be seductive, and so on. With these thoughts, one could say that a theory about immigration must seek to become immigratory. This approach, which is based on the death of the subject (or “the death the author”, in Foucault’s phrase), means in our context that the subject (the researcher, the sociologist, etc.) and the object must fuse with each other, and that the theory and methodology should cling around the object. A travelling, immigratory approach towards immigration should, in other words, not imitate the traditional theories, which already have lost their objects, but instead take the position of its “object”, that is, in our context, the position of the stranger (see Baudrillard 1988: 29).

How can a theory and methodology related to immigration research adapt the situation of a “stranger”? How can a theory become both an insider and an outsider to the studied context at the same time? The first step is to recognize ambivalences, which have surfaced several times in the preceding chapters, and to account for this in both the research agenda and methodology. What kind of a mobility, then, are we speaking of? Before discussing this issue more explicitly with respect to social theory, using the concepts of order, ambivalence, hybridity and purity in the next
part of this chapter, I want to mention three different frameworks in which mobility is relevant.

Firstly, mobility can be taken as an ability to move between social theoretical analyses of systems and life-worlds. Secondly, mobility can be taken as an ingredient of interdisciplinary work, which seeks to communicate with more than one of the established academic disciplines. Thirdly and lastly, it can be taken as a methodological “oscillation” between coming as close as possible to the object of study by using hermeneutic methods and moving away from the issue of immigration by “deferring” it. In this context, I will relate the mobility of an ambivalent social theory to the issue of visuality by arguing for the need to oscillate between analytical methods, which often fix and freeze the ambivalence and heterogeneity of the ongoing life, and other ways of seeing, such as “qualitative” research, which seek proximity and reciprocity but often create an illusion of visibility of the object or, in other words, become a “metaphysics of the concrete”.

Systemness and the life-world

Classic social theory was grounded on the assumption that a “systemness”, understood as regularities in the “social”, could be found. In Lars-Henrik Schmidt’s phrase, early social theory aimed at building a sort of “social physics”. If social theory could have found these regularities, then it could also have its own life with its own logic. Schmidt says that, since these systemic regularities, which could be the essence and substance of the “social”, were impossible to find, classic social theory then tried to find other categories to relate itself to. In this, the category of the average person, L’homme moyen, as a statistical category has been the central occupation of social theory. L’homme moyen did not make regularities and social laws available but, instead, allowed the social scientist to engage in statistical generalizations pointing toward a “normality”. In other words, since the social scientist could not get laws, he could engage in calculating “tendencies” shown statistically (Schmidt 1995: 44). Much mainstream social theory can possibly still be reviewed as variations on these two assumptions, that is, the existence of a separate social essence and regularities, and/or the availability of statistical generalizations.

The context in which classic social theory was born was modernity. Classic sociology, for example, has therefore been deeply interested in the dismantling of
what was conceived of as “tradition”. Since Tönnies and his separation of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, social theory has been preoccupied with the question of how the enchanted, religious aspects of the “traditional” is replaced by secular, modern forms of social conduct (Schmidt 1995). Just as social theory is by birth a modern discourse, it has at the same time been a discourse that legitimized modernity itself and contributed to its construction (Bauman 1993).

This legitimation was closely related to the role attributed to cognitive rationality. If modernity has meant a differentiation of the cognitive, the aesthetic and the ethical as different spheres, then social theory has told us that it was both possible and desirable to look at the “social” in “scientific”, or “cognitive”, terms. Cognitive rationality was now to be put into service out of the desire to know of a society held to be “out there”.

The “social”, imagined as an essence or a statistically generalizable totality, was to be discovered by the social theorist who stands outside it as a separate entity, as a subject or an ego, and looks at it from the outside. That is to say, both the social scientist as an observing unity, a subject, and the “social” as a separate totality outside this subject were the focal points in the construction of social theory as a modern science. The tool with which the theorist could “look” at the social phenomenon was “theory”. Hence, theory supposedly “mirrors” the reality (Game 1991: 21).

Martin Jay points out that the word theory, theoria, shares the same root with the word theatre and means “to look attentively, to behold” (Jay 1994: 23). In old Greek, the word “teos” means God; thus one could say that theory is “God’s gaze”. Concomitantly, “[t]he idea of observation within the tradition of social theory implies a studied passivity and a disengagement. We can detect a theorist who is skilled in watching, contemplating and spectating, but there is also the suspicion of the icy and self-gratifying gaze of the voyeur. This version of the observer demands the necessity of standing back, an aim of seeing from a distance or, perhaps most favoured of all, the privilege of looking down from an elevated platform (Jenks: 1995: 4).

As Heidegger shows, “theoria” is conflated with observation in the history of modernity, and we understand theory as observation today. The word “observation” is related to the Latin tractare (“betrachten” in German and “betrage” in Danish), which means both observation and to “manipulate”. Observation requires “curiosity”, an interest in how things function and in how one can change them, in contra-distinction to “wander”, which lets things be (Jay 1994: 270-1). According to Heidegger, this conflation of “theoria” and observation is
connected to the question of technology. The technological mind experiences the world as a relationship between people and things where the world increasingly becomes a “standing-reserve”, taken, put, “set up” somewhere else by “manufacturing”. In this world of technology, which is dominated by instrumental rationality, even the object disappears because it is reduced to needs and resources. Thus, we do not even have the notions of truth any longer, because we understand it in terms of certainty and correctness, that is, in positivist terms (see Heidegger 1993: 307-42).

Significantly, “the essence of modern technology is in enframing” (Heidegger 1993: 328). This “enframing” is attained in modern social science by what Schutz has called a “reflective” attitude towards the social phenomenon. Reflective attitude enframes, fixes and freezes the phenomenon to be able to investigate it through the “reflecting glance”; it is a distantiated, goal-oriented gaze that thematizes its object. What reflective attitude manages is, in other words, “enframing”. It is necessarily “theoretical”, and it derives “meaning” by classifying, categorizing and signifying the phenomenon only to set a clear boundary between the subject and the object, between the same and the other. The other, reduced to being an “object”, is not “taken for granted” on the basis of his or her social experience, which still is “ongoing”, but instead thematized as an “accomplished act” (Schutz 1972: 30). An important achievement of reflective, or theoretical, enframing is to decontextualize the social phenomena, which also makes it possible, in both senses of the word, to “overlook” heterogeneities and ambivalences in the life-worlds of people.

Today much research on immigration remains a kind of subject-object thinking. Thus, the curiosity of the eye is focused and fixed on the object, which it itself enframes and constructs at a distance. And, most often the techniques of “observation” do not allow for “letting things be” either. The question is, therefore, how an ambivalent social theory can tackle the tyranny of the theoretical gaze and its subject-object thinking. Although much of this chapter deals with this issue, here I want to make some initial points related to the empirical material and the philosophical background of social theory.

The life-world and the “natural attitude”

Empirically, an ambivalent social theory necessitates, in addition to reflective “enframing” at a distance, “dwelling among” its objects, focusing on their located and situated practices, on their habitus, and taking up an inter-subjective dialogue.
with them. In other words, it involves meeting in life-worlds and thus requires a skill in hermeneutic reflexivity.

As opposed to an enframing “reflective attitude”, one of the most interesting characteristics of hermeneutic reflexivity is the role of the “natural attitude” in it. The natural attitude found in practices of everyday life is focused on the body, immediate experiences, stream of consciousness, reception and tacit knowledge. In the everyday world, we know a lot of things without knowing that we know them, and we have many “prejudices” without taking notice of them. Even using language necessitates both tacit knowledge and prejudices; without them, as Gadamer has shown, we cannot do (Lash 1994).

The life-world is always already structured with our classifications, typifications, categories, common-sense constructions, interpretations, etc., and we cannot just step out of this life-world to interpret it. Experiencing and interpreting the life-world are thus closely inter-connected activities.

In everyday life we directly experience the acts of another. We interpret those external events which we call “another’s act” as indicators of a stream of consciousness lying outside our own. To the extent we do these things, we can “understand” the events in question, reading the indications as they occur, and thus directly witness the action as it unfolds, witness it “in the mode of actuality”. Observational understanding [or natural attitude] is then focused on action as it takes place, and we, as beings living alongside the actor and sharing his present, participate experientially in the very course of his action. (Schutz 1972: 30)

Schutz’s phenomenological life-world concept is important for an understanding of social relationships. Culture (and life-world) is defined in this context as what is taken for granted in a definite place and at a definite time; and what is taken for granted relates to typifications, images and interpretations that define situations in which actions take place (Jensen 1993: 20). What an ambivalent social theory aims at, by seeking to come as close as possible to the life-world of its objects, is to chart, interpret, or decode, the classifications, typifications and common-sense categorizations in the life-world of its “objects”.

“Egology” or inter-subjectivity?
The most important background assumption of classical social theory mentioned so far is a subject-object thinking, and this requires a philosophical awareness on the
side of an ambivalent social theory. What both purely analytical and positivistic methods of social investigation share in general is the assumption of availability of some “facts” or objects that can be “represented”. Such approaches must necessarily assume that the subject, on the one hand, and the object, the social world, on the other, constitute some unities. Importantly, this distinction between the knowing and thinking subject (the Cartesian cogito) and the (human or non-human) “other” as an object completely exterior to the Cartesian subject is fundamental to Western metaphysical philosophy which, bracketing the dialogical “interhuman” relations between “I” and “Thou”, prioritizes an instrumental relation between “I” and “It”. Thus Emmanuel Levinas calls most Western thought an “Egology” that separates the subject and the other. “Insofar as the object is constituted by the autonomous subject, ‘truth’ emanates from the solitary mind or ego. Hence, the subject-object relation is above all a relationship of superiority and power” (Gardiner 1996: 129). What “Egology” does is to convert a subject (difference) into an object (the same) and to reduce the “messiness” and ambivalence of reality to coherent elements of an abstract system of knowledge. As Levinas says, the history of philosophy can be interpreted as:

an attempt at universal synthesis, a reduction of all experience, of all that is reasonable, to a totality wherein consciousness embraces the world, leaves nothing outside of itself, and thus becomes absolute thought. The consciousness of self is at the same time the consciousness of the whole. There have been few protestations in the history of philosophy against this totalization. (Levinas 1985: 75)

The totality Levinas speaks of is a product of the achievements of the systems of institutional legality. It suppresses the subjectivity of the “I” by picturing it as an abstract Cartesian unity. What is lost in this picture of atomized, solitary ego, or in the pretension as if the society consists of isolated solitary individuals, is the concrete and singular “I” who constantly has intersubjective relations with others. Levinas’ self, not the abstract or egotistic “I” but the singular “I”, is heterogeneous and as such a product of alterity with the other (see Gardiner 1996).

According to Levinas, intersubjective relationships are not matters of thinking the ego and the other together, but to be “facing”:

The irreducible and ultimate experience of relationship appears to me to be ... not in synthesis, but in the face to face of humans, in sociality, in its moral signification. But it must be understood that morality comes not as a secondary layer, above an abstract
reflection on the totality and its dangers; morality has an independent and preliminary range. First philosophy is ethics. (Levinas 1985: 77)

Thus, the theme of intersubjectivity, understood as a form of sociality in the life-world, takes us away from the totality that is constructed on systemic “synthesis” based on cognitive knowledge, and further brings us to ethics and morality, which are closely related to the “social”, as we will see.

Is systemness uninteresting then?

Do the points made above mean that systemness is uninteresting for an ambivalent social theory of immigration? Not necessarily, because the “social”, as social space or as social systems, with its institutions, structures and collective and individual actors, still constitute a framework in which both social order and social change can be studied. For example, in our context, as it has been shown, politics of immigration is a part of the Danish economic and political system, and it can further be placed in a global system.

But while an ambivalent social theory does not turn its back to issues related to systemness and order, it should be aware of the “excesses” of the systemic ordering ambitions, including its own systematizations. In other words, it must also reflect upon its own role in the constitution of totalities. Issues related to the “colonization” of the life-world by totality-seeking systems (including the scientific ones), for example, are also of interest and importance. Thus it is crucial that its object of study is not only an overarching systemness, which it seeks to understand exclusively by use of cognitive rationality.

This requires a recognition that the possible orders, like Luhmann’s social systems mentioned in chapter 7, are both themselves plural and aware of the existence of other systems or of other orders. At the same time, the “environment” to which any system relates itself is naturally much richer and more complex than the system itself, which also explains why the ordering of any system is necessarily a function of “reducing” the ambivalence in its environment. At this point, we can borrow the metaphor of “archipelago” from Bauman:

If cognitive space could be projected upon the city map, or upon the map of a country or the modern world as a whole, it would take the shape of an archipelago rather than a circle or any other compact or continuous figure. For every citizen of the modern world, social space is spattered over a vast sea of meaninglessness in the form of numerous
larger and smaller blots of knowledge: oases of meaning and relevance amidst a featureless desert. (Bauman 1993: 158; my emphasis)

Engaging an ambivalent social theory is like navigating in an archipelago, with no compact order or unity that can be mapped linearly and continuously. As Michel Serres says, “the rational ... is an island of reality, a rare peak.... Every cognition borders on what we do not have any information on” (quoted in Lyngsø 1994: 123; my translation). An ambivalent social theory, then, requires both the knowledge of the order to be found on small and large “islands” and a sense for the “sea” of ambivalence around.

The need for interdisciplinary work. But in what sense?

Trouillot summarizes the desperate confusion of the anthropologist becoming more and more reflexive while things get more and more chaotic after the collapse of grand-narratives:

He does not know what to aim at. His favorite model has disappeared or, when found, refuses to pose as expected. The fieldworker examines his tools and finds his camera inadequate. Most importantly, his very field of vision now seems blurred. Yet he needs to come back home with a picture. It’s pouring rain out there, and the mosquitoes are starting to bite. In desperation, the baffled anthropologist burns his notes to create a moment of light, moves his face against the flame, closes his eyes, and, hands grasping the camera, takes a picture of himself. (Trouillot 1991: 35-36)

As Schmidt says, anthropology taken as fieldwork is a “soft” discipline: it is mobile, it grows together with the situations it describes, and what is most important for it is the practical and situational meeting with its object, which makes anthropology also dependent upon who makes it. According to Schmidt, these characteristics constitute a clear contrast to what mainstream sociology and other “strong” theories do: for them, the theory plays the main role instead of the object, something which can be traced back to the assumption that there is a social essence to be investigated out there before the intervention of the investigator. In other words, “strong theory” aims at normalizing and neutralizing the participants and at making both the object and the investigator irrelevant for the continuation
Strangers, Ambivalence and Social Theory

of social analyses. “Strong theory” is thus very much interested in “guidelines”, which anthropological fieldwork cannot be content with (Schmidt 1995: 48-49).

Can one, then, imagine a reconciliation of “weak” and “strong” theory to form an interdisciplinary social theory? Another question must be answered first: does an ambivalent social theory mean being “desperate” in the face of contingency? This question is important because, as is the case with the desperate anthropologist above, if ambivalence is taken only as chaos or contingency, we risk reducing it to the absolute other of “order”. But, as was argued in chapter 6, order and chaos presuppose each other and cannot be defined without each other. What we face here is therefore a conflictual balance between chaos and order, between contingency and systemness at the same time. In this context, as opposed to the desperation pictured above, the task of an ambivalent social theory is to say something in doubt; it cannot simply just say that “everything is doubtful”, which ironically amounts to saying something absolute, and which expresses a “fear of touching”.

Then the question of “weak” and “strong” theory also becomes a question of degree. One could say that a combination of different methods would be a solution, that is, if one uses both “weak” and “strong” theories to understand a single phenomena, then one could have a deeper understanding of the phenomena in question. For example, as Canclini proposes in the following, the merits of zapping between different perspectives of different scientific fields could be worth considering:

The anthropologist arrives in the city by foot, the sociologist by car and via the main highway, the communications specialist by plane. Each registers what he or she can and constructs a distinct and, therefore, partial vision. (Canclini 1995: 4)

An ambivalent social theory of immigration must be particularly aware of the merits of interdisciplinary work: if strangerhood is being both inside and outside, an ambivalent social theory is a stranger in that it crosses borders and territories of institutionalized scientific fields, which necessarily produces hybrids. Just as the passports of strangers are “juridical fictions”, the academic territories are ideally “scientific fictions” for an ambivalent social theory.

But to leave it at that would not contribute very much to interdisciplinary work. Hence, now popularized understandings of interdisciplinary work reduce it to a sort of methodological pluralism, which assumes that there is one object of study and that, by using different perspectives, it can be represented from different points of
view. Lars-Henrik Schmidt calls this understanding of interdisciplinary work passive perspectivism, which is based on the false premise that “in reality we all speak of the same” (Schmidt 1995: 47). Indeed, the different perspectives employed do not represent the same object, which is already found outside the observer, but they actively constitute their objects. In other words, different perspectives not only “construct a distinct and ... partial vision” as Canclini says above, but they, as different discursive practices, contribute to the construction of different realities as well.

Thus, Schmidt speaks of an active perspectivism, which not only describes a vision but also “wants something”, that is, engages itself with some problems and tries, in its discursive practices, to “change” them. Thought in this way, “active perspectivism” denies a dichotomy between interpretation and action, just as power/knowledge, discourse/practice cannot be separated from each other.

What are the criteria for the generosity of such an active perspectivism regarding interdisciplinary work? Or, how should one decide on which disciplines to work with since they cannot be chosen arbitrarily? Schmidt says that this choice must be made by considering the problems at hand and with respect to the criteria of “effectivity” so that the analysis does not get reduced to unimportant details. Significantly, the criteria cannot be demarcated beforehand, and it must be a “practical” matter to decide on it.

Schmidt offers a way out of the dichotomy of the “weak” and “strong” theory. But, by pointing out differences in kind together with differences in degree between “strong” and “weak” theories, he also distances himself from a vulgar methodological pluralism. Thus, what is an important issue relating to interdisciplinary work is to acknowledge differences between different disciplines and their different discursive practices. For an ambivalent social theory, this means that a total denigration of “differences” between scientific fields and turning them all into “the same” is not an aim. But on the contrary, such a social theory must recognize that differences and thus borders are what are to be crossed and to be played upon. In this sense, an ambivalent social theory settles on the margins, or “limits”, of these disciplines.

If an ambivalent social theory navigates in this way, it is also because it does not search for a meta-theory combining these disciplines in a totality or synthesis. In another context, Richard Rorty mentions, regarding the divide between the public and the private, that some writers (such as Heidegger and Foucault) underline the desire for private autonomy and self-creation while others (such as Dewey and Habermas) are more interested in questions of justice and free human community:
We shall only think of these two kinds of writers as opposed if we think that a more comprehensive philosophical outlook would let us hold self-creation and justice, private perfection and human solidarity, in a single vision.... There is no way in which philosophy, or any other theoretical discipline, will ever let us do that.... Both are right, but there is no way to make both speak a single language. (Rorty 1989: xiv-xv)

In a similar vein, for an ambivalent social theory of immigration, both analytical theories of the “social” and hermeneutics of the life-world may raise relevant issues, and they can be “both right”, without needing “a single language” and without being united in “a single vision”; hence an ambivalent social theory often “oscillates” without a synthesis, by avoiding to think of different understandings as oppositions. Or, in other words, it does not aim at finding “dialectical” relations between different perspectives, but at finding Bakhtinian “dialogical” relations which maintain a co-presence of perspectives without a reconciliation between them. As Bakhtin says, “there is neither a first nor a last word. The contexts of dialogue is without limit. They extend to the deepest past and the most distant future.... [E]very meaning will someday have its homecoming festival” (quoted in Holquist 1990: 39).

It is important to underline that there are no clear and singled methodological guidelines (which are replicable and re-usable in later observations without being transformed) for an ambivalent social theory of immigration. A stable, de-contextual methodology comprising clear-cut guidelines contradicts its deconstructivist soul: it seeks points of “settlement” rather than stable fundaments.

Phronesis and deferral

If a social theory related to strangers is to take the position of the stranger, it must dwell on both insider and outsider viewpoints; it must be able to come as close as possible to the studied context, while it must also be able to move back. We begin with how this social theory can come closer to its object without “going native”.
Coming close to the studied context

If one admits that research on immigration requires hermeneutic (and aesthetic) reflexivity along with cognitive reflexivity in coming closer to the studied context, that is, the life-world of one’s respondents, one could consider once more the long tradition of Aristoteles. This stresses that the study of human activity necessitates practising phronesis, an engagement with values and ethics as a basis for praxis. Phronetic research focuses on ethical and rational questions at the same time and tries to balance instrumental rationality with ethical reasoning in the research process. In this, it also directly relates itself to the issue of power, that is, the question of winners and losers (Flyvbjerg 1991: 141). The goal of phronesis is first and foremost to engage in producing qualified judgments and actions in concrete situations. This very often involves thinking about normally “incomparable” entities, such as politics and ethics, at the same time. Thus, Aristoteles conceives of politics when it is only related to tactics and strategies independently of moral judgements as a “perversity” (Jensen 1993: 21). Thus, Levinas says that “[p]olitics must be able in fact always to be checked and criticized starting from the ethical” (Levinas 1985: 80).

Phronesis is concerned not only with universals and theoretical knowledge, but also with particulars and practical knowledge. It can only develop on the basis of deep case experiences since a “high level of skill in any unstructured problem area seems to require considerable concrete experience with real situations” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986: 20). Quoting Foucault, Flyvbjerg claims that the aim of phronesis is to “open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible” (1991: 21; my translation).

Such a starting point also means prioritization of involvement rather than detached knowledge, of holistic views rather than purely analytical ones, of contextual and intuitive approaches rather than abstract and formal ones, and of critical perspectives rather than objectivism of purely analytical theories (Flyvbjerg 1991). To use one of Richard Sennett’s metaphors (in 1994), doing phronetic research can be seen as an exercise in becoming a “vulnerable body”. One uses a personal language; exposes oneself to outer, positive and negative effects consciously; prefers “touching” rather than looking from a distance; and partakes in debates with one’s own metaphors and ethical values. Going close to the “reality”, to the concrete context, to be able to develop a hermeneutic understanding of it, is one of the most important aspects of such a research process (Flyvbjerg 1991).
In phronetic research, who conducts such research increasingly matters because the researcher himself becomes a major instrument for research (Flyvbjerg 1991). In this respect, engagement with phronesis can also mean an increased interest for aesthetic orientation toward research. As Elliot Eisner puts it:

“Artistically oriented research does not aim to control or to produce formal predictive statements. It is after explication. It is closer in character to a hermeneutical activity than a technological one.... In artistic approaches to research the major instrument is the investigator himself.... By this I mean that although the investigator might use some formal instruments to collect data, the major source of data emanates from how the investigator experiences what it is he or she attends to. There are several utilities of such an approach. In the first place, many things that might be significant might not find a place on a formal observation schedule. (Eisner 1981: 8)

For Eisner, the necessity of aesthetic awareness for research relates to the central role emotions play in knowing and to the role of representation in effectively acting upon what is being talked about or shown in research.

According to Luhmann, what art does is to help making private sensation accessible to communication: thus every system that is autopoietically closed needs artistic reductions in its communication with the environment. For example, as a single person, one cannot express precisely what one senses in one’s nervous system; that is, when one opens one’s mouth, one is in communication with second-order concepts (and not in the nervous system). This means that communication brings with it a “fictive closure” of the reality, which is indeed much more complex (see Luhmann 1995: 82). In our context, I want to argue that the complexity an ambivalent social theory is confronted with can often be expressed better using artistic techniques. This does not necessarily mean that social theory should be an “art” in the ordinary sense of the word; the point is rather that it cannot do without it.

Concomitantly, the narrating of “critical and effective histories” (Dean 1994) are pivotal for phronesis; thus narration, as it is used in Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy, is as important as epistemology for phronetic research, as it is defined by Flyvbjerg. Moving from analytical theory to phronetic research, we also move from gazing to narration and dialogue.

*Phronesis and “ethics of blindness”*
As an alternative to the optics of analytical or positivist gazing, which places the observed phenomena in a distantiated visual field, the attraction of more intuitive methods in researching temporality and spatiality of daily practices are easily understandable. Phronesis is, as such, also an alternative to what Gregory (1994) has called “the optics of expert-systems”. To understand the implications of this point, we must once more return to the theme of visuality.

I have already used some sensual metaphors, such as seeing and touching, on which (mis)management of our lives depend to a large extent. In “Sociology of the Senses” (1969), Simmel writes that the eye as a sense organ has a very important function in social interactions because of its role in establishing reciprocity. According to Simmel, the human sensual reciprocity also explains the basis of social and cultural relationships. Yet it is something very fragile. For example, the reciprocity in seeing can disappear very easily, and seeing can become a one-sided activity (Tester 1995: 98).

In this context, it is relevant to recall that modern social life is built on avoidance of such reciprocity to a large extent. For example, meeting with undesirable strangers strongly requires mastering skills to avoid eye-contact with them and to be able to transform meeting into “mismeeting”: “To live with strangers, one needs to master the art of mismeeting. The application of this art is necessary if the strangers, for their sheer number if not for any other reason, cannot be domesticated into neighbours. On the other hand, it is the application of this art that constitutes the other as a stranger and reaffirms him in this capacity” (Bauman 1993: 154). Mismeeting is required most when one cannot avoid sharing a space with strangers.

A typical example of mismeetings based on non reciprocity could be the reserve attitude developed against over-stimulation caused by modern urban life; over-stimulating situations in city life are characterized often by people who see each other without hearing (Simmel 1992; Benjamin 1973: 38) or without touching (Sennett 1994).

In social relations, seeing without the help of other sense organs makes one uneasy. And then there is seeing without being seen or vice versa, a situation which completely erases the reciprocity of “mutual” glance (Simmel 1969: 358; Tester 1995: 96). Having extreme consequences like scopic fetishism, exhibitionism, paranoia etc., this lack of reciprocity is also related to power:

The nonreciprocity between look and eye, between the subject and object of the gaze, is in fact related to a fundamental struggle for power. For the one who casts the look is
always subject and the one who is its target is always turned into an object ... objectification is the telos of the look. (Jay 1994: 288)

If one holds the view, as I have been doing, that immigrants are over-represented in the discourse, or in the visual field, of immigration that “enframes” them, then it is relevant to remember, as Heidegger said, that the essence of epistemological representation, which replaced the truth in modernity, is vorstellung:

In German, the word we translate as “re-presentation” is Vorstellung. Now, this word signifies a gesture of setting down (stellen) in front (vor), a gesture which corresponds to the “frontal” ontology of modern, nihilistic world. I submit that the concealed essence of ‘re-presentation’ begins to appear through this interpretation, and that it is, in a word, staring. (David Michael Levin; quoted in Jay 1994: 274)

Much theoretical re-presentation is visual in its essence, and this visuality is more based on an objectifying gaze than on a mutual glance; the “master” point of view of analytical gazing is decontextualized, a-temporal and decorporealized. And this all is radically important, also in the context of ethics.

For Levinas, the other is a “face” speaking to us to which we speak. According to him, this human interaction is important for developing moral relations and hence breaking the “totality”. But:

Face and discourse are tied. The face speaks. It speaks, it is in this that it renders possible and begins all discourse. I have ... refused the notion of vision to describe the authentic relationship with the Other; it is discourse and, more exactly, response or responsibility which is the authentic relationship. (Levinas 1985: 87-88)

For Levinas, visual relations merely foster instrumental manipulation, and it is “touch” that allows more benign interactions. Whereas sight distances subject and object, touch re-establishes a proximity between them. Furthermore, touch is directly connected to the “primacy of doing over contemplation”. Thus, Levinas’ ethics are an “ethics of blindness” (Jay 1994: 543, 557).

In today’s cities which, as Sennett says, are planned according to the principle of “fear of touching”, this ethics is extraordinarily significant. Indeed, in the next chapter, I will partly argue for a “blind” planning, which underlines the need for
touching and thus deliberately seeks to come in touch with ethics. In this context, phronesis is important as a way of seeing other than that of the totalitarian “eye of the power”. But, however, one could formulate some potential dangers related to phronesis in ethical, scientific and aesthetic terms.

Regarding ethics, even though phronetic research underlines the necessity of inter-subjective dialogue with the other, as a research activity, it above all entails one actor’s involvement and activity directed toward others. A single actor, the researcher, seeks dialogue with the respondents to reach “verstehen”. Since there is always more than one moral actor or identity implicated in the research as a social interaction, we can ask: can there be an epistemology that can guarantee that what the researcher does or decides is ethical for the other as well? How can the researcher be safe and sure that this is the case unless he operates with a strict ethical codex (which would also amount to a paradox for the situational ethics of phronetic research)? Can the researcher be sure that he does not undermine the other’s identity by (not) saying or (not) doing something? As I will argue in detail in the following, ethical and moral issues are inherently uncertain ones, and one cannot know the result of face-to-face confrontation with the other’s singularity. Thus, as long as phronetic research assumes that the researcher as a moral actor is immune against undermining the other’s identity in any decision about him, it will have a problem, regarding ethics and morality. Any assumption of “safety” regarding the relationship between the researcher and his ethical responsibility will make it a “self-appointed” guardian of ethics. At this extreme, a romantic illusion of “verstehen” may make the inherent ambiguity of the moral encounter with the other seem less relevant. As Rob Shields argues:

The tendency of Verstehen is to seek a univocal and monological interpretation. It is predicated on the possibility of, and directed toward a synthesis. Verstehen is a pre-semiotic, romantic theory ...—in its ideal form—directed towards a relation of identity between the researcher’s and research subject’s values. That is, the identification of Self with Other. ‘Speaking-with’ is transposed into ‘speaking-as’ that Other. The ‘empathetic aspect’ of Verstehen is a flaw which silences the Other by masking the difference between Self ... and Other. (Shields 1996b)

With respect to the aesthetic and cognitive elements of phronetic research, one might also need critical scrutiny. For example, in “coming as close to reality as possible”, the notion of phronesis seems to risk coming too close to a positivistic optimism regarding the visibility of the “concrete”. But the concrete is both temporally and spatially always already mediated in the life-world, and it amounts
to naiveté to suppose that it can be grasped without mediation. Consequently, analyzing the “lived action”, embedded in time and space, is more problematical than is often maintained when one, I think rightly, prioritizes the lived action against analytical contemplation. In this context, Bourdieu’s “participant objectivation”, which necessarily has another time dimension than that of daily practices, can be criticized as well, because it presumes the possibility of the “repetition of the same” by excluding the irreversibility of time from its considerations (see Game 1991: 27).

Qualitative-quantitative distinction

Regarding qualitative research, it is generally held that it is non-positivistic, that is, it automatically has more “intimate” relations to, and thus contains more “truth” about, the studied object to which one tries to come closer in sensual terms. But such assumptions can easily result in making qualitative methods “pre-positivistic” in their nature (Bertilsson 1995: 6). It can be added that by formulating some “rulesets” about how to make qualitative research and producing more and more “guidelines”, qualitative research tradition today becomes an increasingly standardized (and thus “quantified”) body of knowledge.

Against a dichotomic understanding of quantitative and qualitative methods, Margareta Bertilsson reasserts in McLuhan’s words that “the media is the message”. Thus, because of the “panoptic character of observation techniques” (for example, winding and rewinding the interview tape endlessly by always finding new angles for seeing the established material), when we use “qualitative” research techniques in search of “mimesis”, qualitative methods risk constructing a “totalitarian” language. “With audio-visual techniques the observer ... orchestrates, conducts and constructs ‘the real’; it is not a morality without techniques which sets the limits ...” (1995: 7).

The dichotomous distinction between qualitative and quantitative methods serves to hide the role played by the material, “non-human” actors in qualitative methods. When one makes use of non-human materials especially, such as tape recorders, cameras and so on, it is almost absurd to suggest that, for example, an interview is only a “human” relationship. Thus, in line with social scientists, such as Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, one can take a single interview to be an “actor-network”, which involves both humans and non-humans in which the non-human “actors” also play an active role in the construction of realities (see the following on actor-network theory).
Regarding the qualitative-quantitative distinction, there is another forgetfulness which is equally important:

The traditional opposition between so-called quantitative methods, such as the questionnaire, and qualitative methods, such as the interview, conceals the fact that they both rest on social interaction which is brought off within the constraints of social structures. Defenders of these two categories both ignore these structures, as do ethnomethodologists, whose subjectivist view of the social world leads them to ignore the effects exerted by objective social structures not just on the interactions they record and analyse (between doctors and nurses for example), but also on their own interaction with those who are submitted to their observation or questioning. (Bourdieu 1996: 134)

Thus, to argue against the pitfalls of purely analytical observation and positivism and consequently to assert the necessity of going closer to the object should not lead us to establish another kind of positivism, or “pre-positivism”, based on the illusion of “seeing” the object through a “healthy” perspective.

“Intimate”, qualitative methods can trouble our tacit assumptions and problematize what Foucault called “facile gestures” of discourses by pointing out the hidden, familiar, unconsidered ways of seeing (1988: 154). They can, for example, function like Duchamp’s “anti-work” and displace us and our knowledge by ridiculing what is familiar in our ways of seeing (Sennett 1996). Yet, Duchamp knew the impossibility of depicting duration on the canvas and mocked the attempt to do so (Jay 1994: 206-7). Taking power over the object by coming very close to it is an illusion, or what Derrida calls “metaphysics of presence”. As in the case of Manet’s paintings, the story is always off the canvas; we cannot take power over the object. We can only “crack” the usual frames and displace perspectives and their reference points (Sennett 1996).

But, rejecting the dichotomies between quantitative and analytical research, hermeneutics and structuralism, etc., I nevertheless do not want to dismiss the qualitative methods. As Bertilsson says “the methodological power of sociology in relation to other social sciences is in the dialectic ... between the quantitative and the qualitative” (1995: 14). I would just replace the “dialectic” with the “dialogic”.

In this context, an ambivalent social theory would argue that purely analytical approaches, on the one hand, and both positivistic and intuitive approaches, on the other hand, have their own problems with respect to picturing the ongoing phenomena in its temporal duration and spatial practices. As such, it takes an ambivalent stance towards these directions and ambitions. On this basis, the
theoretical and methodological intentions and sympathies of an ambivalent social theory of immigration can perhaps be summarized in Jean Starobinski’s words:

The complete critique is perhaps not one that aims at totality (as does *le regard surplombant*) nor that which aims at intimacy (as does identifying intuition); it is the look that knows how to demand, in their turn, distance and intimacy, knowing in advance that the truth lies not in one or the other attempt, but in the movement that passes indefatigably from one to the other. One must refuse neither the vertigo of distance nor that of proximity; one must desire that double access where the look is always near to losing all its powers. (quoted in Jay 1994: 20)

The double movement, or oscillation, between distance and proximity is the fleeting ground of an ambivalent social theory. It requires neither analytical totalities nor intimacy alone, but a reckoning with both. The oscillator is a good metaphor for this social theory, which seeks to “settle” itself on this in-between location without deciding on a “master” perspective. That is also to say that it does not rush to produce single truths or judgements, but on the contrary, suspension of these, that is, interpretation in and of partial perspectives, is what motivates the oscillation.

- II -

SOME TRAJECTORIES OF AN AMBIVALENT SOCIAL THEORY

At this point I want to concretize how a more ambivalent social theory of immigration can be put into motion, or in what way it can work theoretically and empirically. In this context, we need a way of thinking which can deal with both ambivalence and systemness at the same time. The relationship between these two is not given in advance but must be thought of as a (de)stabilization process, or as a *continuum*. In this, a relational thinking based on three points will be maintained.

Firstly, as discussed in chapter 6, it will be held that order, or consistency, and chaos, or contingency, are not absolute and complete opposites to each other, but rather they are degrees on a continuum. Secondly, neither purity nor hybridity are complete opposites to each other; they are, again, degrees on a continuum. And
thirdly, order is not identical with purity just as chaos is not identical with hybridity. These three points give way to a mode of thinking that operates on two axes that intersect each other yielding four possible fields, shown in diagram 8.1.
Diagram 8.1: Different topologies of the social

By using the diagram, we can refer to non-existent, or “ideal-typical”, end-points, such as pure order, pure chaos, ordered or organized hybridity and chaotic hybridity. Here the “chaotic” can be defined, following Deleuze and Guattari, not as an absence of any determination, but as what disorganizes, dissolves and disintegrates any consistency in infinity. “Order” can be defined as “systematic consistency” (Albertsen 1995: 160). In this respect, the ambivalent will be determined as a hybrid of order and chaos that can exist on different points in relation to the axes of the diagram. That is also to say that the ambivalent is a “both/and” between chaos and systemness. In Deleuze and Guattari’s words, it is what has attained a “certain consistency without losing the diversity of different motions” (quoted in Albertsen 1995: 160; Deleuze & Guattari 1994: 42).

The diagram offers a non-essentialist starting point in that we are not necessarily confronted with phenomena that belong or should belong to the first, the second, the third or the fourth field. Rather, the question is, as mentioned, one of degree, that is, if phenomena take place “more” or “less” in a single field. But not all differences can be reduced to quantitative questions of “more” or “less”. Thus the question of “degree” must be understood both quantitatively and qualitatively. That is, by using the above diagram, we will discuss qualitative differences in kind as well as quantitative differences in degree with respect to different phenomena and different perspectives (see Deleuze 1991: 17-21).

The intention of the diagram is to undertake a classification of different theories, or a mapping of different perspectives, by relating them to the four fields of the diagram. This heterogeneous mapping will also be used to discuss the idea that different questions and problems we have been confronted with in the preceding chapters can in different times and places be localized at different points in the four fields (see also Albertsen & Diken 1997 which this undertaking builds on).

The perspectives chosen for discussion in relation to the four fields are not exhaustive with respect to the broad range of social theory. Rather, the choice of
perspectives has been made considering the central issues dwelled on in the preceding chapters. Thus, we are already acquainted with some of them, such as Bourdieu’s, Luhmann’s, Lash and Urry’s and Bauman’s theories. In addition to these theories, some others, for example, the actor-network theory, will also be introduced and discussed. The discussion is organized such that I firstly elaborate on the character of the “social”, the object of social theory, with respect to the four fields. Afterwards, some issues related to the “cultural” and the “spatial” will be discussed in relation to the diagram introduced.

The “social” as horizontal and vertical differentiation

The “social” can be conceived of as comprising social structures, institutions and collective actors. This is also what constitutes the traditional areas of social sciences. Characteristically, the social sciences examine the “social” by concepts that can set out and explain social order and systematic change. That is, order and change are not concepts which exclude each other. According to Marx, for example, only an organized proletariat could change the structure of capitalism. Another characteristic of the social theory tradition is that social order can be explained exclusively by social relationships; as Durkheim would insist, social facts should be explained by social facts. This desire for the purely “social” explains why and how sociology as a modern discipline has been built on a principle of self-referentiality by which the social, so to say, explains itself. This self-referential understanding of the social can be found in differing versions in the works of some of the most important contemporary social theorists, such as Niklas Luhmann and Pierre Bourdieu, who have both gradually formed different schools of sociological theory and empirical material.

These two theorists are, to be sure, vastly different from each other. For example Luhmann, mentioned in chapter 7, has a “horizontal” perspective over modernity (Albertsen 1994: 3), which he conceives of as being comprised of differentiated and thus separate autopoietic subsystems existing side by side. Thus, these subsystems constitute some highly autonomous regions that limit one another; but this limiting emerges, importantly, from inside each system. Differently from Luhmann’s horizontally differentiated modernity, Bourdieu perceives modernity as a “vertical” hierarchy of different fields, which are, again, demarcated from each other, but now held together via the power-hierarchy of the social space (ibid, 4).
Despite these differences, what Luhmann and Bourdieu share with each other in our context is that they both think in terms of social order and purity. Thus, in our diagram, their theories must be placed in field I. This is also because neither differentiated subsystems nor an investigation of the habitus incorporate hybridity, on the one hand, nor ambivalence, on the other, into the theory itself. For Luhmann, the ambivalence, or paradox, is present only to be temporalized and spatialized, that is, to be constantly “ordered”, which is the very logic of the functioning of the subsystems; and for Bourdieu, the ever-repeated and routinized “practices” are so hierarchically systematized that the habitus becomes an all too stable concept that does neither allow for hybridization nor for inconsistencies in it.

Hybridization, de-differentiation and networks

If we move from field I to field II in the diagram, we meet a sort of “hybridization” of the social. For example, Scott Lash and John Urry’s theory of “economies of signs and space”, which we dwelled on in chapter 7, could in our present context be taken as an example of this movement. The theory of economies of signs and space, or the disorganization thesis in general, points importantly toward interrelationships and mutual penetrations between different structures and spheres: between the “social” on the one hand and the economic and the cultural on the other; between the economy (disorganized capitalism) and cultural change (postmodernism); between the economy and political regulation; between the social and the spatial, on the one hand, and the social and the temporal, on the other; between production and consumption (e.g. of places); between industrial production and post-industrial service economies; between production of knowledge and of signs; and so on.

But as Lash and Urry underline, the “disorganization” they investigate is not chaotic. One could say that the “social”, as they conceptualize it, constitutes a “hybrid order”: whereas Luhmann’s and Bourdieu’s focus is constantly on “differentiated” modernity, theirs is very much on a trajectory of postmodern “de-differentiation” of what was held separate in simple modernity. It is significant in this context that the theory of disorganization also scrutinizes what is not differentiated. For example, as opposed to Luhmann’s differentiation thesis, Lash and Urry point out that it is possible to detect “unmodern” routes to reflexive modernization as in the German case, which is “extraordinarily undifferentiated, unindividualized and unreflexive, since corporations and the family do much of the
deciding for individuals” (Lash & Urry 1994: 190-191). In short, then, we can say that the theory of economies of signs and space takes us from field I to field II.

Another theory which can be placed in field II, and which radically challenges the “sociologism” found in field I, is the actor-network theory, put forward by innovation researchers and sociologists of science, such as Bruno Latour (1986, 1993) and Michel Callon (1986). Their framework has not been used explicitly in the preceding chapters, but since it is relevant for an ambivalent social theory, it will be reviewed here and then later connected to different questions regarding social theory and planning.

“No-one has ever seen a social relation by itself ... nor a technical relation”, says Latour (quoted in Michael 1996: 74). According to him we cannot actually speak of purely social phenomena or social actors regarding human societies:

This becomes clearer when we express its opposite: when a society is made of social elements alone it does not have a stable structure. To find such a situation one has to study not human but animal societies ... baboon societies, for instance, manage their intense social lives without the use of what we call extrasomatic resources. They build the collective body with their own bodies alone, using no resources beyond these. This leads to extreme complexity of their social skills, since they have no way of transforming a weak bond into a stronger one.... The result ... is that there is no stable structure, but rather social skills to repair constantly a decaying social order. (Latour 1986: 275)

Thus, what holds society together is the “extrasomatic” resources that are mixed with social elements and contribute to the stability of the very society. In other words, “society is not what holds us together, it is what is held together” (1986: 276). Hence, concludes Latour, something has gone wrong for social theory because of the restricted definition of the “social” as purely human relationships. Instead, one should look at how the human and the non-human are “associated” and mixed by producing hybrids between the humans and the non-humans. That is also to say that non-humans, or “objects”, are central to social interaction. At this point, another main assertion of the actor-network theory proliferates. If human society, in contrast to the baboon society, is held together by non-human elements, then this also means that in fact “we have never been modern”, because modernity has imagined the social (and the subject) as an opposition, as a complete contrast, to the “natural”. But, says Latour, these two are never found in “pure” forms; instead, what we have are hybrids between these two poles assumed by modernity: “Nature and Society are not two opposite transcendencies but one and the same growing
out of the work of mediation” (Latour 1993: 87-88). The “abyss” between the two poles of this dichotomy is thus, because of the mediation based on proliferation of “hybrids” in-between the “social” and the non-social, a “continuous gradient”. In other words, what we have is a continuum between nature and society, which is indeed, as we will see, also a strong argument against both epistemological realism and social constructivism.

The actor-network theory does not mention a purely social network, but hybrids of social (human) and non-social (technological, natural, material) elements. Furthermore, it is characteristic for the actor-network theory that, in contrast to Bourdieu and Luhmann who in their own ways conceive of modernity as differentiation, it is interested in how transversal networks are created across limits of the differentiated regions in modernity (Albertsen 1994: 12). In other words, whereas Luhmann is horizontal in his perspective, and Bourdieu vertical, Latour conceives of the “social” as transversal hybrids of the human and the non-human. But while this is a fundamental difference between these perspectives, the actor-network theory is, interestingly in our context, similar to its sociological rivals in that, as we will see, it also has the predominant interest for order. But the order now is a hybrid one, which shows how what is horizontally and vertically differentiated becomes now de-differentiated again in a stable and consistent way.

To understand the differences better, we must dwell on the question of how an actor-network is constructed. In this context, we can focus on some of the most important analytical concepts of the theory, their relations to the processes of ordering and the important role of the non-humans.

A central analytical tenet of this theory is the concept of “free association”, which means “the repudiation of a priori distinctions between the social and the natural or the technological” (Michael 1996: 53). “Actors”, which can be both human and non-human, are multifaceted entrepreneurs who engage in mobilizing human and non-human “intermediaries”, which can be any medium defining the roles of humans and non-humans in a network. An “actor” is in other words the “author” of the action that brings intermediaries together. Thus actors are “those who conceive, elaborate, circulate, emit or pension off intermediaries, and the division between actors and intermediaries is a purely practical matter” (Callon; quoted in Michael 1996: 55). In this context, it might be useful to return for a moment to Wittgenstein’s example about “language games”, which we dwelled on in relation to discursive practices in chapter 2. By using Wittgenstein’s example of building a wall, we saw that action and speech work together in the context of pragmatics. To be able to conceive this same phenomenon as a network, Latour, for
example, would go further and add that we also have to look at the “activity of the brick” as a medium for the social (discursive) activity taking place.

How, then, does the action of an actor take place in building a network? Mike Michael explains this in three stages. Firstly, an actor must engage in “interessement” of relevance to others, that is, he or she or it must persuade others that something is really what they want to be. Secondly, an actor must be able to persuade others about his (or its) own importance in helping them to become what interessement proclaims to be significant; in other words, an actor must be able to “translate” oneself into the role of being indispensable, a process called “translation”. Thirdly, if others grant their obedience by their own consent, then a process of “enrolment” takes place. If these three actions take place successfully, then we can speak of a “durable” network in which actors and intermediaries converge despite their heterogeneity.

Something very important in this respect is that the actor-network theory holds the possibility that this “durability” of the network is always relative and open to destabilization. To see this, we make use of the relationship between enrolment and power. For Latour, power is not something one “has” in inertia, as a potential, which then is spread by a diffusion. Such an understanding of power has the following paradox, which also makes it useless for theoretical investigation: “when you simply have power—in potentia—nothing happens and you are powerless; when you exert power—in actu—others are performing the action and not you” (Latour 1986: 264-5). Thus, Latour says that we must investigate power, not as inertia like a diffusion model would conceive it, but by using a “translation model” for which the initial power does not solely count for events and which takes the view that power is never translated in its entirety by different actors in the chain of networks. In the translation model, my power can be detected in others’ activities “in actu”, not in my hands. “History is full of people who, because they believed social scientists and deemed power to be something you can possess and capitalise, gave orders no one obeyed!” (Latour 1986: 265).

According to the translational model, which understands power as a relation, power can stop being effective at any time along the chain of the network if the next person(s) along the chain does not accept the enrolment actively. Concomitantly, the medium of power, the “token”, is as such not passive either, because active actors change and (re)shape the token as it moves through the network. In short, power in the translational model, just like society itself, cannot be defined as existing a priori, rather it is something achieved by enrolling many heterogeneous actors. That is, power is something that proliferates in “performative” practices. “Instead of the transmission of the same token—you get,
[in the translation model], the continuous \textit{transformation} of the token. When, as a result of unusual circumstances, it is made to stay the same, this is what requires an explanation” (Latour 1986: 268). In other words, it is not the “destability” of power relations (or of enrolments in general) that is astonishing; rather it is “stability” that requires explanation because it is what is extraordinary.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Gellerup as an actor-network}
\end{center}

Can one use the actor-network theory in our context? Let us now try to dwell on this question briefly before we go on. If we look at immigrant settlements like Gellerup as an actor-network, what we constantly have to focus on is the relationship between human (the social) and non-human actors, things, whose mutual relations define the very network. It can be said that the actor-network in Gellerup is maintained and stabilized as an immigrant culture by a physical infrastructure (even if it was originally designed and built for other population segments) and other “things”.

At this point, a short reflection on the theories of hybridity could be useful. In chapter 5, by criticizing these theories partly, I distinguished between hybrid “identities” and pure “identifications”. But this distinction of identity and identification rests on an a priori distinction between the non-human objects (recall the examples of pizza, the satellite dishes, etc.) and the human subjects’ “social” relations (e.g. social identifications). This separation is entirely problematic in the context of the actor-network theory. Seen in its perspective, such criticisms of the theories of hybridity recourse to a “sociologism” and force us to separate the social from the intermediary non-humans, or “objects”.

To be able to discuss the “social” Gellerup as a construction in the form of an actor-network, one must be able to show three complementary relations: firstly, that the social feature of Gellerup is a construction that is actively maintained by consistent translations; secondly, that there are identifiable human and non-human intermediaries actively shaping the “social” relations in practice; and thirdly, that there are emerging stabilizations as a consequence of these.

What is constantly sought to be translated for places like Gellerup is an agglomeration of issues like integration, multiculturalism, dispersion, concentration, activation, etc. which have been mentioned before in detail. The translation mechanisms of immigration aim at constituting subject positions for actors to be
enrolled into the network. The intermediaries we focus on can be cultural (e.g. maintaining some life forms); physical (cultural artefacts, the physical space, flags, etc.); and institutional (such as those of welfare state institutions, the economic subsystem, political arrangements, housing laws, etc.). What is interesting in the context of the actor-network theory is that these do not automatically form a stable order despite all intentions, and if this happens, this order remains contingent so that the consistencies attained may fall apart. Thus, we have to look not only at which parts of the power discourses are translated and at how immigrants and other actors are enrolled, but also at which parts of these discourses do not succeed in the translation and enrolment processes.

A good example of the first possibility, where translation and enrolment is successfully managed, can be found regarding welfare state arrangements. But as Latour underlines, power relations emerging in this context do not get diffused without being changed by actors’ acts. That is, the tokens of power are not only “transmitted”. On the contrary, they are, for example in the case of the welfare schemes (see chapter 7), hybridized and “transformed” to different ends by the actors. Perhaps precisely because of this capacity, actors actively consent to enrolment in this case. Another good example of successful translation and enrolment, though again partly, is the discourse of multiculturalism: many actors, especially those who professionally engage in what is called the “ethnic relations industry”, willingly accept enrolment (that is, for example, their own and others’ subject positions), and this significantly contributes to the stabilization of the order of the discourse, and of the order of things.

But this stability is, nevertheless, relative and unstable. For example, even though the discourse of multiculturalism is translated to a considerable degree in this actor-network, it is, by way of “mimicry” (see chapter 4) negated or transformed in many circumstances. Likewise, it is mentioned that the main message behind the discourse of immigration, the temporality of the “Danish Home”, which firmly distinguishes between “us” and “them” and sets immigrants “aside” as “latecomers”, is transformed either by way of mimicry or by creating temporalities and “homes” other than that of the repressive temporality of the Danish “Home”. From the perspective of the actor-network theory, it is furthermore very significant to note that the construction of those “other” temporalities and diasporic identities are heavily interrelated to “fetish” objects, or, now we can say, the “non-humans”.

Now, just because “society” is impossible without non-humans, for Latour, complete anti-fetish is also impossible. With reference to scientific laboratory work, he says that processes in which scientific “facts” are constructed seem in fact very
much like fetish-cultivation, which also explains why scientists always speak of “something more”, or “black holes”, which cannot be grasped or formulated. “Facts” which are “constructed” in laboratories are neither already existing “realities” that are excavated by the scientist (as realists would argue), nor purely discursive formations (the way social constructivism would see them). For Latour, even though facts are “constructed”, they still say something about realities; and even though they are “realities”, they are still constructed. To come out from the false dichotomy between social constructivism (underlining the “fetish” character of the facts) and realism (insisting on a priori facts), Latour thus coins a hybrid concept, “faitiches”, or in English “factish” (see Latour 1987; 1996).

Were the international laws the Municipality of Aarhus so eagerly opposed “facts” or “fetishes”? Or, is the discussion about the “concentration or dispersion” of immigrants in or from specific, “socially burdened” areas “factual” or “fetishistic”? At any rate, what they clearly show is that some non-human actors (in the first case, “laws” and in the second, the physical space) are significantly incorporated elements of Gellerup as an actor-network and play important roles in the stabilization or destabilization of this network. For example, in the concentration/dispersion debate, one pole of argumentators, typically the municipalities and the central government, restlessly point out a parallel between cultural and spatial concentration, which then legitimizes the will to dispersion. The opposite pole in the argument, those who support the idea of concentration, asserts that concentration is a powerful factor in the stabilization of immigrant cultures. Both views thus agree that space, the non-human, matters in that there is a relationship between stabilization of immigrant cultures and spatial patterns. But then they disagree as to the ends: the first pole tries to stabilize the Danish culture by geographically dispersing immigrant concentrations, whereas the other pole tries to stabilize immigrant cultures. What is also shared in both views is a static understanding of stabilization; thus, both views are culturally deterministic and perceive stabilization not in a transformational but in a transmissional way. The actor-network perspective would argue against both of these perspectives in that, firstly, the stabilization processes are much more relative and sensitive to changes, and secondly, in addition to the spatial stabilizers of the social (as physical space), there may be other elements in a network: an actor-network consists of many more heterogeneous elements which cannot be “reduced” to one determining causality. It naturally follows that, if a single other element is changed, this can also effectively change the actor-network itself. For example, if the economic conditions are changed, as the Urban Committee tried to do by lowering the rents in “socially burdened” areas to stop the out-movement of Danish families with stronger
resources, then they can have an effect on the translation mechanisms at work and thus on the overall composition of the actor-network. But nevertheless, we must not speak of any deterministic factor. Thus, if the strategy of the Urban Committee has failed until today in Gellerup, this only means that other translation mechanisms, e.g. the stigmatized image of the place, the economic conditions of the dwellers, social and physical segregation, and so on, are more effective.

The actor-network theory offers a dynamic framework to understand the relatively stable (and thus relatively unstable) character of the “social” order as a network, and I will continue to use it as the plot of this chapter and the next one develops.

**Action and practice**

The relationship between field I and field II in the diagram can be characterized so that if one is located in field I, then one would have difficulty in seeing the stabilizing effects of transversal actor-networks with respect to differentiated (modern) social phenomena. In this context, for example, the concept of “capital” Bourdieu uses would be too static compared to a relational, or translational, understanding of power, which Latour argues for by dissolving the notion of power held in favour of diffused Foucouladian micro-powers and by extending power to non-humans (see Latour 1986: 279). On the other hand, if one is located in field II, (especially in the actor-network theory), the contribution of differentiated systems to this stabilization will generally be difficult to observe. For example, it is difficult for the actor-network theory to say something about the circumstances under which order is considerably stabilized. Thus, Lash criticizes the actor-network theory by comparing it to Bourdieu’s “habitus”:

... Action theory posits, at least implicitly, a disembedded, cost-minimizing and benefit-maximizing, preference-scheduled actor. Habitus exists only as situated in its “world”. Action theory is often “constructivist”, in which agency is the motive force behind structure as for example in “actor-networks”. Habitus, in contrast, assumes a certain “thrownness” into a web of already existing practices and meanings. (Lash 1994: 156)

Above, Lash attacks the actor-network theory and its conceptualization of “action” by referring to the habitus and the concept of “practice”, which we dwelled
on before. It is right that the actor-network theory is badly equipped for an understanding of very durable and stable practices that are formed and repeated over much longer time spans than the actor-network theory operates with. But what must also be underlined is that Bourdieu does not operate with a theory of action in the way the actor-network theory understands it either. Whereas in Bourdieu’s theory one can speak of original actors who are something in themselves before they act, the actor-network theory operates with actors who or which are not given; everything and all actors in a network are mediatory and related to something else (see Latour 1994: 601). So I want to argue that, instead of “either/or”, we can make use of a “both/and” logic regarding this difference between the two theories: Bourdieu’s “practices” are useful to understand stability in differentiated systems, which turns our attention to “traditions”, whereas the actor-network theory is more useful to explain stability and potential instability in de-differentiated networks, which turns our attention to “innovations”. (It is, one could add, no coincidence that, for example, both Latour and Callon are innovation researchers.)

In short, for an ambivalent social theory, both can be useful at the same time to understand what does change and what does not. Moreover, what is interesting and relevant from this point of view is to concentrate on more durable practices in action and more unstable processes of action (or innovation) in practice instead of dichotomization of the two perspectives. For example, can one not imagine a “reflective practitioner” as theorized by Donald Schön (1983)? As John Forester points out, Schön convincingly shows “how practitioners ‘reflect in action’ as they make moves, evaluate the results of those moves, and reconsider the working theories that guided those moves.... But [this] ... presumes a good deal of practical knowledge on the practitioner’s part. Before moves can be refined ... the practitioner needs to have taken a role in an institutional and political world. Not only are the roles typically ambiguous, but the political world is fluid as well ...” (Forester 1996: 524). This important issue will be revisited vis-à-vis planning, which is closely related to the question of action.

**Fluids, flows and ambivalence**

Now we can return to our diagram and conclude that the theoretical perspectives mentioned so far can be placed on the axis of order, but there are differences between them in that, whereas field I perspectives are best for putting forth what is
stabile and continuous, whether it is an autopoietic system or hierarchically ordered social space and habitus, field II perspectives focus on open-ended stabilization processes in which the possibility that stabilization does not succeed is internalized in the theory. In this, the actor-network theory moves further to field III. Thus, Michael writes that:

... if networks are multiplicious and multidimensional ... it might be the case ... that they are rendered durable by the way that actors at once occupy the margins and the core, are the most outspoken critics and the most ardent stalwarts, are simultaneously insiders and outsiders—in sum, are ambivalent. (Michael 1996: 65)

“Hence”, says Michael, the “actor-network is characterized by ambiguous associations, multiple identities and ambivalent discourse” (1996: 66). But, as is most often the case in the actor-network theory, it seems that Michael points out ambivalence here in preparation for showing how this ambivalence is “uncovered” and internalized by an actor-network and thus becomes a functional part of it: hence “[i]t is the necessary ambivalence of ... that allows the ... actor-network to be maintained in the very dynamism and complexity of its functioning” (Michael 1996: 67). In short, much actor-network theory is still largely focused on ordering mechanisms and the functioning of “order”. There are, though, other examples of a more explicit recognition of fluidity and ambivalence of the “social” in the actor-network theory; thus, Mol and Law speak of social space as “fluid”:

“The social” doesn’t exist as a single spatial type. Rather, it performs several kinds of space in which different “operations” take place. First, there are regions in which objects are clustered together and boundaries are drawn around each cluster. Second, there are networks in which distance is a function of the relations between the elements and difference a matter of relational variety. These are the two topologies with which the social theory is familiar. The first is old and secure, while the second, being newer, is still proud of its ability to cross boundaries. However, there are other kinds of space too, ... [where] neither boundaries nor relations mark the difference between one place and another. Instead, sometimes boundaries come and go, allow leakage or disappear altogether, while relations transform themselves without fracture. Sometimes, then, social space behaves like a fluid. (Mol & Law 1994: 641)

To understand the social as “regions” corresponds to the thinking found in field I in our diagram, just as Luhmann’s, Bourdieu’s and Habermas’ theories do. Society as
“networks” is the thinking found in field II. But in field III, the social is neither solid nor stable. “It is all contingent” because it is fluid, and thus the study of fluids is a study of “flows” (Mol & Law 1994: 663-4). This idea turns our attention explicitly toward field III. But in Mol and Law’s article, which is quite extraordinary regarding the range of the actor-network theory and which explicitly aims at distancing itself from this framework (see the status of the society as “networks” in the above quotation), we get only a glimpse of the broad range of the issues that can be related to field III.

Regarding an explicit sociological thinking in field III, we can revisit Bauman’s theory (see, for example, also Game 1991 for a deconstructivist offer of “undoing the social”, which in our context can be localized in field III).

From “habitus” to “habitat”

For Bauman, it is significant that social theory was born as a “modern” discourse and as such it has, as long as the social scientist pretends to be a “legislator” as opposed to an “interpreter”, legitimized the social condition of modernity and its illusions by picturing modern history “as a movement with a direction” (Bauman 1992b: 188; see also 1987 and 1993). But today, having seen what ambitions (of universality, homogeneity, monotony and clarity), most eagerly sought by modernity, meant in the “century of camps”, we are left without those illusions. The “chance” that postmodernity as a social condition offers is hence not the building of fundamentals but rather settlements on plurality, variety, contingency and ambivalence. What would be most wrong with this condition is for Bauman to continue practising “modern” social theory in the face of an increasingly “postmodern” society. Social theory must leave its traditional preoccupation with social totality understood as cohesiveness, equilibration, coherence of values or functions. Needless to say, for Bauman, this does not mean that it is impossible to speak of any “systemness” in postmodernity, which he in some earlier formulations defined as a “viable social system” building on an analysis of the consumer society (Bauman 1988b: 811; see also Warde 1994 for a critique from a field I perspective). Thus Bauman initially differentiated between a “postmodern sociology”, which is a pragmatic and “mimetic” response to postmodern condition, and a “sociology of postmodernity”, which tries to understand relations between systemic reproduction and social integration by focusing on the “last frontier” of the system, that is, the sphere of consumption. But in Bauman’s later work, these two types of
sociology increasingly merged into each other making the distinction above somewhat more ambivalent.

Hence, “all order that can be found is a local, emergent and transitory phenomenon”, just like a “whirlpool appearing in the flow of a river” (Bauman 1992b: 189). Thus, any theory of postmodernity “must be free of the metaphor of progress”. For such a sociology, which breaks with rationalization, systematization and universalization, Bauman proposes the concept of “habitat”, which is significantly different from “habitus” and which takes us, in a Simmelian route, away from the idea of “society”, assumed traditionally as a totality prior to its constitutive parts, to the idea of “sociality”, conveying the “processual modality of social reality” and defined as a “play of randomness and pattern ... of freedom and dependence” (Bauman 1992b: 190). Habitat is thus a concept that focuses on agency; as such, it is the context in which agency operates. But unlike the system-like social theories, “habitat neither determines the conduct of the agents nor defines its meaning” (Bauman 1992b: 190).

Habitat is a complex system, that is, it is unpredictable and uncontrollable by statistical factors because no single goal-setting, organizational agency is determinant in it. In this condition of plurality, agents are “only partly determined” by what they institutionalize as their purposes. Thus, habitat “appears as a space of chaos and chronic indeterminacy, a territory subject to rival and contradictory meaning-bestowing claims and hence perpetually ambivalent. All states the habitat may assume appear equally contingent.... ‘next moves’ displaces, therefore, ... the deterministic chains” (Bauman 1992b: 193). In habitat, it is the performative, non-cumulative, self-constitutional activities that create the identity of agents, which also displaces “life-projects” assuming long-term stabilities. Construction of identities is closely related to the body (as the material, carrier and executor of the construction activity), and symbolic tokens of belonging, the availability of which, as resources for construction activity, matter in that non-access to them is a source of inequality (Bauman 1992b: 191-6).

The concept of habitat is very close to an understanding of the “social” as fluid, similar to the way Mol and Law understand it. Both concepts explicitly affirm ambivalence and indeterminacy.

Is the “social” Bauman describes totally chaotic and indeterminate? If we read Bauman further, we will find some other traces which are interesting for an ambivalent social theory. For this purpose, we can shortly compare Bauman’s social theory with Baudrillard’s, which pictures a world composed of full-fledged, or “absolute”, chaos and ambivalence. Everything is simulation, or even hyper-
simulation, in Baudrillard’s postmodern world. In complete chaos and indeterminacy, all that was solid in modern “society” is decomposed and thus the social is “imploded”. The social no longer exists. As Rojek and Turner say, if we use Bauman’s distinction between legislators and interpreters, both Simmel (who understood the “social” not as “society” but as “sociality”) and Baudrillard would be “interpreters”. What they both share is a preference for phenomenologically grounded explanations and a denigration of the orthodox social theoretical understanding of society and symbolic exchange as an object, an ordered being, rather than a change, becoming. However:

... it would be rash to assume an evolutionary link between the two.... For one thing, Simmel retained the concept of the social. As a genuine fin de millenium and fin de monde figure Baudrillard argues that the social has imploded. In Simmel there is the acknowledgement of an emotional content to life, while in Baudrillard’s media-fixated universe emotions have been neutralized by the blue glare of the TV screen.... (Rojek & Turner 1993: xiii)

Bauman’s “spiritual father” is Simmel. In line with this, he conceives of Baudrillardian social theory as a useful “travelogue” to postmodernity, but further questions it from the point of view of its “leftovers”, that is, from the point of view of the “social”, which is now “imploded”, or perhaps rather transformed, into “masses” in Baudrillard’s theory:

Baudrillard’s work may be usefully read as a travelogue of a visitor to a country not all (not many?) have had so far a chance (and not all, at any realistic stretch of time, are likely to have a chance) to explore. The problem is that those who in the land now left behind used to supply the formulae of emancipatory criticism, moved massively to that other country the others do not know, and show unmistakable symptoms of settling down in their new habitat. From their new residence, those others who did not (could not, wished not to) follow them, look baffling: frightening, like les classes dangereux of yore, but unlike them impotent and placid: the masses (as distinct from players), whose indifference ‘is their true, their only practice’..... Of the morphology of that mysterious leftover Baudrillard has little to say—and so he flatly denies that there is a morphology to speak of. One wonders. (Bauman 1993b: 45)

If we re-use the metaphor of the archipelago, which we borrowed from Bauman before, we could say that Baudrillard’s social theory of complete indeterminacy and
chaos could be read as a travelogue of the navigator moving in the vast sea of ambivalence. But there are, in the archipelago, also islands of order some of which are stable (like Bourdieu’s habitus, Luhmann’s systems) while others are unstable (like actor-networks). Now, we could add, there are also different “habitats” to be found on those islands of cognitive spacing. This is one of the points we can make with respect to field III in our diagram. But we also approach another, perhaps most central, point in Bauman’s social theory here.

Morality: the deep-water fish in the sea of ambivalence

In Postmodern Ethics, Bauman placed ambivalence into the hearth of the “social”, something which makes any simplistic assumption about plurality of perspectives in fields I, II and III, and about any mechanistic relation or even a “dialectic” synthesis among them, terribly problematic. Here the issue is ethics and its relation to morality. Let us begin, as Bauman does, by distinguishing between ethics and morality. Ethics is modern and thus universalistic and rationalist (see Bauman 1993: 8); it has, as Bauman defines it following Leininas, hitherto consisted of an engagement with formulation of a foundationalist, supra-individual, or a “social”, rule-set, an ethical codex, about how individual human beings must organize their conduct with each other. In other words, it has been an engagement with being with the other. The natural implication of such an understanding is that we are moral because we live in a society, which modern philosophy (for example, of Hobbes) and modern social theory have told us. On the contrary, argues Bauman, we live in a society because we can be moral, that is, the moral is not only a pure addition to the social. The most important issue in this context is that morality is an irrational and personal matter; in other words, whereas ethics seeks to establish a system, morality remains as an impulse, a strong contrast between the two. Thus, Levinas says, “the relationship between men is certainly the non-synthesizable par excellence” (1985: 77).

... Ethics, in Levinas’s sense, is an Ethics without law and without concept, which maintains its non-violent purity only before being determined as concepts and laws.... let us not forget that Levinas does not seek to determine a morality, but rather the essence of the ethical relation in general. But as this determination does not offer itself as a theory of Ethics, in question then, is an Ethics of Ethics. (Derrida 1978: 111)
The “morality” Levinas and Bauman speak of is impulsive, spontaneous and unregulated; it is bound up with face to face relations of two persons before the “social”, the third party, intervenes. Thus “morality comes before ontology”, which of course must be understood not empirically (because empirically ontology precedes morality in that one is first involved before responding to the other morally), but philosophically, as a phenomenological gesture, a shock, where one faces moral responsibility. In this sense, as Bauman formulates it, morality is like “sobering up” from intoxication of being. Morality is also related to taking an active and asymmetrical “responsibility” for the other, whereas ethics speaks of “obligations” for the strong, external and supra-personal authorities. Hence, morality is oriented to the weak; it is about demanding rights for others, not for oneself.

We could perhaps use a concrete example to illustrate the point that the moral act comes before cognitive thinking about one’s obligations. For instance, faced with the dilemma of hiding or not hiding a Jew during the Nazi period, the chance that a German family would “decide” to hide him by thinking rationally would be very limited, because this would be both incongruent with the dominant ethical codex and its “obligations”, and too dangerous for the family. The point is, then, that the family would only have the option of hiding the Jew impulsively. Naturally it does not follow that the family automatically would choose to hide the Jew if it decides impulsively. But the important thing is that it gives a chance compared to a heteronomous ethical codex, which takes the burden of decision, responsibility, and autonomy away from the actors.

That is also to say that the moral situation is an ambivalent one; one does not, and cannot, know the result of the face to face confrontation with the other’s singularity, his face. Thus morality stands in opposition to ethics because it cannot be formulated as a rule-set: the only yardstick one can employ is the responsibility for the other knowing, at the same time, that too much of it would cause domination, whereas lack of it would amount to indifference. Thus the moral actor would never feel certain with respect to being moral: confronted with the “unspoken demand” (Løgstrup) from the other, or the “unconditional responsibility” towards the other (Levinas), there would never be a definitive description, or law, as to how one can “caress”, or “touch”, without squeezing or “grasping” at one extreme and without becoming “indifferent” to, by turning one’s face away from, the other at the other extreme (see Bauman 1993: 92-4).

Thus, says Bauman, morality is a deep-water fish; that is, as soon as you embark on defining it, it dies. This is not surprising in that the moral self is born in a condition of uncertainty. In other words, uncertainty is not only dangerously
uncertain, but it is simply the home ground for morality. Thus, if we can be social because we can be moral, the basis of society also becomes ambivalent. One could perhaps say that, for Latour, society is “what is held together” by hybrids, and that, in a parallel manner, for Bauman, society is not what holds us together but what is held together by morality and its ambivalence. What Latour and Bauman share in common is an attack on sociologism and thus the view that it is society that holds us together. But whereas Latour put forth the idea that we can be moral because we live with “things” (1992: 225-7), according to Bauman, morality comes from a “void”, the impulsive moral self. It has no cause even though classic social theory tries to find a cause for it.

In searching for an unambiguous fundament, a cause, modernity has tried to relocate the uncertainty of the moral self outside the single person. It has tried to formulate a rationalist ethical codex independent of who uses it, that is, independent of moral actors. Seen in this way, modernity has been “ethical”, but not “moral”: as long as ethical philosophies aimed at universalistic or individualistic (recall the autonomous subject of the Egotistic totality) laws for humans to be with each other, they have promoted social heteronomy and discipline regarding the moral autonomy of the impulsive moral actor as a mode of being for the other. Bauman calls this disciplinary process of ethical neutralization “adiaphorization”: the “society” with its bureaucratic institutions and social structures, organized according to principles of procedural rationality and functional differentiation, has been both a necessity and a consequence of this emancipation of actions from the moral actor’s capacity (Bauman 1993: 125-128; see also Christensen 1995: 99-101).

We have seen that orthodox social theory has pretended that the “social” could be taken as a totality exterior to the moral actor. Now, in field III of our diagram, we can say that an ontological definition of the “social” as something that is ethically (or rather morally) neutral is impossible. The issue of moral uncertainty takes us thus from field I (purity and order), through field II (hybrid order), to field III (hybridity and ambivalence).

As Derrida points out above, for Levinas, the condition of morality is a singular “purity” as opposed to systems of totality. Ethics understood as morality comes thus before everything else ontological, like society. But it was underlined that this purity is not an empirical but a philosophical one. Furthermore, one can say, the “social” in field III is always a “sociality”, which is also hybrid in that, as was mentioned before in relation to Levinas and Bakhtin, it is impossible to imagine a totally independent, atomised, actor or a “solitary ego”. Sociality is not based on “I”-“It” relations in which an abstract ego considers the other as an exterior raw material, but on “I”-“Thou” relations in which actors are to be understood
dialogically, or where self-hood is, as Bakhtin says, a “gift” from the other (see Gardiner 1996: 141). Or as Lasse Dencik formulates it: “... there is always somebody to whom we orient ourselves.... society is not comprised of individuals. Two is more than one plus one.... Two is the condition of life and the starting point for the individual person’s identity. A solitary person is the shadow of nobody” (Dencik 1996; my translation). Now we can ask: what happens to the “social” if we move to field IV?

The socius: pure chaos

Here the “social” is replaced with what Lars-Henrik Schmidt (1993) has called “socius”, which is, as we will see, a pure form of “sociality”. Whereas the “social” is related in fields I and II to structures, institutions and collective actors, “sociality” is more about informal interactions among individuals. In this sense, “sociality” is neither Gesellschaft nor Gemeinschaft, neither society nor culture, but something third. Georg Simmel described this pure sociality as “sociability”, as sociality to be found, so to say, in “pure culture”. It is found, for example, in ordinary politeness in people’s dealings with each other, and it is according to Simmel “the sublime symbol of the social” (Ørnstrup 1989: 46). Schmidt uses the concept of “socius” for the same phenomenon (Schmidt’s use of this concept must not be confused with the concept of “socius” used by Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 1987).

According to Schmidt, its characteristic is that, on the one hand, socius is the most important social bond among people, and on the other, it functions exactly by virtue of that it is not thematized as such. As soon as it is thematized and drawn out of its silent existence, it becomes ambivalent and conflictual. Thus, socius exists only as “pure sociality”, as sociability, in a non-thematized condition and unconnected to pragmatic interests and necessities. It is also necessarily unstable, without extrasomatic resources or, in other words, “hybrids”. Socius shows itself in that type of conversation that is carried for its own sake and that does not seek conclusive judgements; it is a temporary “settlement” that is open for continuous conversation and suspension of judgement. Thus, what holds the “socius” together is “settlement”.

In this context, in a rather rough summary, Schmidt’s argument is that even though modernity has meant a parcelling-out of values like the true, the good and the beautiful into different spheres (such as science, ethics and aesthetics), some
“ideals” have served to hold a common ground, despite their differentiation. For Nietzsche, the ideal that served as a common ground for different spheres was asceticism (Schmidt 1993: 5). Schmidt mentions the concept of “quality” as another example: quality is an aesthetic category which signifies an ideal and thus “collects associates” in other fields like science and the moral field.

No-one disputes the value of quality.... Quality is not a unifying ideal but something we hold in common. But then again: one could not identify those who hold this in common. So it is not an ideal for anybody and it is not an ideal for everybody. It is the preference of all. Who are ‘all’?, you might ask, and the answer is: no body; all(as)one is nobody. Between anybody and everybody, between society and community we find what we are looking for. We are looking for the preference of all in its unidentifiable status, and we shall call the stratum corresponding to the dilemma between society and community for socius. (Schmidt 1993: 6-7)

The concept of quality, which has no substance in itself and hence exists only in articulations with something else, becomes a common ground, a conflictual balance, or a “settlement”, that holds society and the community together. “The conflictual balance is taste, and the capacity related to taste and preference is not understanding, reasoning or judging but the ability to settle the argument”. “What is intriguing about taste is the fact that it has no fixed procedure. Taste is not judging but settling” (Schmidt 1993: 8). According to Schmidt, “taste” reduces ambivalence, whereas scientific understanding reduces complexity, and traditional reasoning is about rationalization.

In our terms, or in our diagram, what is reduced in “socius” is not so much ambivalence as such, but rather hybridity. Perhaps more aptly, what is reduced is ambivalence as hybridity (which is opposed to purity), not ambivalence as the chaotic (which is opposed to order). If anything, the socius is not ordered. If we, then, use the term “socius” as a common concept for “pure socialities”, in which not chaos but hybridity is reduced, then the “socius” must be located in field IV. Socius is, as such, pure and unstable. Paradoxically, it looks very much like the sociality of baboon societies, which are also pure because they are not underpinned by non-human elements and are therefore also unstable, as was discussed before in relation to Latour’s theory.

But this all does not mean that the socius cannot be stabilized, if necessary. Pure conversational sociability can perhaps, with the help of stabilizers, such as socially disposable time, be stabilized for some (but not all) people. But if socius is
stabilized, then it ceases to be socius. In this context, one must also ask if such a stabilization of socius is desirable for all and recall, regarding the time necessary for sociability and conversation in endlessness without pragmatic conclusions, that not everybody (unlike philosophers, humanists and social scientists, and the intellectual overclasses) has endless time for a generalized socius life. As Bourdieu says, “what the philosophers, sociologists and all in the profession of thinking about the world have the greatest chances of ignoring are the ... social conditions of possibility for the scholastic view ... [that] we have the time, all our time; and this freedom from the urgent ... is made possible by an assembly of economic and social conditions, by the existence of those reserves of free time, which are accumulated economic resources” (Bourdieu 1994: 223; my translation). Thus, before making any generalization from the habitat of intellectuals toward social life “as such”, one should remember that history is already fully saturated with respect to “legislative” ambitions by which intellectuals become self-appointed knowers of the good life for others.

Having said this, one must explicate another point that might be important with respect to relations between field III and field IV. Bauman’s (and Simmel’s) stranger also looks like an example of pure sociality. Thus, the strangerhood of the stranger is alone grounded on a social “us/them” relation. Which cultural content or which locally embedded “substance” the stranger comes from, and what his or her cultural, social, geographical “baggage” is, are as such not decisive; at any rate, the stranger becomes categorized in an us/them relation. But, significantly, Bauman’s stranger is also the one who destabilizes socius’s conversing pure sociability. The “us/them” relation brought forth by the stranger introduces “hybridity” to socius. If socius is a silent, a presumed “we”, then it ceases to remain the same after the intrusion of the stranger. The stranger thus “disturbs the comfortable quiet way of life by asking questions no one among the ‘locals’ remembers being asked, let alone answered. Such questions make puzzles out of evident things: they defamiliarize the familiar” (Bauman 1990: 15). The result is that, if the socius tries to be reflexive towards both itself and its stranger, it also becomes transformed into sociality, that is, it becomes more hybrid. Thus, one could say, Bauman’s stranger brings hybridity to socius which is, in advance, unstable and chaotic.

**Fields, qualitative differences, and “series”**
In the following, we will add some other dimensions (like the “cultural” and the “spatial”) to our diagram; this will increase its complexity. But already here we can discuss some of the implications regarding immigration. My main thesis is that perspectives and problems in any field of the diagram can be related to other perspectives and problems in other fields—which is also to say that there is an epistemological continuum and a relation of complementarity between the fields. But the four fields cannot solve each other’s problems (even if, for example, field I can consciously avoid blocking other fields like III and IV). This is mainly due to qualitative differences \textit{in kind} among the perspectives and the phenomena. To illustrate how these qualitative differences as well as continuity can be thought of in our context, we can conceive the fields of our diagram as what Deleuze calls “series”. Series are heterogeneously organized by difference:

Each series tells a story: not different points of view on the same story, like the different points of view on the town we find in Leibniz, but completely distinct stories which unfold simultaneously.... Each series explicates or develops itself, but \textit{in} its difference from the other series which it implicates and which implicate it. (Deleuze 1994: 123-4)

We can, for example, imagine some distinct series evolving around the concepts of “habitus”, “network”, “habitat” and “socius”, by relating each of them to a wider conceptual frame. Or, some other sets of series can be imagined regarding the heterogeneous movement between the elements of these concepts, for example, from “habitus” to “habitat”, or from “differentiation” to “de-differentiation”, etc. All these possible series will be epistemologically contiguous and complementary: they constitute different aspects of the “social”, while “each series exists only by virtue of the return of the others” (Deleuze 1994: 69). In other words, they are all “parasitic” on each other (see Serres 1980).

But these qualitatively different concepts cannot be reduced to each other or united in a single vision, an argument which is relevant especially when we focus on ontological questions regarding how the world is. We can speak of a “meta-theoretical” single vision uniting these perspectives and, thus, different fields of our diagram only as long as we can assume that different concepts (such as habitus, habitat, etc.) show “the same story” from different angles. But, as Deleuze points out above, these concepts, or perspectives, also construct “distinct stories” with respect to how and what the world, or the “town” in the above quotation, ontologically is.
Hence, in opposition to what methodological pluralism of “passive perspectivism” would maintain, the “active perspectivism” of an ambivalent social theory is aware that the different fields give different opportunities for different presentations and re-presentations which also construct different objects (objects that are, so to say, not “facts” but “factisch”). Thus, the different fields in the diagram are not necessarily different “regions” as Luhmann, Bourdieu and Habermas would understand them.

Let me now present an illustration of this way of thinking, to be developed later in the context of the planning discussion.

As can be seen in the preceding chapters, the Danish discussion of the “social” regarding immigration has taken place mainly in field I. Thus, in the discourse of immigration, one often sees ambitions aiming at solving problems related to fields III and IV by regulating and institutionalizing the phenomena related to immigration. Let us, for instance, recall an example from chapter 2, where, in the context of a murder, a case used to illuminate some of the main assumptions of the discourse of immigration, we saw that most speakers spoke from field I. Hence, there was an intervention of totalities; “sharpening the penalties”, “Danish principles of law” were constantly proposed to “solve” the problems at hand. This also corresponds to the way the Municipality of Aarhus and the central government tried to solve the so-called immigration problems, that is, social engineering (see chapter 1). Another typical example given was the language courses immigrants attend daily, in which a considerable portion of the curriculum is organized to give immigrants a knowledge of Danish “society”, that is, they are supposed to become “integrated” by memorizing the “rules” of the social game. The “hidden curriculum” is thus, hoping against hope, to “design” an integration process using field I perspectives as a base, which is indeed absurd because it all rests on the assumption that people first learn the rules outside and then play the “social” game, which is now defined in a rough instrumentalist manner.

Nevertheless, such arrangements effectively create a social game, as Bourdieu would say. Thus, we can still investigate what is happening by using field I and II perspectives, but without an ambition to organize other fields, which amounts to a “colonization” of them. That is, field I perspectives can still be used to show how stable hierarchies and systems of “society” function. Preferably, they can be refined and supported by field II perspectives.

Something significant in this context is that, in practice, mainstream attempts to organize the perceived hybridity and ambivalence from field I via ethical neutralization and colonization very often divert our attention from alternative
accounts of stable and unstable power relations in society. These mainstream attempts simply negate, for example, the relevance of the functioning of the systems that exclude immigrants and the relevance of the order of the social space which functions to discriminate them (see, for example, how “L” in chapter 2 operationalizes this turn by disclaiming “discrimination” from a field I perspective; or recall the discourse of the Municipality of Aarhus, which constantly disclaims discrimination and underplays the role of systemic exclusion).

For an ambivalent social theory, field(s) I (and II) perspectives can effectively be used to discern institutionalized discrimination, or, systemic exclusion. It must be recalled here that “exclusion” means, in Luhmann’s terminology, that some people increasingly get reduced to being solely “bodies” from the point of view of systems; or in other words, exclusion is what reduces participation in the “social” to “pure sociality” (or socius) for some people without the stabilizing effects of the subsystems.

But a social theory navigating only in field I, and empirically aimed at finding normalities based on L’homme moyen, is not enough. An ambivalent social theory goes on to “find” other objects in other fields, by, in its constructions, using other criteria as action, problem solving, sociality, etc. Thus the first divide it focuses on is hybridization. In this context, phenomena related to “structural hybridization”, “glocalization”, and concomitantly, the issue of the diasporic underclass, international laws guaranteeing hybridization (thus having a considerable effect in relation to fields III and IV in our diagram), and “post-national” rights are all important.

Then the second divide, between order and ambivalence, is met. Here the most important issue is to remember the dangers of a modernist colonization of fields III and IV by field I via adiaphorization. For example, whereas we can speak of many sorts of deficits of regulation with respect to phenomena related to fields I and II, especially around issues such as underclass, structural hybridization, institutional discrimination and exclusion, after this divide, any form of regulationist ethics, any totality, must be left behind. Here the face-to-face relations of the moral actors, and thus “sociality”, are of prime importance. Here, an ambivalent social theory closely relates itself to what Simon Critchley (1992) has called “the ethics of deconstruction”. Thus, the phenomena and the perspectives detected in these two fields must be especially sheltered against interventions aimed at social engineering.

But such an attitude which seeks to guard field III and IV perspectives must not be confused with old or neo-liberalism. If the moral situation is simply groundless,
and if the best one can do is not to damage its ambivalent condition of existence, this does not mean a recourse to liberalism. I want to argue that both liberal and communitarian theories build on a field I (or II) perspective. The first one operates with an abstract individual, a “solitary ego”, which is the shadow of oneself, and the second replaces the universalist ambitions of liberalist and neo-liberalist individualism with another “ground”, which are the stable practices of the community, the nation, or the tribe. Liberalism is inherently defected in that it speaks of freedom of choice but does not mention that the resources to choose are unevenly distributed in the social space. But, on the other hand, “communitarianism is not a remedy for the inherent defects of liberalism.... Both communitarianism and liberalism are projections of dreams born of the real contradiction inherent in the plight of autonomous individuals” (Bauman 1996b: 89). In short, both liberalism and communitarianism try to ground the inherent uncertainty of the moral actor. This cannot be done, and it is not desirable for fields III and IV from the point of view of an ambivalent social theory. Scott Lash says that “there is an element of groundedness in communitarian thought that contemporary morality and politics ignores at its own peril” and argues that postmodern ethics formulated by Bauman, Levinas and Derrida must be combined with this groundedness: “any serious postmodern ethics, any ethics that also will have political purchase, must consist of, on the one hand, a ground and, on the other, a certain groundlessness. Postmodern ethics must then be the ethics of mobile roots, the groundless ground. Bauman, Levinas and Derrida, give us only one side of this: they give us routes without roots, groundlessness without ground” (Lash 1996: 91, 103). To be sure, this is true. But the problem is, as should be clear, there is no ground to give with respect to fields III and IV, while Lash’s point could be extremely relevant in fields I and II, on the condition that, by a reversion of Lash’s terminology, any politics that also will have ethical purchase, must consist of, on the one hand, a ground and, on the other, a certain groundlessness.

But, to end with, any attempt at a “dialectical” reconciliation among the different fields of our diagram, especially between fields I and II, on the one hand, and III and IV, on the other, will mean a colonization of fields III and IV by the others. Hence, the theoretical and practical necessity of a “dialogical” logic, which does not seek a synthesis but a co-existence of contrasting perspectives that are qualitatively different.

The “cultural” and an ambivalent social theory
As was the case with the “social” in the preceding, the “cultural” can also be constructed in different ways. Firstly, it can be understood in an essentialist way, in which cultures are conceived as different from each other, as “pure” cultures. These cultures of essentialism are also pure in the sense that they are completely separated from both the “social” and the “sociality”. As earlier quoted from Søren Krarup, in the boldest versions of this understanding “a Muslim is a Muslim... In the world of realities, one is either a Muslim or a Christian”. Likewise, much of the discourse of immigration is essentialist in that one is always already either something or something else. In this sense, multiculturalism, just like the concept of “integration” on which it builds, is also essentialist.

This concept of “culture” is pure and ordered, and belongs to field I in our diagram. This culture is above all a discursive construction that functions to create order in a heterogeneous world in which pure cultures are not to be found.

Thus, the most radical response to essentialism prevailing in the discourse of immigration is to say that the immigrants do not exist: they do not have a secret, homogeneous identity or culture corresponding to our fantasies about them—which is also the very reason why we are afraid of them. Thus, as Slavoj Zizek nicely puts it, Freud’s answer to the threat of Fascist anti-Semitism was to endeavour to prove that Moses, the founding father of the Jewish identity, was Egyptian, that is, the Jews were not the elected people and their identity was “decentered” in its origins.

Notwithstanding the historic (in)accuracy of this thesis, what really matters is its discursive strategy: to demonstrate that Jews were already in themselves “decentered”, that their “originality” is a bricolage. The difficulty does not reside in Jews but in the transference of the anti-Semite who thinks that Jews “really possess it”, agalma, the secret of their power: the anti-Semite is the one who “believes in the Jew”, so the only way effectively to undermine anti-Semitism is to contend that Jews do not possess “it”. (Zizek 1993: 220-1)

In the same way, the essentialist is the one who believes in the immigrant, or who thinks that the immigrant exists—the problem does not reside in the immigrant or in immigrant cultures, but in the essentialist who thinks that “they” exist and that “their” cultures can be defined as pure and ordered entities.

All cultures are hybrids, the question is just in which way. That is, “in the world of realities”, we will rather find “really-existing” cultures spread in different ways in
fields II and III, some being more hybrids than others, others more ordered than others. To understand this phenomenon, we can make use of Landry and Bianchini’s concept of “interculturalism”, which brings the openness of cultures to influences from each other into the light:

External influences can be re-elaborated creatively through local culture and hybrid identities can emerge.... These cultural hybrids matter because creativity arises more from interculturalism than multiculturalism. Many social and cultural policies have aimed at multiculturalism, which means the strengthening of separate cultural identities of ethnic minorities, which now have their own arts centres, schools, places of worship and social clubs. But multiculturalism can be problematic if there is little communication between cultures. We now need to move one stage further. Resources should be directed more to intercultural projects which build bridges between the fragments, and produce something new out of the multicultural patchwork of our cities. Creativity can be encouraged by fragmentation, not by marginalization. (Landry & Bianchini 1995: 25)

In such a framework regarding the “cultural”, absolute otherness would be both useless and undesirable and, instead, a third space, which can be called the zone of hybridity, in-between the same and the other, will be taken as the basis. In other words, the focus of analyses will not be on cultures in themselves, but where they “touch” each other.

In this, the concept of interculturalism also allows for an opening toward field III of our diagram, because the cultural hybrids we find in this zone can be partly stable/ordered, partly more contingent, transient, and, in a metaphor dear to Bauman, “kaleidoscopic”.

How can we deal with contingency in an interculturalist framework? To answer this, we can reflect over the concept of stranger once again. What we stress here is that, even if the stranger is theoretically both insider and outsider at the same time, in many debates, his otherness is basically interpreted one-sidedly as that of the complete “outsider”, as a complete indeterminacy. But as we have dwelled on at length, the stranger is also an “insider”, which means that there are some points of intersections, some overlaps, between the same and the other. In other words, we can say there are two meanings of the contingency of the stranger; pure “indeterminacy” and, at the same time, “contiguity”, that is, “touching”. As Homi Bhabha explains:
We need, not surprisingly, to invoke both meanings of contingency and then to repeat the difference of the one in the other.... The contingent is contiguity, metonymy, the touching of spatial boundaries at a tangent, and, at the same time, the contingent is the temporality of the indeterminate and the undecidable. It is the kinetic tension that holds the double determination together and apart within discourse. (1994: 186)

Bhabha understands the in-between space of interculturalism as the space of the difference and stresses its importance. This in-betweenness is “beyond” both absolute otherness and the same, thanks to contiguity, which is also the cause of hybridity. Most importantly, Bhabha’s theory of hybridity opens a subject position for the other, where the stranger develops relations to the same. If the stranger now becomes a subject, a moral actor, most scenarios of the immigration debate also completely change: instead of a subject-object thinking (where the other is conceived as an object for “cognitive” reflexivity), the theme now becomes “intersubjectivity”, where subjects touch each other, producing hybridity, and see each other as “face”.

Additionally, if the concept of culture, which is obviously one of the most complex social theoretical concepts (see for example Williams 1976 or Fink 1988), is taken as such an open intercultural concept, then it can also be open toward the “social” and “sociality”. Thus, with respect to the first, that of between the cultural and the “social”, the theory of economies of signs and space has been used in this study, whereas, with respect to the relationship between the “cultural” and “sociality”, Bauman’s sociology has been used. The main point in placing a hybrid concept of interculturalism so centrally in the framework of an ambivalent social theory is that it makes it possible to understand not only the mixing of cultures with each other, but also culture’s mixing up with the “social”, the “sociality” and, as we will see in the next section, with the “spatial” and other non-human actors.

As to the socius, we can note that “intercultural” conversations can have some characteristics that come close to socius’s conversation, but they will never be as pure as socius, in that they focus more on “translations” than on the presumptions.

Then, we can conclude that for an ambivalent social theory, field II-IV perspectives will be most useful regarding an understanding of the “cultural”. But I want to argue that it can also relate to field I: it can, for example, analyze culture as a system or social space (and habitus) as an alternative to nationalist or multiculturalist conceptualisations of culture as ordered purity. Such an analysis would have political affinities with, what Spivak called, “strategic essentialism”, which necessitates a partial fixation of identities (see chapter 2). In our context,
strategic essentialism can be a viable strategy especially for issues like systemic exclusion and ethnic discrimination, where immigrants more or less constitute a statistically meaningful group. As such, strategic essentialism can aim at taking part in conflicts and at showing and dismantling stable hierarchies and systems of exclusion. Thus, an ambivalent social theory does not need to be content with only positing that identities are hybrid and ambivalent and that we cannot speak of any fixated identity, which in certain cases would amount to social and political “indifference”. Chapters 1, 4 and 7 partly took such a strategic position, where immigrants were conceived as a partially fixed group in relation to systems. Having said this, an ambivalent social theory must of course go further from field I to an analysis of culture as an actor-network or as part of the economies of signs and space. Thus, what it can take in by building on fields II and III perspectives is predominantly the issue of hybridization and ambivalence, which we dwelled on in chapters 5 and 6.

The “spatial” and an ambivalent social theory

It can hardly be overemphasized that modern social theory, whether it deals with the “social” or the “sociality”, has founded itself by inserting non-humans, including space, place, or what Dag Østerberg calls the “material”, into a parenthesis (see Østerberg 1988 and 1991). To be sure, throughout the history of social theory, one can find attempts to go beyond this parenthesis, to involve the “other”, be it the spatial or the natural, in the theoretical discourse. But this attempt has seldom become a central activity, and more often than not it has resulted in becoming a “sub-discipline” of general sociology. Thus, traditionally, a good sociology department also contains a sub-department of urban sociology. As long as the study of space is conceived of as a subdiscipline, it does not seem to be problematic for orthodox social theories to operate with a subdiscipline in which the spatial determines the social.

However, in recent years, the spatial has moved closer into the centre of social theory, perhaps initially by Giddens’s efforts. Thus, for example globalization is defined by Giddens as “action at distance” (1994b: 4). Thus, modernity means the “disembedding” of social relations and actions from local contexts by the development of expert-systems, which, in regulating “action at distance”, depend on people’s trust in them (see Giddens 1991) and which make mobility in space, as in the case of tourism activities, possible (Lash & Urry 1994: 254). We can say, then,
that factors such as distance and mobility are increasingly included in sociological analyses.

Regarding the spatial, the central question which has occupied social theory in the last decades, and which is hardly answered yet, has been how to understand the relationship between the social and the spatial. In this respect, one could speak of a continuous interplay between a spatial determination of the social and a social determination of the spatial. Thus, once the spatial is brought into the centre of social theory, the determination of the social by the spatial also becomes a central figure. However, it seems that in most cases the social still remains central and the spatial remains the “means” that the social makes use of. In other words, still in many sociological analyses, (first) the social determines the spatial which (then) determines the social as an intermediary figure, the formula being: the social —> the spatial —> the social. The most terrifying danger for a “sociology of space” (Tonboe 1993) was and remains spatial fetishism.

The actor-network theory is not afraid of non-humans, but conceives of them as actors in line with humans in the establishment of social relations. The main point it makes is that pure sociality in human contexts is not only impossible but also undesirable. Pure sociality without non-human actors can only be supported by purely bodily pillars, which would make it to a high degree unstable, as the analyses of the baboon society shows, and potentially violent. Thus, relatively stable and durable human sociality necessitates non-human actors, artefacts. In the long term, non-humans can be important for the stabilization of society in other ways than unstable, ambivalent humans can. The important distinction in our context is that this “stabilization” can take vastly different forms depending on the character of different networks. For example, the stabilization gained by panoptism, which Foucault significantly defined as a “technological invention in the order of power” (Foucault 1980: 71; my emphasis), differs vastly from spatial arrangements aimed at optimizing what Sennett calls “the uses of disorder” (see chapter 6 and the following). Nevertheless, in both cases, space matters directly.

Hence, the interesting question for the actor-network theory is not if the non-human or the spatial has social significance, but how human and non-human actors become integrated in a network. The main question is, in other words, how these heterogeneous actors are enrolled and how translations among them take place.

So far, in relation to our diagram, we have the following picture: the sociology of space as a subdiscipline was an attempt to find a purely spatial element with a purely social effect. The spatially oriented, general social theory generated by David Harvey (1981), Manuel Castells (1977) and Anthony Giddens (1991) has argued
against spatial determinism, but in this, the spatial became “sociologized”, or in other words, it became a social relation. In this framework, the social becomes increasingly hybridized by the spatial, but the central emphasis remains on the social. Thus, spatially oriented social theory does not move definitively out of field I, which can, for example, be seen in that this social theory thinks about the relationship between the social and the spatial in terms of causality and consistency, where the spatial, importantly, is perceived as a potentiality (see Thrift 1996 for a thorough criticism, which is, to a considerable degree, in line with the actor-network theory).

In our context, for example in chapter 7, Lash and Urry’s theory of economies of signs and space was used to pull traditional social theory of space into field II. This theory holds the view that, for example, in relation to the formation of “impacted ghettoes”, the spatial mechanisms of regulation are always and already actively present. Moreover, as we saw, it opens up for a hybridizations between the economic and the cultural and between other traditionally separated spheres. In this context, the concept of “mobility” replaces “structure”: “Why then has there been so little investigation of mobility, of ... diverse forms of transportation and travel? This neglect stems from certain academic prejudices: of analysing manufacturing rather than services, of production rather than consumption, of ‘work’ rather than ‘leisure’, of structure rather than mobility, and of work-related mobility rather than leisure-mobility.... The absence of a sociology of travel illustrates the salience of these various priorities within the ‘academy’” (Lash & Urry 1994: 254). The theory of economies of signs and space is a post-purity theory compared to those in field I. In other words, it is a theory of de-differentiation compared to differentiation processes, which are focused on in field I.

For the actor-network theory, space also makes a direct difference, which is reflected in that the non-human element is incorporated into social theory from the beginning. The actor-network theory operates with the concept of “collectives” of humans and non-humans, where non-humans are conceived not as a potentiality, in potentia, but as actors, in actu. The “social” in the sense of orthodox social theory is a reduction of this heterogeneous collective. However, as is the case with the theory of economies of signs and space, actor-network theory’s main interest is still to understand the social order: whereas the disorganization thesis is about finding out how “disorganized” capitalism functions as an order, the actor-network theory is about how stability, durability and consistency is created in actor-networks (e.g. how could Pasteur “pasteurize” France; see Latour 1988). That is, the theory of economies of signs and space and the actor-network theory are theories about hybrids and about their descriptions, but with special reference to order. They
localize themselves in field II of the diagram. But they are not necessarily bounded to a perspective of social order. On the contrary, they supply many examples about how fragile the disorganized orders or the actor-networks are and how they can fall apart.

According to the actor-network theory, because of the heterogeneity of actors, there will always be contingency and ambivalence at work in networks. Thus, one could say that the actor-network theory is especially open toward field III for a study of contingent, transitory, fluid and chaotic constellations of relations between humans, non-humans (as artefacts and of a non-artefactual nature) and discursive practices. A theory which explicitly takes this turn is Bauman’s social theory. In addition, de Certeau can be recalled here (see chapter 3).

Here we will dwell on Benjamin’s way of walking in the city and on Richard Sennett’s urban sociology, and will mention, once more, Ann Game’s sociological theory inspired by deconstructivism and Edward Soja’s concept “thridspace” in relation to field III of the diagram.

For Benjamin, the urban sites are distinct repositories of meanings and memories. This “memory” is the type Proust named “involuntary memory”. In contrast to voluntary memory based on conscious efforts to remember, it consists of “memories which are triggered by a particular inadvertent stimulus and which seem to envelop the person from the past, so breaking the apparent boundary between past and present, and bringing lost hopes and dreams to mind” (Savage 1993: 19). Hence, for Benjamin, reading the urban as a text is not a matter of cognitive reflexivity, but rather it is “a matter of exploring the fantasy, wish-processes and dreams locked up in our perceptions of cities” (Savage & Warde 1993: 133). Furthermore, people’s memories “lay bound up in their experience of built forms” (Savage & Warde 1993: 134); that is, the spatial matters directly in our allegorical understanding of the city as opposed to the cognitive reflection about it. Thus, Benjamin even defines the city dwellers very often by their spatial activities: prostitutes, flaneurs, street prowlers, onlookers, etc. (see Benjamin 1983; Shields 1996: 230).

In such an understanding of the spatial, each physical setting becomes unavoidably unique, which makes it impossible to understand the city by a ready-made formula. This importance of perception also draws our attention to the fact that there may be other “invisible” cities, as, for example, that of the immigrant. As such, the spatial is important in that it constitutes the playground “where received cultural values can be displayed, and therefore subverted” (Savage & Warde 1993: 137).
One important aspect of memory is, as I already touched upon in chapters 3 and 5, its relation to the Bergsonian concept “duration”. Duration is for us a significant concept to be able to differentiate the understanding of space when we move especially from field I to field III.

In Bergsonian thinking, differences between order and disorder are not only of degree, but in kind (Deleuze 1991: 17-8): order, or ordering, correlates to the idea of the “spatial” in a definite sense we have dwelled on before, that is, the static, homogeneous, discontinuous, timeless, or “dead”, space; and disorder correlates to duration, which is continuous and heterogeneous.

As Ann Game says, the concept of duration serves to invert what orthodox social theory has aimed at: for example, for Durkheim, a “concept” is “opposed to sensual representations”, it is “outside of time and change”. “It is a manner of thinking that at every moment ... time is fixed and crystallized” (quoted in Game 1995: 193). Game notes that this is an understanding of the “concept” as solid and stable, or “spatial” in Bergsonian terminology. But her main point is:

that not only does duration displace abstract spatialized time, but that it is dependent upon qualitative space. Bergson is concerned with an account of duration that is embodied. I want to suggest that he falls short of this by not taking sufficient account of space, by excluding it as abstract ... without spatiality, duration remains disembodied and abstract: undifferentiated flow, without limits. (Game 1995: 195)

We need a dynamic concept of “lived space”, or of “qualitative space”, to navigate in field III. Because “Bergson’s lived time of duration ... becomes abstract time unless there is space; it is space which quickens memory, gives time life. Otherwise we are merely left with dates” (Game 1996: 201). In Game’s understanding, as is the case with Benjamin, space is related to imagination, to reverie, to fluids, to being in flux, to the material, to what is embodied and to sensuality. As such, the lived space is incompatible with the concept of “structure”, which Derrida says is related to what is static, synchronic, taxonomic and ahistoric (see Game 1996: 192).

Edward Soja’s concept “thirspace” also aims at a dynamic and heterogeneous understanding of space, which is significant for field III of our diagram. Building on Lefebvre, he writes that:
Two terms are never enough.... There is always the Other, a third term that disrupts, disorders, and begins to reconstitute the conventional binary opposition into an-Other that comprehends but is more than the sum of two parts. (Soja 1996: 31)

On this backdrop, Soja defines the “thirdspace” differently from “firstspace” (that is, the empirically observable, perceived space) and “secondspace” (that is, the conceived space). Thirdspace parallels the concept of the “lived” space, which we dwelled on in chapter 3, and it points toward what is dynamic, unpredictable, fluid and qualitative (Soja 1996: 69). Thirdspace requires a way of thinking which is “disorderly, unruly, constantly evolving, unfixed, never presentable in permanent constructions” (ibid, 70). Moreover, Soja’s Thirdspace is also interesting with respect to its hybridized relation with post-colonial and feminist theories (see Soja 1996: 106-44).

In our present context, we can focus again on Richard Sennett. His entire urban sociology is built upon the relationships between the spatial, the social and the sensational. In a pragmatic way, he wants to understand “why and how humans settle in the material world”. According to Sennett, the materiality of the physical world—smell, noise, taste—plays a central phenomenological role regarding how we sense and experience the world. Thus, in Sennett’s writing (1994), “Flesh” and “Stone” are continuously in dialogue with each other while he seeks to pull the “political” back into the daily life. Interestingly, urbanity is not defined by Sennett egotistically; it is, as we have dwelled on in detail before, a condition of being together with strangers. One cannot have a city composed of citizens seeking the “heimlich”: “citizenship is created on the basis of the unknown other”, a context in which subjectivity, the singular “I”, is important to be able to develop “impersonal” relationships as opposed to the “tyranny of intimacy”. This urban art, what Sennett has called the “art of exposing” oneself to strangers, necessitates a scene, the spatial, which conditions urbanity (Sennett 1990; 1994; see also Nielsen 1994, an interview with Sennett from which the above quotations are taken).

For Sennett, disorder is not a cancerous danger with respect to spatial organization of the human world. “Touching” the other (not only seeing) in the urban (non-human, material) settings that are not ordered (by the eye of power) is not only an aesthetically enriching experience, it is also necessary for ethical interpersonal relations through which we displace our selves and others. Hence the sensual metaphor of “fear” is the leitmotiv of spatial organization of contemporary cities. Sennett criticizes this fear and associated will to order and segregation because they make it impossible to come across differences and variety. As such, Sennett’s understanding of the spatial is to a high degree congruent with Bauman’s
social theory and ethics of ambivalence, which affirms disorder and hybridity as the home ground. (It goes without saying that the sensual metaphor of “fear” is useful not only in the context of immigration but also to reflect upon more general social tendencies in contemporary cities which increasingly create a “geography of fear”, or an “ecology of fear”; see Davis 1992).

Lastly, we can ask how the spatial would look in field IV of our diagram? But here we must not confuse the general micro-sociology and field IV of our diagram. For example, Maffesoli’s tribes could be related to a pure understanding of the spatial. According to him, there is a significant link between space and everyday life, and this very link is the repository of sociality. Thus, in certain cases, says Maffesoli, “urban morphology and ... lifestyle manage to form a harmonious whole” (Maffesoli 1996: 126):

the territory-myth pair ... is the organizing principle of the city.... [L]ike a nest of Russian dolls, the city reveals other entities of the same type: neighbourhoods, ethnic groups, associations, various tribes that will organize themselves around (real or symbolic) territory and common myths.... These groups may be of many types (ethnic, social); structurally, it is their diversity that assures the unicity of the city. (Maffesoli 1996: 124)

Maffesoli defines this togetherness of place and identity on the basis of an affectual tendency, an “aura”, which arouses intense feelings like “feelings of local patriotism” because it is related to a place, a topos (Maffesoli 1996: 127-30). But metaphors like “harmonious whole” and “Russian dolls” do not leave so much place for chaos even if purity is present in Maffesoli’s descriptions of the spatial frame of everyday life. Regarding the “spatial”, his micro-sociology must be localized in field I of our diagram. What we need is a “chaotic” purity.

To find out what comes closest to this in spatial terms, we can start with Dag Østerberg’s distinction between materiel and materie, regarding the concept of the material. Materiel is treated and formed socially; it is, so to say, man-made. And it is closely connected to our life-world in that it always already interacts with the “social”:

The materiel participates ... in social life next to, together with, and in opposition to humans.... Society is a socio-materiel whole where the social ... and the materiel are under continuous mutual influence of each other. (Østerberg; quoted in Tonboe 1993: 458; my translation)
But this socially formed *materiel* is distinct from simple *materie*, which is untreated, unprojected, unmanufactured and unformed. So to say, the *materie* is the raw material of the *materiel*. The *materie* is a pure and chaotic materiality. I want to suggest that what we have to deal with in the field IV is this unplanned, chaotic, pure artefactuality. In this respect, *materie* is very similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept “the body without organs”. They speak of a prediscursive, *material*, universe “without a face”. The body without organs is “what remains when you take everything away. What you take away is precisely the phantasy, the significances and subjectifications as a whole” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 150). The body without organs consists only of intensities and waves. Only intensities and flows pass and circulate across it. “It is nonstratified, unformed, intense matter, the matrix of intensity, intensity=0” (ibid, 153). “Material” means in this context:

materie as the raw material of the universe, in itself an “unorganized mass” until form is conferred upon it. The body without organs is this “without-foundation” subtending difference—the excessive and the unequal, the interminable and the incessant, the informal ... a tendency towards a chaos so perfect, so pure, so complete that in it all differences, all articulations are effaced ... The body without organs is, then, the zero degree of difference. Pure chaos, the undifferentiated reality... (Callinicos 1982: 94-5; my emphasis)

If we take the urban space as “the body without organs”, it will above all mean a break with the traditional Cartesian representation of the city, which (re)codes and reduces it to a circulatory system, traffic patterns, functional zoning, or which, so to say, reduces the “urban body” to its “organs”. As Shields says, focusing on “the body without organs” in an urban context will mean to focus “on the undivided and undissected city which is a complex surface of activities and interactions which are usually dismissed as anomalous in conventional representations of the urban” (Shields 1996: 242). Official technologies of governing the city (as the municipal planning) and the “flows” of urban dwellers are thus antithetical: if the former associates to “order”, the latter associates to “pure war” and to spaces occupied by “pirates” and “nomads”. “The contradictory nature of the modern city derives from its dual organisation along both of these axes—the State and the Nomad” (Shields 1996: 243).

Then, in field IV of our diagram, the focus is on urban spaces that cannot be reached or are “left over” from the official technologies of planning also because
these places fall outside the typologies and units according to which planning functions, e.g. zoning, street, corner, etc. It is the unstructured space of the city where unstructured activities take place. These “purely chaotic” spaces do not necessarily become hybridized or, as in the case of tribalism, ordered.

To elaborate more on space from another perspective as well as a social theoretical one, we go on to the issue of planning, where we also will focus on questions related to “action”, questions such as “How, then, do we proceed from here?”
9 Heterogeneous Reflexivity, Ambivalence and Planning

At a time when there appears to be literally no end to the ways in which planning is exercised in modern society, the planning profession itself is undergoing a crisis of professional identity. (Perry 1995: 211)

... post-modern planning and post-modern organization theory are almost by definition a contradiction, and this may be why post-modernists in these fields are required either to compromise with modernity and reason instead of dismissing them entirely or somehow limit themselves to critique. (Rosenau 1992: 131)

Above, Pauline Marie Rosenau describes the ambivalence with which the planner comes face to face after modernism, which is, arguably also a reason why the professional identity of the planner is itself in crisis. But I want to argue, firstly, that a postmodern planning must not be conceived as a question of either dismissing reason totally or a superficial compromise with modern reasoning. Can one not, as in the case of ambivalent social theory, imagine a planning that can make use of both reason and interpretation, not by compromising but by trying, dialogically, to live with paradoxes? This will be one of the points of reference in the following. Secondly, any possibility for “limiting oneself to critique”, be it for a social scientist or a planner, is based on a false dichotomy between theory and action, or between discourse and practice. As should be clear by now, there is not such a dichotomic or principal difference between theory and action or between discourse and practice. For example, we cannot assume that a planner can choose between innocent “critique” and “practice” with dirty hands by adapting a modernist or postmodernist or a third perspective, which is in fact also true for the social scientist, because, as Foucault has shown, every theory necessarily makes references to some forms of action. Thus, in the following I do not principally distinguish between social theory and planning as to their analyses of the “social”.
Much of what was said on social theory earlier in this book can be used in a planning context as well.

But even though we cannot principally distinguish between social theory and planning, on the one hand, and between a theory for planning and a theory of planning, on the other, this does not mean that there is no difference between social theory and planning. This difference is to be found in the forms of “competence”. Speaking generally, planning as a mode of thought and action depends on developing competences other than theorizing the social. In the following, we will concentrate on planning in this context.

As David Perry argues in Foucauldian terminology, one must think about planning “spatially”. It means “seeing the various politics and technologies of planning—its various discourses—in their contextual place(s) in society ... as part of the production and reproduction of the social relations of power”. Planning is not a free-standing scientific occurrence but a “social event”; it is not about making plans, but about “making space”, and thus its history consists of practices (Perry 1995: 213-4).

To discuss planning as a form of competence, or as a mode of action, we need a short review of recent planning history. Thus, this chapter starts with a discussion of four types of planning that have more or less succeeded one another in Denmark and most other European countries during the last 30-40 years. These are: rationalist/functionalist planning; participatory planning; corporatist planning; and lastly an aestheticist planning, which is, together with corporatist planning, the dominant tendency in most areas of planning today. Afterwards, as an alternative to these four modes, planning will be reframed in the context of the actor-network theory whereby the concept of “competence” will be mentioned and related to the issue of reflexivity.

**Four modes of Danish planning in the last four decades**

By its birth as a professional discipline, planning has been a variant of modern epistemology with its emphasis on universalism and rationalism: in this, planning was conceived of exclusively as a “rational” process aimed at producing scientific plans. Moreover, it was effectively characterized by a “focus on large scale, technologically rational, austere and functionally international style design” (Michael Dear; quoted in Rosenhau 1992: 130). These ambitions, which were
accentuated by the dominant “growth” ideology of organized capitalism, gave way
to a functionalist understanding of the spatial, and planning perceived the city as an
object of engineering. Before the widespread influence of functionalism, or until
the second half of this century, Danish physical planning was dominated by the
classic tradition, which prioritized the street, the square and their relations to the
rest of the city and nature as the ground elements in planning. This planning
“conceived of the urban territory as a concrete, architecturally defined area”. In
contrast, functionalism defined the city in abstract terms, as a product of

The functionalist city consisted, like an organic mechanism, of parts which had
independent latent functions and which contributed to the stability of the overall
urban structure by satisfying some basic needs. Thus, functionalist planning aimed
at creating a socio-spatial order by functionally separating industry, businesses and
other services, housing areas, etc. from each other, the main philosophy in this
being that each area should function as effectively as possible. The city was to be
ordered according to the principle of homogeneous functions. The result of this
ambition has been a rather boring one because functionalist planning, which
created mono-functional and culturally sterile cities all over the world by insisting
on an understanding of the city, in a very static manner, as a quantity. Functional
purity and order was what it desired; monotony and segregation was what came
out of this desire.

Even though functionalist planning has been effective on an urban scale in
neutralizing formerly heterogeneous urban landscapes, it has been ineffective
regarding its overall ambition to operate on very large geographical scales and over
very long time spans (e.g. via “master plans”). This naturally required an
superhuman capacity of foreseeing the future, but the inherent rigidities of
functionalist planning and its indifference toward social change were important
factors in this context. For example, systemic changes, like that of the transition
from organized to disorganized capitalism, created tremendous problems for
functionalist planning, which was born in organized capitalism and which conceived
of society as the organized capitalist society. This weakness was to become one of
the most important sites of criticism against functionalist/rationalist planning. This
criticism was coupled in the 1970s with a criticism of “instrumental rationality” in
general (see, for example, Habermas 1976) and the architectural anti-functionalist
tendencies specifically (like postmodern architecture). Criticism of instrumental
rationality, which directly gave birth to a new ideology of planning, was about
participation of citizens in the planning process, which functionalist planning had
formerly depicted as a “black box” exclusively reserved for experts.
If the competence of the functionalist planner was to be sought in his engagement with “rationalization” of the social and physical infrastructure on the basis of scientific totalities, in “participatory planning” the planner became an “advocator”. In this period, planning increasingly became a tool for public administration and “the urban territory was perceived as areas of administration” that municipal and local plans sought to regulate down to the slightest detail (Mammen 1994: 278). Nevertheless, the themes, such as “participation”, pulled planning theory and practice toward social theory. Planning in the 1970s also became a relatively “social” engagement compared to the detached “scientific” expertise propagated by functionalist planning. Yet participatory planning was not immune to some important problems: for example, the processes of public participation typically took place too slowly and thus were extremely time-demanding. Since city dwellers did not have the time necessary to routinely “participate” in a formal and bureaucratic decision process, the idea of participation was many times rendered ineffective. In addition, the technological discourse of the municipalities and the central government planners was, in most cases, not easily understandable for “outsiders”, rendering very often the idea of “participation” an illusion. Another line of criticism also proliferated, because the “formal” rights to participate in a definite phase of the planning process did not in practice mean that participants had “real” political influence: for example, they still did not have the chance to discuss what came before planning, such as political decisions and ethical predispositions regarding the problems to be discussed, and after planning, such as implementation (see Flyvbjerg 1991).

As a reaction to the first and second modes of planning, a third mode of planning became powerful in the 1980s and 1990s: not being able to go on with the large-scale ambitions of functionalist planning, and finding participation too costly and ineffective, what was still “feasible” was creating possibilities for ad-hoc adjustments. In this form of planning, the developers (or, the market) became the central actors in a tripartite negotiation between political authorities, planners and the developers, a planning which is now, once again, closed to the participation of others, such as city dwellers. Thus Arne Gaardmand aptly called this form of planning “corporatist planning”:

[It] consists of putting together an assembly of relatively few top persons from political parties, administrations, business life, financial circles and possibly the academic world to solve a big planning task.... [These persons] move from task to task in different combinations. They are chosen on the value-basis which is dominant in the country’s or in a single municipality’s leading circles and it always appears that [they] think identically
and take uniform positions about the problems (and the critique they meet). It is also characteristic that ... the decisive decisions are in fact made behind closed doors—and as a rule, before they set the scene for discussion about a project. (Gaardmand 1993: 290, my translation)

As was the case with corporatist planning, the fourth and last mode of planning we will look at was born in the 1980s as a reaction to the first and the second modes (functionalist and participatory planning); but in comparison with corporatist planning, it has moved more in “aestheticizing” direction. In this understanding, a city is first of all an aesthetic object which keeps changing after it is apparently ready-built. Hence as opposed to modernist/functionalist ambitions, it cannot be “created” on the basis of final and definitive plans; on the contrary, it is the plurality of future visions that gives a city unforeseen and unexpected qualities (Foss 1996).

A new philosophy of planning must be based on the dynamic of the city in the process of development instead of in static future visions. It must take hold of the social life, the development of businesses and the market forces. Planning should not lay restrictions on this dynamic, but seek through incentives to support this development....

A new planning philosophy cannot naturally ignore the social and functional needs, but it must reach out of functional solutions... Urban planning must be accepted as an aesthetic discipline. (Foss 1996b; my emphasis and translation)

Foss also writes that what is important in this context is to “dare” a planning which “is immanently spacious for the chaotic” (Foss 1996).

While corporatist and aestheticist planning are quite different in some respects, they seem to agree on the role of the market with respect to planning. Indeed, this agreement often turns out to establish firm relationships between corporatist and aestheticist modes of planning in practice. Thus, Ib Jørgensen, a planner from Aalborg University, criticizes Foss, quoted above, by stressing that Foss’s aesthetic ideals are not much more than “demagogic” in practice. For example, she has also been a key figure in one of the largest and best known corporatist planning projects in Denmark in the 1990s, the Ørestaden project (Jørgensen 1996; see also Gaardmand 1996 about the relations between corporatist and aestheticist planning). What is important in our context is that planning increasingly becomes aestheticized in this fourth model. Foss says above that this aestheticization “naturally” should take place without ignoring the “social”. But when planning becomes an “aesthetic discipline”, one can ask how this will happen. In other
words, one can ask if this “naturalness” for including the “social” in planning considerations is not only a rhetorical disclaimer when planning is predefined beforehand as an “aesthetic discipline” and done so exclusively.

To sum up, in the last 40 years, planning has radically moved between cognitive, ethical and aesthetic ideas. One can say that traditional functionalist planning (rationalism) and corporatist planning (black box incrementalism and pragmatism) predominantly aimed at cognitive ideals. As a reaction to the purely cognitive models of planning and by underlining the issue of democracy, participatory planning sought to transform planning into a more social and ethical engagement. Nevertheless, this was still a cognitively oriented ethics: so to say, planning has, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, tried to legitimize its discourse via a “communicative rationality” based on an idea of citizen participation, which was, or so it was assumed, a means of achieving a widespread consensus. Aestheticist planning moves definitively away from both cognitive and ethical ideals and overwhelmingly speaks of aesthetics. In this, planning is reduced, at best, to urban design and, at worst, to architectural design, which also entails a “de-professionalization” of planning as such (Albertsen & Diken 1997). In the following, I want to problematize this reductionist aspect without problematizing the importance of the aesthetic element in planning or in the physical environment.

My overall purpose is to go beyond these rigid oppositions and to argue for a planning that can “settle” on cognitive, aesthetic and ethical issues at once, but again, not by building on a passive, but an active perspectivism and by keeping an eye on the qualitative distinctions between these. Let us for this purpose initially dwell on a fifth understanding of planning as an alternative to the four mainstream ideas mentioned above.

**Planning as an actor-network**

In an actor-network perspective, planning must be analyzed both as an activity and as an object (plan). Physical planning, if we conceive of it as a process and as a product at the same time, can be a paradigmatic example for such an undertaking. Physical planning has been trans-sectorally organized: characteristically, it should settle where different sectors need a mutual coordination. Thus, there is indeed a built-in actor-network theory perspective already in the first stages of planning. Physical planning is about creating network relations: it aims at sustaining a
consistency between different sectors or between heterogeneous actors. In this, the planner becomes an “obligatory point of passage” in the structure of translations necessary for the creation of a network. If translations and enrolments aimed at by the planner succeed, this often takes place because there are also “physical” tokens in the process: technology, the physical space, etc. as non-human intermediaries or stabilizers, are often co-existent with other actors from the beginning. Then, we can say that what planners do is a sort of coordination in the face of this heterogeneity of actors and diversity of situations. John Law has thus proposed the concept of “heterogeneous engineering” to depict the activity of relating and interpreting different points of views and elements in such processes of coordination (see Callon 1996: 30).

If we view the adventure of functionalist planning through this perspective, we can say that it was practically possible to mobilize and enrol a heterogeneous network of actors (both human and nonhuman) to realize a social and physical stabilization in functionalist terms, a network that was also coupled with the widespread popular support for this project in a definite period, that is, in the period of organized capitalism. The stability of organized capitalism and the stability of this functionalist actor-network were closely interrelated: thus, the crisis of organized capitalism and the following legitimation crisis, both of which were coupled with the issues of democracy and the 1968 revolts, etc., meant that the declared ambitions of functionalist planning, such as producing “total” and large-scale plans, were increasingly problematized, and its actor-network was thus rendered problematic and unstable (Albertsen & Diken 1997).

What was sought, then, was a solution which could both maintain total planning and incorporate democratic aspects into planning processes, and this resulted in the invention of participatory planning. But, at a concrete level, this mode of planning has also necessitated comprehensive enrolment and translations. This has simply not worked out in practice, even if formally it did for a while. Hence, participatory planning has not been able to build its actor-network in a consistent and durable way. The reaction to this has been ad-hoc, or corporatist, planning in which the scale has become smaller compared to that of traditional rationalist/functionalist planning. But the perspective has been the same, that is, the aim has been still to create order in rationalist terms. Today, this mode of planning still functions also because it necessitates enrolment and translation on a much lower scale and scope than the other two modes of planning. (Another additional, but nevertheless important factor is, to be sure, the decreasing importance of “legitimation” compared to “seduction” in the regulation processes as a whole).
Lastly, aestheticist planning has turned out to be successful in its translations and enrolments with respect to regaining a professional territorium in the 1980s. But, in this, planning has been reduced to traditional architecture, understood as building design. In the 1980s and the 1990s, planning education in Denmark also has followed a route “back to the traditions”: the planner has increasingly become a “local” planner, the aesthetic component of planning has become overemphasized, and the “urban” has been increasingly reduced to a design object. One could say that aesthetization has become, in fact, a way of “de-complexification” of the planning profession in the 1980s and the 1990s in face of the ever-increasingly complex problems it faced (Albertsen & Diken 1997).

If we now return to our diagram in chapter 8, we can place the functionalist, corporatist and aestheticist perspectives on planning in field I, because they all seek to establish an ordered and pure identity of planning as a profession and as a field of operation. In contrast to these three perspectives, which are reductionistic with respect to pure order, participatory planning has been, though only partially, the only mode of planning that has moved in the direction of hybridization, by mixing scientific planning with social questions.

As to aestheticist planning, even though it principally remains open to the chaotic, it must be underlined that this is so purely in aesthetic terms. It is, therefore, a “pure” understanding regarding the question of what planning should be and do. In this case, we are, above all, confronted with an aesthetic reductionism. Moreover, as was the case with corporatist planning, aestheticist planning does not mention participation or any other issue related to the “social” and its perspective remains insistently homogeneous. When, and if, it articulates a relation to the “social”, it is more often than not understood exclusively as the market; hence, its close relationship to corporatist planning. Aestheticist planning is powerfully congruous with the urban processes in which the market has been much interested in the last decades: processes such as gentrification, concentration of prestigious buildings in city centres, urban renovation, development of the heritage industry, and so on. It is, then, not especially surprising that criticisms, which are rarely made about aestheticist planning, are most often launched from traditional functionalist views.

It becomes a challenge to planning today to rethink interrelationships between the functional, the aesthetic and the ethical, especially with respect to fields II and III in our diagram, that is, in terms of chaos and hybridity. Two points must be initially explicated in this context. Firstly, the strategy of participation, which both corporatist and aestheticist planning fully ignore today, must be re-evaluated and re-incorporated in planning. And secondly, it seems that today we have already left
those days when the only mainstream planning idea was the functionalist one; that is, today not only functionalist planning, but also corporatist and aestheticist planning are equally incorporated into the mainstream discourse of planning, a point which is significantly absent, for example, in Foss’s criticism of functionalist planning, mentioned in the preceding section.

What must be done, then? Should we, for example, on the basis of a criticism of planner roles (as “rationalizer” and “advocate”), declare planning to be dead? Is the demise of these forms of planning sufficient to say “planning is dead, long live architecture”? These are not the arguments in the following. Rather than problematizing the existence of planning as a profession as such (it seems to me that planners are still needed), I want to discuss which forms of competence must be improved in this field to replace those old ones, which are now dysfunctional.

Heterogeneous reflexivity

I want to define this new form of competence of the planner as a differentiated function aimed at “de-differentiation” (Albertsen & Diken 1997). This de-differentiation must be conceived of, not in terms of “social engineering” or “homogeneous engineering”, but in terms of what John Law calls “heterogeneous engineering”, which is necessary to go beyond social or spatial determinism and fixations on order and purity.

As should be clear by now, hybrids and networks are not created by themselves, and their proliferation to a large extent depends on activities of actors. Engineers create hybrids between human and non-human elements; theologians organize the hybridization between Gods and human beings; and doctors hybridize natural sciences and human relations. In short, the role of the professional is decisive in actor-networks with respect to the mobilization of human and non-human intermediaries, both of which are differentiated in social space and in systems. Furthermore, if it is the non-human that holds society together, as Latour says, then the role of the professional increases even more, especially with respect to hybridization. Since modern and postmodern societies cannot exist without hybrids, the most significant types of professionals are those who can function as “experts of de-differentiation” (Albertsen & Diken 1997).
Despite the importance of the professionals, one need not create elitist, or “heroic”, stories of them; actor-networks are always partially stable and can fall apart at any time. To avoid potential elitism due to an emphasis on the role of the professional, and because the term “engineering” strongly connotes “social engineering”, which is still a strong and dangerous planning ideology in our context, we can incorporate a dimension of reflexivity into Law’s term, heterogeneous engineering, by replacing it with “heterogeneous reflexivity” (Albertsen & Diken 1997).

Reflexivity emphasizes the possibility of self-critique in this profession. The type of professional we are looking for is, so to say, a “paradoxical professional” who can reflect on him or herself. This professional is as removed from the functionalist or corporatist planner, or the “homogeneous engineer”, as he or she is from the advocatory planners who sought a “de-expertization” of the profession in the 1970s by arguing that physical planning and architecture should become, for example, vernacular and popular. What we need is a professionalism that can both continue the profession (avoiding de-professionalization) and reflect on the fragility of the actor-networks created. That is also to say that planning must be a reflexive profession, a profession of self-limitation, which is necessary to avoid both extremes of populism and elitism.

Heterogeneous reflexivity is especially important regarding possible (and sometimes impossible) combinations, that is, “heterogenizations”, between the three forms of reflexivity we dwelled on earlier: cognitive, aesthetic and hermeneutic reflexivity.

Planning as “science” has hitherto tried to reproduce itself only by underlining “cognitive” aspects of its object and itself. Cognitive qualities still matter for planning, but they must now be thought of in the context of reflexivity. The answer to the question of where cognitive reflexivity is most important in our context is two-fold. Firstly, planning must be related to a mechanism of “self-reflexivity”. The planner is a part of the society for which he or she plans and thus a part of the enrolment processes and discursive practices at work (Callon 1996). Going beyond the dichotomy of the “public” and the “personal”, his or her body becomes thus “a detector of discursive interpellations” (Law 1996). For example, in the context of immigration, it is relevant that a planner reflects on which stereotypes, metaphors, assumptions he or she operates with, how and which power relations are translated in the process of planning, and so on. Secondly, cognitive reflexivity is important in another sense, regarding “social reflexivity”. Here the issue of “manufactured risks”, which we dwelled on in chapter 6, is of prime importance because the problems planners face today are very often the products of earlier planning. For example,
the most important “ecological” planning achievement of Aarhus in the 1990s was the re-opening of the river that functionalist planners, with enormous self-confidence and implicit faith in progress, had covered over in the 1940s in building a boulevard. That is, the planner’s own role in creating “planning disasters” is, in fact, not a modest one. In most cases, these disasters were created socially, and the material, the non-human element, played an important role in this. One can ask, for example, how this same expert system could be trusted in other areas, e.g. in the field of immigration, if it could not seriously reflect on its own “achievements”. What has (or has not) changed to make planners more long-sighted and reflective today? is an important question in this respect. One could add: why is planning in Aarhus so overwhelmingly busy with obtaining results, or reaching goals or “utopias”, in the field of immigration while it is equally busy “repairing” old mistakes in other fields?

In postmodernity, defined as a situation of living without illusions, such reflection can no longer be based on merely positing that we “know” better today what and how compared to yesterday. We cannot afford to believe this because the risks produced today are also proportional to the expert knowledge accumulated, that is, much higher. Then, what is needed in the context of social reflexivity and planning are not arguments based on earlier “deficits of knowledge”, but a sincere recognition that planning can always make mistakes and thus requires a built-in self-limiting perspective. As Arne Gaardmand says, after the era of the master plans,

it is an incontestable wisdom in urban planning that we must be careful with respect to beautiful ideas, plain truths, total solutions and actions that are pictured as a matter-of-course and as logical. It is better to listen to them who are in doubt, who use dialogue as an alternative, and who proceed carefully and with a moderate tempo. (Gaardmand 1993: 282; my translation)

According to Gaardmand, a defensible planning is one that can limit itself. Such a reflexive planning cannot and must not be self-confident. (To see the relevance of this issue, recall chapter 1 in which it was shown to which degree planning is sure of what it does).

Based on this argument, self-reflexivity and social reflexivity force the limits of planning as pure “science”, as a purely cognitive reflexivity. In the context of heterogeneous reflexivity, this can be perceived not as a problem but as a resource for the heterogenization of cognitive reflexivity. The competence based on
Strangers, Ambivalence and Social Theory

heterogeneous reflexivity is about the ability to translate other forms of reflexivity into cognitive reflexivity and vice versa (Albertsen & Diken 1997).

Regarding the aesthetic dimension, there are two points. Firstly, we can reflect over Lash and Urry’s argument regarding reflexive accumulation (see chapter 7) from a point of view of planning: an increase in reflexivity means increasing informationalization and increasing aesthetization of society; production and consumption modes become more dependent on aesthetic components, such as design and advertisement; people reflect more on their daily lives by consuming aesthetic goods, such as films and books. That is, reflexivity via aesthetic intermediaries increases. What was hitherto perceived as a “passive” activity of onlooking, like tourism, actively creates landscapes; that is, the aesthetic component is no longer only a final stage in the relationship between production and consumption (for example, of places), but it is an active participant in the process from the beginning to the end. In addition, today, even political propaganda gradually became an aesthetic show business.

This development directly forces planning into an aesthetization as well, most visibly in areas where market forces are overwhelmingly and monologically dominant (as in the cases of gentrification and mass tourism). As a whole, the fates of single cities become more and more dependent on culture and service industries (see Lash & Urry 1994). This development should not just be criticized in a passive way. Instead, as I will argue in the following, aesthetic reflexivity should be more actively and consciously (and conscientiously, one could add) incorporated into the planning processes.

With respect to the second point, we can ask what heterogeneous reflexivity means in the context of this increasing aesthetic component in society in general and in planning specifically? Besides the point that an acceptance of the aesthetization of the hitherto “scientific” planning is necessary, we can now argue that this incorporation of the aesthetic element take place in heterogeneous terms. What is most important in this context are the translation mechanisms between the aesthetic, cognitive and ethical components of reflexivity. What is, for example, the translational structure of the relations between the social and the physical space? Or, in which way and how does the physical space play a role in people’s meetings and confrontations with strangers? If we look at contemporary cities as architectural scenographies, we see that segregation processes have increased and, apart from the consumption sites, people are more separated from strangers than ever before. Most cities, especially American and larger European cities, have already become agglomerations of “enclaves of fear”, and consequently, contemporary urban geographies can, as Mike Davis shows, be read as an “ecology
of fear” (see Davis 1992). My argument is that “design control” of these enclaves cannot be an acceptable and sufficient urban and social political instrument. The aesthetic component goes hand in hand with the social, and we need a more heterogeneous way of thinking about the aesthetic component of planning without being content with aesthetic reductionism. But nevertheless, aesthetic questions must be taken seriously. If the “physical” directly plays a role regarding the “social” problems we have dwelled on in this study, then it can reasonably be expected that it plays a role regarding solutions too. The question becomes thus how physical planning can be practised to minimize functional isolation and social exclusion and/or to maximize possibilities for communication between different urban populations. Richard Sennett’s urban sociology, for example, gives interesting clues for creating a basis for urban design.

To sum up at a more general level, the aesthetic component of heterogeneous reflexivity has a two-fold meaning. Firstly, it invites a focus on the relationships between the “social” and the “material” (including aesthetic representations of the “social” and the “cultural”). And secondly, aesthetic reflexivity can be incorporated into the operations of planning as a different mode of operation: instead of focusing only on a “grid” or abstract plans, for example, a heterogeneous reflexive planning must also be able to focus on the “street”, the “lived” space, spatial practices (like de Certeau’s “walking”), place-making processes in daily life, and so on.

Needless to say, this engagement with aesthetic reflexivity must not block cognitive and ethical components of planning. Planning is not just an aesthetic instrument; it is also about cognition and ethics. This brings us to hermeneutic reflexivity. In the context of heterogeneous reflexivity, we can speak of three variants by which hermeneutic reflexivity can be related to planning. Firstly, the method of phronesis is, as argued before, a useful tool for asking questions regarding the relationships between rationality/power and ethics and between the singular and the general. Secondly, an ethics of deconstruction, which can, as Scott Lash (1996) argues for, be combined with the “roots” or practices in the life-world, gives opportunities to think about hermeneutic and ethical issues together with the cognitive and aesthetic ones. Such an approach, which can couple groundlessness and groundedness, routes and roots, is especially relevant for fields I and II in the diagram. Any planning or urban policy with an ethical purchase with respect to the issues raised in this study must be able to open itself up to a broad range of “risky” matters, such as ecology, ethics, morality and so on. But, as was argued earlier, this hybrid combination will not be sufficient for moving to field III of our diagram: what matters most here is an ability to leave the space for moral proximity and the
“face”, recognizing that not everything can be planned. Furthermore, a self-limiting recognition, that not everything should be planned, is crucial for heterogeneous reflexivity at this point. So to say, while it is necessary to find a terminology to speak of an “ambivalent planning” regarding hermeneutical aspects related to field III in general, we should discuss a “blind planning” with respect to morality and the socius.

To conclude, heterogeneous reflexivity means in the context of planning an ability to handle issues of order (and ordering), hybridity (and hybridization) and ambivalence (and “uncertainization”) altogether. In this, the competence of the planner comes close to the competence of Donald Schön’s “reflective practitioner”, whose task is to improve the ability to change the frames on deadlocked problems, that is, an ability to reframe difficult issues in new ways. Schön underlines that experts become necessary for handling situations characterized by uncertainty, conflicts and uniqueness, in other words, new, strange and ambivalent situations not similar to those we know how to proceed with (see Schön 1990).

Needless to say, this dealing with “uncertainty” must not be understood as a process of “rationalization” that wages war against contingency and ambivalence. In contrast, regarding this reflexive competence, the planner can learn much from the “ironist” who lives with contingency. Richard Rorty defines the “ironist” as:

... someone who fulfills three conditions: (1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she realizes that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither underwrite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes about her situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others....

I call people of this sort “ironist”... [They are] always aware of the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves.... (Rorty 1989: 73-4)

The self-reflection of the planner must become ironic, and this can be very useful in re-presentations of and by planning. But ironic strategies often may involve a detachment or a withdrawal from confrontations in practical situations. Thus, Rorty maintains that “ironic gestures”, which are decisively relevant for the final vocabulary, are “politically useless” (Kolb 1992: 143; see also Rorty 1989: 73-94). Politics, which often brings or requires open confrontations about meanings and material goods, is a typical site for planning. Here heterogeneous reflexivity must be related to rhetoric and rhetorical strategies that can depict the social
interests in the city better than ironic strategies can by emphasizing involvement rather than detachment. In this context “rhetoric is about moving others through language toward decision and practical action” (Albertsen 1993: 181). With rhetorical strategies, the planner can also consciously make herself a visible and thus vulnerable target by exposing herself and her ideas to the outer environment and by using her body as a “detector” for discursive interpellations (Law 1996).

Heterogeneous reflexivity and ambivalence

Just as we said earlier in the context of the “social”, the “cultural” and the “spatial”, now we can say that different planning problems are confronted in the different contexts of pure order, hybrid order, chaotic hybridity and chaotic purity. This means that, in contrast to traditional views of planning, which only focus on field I (and rarely II), the other fields are relevant for incorporating planning theory and practice.

My point is that different modes of planning can belong to different fields of the diagram. That is, the limits differentiating the four fields are not iron curtains. Even though there are differences in kind between them and these must be respected, there are also interrelationships which must be conceived as a continuum. These relationships of continuity and contiguity between the fields must not be conceived as hierarchical, but as horizontal; they are not, strictly speaking, relations of macro and micro levels. The horizontal character of these relationships also points out the necessity for interpreting and translating between the fields. Concomitantly, planning moves from seeking “truth” and fundaments to making “interpretation”.

In relation to our diagram, reflexivity means an ability to cross the different fields. In this context, another important difference between “heterogeneous engineering” and “heterogeneous reflexivity” is that while the former emphasizes the ability to create consistency with a view to stability in a heterogeneous context, the latter also emphasizes the ability to think in terms of “settlement”, that is, in terms of stationary and conflictual agreements and arrangements. Thus, it is a form of paradoxical, or dialogical, thinking in that it must explicitly come to terms with the otherness in heterogeneous orders. This requires, in William Connolly’s words, an:
... ethics of cultivation rather than a morality of command; it cultivates an experience of excesses, resistances, and remainders that calls into question the closures and sufficiencies of established practices of rationality. It promotes greater generosity in those valuable relationships of interdependence and rivalry rather than a unified consensus to which everyone subscribes. (Connolly 1993: xiv-xv)

Connolly stresses that these points “merely provide preliminary bearings for a sensibility that expresses itself through the interpretations of prevailing practices it offers rather than through a set of abstract principles it brings to the judgement of fixed conventions” (ibid, xv).

The reflexivity we are speaking of, then, is neither self-transparent nor an instrumentalist one (as the municipality’s “means/ends” thinking is). Furthermore, it does not aim only at market-oriented “incentives to support ... development” (as Foss says; quoted before) and restrictions, but also at “generosity” with respect to excesses, multi-marginalities and differing interpretations. That is, it tries to settle itself in the context of ambivalence and hybridity.

We have seen that the actor-network theory says that networks are, because of the multiplicity of actors, endowed with an “intrinsic uncertainty” (Michael 1996: 64). Thus, even actors who are excluded, or those “alternative, failed or marginal networks ... lurk in the background and they inform, perhaps more loosely, actors who are enrolled into larger networks” (Michael 1996: 65). This is also the reason why the actor-network theory is interested in “multiple membership” and “multiple marginalities”. But, as we have noted before, this multiplicity must not be taken into account only with respect to “ordering” and determination, but also with respect to living with it without determination. Regarding this point, and in the context of a planning which also can deal with ambivalence (that is, field III in the diagram), we can use the concept “affordance” (Albertsen & Diken 1997).

Mike Michael’s use of this Deleuzian concept suggests that the interface between an individual organism and its environment generates options for changing Foucauldian power/knowledge mechanisms. Affordance “refers to the way in which the (optic) array of surfaces and structures in an environment specify a range of possible actions for the organism. A flat horisontal surface thus affords sitting on, lying across, rolling out dough and so on”. What is most important to underline in this context is the “optionality” related to affordance: “the environment does not determine what happens, it implicates a repertoire of possible happenings” (Michael 1996: 149).
Returning to planning related to field III of the diagram, we could say that it must incorporate into the cityscape a diversity of non-determined affordances that people can potentially convert into various uses. As such, products of planning can become important non-human resources, or actors, which people can use to extend their identities. In other words, with non-human elements functioning as affordances, planning as an actor-network is an alternative to prescriptions of modern planning (for example, functionalist planning, which predefines function and the use of its objects). In addition, in contrast to the “timeless” architecture of functionalism and its ambitions to generalize, one cannot say something general about affordance. Its point is rather that it changes meaning from place to place, from time to time and from person to person (see Michael 1996: 149).

Traditional planning has sought to stabilize the ambivalence of human social relations via non-human elements, but this idea has generally been based on spatial fetishism and determinism. One can still try to incorporate what Latour (1992) calls the “missing masses”, the non-human elements, into planning processes, but this must be done without becoming determinist. Planning as an actor-network tries to stabilize ambivalence not via functionalist plans but by affordances, the non-human elements, including space, which is also a way of living with ambivalence because affordance is not what is “ordered”.

Latour argues that democracy should be extended to the non-human elements, or “quasi-objects”, that is, hybrids: “to replace the clandestine proliferation of hybrids by their regulated and commonly-agreed-upon production. It is time, perhaps, to speak of democracy again, but of a democracy extended to things themselves” (Latour 1993: 142). The democracy of hybrids draws planning toward field II; and affordance and settlement mean that planning can go further to field III. In this context, we can explicitly speak of an “ambivalent planning”. But what about socius and morality (understood in Levinas’s and Bauman’s terms)?

It seems to me that the issues related to socius and morality show the limits of planning and thus the points where its self-limitation is most crucial. Indeed, in addition to those disasters related to ecological ones, a good number of “planning disasters” in history occurred because planning did not respect these limits. Hence, we need a “blind planning”, which relates to the Levinasian “ethics of blindness”.

This point is ironically also the hub of weaknesses of existing planning in the context of immigration. Thus, whereas there are important deficits of regulation with respect to problems regarding discrimination and systemic exclusion, what planning constantly aims at is a regulation of socius and sociality, which as a rule results in over-regulation and a replacement of the autonomy of moral agents by
heteronomous control. The present situation is consequently characterized by under- and over-regulation at the same time. And what is needed is a planning which can re-arrange and redirect this unbalanced relationship in the opposite direction.

If planning tries to penetrate the socius, it pushes it to other fields with the consequence that the socius ceases to be socius. If planning tries to regulate the conduct of the moral actors, it kills the very morality which is, as we saw in the previous chapter, a deep-water fish. Hence the only thing planning can do here is to stimulate possibilities for the existence of moral actors and the socius, by creating affordances. But in this, there will be no certainty regarding the outcomes of planning; there is only a possibility that planning in fields I and II may function positively in their effects on fields III and IV by creating affordances. The possibility that planning can function negatively with respect to these fields will always lurk behind: nothing more, or nothing less.

From “movement politics” to “campaign politics”

Planning and the systemic power relations of society are not exterior to each other. That is, planning is not a neutral mechanism that stands outside society and then creates miracles in it by way of social or physical designs. As Arne Gaardmand says, “plans reflect the important power relations in society.... Therefore it would be wrong to expect that solutions deviating from the general characteristics of social development can be obtained by planning” (Gaardmand 1993: 280; my translation). There will always be constant pressure from other social relations on planning, and in this context, an indispensable reflexive task for planning is to look at those social “general characteristics” that often condition it.

Not surprisingly, the existing planning that operates in the context of immigration is also closely related to the operation of social systems and the social space. Therefore, planning is not always necessarily a solution to, but rather often a part of the problems at hand. To see how, we can initially define the existing planning in the field of immigration as a “functionalist” one, which operates with an idea of pure order. As discussed on several occasions in the preceding chapters, it sets “ordering” as its task, which also finds its expression in the concept of “integration”.
Integration is the “utopia” of the politics of immigration and its planning activities. Both aim at creating *more integration*. Importantly in this context, integration is conceived of as something that will take place in the *future*. While the effectivity of policies is evaluated from the point of view of a distant goal, or a futuristic “target”, the goal itself often remains self-referential and is only measured against itself: however it is defined, integration is good, and more integration is better. A society in which immigrants are “integrated” will be a better society. The discourse of immigration is as such, in Rorty’s words, “parasitic on the hopes” (1989: 86).

Having a model of future society, the politics of immigration tries to come closer to it. In this, so it seems, it does not bother very much about the immediate effects of what it is doing here and now. What counts most is the shortening of the distance to the ideal of integration.

If Rorty contrasts irony with the vocabularies the principle function of which “is to tell stories about future outcomes that compensate for present sacrifices” (Rorty 1989: 86), this contrast is very significant in our context as well. As quoted earlier from the Municipality of Aarhus report, what counts in its definition of integration is “which goal one sets for integration and the means one will employ to reach the goal”. Not surprisingly, when one embarks on creating future society in this way, the “goal” can easily silence the questions related to the character of the “means”. Thus, the Municipality perceives everything that stands in its way, for example, international conventions against racial discrimination, as a “barrier” to *movement* toward the goal of integration. There are no future outcomes without necessary present sacrifices, or as a local politician expressed it, “it is a problem if we take steps against human rights, but the problem gets bigger if we don’t” (see chapter 1). This imagery is about a progressive *movement*. We can call this form of politics, of which planning is an instrument, *movement politics*, a concept borrowed from Richard Rorty and Zygmunt Bauman.

On 27 December 1996, *Det Fri Aktuelt* reported that in all of Denmark “the war against ghettos [is] on the threshold of fiasco”.

The development of public housing communities is going in the wrong direction. The concentration of immigrants, refugees and recipients of welfare benefits still continues to grow. This is directly contrary to the urban plans…. (my translation)

What was meant was that “[t]his is directly contrary to” the plans of the Urban Committee and the municipalities. This expensive “fiasco” demonstrates once more
that “movement politics” is illusory. In a moralizing and alarming tone, a planner from the Municipality of Aarhus was quoted in the same news article, saying that “[i]f not we do something, then this development will just continue” (my translation). Although significantly “unsaid” in the discourse, what was meant by that necessary “something” should be clear to the reader by now. It is about restrictions regarding allocation rules, social engineering, dispersion, saving the city from the immigrants, control, preventing that they stabilize their cultures by use of non-human elements, such as the physical environment, making them (in)visible, problematizing them even more, demanding identification without participation, and “activating” them (Arbeit macht frei!). Human rights, laws against racial discrimination, etc. are only “barriers” in the way for getting this “something” done.

Contingency and ambivalence only amount to “weeds”, which need to be cleansed away. Hybridization, globalization, glocalization, detraditionalization, reflexivity, and so on: this “something” does not listen to these words; they all seem to belong to a language other than that of the municipality, which is a language of necessity, purity and certainty that only serves to humiliate strangers.

In short, the existing planning in the context of immigration is immensely problematical, and it co-functions with other mechanisms that exclude immigrants. My argument is, then, that an ambivalent planning (field II and III perspectives) must actively engage in a criticism of this existing planning, which often worsens problems related to immigration. It must operate with a view toward “destabilizing” this planning by way of hybridization and pointing out its paradoxes. Regarding broader social problems, which this planning accentuates rather than solves, we can say that the goal of a new planning should be campaign politics, as described by Rorty and Bauman, based on “injustice removal” instead of “justice creating” by movement (Bauman 1996c).

The existing politics of integration, aimed at “movement” (also of immigrants) toward some distant goals, must be replaced by a new politics of immigration that prioritizes “injustice removal” based on campaign politics. Such a politics aims not at a removal of supposedly well-defined, large-scale problems, such as “non-integration of foreigners” into Danish society, etc., but at a removal of “smaller” and more concrete problems to be found here and now. For instance, pressures against immigrants’ residential rights, unemployment, their exclusion from public places (such as, for example, cafes and discotheques) in the city centre, the physical isolation of their residences from surrounding ones, practical training positions for second generation immigrants, and so on. Many other single issues not necessarily connected with one another, that is, which do not necessarily accumulate into a higher totality, but which exemplify possible networks that can build on “powers of
association” (Latour 1986), can form the sites on which such a politics of immigration, such as campaign politics, settles on. Hopefully, this form of politics will encourage the proliferation of issue-based alliances that become intersectional sites of oppositional politics that immigrants can cohabit together with other groups sharing similar problems or campaign-political aspirations.

“Utopias” are to be avoided because they divert our attention to homogeneous social engineering; campaign politics can be useful in avoiding the ambition to operate with too fixed, or rigid, frames of reference found in the bureaucratic forms of planning. And planning as a part of campaign politics must be able to come to terms with Asger Jorn’s 1943 criticism of the rigidities of functionalist planning: “Let us not begin by determining the frames.... [L]et the frames elastically follow the development in the manifestations of life, so that life can test the frame instead of letting the frame force and form life” (quoted in Gaardmand 1993: 68; my translation). With this in mind, Gaardmand formulated the concept of “generative planning”:

Generative planning is about shifting the emphasis from the pattern, the realization of which is sought via planning (for example, a definite distribution of population), to situations where single individuals or groups make choices, for example, regarding family income and housing.

Instead of trying to realize a pattern that planners can argue is “good”, we must try to remove “bottlenecks” in the struggle of groups toward what they define as the good life. This includes a tolerant attitude for the values that are highly prioritized by those who are being planned for. (Gaardmand 1993: 185; my translation)

As I mentioned before, the existing politics of immigration and planning aim at creating tremendously rigid “patterns” (recall, for example, the debate of concentration and/or dispersion which focused on quotas and ideal “patterns” of residential mix). In this context, campaign politics, now combined with generative planning, means an avoidance of pre-defining people’s realities, the germ of “planning disasters”. Instead, what is needed is a self-limiting planning. In other words, the goal is to focus on avoiding “disasters” instead of focusing on the creation of the “good” future for people.

Self-limiting planning has to come to terms with the “paradoxical” aspects of planning. What most traditional and formal definitions of planning, such as “rational decision-making”, “organizing”, “implementation of decisions” or “forecasting” all conceal is the “paradoxical” character of planning. But, as Michael Masuch says,
... perfect planning would render steering impossible. Perfect planning would be error-free, thus implying perfect knowledge about the future. Such knowledge is available only if the world—and also the social world—is subject to determinism, and if the laws of this determinism are known. Provided that such knowledge is available, future worlds will be totally determined. As a consequence, no discretionary space for planning will exist. Perfect prediction and perfect planning will exclude each other. (Masuch 1986: 95)

Planning has always been a paradoxical activity, undertaken in “imperfect” conditions. If planning is taken to its extreme, it kills both life and itself. This paradox can also be defined as a basic uncertainty related to not knowing where the “optimal” boundary between over- and under-steering is; that is, they both exist as risks simultaneously in every planning situation (see Masuch 1986: 98). On the one hand, non-planning seems to be incongruous with the functioning of any system (including the market) and means pure, unambivalent chaos. On the other hand, too much planning is both undesirable and, as in the case of the very detailed and panoptic design ambitions of early modernist utopias, amoral in that it amounts to heteronomous pre-definitions and disciplining ambitions with respect to human interactions and expectations from life.

Ole Thyssen formulates this paradox of planning, saying that more planning brings more reflexivity and thereby more contingency. “It becomes visible that nothing is necessary and much is possible. Planning provokes reactions against itself and therefore must not only orient itself toward its object, but also toward its own consequences” (Thyssen 1991: 177; my translation).

Why is it so important to stress this paradoxical character of planning and its relationship with self-limitation? It is important because planning tendentially becomes an instrument of over-regulation in contemporary societies. In other words, planning is often biased toward “over-steering”. In this context, Masuch says that forces exist to systematically bias decision-makers and planners with regard to self-limitation. Very often, planners and decision-makers attribute “success to their own behaviour and failure to the actions of others”, and they “evaluate only a few alternatives; once an alternative has been chosen, evidence in support of that alternative is sought, while contradictory evidence is suppressed”. The result of such cognitive predispositions is often “a bias towards over-steering”, which is further perpetuated by the fact that “[p]ast decisions, plans, laws and the like provide the groundwork for the enactment of new plans and decisions, so that later
decisions depend on earlier ones. In historical evolution, decision networks emerge and become tighter as time goes by” (Masuch 1986: 97).

This danger of over-regulation is of course even greater in already over-regulated societies, such as Denmark, something which underlines the importance and the necessity of an affirmation of the “paradox” of planning and consequently the development of “self-limitation” and reflexive competences.

To sum up, campaign politics must be combined with the idea of generative planning, and planning has to adapt itself to living with the paradoxes of planning instead of pretending they do not exist. In fact, were this paradox non-existent, then there would be no need for planning, as Masuch shows above. We have dwelled on the contrasts between ambivalent planning and the existing “utopic” planning in the field of immigration. Thus, we conclude that planning for a well-functioning future society is potentially both dangerous and undesirable. In this context, the goals that an alternative planning sets for itself must not be understood as states it tries to achieve, but as horizons. Such a planning should not aim at creating a just, or planned, society by social engineering, but aim at stimulating, and contributing to, the social relations of people by removing injustices and creating polyvalent affordances.

**Systems, social space, the welfare state**

The above described position-taking does not mean that planning stops engaging with broader social issues. On the contrary, to avoid that “campaign politics” comes to mean a segmentation and fragmentation, or to balance this immanent tendency in it, a more explicit interest in discussing systems and the social space must be combined with planning and its smaller scale planning ambitions in the field of immigration. In this, the overall aim can be, for example, to displace and shift the reifying framework of the immigration debate to a discussion about the functioning of the systems.

In the preceding chapters, we dwelled on, for example, Bourdieu’s and Luhmann’s perspectives to see some of the problems related to systems (as stabilizations in an uncertain and unstable environment) and vertical hierarchies of the social space. Here I want to argue that, even if we have defined planning as an activity of heterogeneous reflexivity, that is, an activity which must first of all be
conceived in relation to field II and III perspectives in our diagram, this planning should be able to take positions regarding the issues raised by field I perspectives.

I want to exemplify this idea by focusing on the issue of unemployment of immigrants. As I argued before, this issue is closely related to the functioning of systems, like the economies of signs and space. Then, significantly, the “solutions” must not be sought in a form of planning insistently fixed on the ambition of grasping, say, the cultural “truth” of immigrants via static, pure and ordered conceptions, but in adjustments necessary with respect to the functioning of the systems. Many “immigrant problems” stem from the functioning of the social space (discrimination in the labour market), the economic system (deindustrialization) and rigidities related to the welfare state. And, when the focus is on the economic subsystem, the question becomes how planning can function so that this subsystem “includes” immigrants. Asking such questions constitutes an important contrast to the existing politics of immigration, which unnecessarily “culturalizes” and “racializes” all relevant debates.

On such a basis, one can furthermore argue that a rearrangement of the welfare system is also necessary and worth dealing with if one wants to remove injustices related to the unemployment of immigrants and others. In this context, I find Giddens’s work especially significant.

To summarize roughly here, Giddens (1994b) speaks of a need for a “radical politics” that can go “beyond left and right”, that is, beyond both the mechanisms fostering a dependency on the welfare state and overregulation, on the one hand, and beyond the market-focused solutions (which have already excluded many from the economic system), on the other. What traditional left and right views share is a modernist fixation on productivism, which aims at a “mastery” of social phenomena and a perception of society as a production-centred “work-society”. Giddens reminds us that the welfare state was historically built up as a consequence of this desire to master the “social”, as an instrument of “risk-management”. With this background, his argument is that the welfare state neither needs to be completely dismantled, as the neo-liberals argue, nor completely protected as it is today, as most traditional social democrats argue. Neither the former nor the latter will solve the problems we face, e.g. the question of the underclass. What should be done, instead, is to reconceptualize society as a “post-scarcity” order in which productivism is replaced with sustainable productivity, the management of crises is replaced with reflexivity and the idea of the welfare state is replaced with “positive welfare”.
Positive welfare means precautionary care instead of tackling problems when they emerge (risk-management). Giddens says that such a conception should be aware of a “wider set of life-concerns” than those that are, unreflectively, “work-centred”; that is, new welfare state arrangements must effectively be combined with “life politics”, which increasingly gain in importance in Western societies. Importantly, these arrangements must build on a “politics of second chances”, which consists of creating real employment possibilities for the unemployed and which “would concentrate on how paid unemployment relates to other aspects of individuals’ experiences and life values, in respect of various different transitions in, or changes of, their social circumstances” (Giddens 1994b: 186).

It is not “activating” people in the frame of a productivist “work-society” (which is, I argued, the dominant characteristic of existing policies) that becomes important, but rather the ability to generate “chances” for meaningful combinations of life-concerns and work in a post-scarcity or post-productivist order. What we need is to think of the welfare state in terms of repairing “damaged solidarities” by establishing new ones (for example, mechanisms of job sharing). This must be done not by externalizing responsibilities that form people’s lives, but by creating what we called “affordances”, whereby people can restore a meaningful background for taking responsibilities. In the framework Giddens develops, “responsibility” cannot be stimulated by, for example, “compulsory jobs” (like the recent welfare-policy changes in Denmark assume). Nothing could have less in common with reflexivity than compulsion. Thus, Giddens says that positive welfare must be thought of and established in terms of a dialogical democracy and with the goal of reducing symbolic violence (see Giddens 1994b).

The point is that any planning ambition regarding immigrants’ unemployment that overlooks these large-scale issues related to the functioning of systems and spreads the illusion of some future solutions without any systemic changes is doomed to be repressive and hypocritical. It will only create suitable sites for reproducing scapegoat strategies or for recoursing to disciplinary politics. The guardians/gardeners of order will speak of “creating” jobs when what they do in reality is merely force people into compulsory jobs with, mostly, negative incentives.

In short, there are problems which can best be seen by taking perspectives related to field I of our diagram. In this context, a relevant question proliferates: as long as one cannot solve the problems related to systems in systemic terms, then, why not leave people in peace and help them come to terms with problems they already have regarding the functioning of the systems? This is, significantly, what is not done in the politics of immigration, and here we approach perhaps its biggest
absurdity: when the politics of immigration cannot solve the problem of unemployment by systemic adjustments (which is related to field I perspectives), it tries to do something by regulating and indeed “over-steering” and colonizing immigrants’ daily conduct (a phenomenon related to field III and IV perspectives). In other words, it confuses differences found among the different fields in our diagram. How does this take place? One answer is that problems related to field I become defined as problems related to field III; for example, the unemployment problem becomes defined as a “cultural” one. But this is only half the answer. Thus, secondly, this “cultural” problem, which is in fact a displaced and re-defined “systemic” problem, is conceived of as a problem from a field I perspective, that is, in terms of purity and order. Then the authorities embark on planning and ordering every aspect of immigrants’ cultural life, which they perceive as part of “the problem”. Thus, for example, old illiterate immigrant women are forced into language courses to “integrate” them into Danish “society” and to enable them to receive welfare benefits. This is a confusion, or misconception, in a double sense; it regards both the localization of the sources of problems, e.g. systems or sociality, and the perspectives attached to them.

As I repeatedly stressed in this study, this confusion is not innocent. For example, by treating problems in this way, authorities can effectively divert the attention of the public from complex and difficult problems to easy-bought “solutions”, and this brings popular support and votes to politicians, and well-enframed “hot” issues to the media. In Denmark, it is mostly the Social Democrat politicians who willingly enrol others or are enrolled in these networks of power. On the other extreme, the Neo-Liberals say “welfare state passifies immigrants” and so on as if there were jobs they, as a rule, do not take, or as if immigrants could automatically be more creative in finding jobs if the welfare state were completely dismantled. The Neo-Liberals also confuse perspectives related to field I with those related to fields III and IV. Thus, even if it seems at first as if Neo-Liberals would protect phenomena related to field III and IV perspectives from a colonization by phenomena related to field I perspectives, the market mechanisms they favour belong to the world of the systems, that is, they are related to field I perspectives. The overall result of the debate between Social Democrats and Neo-Liberals becomes, again, an “either/or” one between the state and the market: the Social Democrats try to order; the Neo-Liberals try to set themselves against this ordering by propagating another order, that is, market mechanisms which are in fact, as I tried to show, among the very mechanisms that exclude immigrants.

To conclude, an ambivalent planning should be sensitive toward problems related to field I perspectives without confusing them with perspectives related to
other fields, even though an ambivalent planning relates itself to thinking in fields II and III. Systemic problems can, for example, not be solved in the socius, but problems related to the socius and sociality cannot be solved by systems either.

Another important line of argument in the context of field I perspectives is related to issues like international laws, post-national rights, structural hybridization, etc. These issues often directly affect the phenomena that can be perceived by field II and IV perspectives; for example, international laws (such as those against ethnic discrimination) directly influence cultural hybridization by establishing a sort of structural guarantee for the co-existence of differences. Or, as was shown in chapter 1, the laws against ethnic discrimination were important non-human actors that rendered the planning procedure of the Municipality of Aarhus difficult and dysfunctional because of its undemocratic plan to “disperse” of immigrants.

Hence, the idea presented in our diagram is not to isolate the fields from each other, but to point out the qualitative differences between them. For example, even though laws are extremely important regarding cultural hybridization and immigrant settlements, neither the issue of cultural hybridization nor settlements of immigrants can be reduced to questions of law. Laws can be changed from day to day, and they cannot promise any guarantee regarding the meeting of strangers in the social space nor their chances for taking moral responsibility. The severe problems related to these issues can only be perceived and solved by perspectives related to fields III and IV.

In the following, we will look at some of the general tendencies in urban development to search for other sites for the settlement on an ambivalent planning.

“Glocalization”, locality and planning

As we have seen before, the urban development of western Europe in the last decades has been characterized by an increasing postmodernization. With postmodern “glocalization”, both global and local relations have increased in importance. “Flows” and mobility, both of people and of industrial and post-industrial objects, have become decisive in the postmodern economies of signs and space. Thus single localities compete for participation in global communication and
information networks, and those that fail become ghettoised (see Lash & Urry 1994).

This brings an increasing disruption of old urban patterns of organized capitalism because these spaces simultaneously experience, with the metaphors of the postmodern discourse, an “explosion” into global space and an “implosion”, a dissolving, into “localities” (Albertsen 1988: 347). In this context, the “local” is still important in the sense of both embeddedness and scale, but it is no longer a national unit, or a “city”, in the traditional sense. Here I will define it as specialized units, or as fragments, of a city which can no longer be defined in homogeneous terms.

According to Mammen, the classic assumption, that the city is a material that can be manipulated by the urban planner as a “totality”, is merely a “myth”. Thus the preconception of the city as a “homogeneous” unity:

must be revised in the appreciation of the city as a patchwork being incidentally organized, as an agglomeration of fragments expressing local ideologies or values and as a framework for difference and change. In this conception the single unit, the district, the quarter ... is of greater significance than the complex totality. (Mammen 1996: 24)

Such a city can be defined as a “quartered city” the quartering of which runs along dimensions such as race, class, occupation and ethnicity (Marcuse 1996: 1). Hereby, the focus changes “from comprehensiveness to particularity” (Mammen 1996: 24). The “city”, which has traditionally been conceptualized as a homogeneous and continuous space, as the “UniCity”, is fragmented. And the “local” has now become a specialized fragment in it. Each fragment, or quarter, constitutes an enclave in the city of fragments, or the “PolyCity”, consisting of discontinuous and heterogeneous spaces.

Today most cities have become PolyCities because urban housing increasingly takes place in isolated quarters, each quarter with its own characteristics. Consequently, the overall picture of the PolyCity seems to consist of many separate fragments. Peter Marcuse mentions five types of separate residential quarters within the “quartered city” he describes. These are: the luxury areas of the city; the gentrified city; the suburban city; the tenement city (of lower paid workers with irregular employment); and the abandoned city (very poor, or the excluded people’s city). A similar separation, or quartering, also applies to the “cities of business and work”: the controlling city; the city of advanced services; the city of
direct production; the city of unskilled work; and the residual city (Marcuse 1996: 1-5). These lines of quartering are not, of course, exclusive.

But the fragmented city is not only “quartered”, it is also “layered”, because in it “one line of division overlaps another, sometimes creating congruent quarters, sometimes not” (Marcuse 1996: 1). Separate quarters with differing characteristics can overlap each other in some ways, giving way to certain lines of layering. There are, at least, three dimensions of layering and thereby three reasons why layering must be incorporated into an understanding of the PolyCity.

The first relates to that individuals experience the city both as part of their life-worlds, as residents, and as part of the functioning of the systems; for example, when they have an economic interest, they “use” the city differently from how they would “experience” it as residents. Secondly, residential and economic quartering of the city may not necessarily overlap; for example, while a person may reside in an isolated or excluded enclave, he or she may not be excluded regarding the economic quartering of the city. In other words, he or she may occupy different spaces regarding different activities. In this case, by relying only on a “quartered” picture of the city, one cannot find out very much about this layering. And thirdly, as in the cases where the differences between day-time and night-time occupation of some quarters vary vastly, “time” matters a lot with respect to the “layered city”. For example, when the white male yuppies leave their offices, the black, female cleaning crews start to work in the same quarters (Marcuse 1996: 8-9).

So the image of the walled and quartered city must take into account the different spatial structure of residential as against economic activities; must take into account the movement of individuals between one and the other; and must reflect the temporal aspect, in which different spaces are occupied by different persons as different times for different purposes. (Marcuse 1996: 9)

We can say that, from the point of view of the individual, what matters in the fragmented city most is how many quarters and layers one can relate to, or how mobile one can be. One can be included with respect to some of the quarters and layers and excluded with respect to others at the same time, and if one is excluded from most of them at the same time, that is, for example, if both one’s residential and one’s economic quarter is an isolated, or “walled”, enclave, or if one both lives in an isolated residential enclave and is jobless, so phenomena, such as underclass and ghetto formations, can become actualized.
At this point we can ask: isn’t there anything common that holds the separate fragments of the PolyCity together? Can we not speak of any urban significance independent of the specialized urban localities, fragments? For example, Hans Mammen says that the priority given to the fragments “does not indicate the dismantling of the public responsibility in urban planning and design” (Mammen 1996: 24). Thus, an understanding of the “urban realm”, defined as “a communicative system which changes with the development of the information and communication technology” (Mammen 1994: 278), must be incorporated in planning theory and practice together with the priority given to the fragments. As such, the “urban realm” consists of “structures, places or elements for any type of communication. In reality, it could be roads, squares, commercial and cultural centres” (Mammen 1996: 24). This urban realm both absorbs local relations and enters into global networks (Mammen 1994: 278).

Culturally speaking, what Richard Sennett refers to as “civic culture”, or public life, beyond the confines of cultural specificities attached to one’s urban quarter and layers, and beyond the “tyranny of intimacy”, can be thought of in the context of this urban realm. It then becomes the “third space”, the zone of courtesy, in between different social identities despite their differences. Regarding the public, cultural life of the urban realm, we can make use of the way Sennett mentions the coffeehouses of the eighteenth century as “information centres”. In these public, urban places, “in order for information to be as full as possible, distinctions of rank were temporarily suspended; anyone sitting in the coffeehouse had a right to talk to anyone else... [I]t was bad form even to touch on the social origins of other persons ... because the free flow of talk might then be impeded” (Sennett 1986: 81). As such, the civic culture of the urban realm refers to the limits of fragments, or the cultural zones of overlap and exposure between them (see also Sennett 1990). In addition, the urban realm also gives opportunities to conceptualize some frames for the political participation of immigrants as zoon politikon, that is, their participation in political life without culturally identifying with it (see Sennett 1996: 193).

Before we go on, there are two important consequences of the recent urban development discussed above. Firstly, the processes of glocalization give way to an urban fragmentation, which must be conceived of both in terms of quartering and layering. And secondly, the urban realm and fragments must be thought of simultaneously, without dichotomizing them. To see the relevance of these points, let us look at how planning is done in Aarhus.

Two dominant ideologies of planning have characterized Danish urban planning in the last couple of decades. In the 1980s, planning was mainly based on a
parcellation of cities as “local areas”, each corresponding to different “communities”. The leitmotiv in this planning, which we can call “local area planning”, was an assumption that an urban “public” sphere existed on the smallest urban scale, that is, in the local area, and this was typically assumed to be physically organized around institutions, e.g. the local schools. According to this planning tradition, if one lived in a definite “local area” in the municipal urban plan- mosaic, in Gellerup, for example, this meant that one’s relations to the outer world were also concentrated predominantly in this local area.

In the 1990s, “theme-planning” began to replace the tradition of local area planning. Theme-planning has focused on the city centre and its steering in harmony with the interests of investments, which often meant that planning took place in terms of corporatist and aestheticist planning. The most usual planning themes have been, for example, transport planning, public transport (e.g. bus routes), aesthetization of some specific areas in the centre (e.g. the area around the cathedral), building new congress centres, re-opening the river, etc.. Most of these projects have aimed at demarcating Aarhus’ cultural profile in competition with that of other cities nationally and globally.

But the problem with theme-planning is that it has not reached the other quarters of the city, such as, for example, the suburban areas where most inhabitants of Aarhus live and where “local area planning” is still used as the main instrument for regulating relations between social life and physical settings (see Diken & Mammen 1996). To see some of the problems attached to the tradition of local planning and some emerging mis-relationships, let us now concentrate on the suburb, Gellerup, again.

In administrative terms, Gellerup belongs to Brabrand-Gellerup, which is defined by the system as a “local area”. As an administrative unit, Brabrand-Gellerup consists of an area that is approximately five times bigger than Gellerup. It is no surprise that, internally, its “community” varies vastly: for example, the western part consists of detached and semi-detached family housing quarters that are occupied predominantly by “white”, middle-class Danes, and the eastern part, where Gellerup is, consists predominantly of public housing quarters occupied by immigrants and “socially burdened” Danes. These two parts of the same administrative unit have nothing in common to be able to constitute a shared local community.

If it ever existed, the imagined “community” on this scale was demolished because of tendencies like globalization and individualization. It “exploded” into global space, and “imploded” into fragments. And, since the processes of reflexive
individualization and social reflexivity cannot develop very well in its poorer parts, or Gellerup, what follows this fragmentation is often tendencies like individuation, isolation and tribalization (as in the form of smaller, tribalized, immigrant communities which do not have much to do with surrounding Danes). Consequently, Gellerup increasingly becomes a “wild zone” in the Danish cityscape in terms of communication and information networks. On the other hand, it gains increasingly in its transnational, and diasporic, relations with other global settings.

Such complex development, which brings new forms of social relations the reach of which is at the same time much larger and much smaller than the “local area”, can only be perceived as an anomaly in the framework of existing forms of planning. For example, this was the case in Gellerup at that time authorities strongly resisted the idea of satellite dishes on the balconies. Instead of conceiving transnational relations as “resources” regarding globalization, the municipality chose to operate with rigid stereotypes about immigrants, and processes, such as hybridization, which take place in spite of official policies, were conceived as problems or anomalies.

If neither fragmentation nor globalization is conceivable in the terminology of “local area” or “community” planning, and if today urban development is in a different phase than planning is, then a double problem exists regarding the scale with which the existing planning system operates. As long as we think in terms of traditional local area planning, even Gellerup alone is too big as a frame for a “community” or a “tribe”, or as a base for a single individual; at the same time, it is too small to catch up with globalization and regionalization tendencies. When the scale is too small, the area becomes isolated and invisible. When the scale is too big, “informal” social relations, and hereby possibilities of taking responsibility for the place become problematic. Social relations become anonymous (Diken & Mammen 1996).

The tendency of fragmentation must be tackled using new forms of planning on a smaller scale than that of the “local area”, and small scale planning initiatives must be combined with planning at the level that we call the urban realm, that is, with planning on a larger scale, and in accordance with globalization processes. In other words, what is needed is a planning that can be more mobile both with respect to the variety of the specialized fragments and their relations to the urban realm and with respect to participation of the PolyCity in the larger systems of communication. To conclude this chapter, let us dwell on some possible characteristics of what we have called “fragment planning”.
“Fragment planning”

In light of new tendencies in urban development, planning must also develop new and more creative methods. As Landry and Bianchini have stated, in the recent history of urbanism, we have been content with the engineer’s and the technocrat’s instrumental, rational and analytical thinking and creativity. This meant an isolation and compartmentalization of problem fields with respect to different “facts”. In this context, Landry and Bianchini call for “a completely different type of creativity, as increasingly we know more facts but understand less”. Particularly, they call for a creativity that is able to “connect, to gauge impacts across different spheres of life, to see holistically, to understand how material changes affect our perceptions... We need, in other words, the skills of the broker, the person who can think across disciplines, the networker, the connector—a ‘softer’ set of skills” (1995: 11-12). We have defined this creative skill earlier as “heterogeneous reflexivity”.

Short-sighted plans that mainly seek to continue the current game of planning, by concentrating on issues when they first become problems and by making those problems even bigger (see chapter 1 to recall how it is done in the field of immigration), is the most important barrier blocking such creativity. Seen from this perspective, a constructive policy of immigration will not be forthcoming if the municipality insists on undemocratic changes in the law regarding allocation rights. This will only be possible if, on the contrary, the municipality reflects upon how planning functions here and now. This self-reflexivity necessitates making use of “trial and error” methods instead of the language of necessity and focusing on “campaign politics” instead of the imagery of “movement politics”. Consequently, the primary criteria of success for planning in the context of immigration must no longer be to reduce the number of immigrants in the municipality (as stated in the municipality’s reports; 1995: 12 and 1995b: 25), but to maximize the “immigrant effect” in planning as an expression of what immigrants can contribute to the municipality, that is, as a resource (Landry & Bianchini 1995; Diken & Mammen 1996).

To discuss “fragment planning”, which is conditioned on these premises in the context of immigration, I want to use the concept of “territoriality”. Jens Tonboe defines territoriality as a tendency to individually or collectively identify with a place and, if necessary, to defend it against other persons or groups (Tonboe 1994: 9). This concept can take on many different, positive and negative, good and bad,
constructive and destructive meanings (Tonboe 1994b: 42). These meanings will always be socially contingent, context-dependent and polyvalent, changing from time to time, from place to place and with respect to the perspectives through which territoriality is viewed (ibid, 27-9).

What is especially significant for Tonboe is that the importance of territoriality increases in contemporary societies due to processes such as increasing individualization (in the sense that individual territories become more important than shared ones, e.g. the community), ghettoisation, the uneven development of regions, international re-regionalization as in the case of EU, increasing tourism activities, and so on (Tonboe 1994: 9-10). We can also say that, what Lash and Urry (1994) call, the increasing “spatialization” of contemporary societies together with their “semiotization” is closely related to the issue of territoriality.

Tonboe explicitly relates the issue of territoriality to immigration in the Danish context. His main idea is that the “aliens”, or the immigrants, are denied access to a space which they collectively conceive as their own, that is, immigrants are denied their own social territories. It does not matter if this takes place through dispersion strategies aimed at distributing immigrants, perceived as “burdens”, across the country, or through segregating immigrants into walled-in ghettos, instead of giving them a place in a polyvalent system of territories which also have mutual relationships; the basic assumption behind both dispersion and segregation policies is that immigrants are more or less outside the law and order of the country. Both are attempts to hinder the emergence of immigrant territories. In this context, Tonboe underlines that immigrants’ attempts and spatial practices, aimed at transforming and identifying with their physical environments, function as “provocation” for most Danes and also gives way to “envy” and “fear” of strangers. Given this background, his proposal for an alternative politics of immigration is to change the general framework in which the issue of immigrant territories is perceived and acted upon. This requires seeing immigrants as a resource and immigrant territories as a necessary base for this resource. According to Tonboe, such a change of perspective can also advance processes of cultural heterogenization and increase Danes’ adaptation capacity regarding this heterogenization by making them more responsive toward the internationalized and unpredictable development. An acceptance of immigrant territories can both mean increased self-reflexivity for Danes and contribute to the establishment of some platforms on which immigrants can solve some of their problems by themselves without the intervention of the state, municipalities or the unemployment fund (Tonboe 1997).
By using this concept of territoriality, we can conceptualize the specialized urban fragments of the PolyCity as different territories that can stabilize different social identities and cultures. But, very importantly, this conceptualization of territories, identities and cultures must not be made in terms of purity and order (field I in our diagram), that is, for example in terms of cultural essentialism, difference multiculturalism or geographical determinism. If we think of immigrant territories in terms of purity and order, there will be only two options for planning: either these territories will be made invisible behind a pure and ordered “Danish” territoriality, which Tonboe describes above, or they will become enveloped fragments of the city of “difference multiculturalism” (see chapter 2 and 6). In the former case, the difference will be terrorized and colonized; in the latter case, it will be sterilized, kept defenceless and turned into “indifference” in a single walled fragment that does not communicate with other fragments of the PolyCity. We need to think of immigrant territories in “interculturalist” terms without allowing fragmentation and heterogeneity to become “ordered” or to amount to marginalization.

How, then, can a “fragment planning” be conceptualized in this context?

Regarding housing, fragment planning must be based on an analysis of the actual processes of “quartering” in a city. To hinder the mentioned development of “walled-in” quarters, housing areas must be planned in a different way, that is, more elastically with respect to their surroundings than they are planned today. Therefore, the focus must be on smaller housing units rather than on “local areas” based on mythical “communities”. Instead of contributing to the further dissemination of today’s two most widespread and most dominant housing forms, that is, single-family housing and high-rise housing, which very often become large and isolated quarters in the urban structure, fragment planning must change priority and work on quarters that are smaller in scale.

The aim of fragment planning must be to counteract the processes of segregation, which separates both physical and social territories from each other. As such, with a view to opening up the quartered city by relating its fragments to each other both physically and socially, the spatial ideology of fragment planning must be “anti-segregationist”. With tactical and small scale instruments, such as the planning of small “fragments” instead of large enclosed spaces, it must seek to establish bridges between segregated areas.

In this planning, each new fragment must be adapted to the special wishes and needs of the dwellers, but each fragment must be conceived as “polyvalent” units that are as open to change as possible. As Herman Hertzberger says, “[t]he only constructive approach to a situation that is subject to change is a form that starts
out from this changefulness as a permanent ... given factor: a form which is polyvalent. In other words, a form that can be put to different uses without having to undergo changes itself" (Hertzberger 1991: 147). In our terminology, Hertzberger’s architectural concept of polyvalence can be related to the concept of “affordance”.

As such, as a tool of urban design, the fragment must be conceived as being situational and context-dependent; that is, in contrast to standard modules, for example, it must be elastic and capable of being adapted to changing situations and contexts. Situational and contextual aspects also ascertain that in the planning of fragments, the focus must be on their interrelationships with their environment rather than their own identities. Identity (and territory) is defined in relation to its “other”, its surroundings, and thus in relation to its “limits”. One cannot define a fragment independent of its surroundings.

One can neither define a fragment independent of who uses it. As Tonboe says, “various actors will view an objective space, and different parts of objective space, differently, as a subjective space. What are obstacles and inertness to some may be resources, experiences or trivial to others. People also act differently towards the ‘same’ space, with different consequences, compared to each other and across varying times and places” depending upon their projects, resources and positions (Tonboe 1996: 28).

Therefore, it is decisive that fragments be as polyvalent as possible so that different groups using them at different times can easily characterize them. But as Hertzberger says, to be able to be open and polyvalent, a form has to have some qualities, a character, in itself, although these must not be fixed. This is also the difference between non-specific neutral spaces and polyvalent spaces, which “have the capacity to elicit, time and again, specific reactions befitting specific situations” (Hertzberger 1991: 152).

Thus, a fragment must have its own, but non-fixed identity to be able to expose itself to its surroundings. In this context, we can also speak of culturally specific fragments. But to plan such fragments, expressing specific points in the complex patchwork of the PolyCity, the planner must not seek some pure and ordered images of social and cultural identities. Rather, such fragments, an “immigrant fragment” for example, must be thought of as “kaleidoscopically” spatial units that cannot be duplicated in different contexts without changing their shapes. If the cultural character of such fragments is defined in terms of ordered purity, fragment planning cannot amount to more than territorial stigmatization. Thus, the planner can be content with designing a polyvalent spatial affordance; when and if
necessary, the dwellers (also others than those a fragment is planned for in the first place) themselves can attach meanings to it and both construct and define its cultural identity through their own practices and interpretations. As opposed to the widespread planning practice today, “detail regulation” is not necessary for such fragments. In contrast, their quality must be related to the interpretative possibilities they can offer to their dwellers. As such, fragment planning must not regulate against, but stimulate the proliferation of culturally specific territories.

In fragment planning, some already existing housing areas (or their parts) can be treated as fragments to revitalise these areas. Or, some new fragments can be built in or between existing housing areas or urban quarters. The main idea in both cases is that such small fragments can relate different residential areas that have been effectively separated from each other by segregationist planning to each other. In other words, fragments as affordances can be used to “soften” the rigid borders of ghettoized quarters. In the in-between areas that separate quarters from each other, fragment planning can seek possibilities for building new buildings or other affordances that can function as points of “intersection” and “overlap” between otherwise segregated quarters. Other affordances, other than houses, for example, can be small pathways, green areas, buildings with polycultural purposes, etc. which can become “local arenas and channels of communication between ... enclaves” (Mammen 1994: 279).

It is important that these new affordances, especially if they are buildings, be built on the edges of the existing quarters instead of in their centres (see Sennett 1994: 18). Until now, fragment planning practically means the opposite of what has been done in the urban renovation of ghettoised areas. Urban renovation has focused on social policies and environmental renovations inside the area, and what is necessary instead is a planning that starts at the limits, at the boundaries of isolated areas such as Gellerup, which in cooperation with dwellers can stimulate the creation of more transgressible limits and zones of overlaps instead of unambiguous “ghetto walls”.

Can the logic of fragment planning be used only with respect to housing? The fragments need not be exclusively residential fragments. On the contrary, together with residential ones, fragments with other functions can be used as planning instruments; and economic quarters, socially central places, sacral places, recreative quarters, and so on, can be the sites on which fragment planning can function with a view to creating overlaps and exposure between functionally different fragments of the PolyCity.
Aesthetically, “exposure” and “overlap”, the two terms Richard Sennett (1990) has written extensively about, can be taken as the mottoes of fragment planning. This planning aims at confrontation, dialogue and interrelationships of differences related to fragments, while the difference and diversity of a single fragment is at the same time protected against the monological temptations of the imaginary UniCity. In other words, fragment planning aims not at homogenizing the quarters and layers of the PolyCity, but at increasing its beneficial complexity and heterogeneity by making its quarters and layers more interactive and attractive.

The concrete architectural implication of exposure can be imagined as, for example, references to functional and visual connections and communication, or iconographically, the concept can refer to differing re-presentations of a single fragment in the urban realm (instead of invisibility or panoptic visibility). The Greek agora, “with its demonstrative confrontation of secular and sacral buildings”, could be a good icon for overlaps in architectural terms (Mammen 1996: 25).

In general, architectural tendencies that are interested both in complexity and contradiction and in heterogeneity can be worth reconsidering with respect to the architectural arrangement of fragments, including immigrants’ residential fragments. For example, Robert Venturi’s architectural postmodernism, which aims at democratic pluralism, aesthetic heterogeneity and social heterogeneity, all at the same time, and other similar frameworks can be worth (re)considering in the aesthetic context of fragment planning (see for example Venturi 1966 and Venturi et al. 1985).

What must be explicitly avoided regarding aesthetic considerations in the context of fragment planning and immigration is nostalgic aesthetics, such as planning some highly exotic fragments that are more associated with “roots” than the “routes” of people. This tendency seems to fix identities. It is, however, much more desirable and useful to build polyvalent fragments with which people can themselves create identifications and extend their identities. This point is important to stress also because nostalgic aesthetics is a mainstream token in contemporary planning, for example, in the context of heritage industry. (For a criticism of nostalgic and the unreflexive re-use of historical forms in contemporary urban design, see Boyer 1994).

Ethically speaking, the spatial philosophy of fragment planning builds on the “uses of disorder” (Sennett 1971). The idea is to open the city to different interpretations by its dwellers so that they can take chances and choices autonomously instead of hiding behind heteronomous institutions and ghetto walls. Communication with others instead of escaping into private life, or a beneficial
anarchy, which is more related to “touching” than “the conscience of the eye”, seems to be the only ethical alternative to the segregation processes that characterize today’s neutral cities, which are sutured with problematic and undesirable power relations. Thus, even if exposure and overlaps may entail the creation of some “conflict” zones between differences, this must be conceived as a resource rather than a danger to be neutralized.

To be sure, meeting strangers instead of hiding (from) them necessitates coming to terms with some uncertainties “the uses of disorder” entails. For example, the widespread idea of criminal preventive planning and fragment planning seem to be contradictory ideals. Whereas fragment planning aims at exposure, spatial openings and beneficial disorder, criminal preventive strategies are based on closure, in making “defensible spaces” (Newman 1972), and encourages the development of detailed rule-sets vis-à-vis the building of housing areas. The aim of preventive strategies is to reduce criminality and vandalism by strengthening social control, for example, by including in apartment design the possibility for directly looking into semi-public, common areas, entrances and gardens from inside the houses. But, in practice such spatially deterministic technologies of ordering often contribute to the neutralization of these areas even more, and do not solve the problem of fear, but often maintain or exaggerate it by creating paranoid spaces. The paradoxical result, from the point of view of fragment planning, is that “[f]earful, timid, defensive people, who find comfort behind fortresses, are bound to be radically unwilling to abolish bureaucratic social controls and unzone their defensive neighborhoods. The less equipped one feels to deal with conflict and disorder, the more one turns to those who promise stability, law, and order” (M. P. Smith 1980: 164). In addition, fear has itself a violent potential, as Erich Fromm (1982) has showed.

On the face of such paradoxical situations, fragment planning aimed at the uses of disorder must of course not immediately deny people’s need for security by creating unnecessary identity crises resulting from forced exposure. The issue is rather, as we have seen several times in this study, that the very search for security and order, be it spatial, epistemological, or social, seems itself to be problematical. Fragment planning must, at this point, lean against the uncertain capacities of moral actors as the only groundless guarantee. What must be done in this context is to open up, stimulate and not to block this capacity. Perhaps, in the end, allowing for capacities of moral actors, who dare to take responsibilities beyond heteronomy, and outside the walls of their fortresses and ghettos, will prove to be “safer” than rigid ordering mechanisms.
As to the ethical, what is most important for fragment planning is not to restrictively plan the social and spatial frames of life in advance, which can block the possibility for people experiencing each other. Thus self-limitation must be the keyword to be able to leave space for moral actors. Even the best enframing and planning, when taken to the extreme (a point which is always uncertain), can kill the autonomy of the moral actor. Having said this, what fragment planning can do is to create non-human affordances that not only do not block the opportunity for humans to meet each other as “face”, but rather ease it.

Of course, fear is a problem in another sense too. For example, writers focusing on the relationship between planning and women especially stress the problem of “fear” and anonymity that most women experience in cities, especially at night. “Security” is thus underlined as a problem of women in a city planned by men (see for example Greed 1994: 49; Weisman 1994: 69). In this context, no more can be said than that fragment planning must take these issues seriously and try to find a balance between security and exposure. For example, planning for women and planning for ethnic minorities can at best try to find some overlapping problems and aims. As with de-zoning, for example, making interconnections, an emphasis on participation, and so on are only some areas planning can operate with in the context of planning for immigration and women (see for example Greed 1994: 49-50, 173-176). In addition, there is also agreement between these two types of planning vis-à-vis what Greed formulates with respect to “planning for women”; that is, her ideas can be translated into our field as well: “You can never plan entirely separately for women (or for men), and it is a sign of dichotomized thinking ... to imagine so”. And, “if you plan well for the minorities, then the majority groups also benefit from the higher level of public provision and improved environmental conditions” (Greed 1994: 176).

Lastly, I want to argue that fragment planning discussed so far must be closely related to the urban realm. As Tonboe formulates it, the planning of territories is about:

... constantly maintaining a relative restrained cautiousness combined with a reflexive and substantiated ambivalence and polyvalence ... such that one can simultaneously underline the local/individual peculiarity and diversity and relate it to the solidarity of the whole. Otherwise we get ghettos instead of a system of territories. (Tonboe 1994: 25; my translation)
To avoid ghettoization, planning must focus on the “urban realm” as well as on the fragments. The urban realm can be taken, firstly, as a “third space” where cultural differences related to fragments can meet without being reduced to each other. In this respect, the emphasis can be put on the intercultural relationships of the specialized fragments. Secondly, the emphasis can be put on the participation of fragments in communicative networks in regional and global scale.

Regarding this second emphasis, planning must concentrate on systems of communication in and around a single city and must try to use the urban realm as an instrument, as a location, to ease and soften city-dwellers’ communication with the points of gravity in these systems. But this requires that single cities are not conceived only as administrative units but also in terms of their relationships with national and international networks. Aarhus, for example, participates in such networks and constitutes an “urban region” together with other smaller cities around it. But existing planning does not adequately take this communication system into consideration merely because it has broader scope than the borders of Aarhus (see Diken & Mammen 1996).

While the municipality predominantly engages with permanent “detail regulation” of the architecture of urban quarters, the urban realm, defined before as what unites urban fragments with larger contexts, receives only very little interest in the sense of a communicative system. This is a relationship that must be reversed according to the opposite principle; that is, whereas the fragments should be less “detail-regulated”, giving more place for the erratic design of their users, the urban realm needs more care and treatment (see Mammen 1996: 24).

Given this reversal, a start for a more explicit consideration of the urban realm regarding planning in Aarhus could be to think in terms of the service industries and educational facilities, both of which are considerably rich resources in Aarhus. Related to immigration, the aim could be the inclusion of immigrants into these “supra-fragmental” networks, the main intention being to avoid the negative consequences of territorial quartering of the city, socially, culturally and physically.
10 Instead of a Conclusion:
“The Other Heading”

Leibniz has said that “if one is to establish the elements of human knowledge, some fixed point is required on which we can safely rest and from which we can set out without fear (quoted in Dillon 1996: 13).

A search for security, understood as a principle, a “fixed point”, a ground, or an arche, has been, as Michael Dillon says, the main characteristic of the long tradition of metaphysical thought. This search has, moreover, become “the predicate upon which the architectonic political discourses of modernity were constructed” (Dillon 1996: 13). Metaphysics seeks a fundament and dreams of building upon it hierarchically. The orientation of metaphysics is thus upward. “Up” is a metaphor associated directly with happiness, consciousness, high status, virtue, rationality and having control: “force is up” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 15). The fundament underpins the security upon which metaphysical epistemologies establish their hierarchies.

In contrast, I have tried to form this book as a horizontal flow. The point behind it has been that there is no fundament, no “truth”, but only perspectives: no View from Nowhere (Nagel 1986), but only partial views from somewhere; a polphony without the illusions of security, fundament, progress, order and purity; a multiplicity of non-hierarchically organized perspectives.

I have argued that if we cannot step outside the language which directly affects the way we see “realities”, because the subject who is supposed to step out is himself created in language-games, it becomes important, then, to keep the conversation going. Thus the flow of the book has been an “interpretative” one, interpretation being defined as “the continual suspension of judgement”. As Robert Alter says, the never-ending process of meaning-creation requires “continual suspension of judgment, weighing of multiple possibilities, brooding over gaps in the information provided” (quoted in Bauman 1991: 192).
So, my interpretations do not have “conclusions” as ending points. Suspending conclusions, I want to join in the party of those who like the inspiration and adventure of the “boat” more than the security of illusory fundaments. “In civilizations without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place of pirates” (Foucault; quoted in Soja 1996: 162).

Luis Buñuel once jokingly said that he would sacrifice his life for a man who seeks the truth, but he would joyfully kill a man who thinks he has found it. Salman Rushdie adds a further irony to this joke by reminding us that today it has again become a currency to kill people because of their ideas (Rushdie 1990: 53). In sobering up from the old universalist illusions, but in living in an increasingly tribalized world—without having to choose between the two—we feel today that nothing harms us more than conclusions.

But nevertheless, despite this seemingly disappointing non-conclusion, or “anti-climax”, we can continue to interpret. In other words, an ambivalent social theory can continue its navigation on new routes without conclusionary judgments. Then, what could be the character of this further navigation, which also requires a direction, a “heading”?

The metaphors of boat and navigation have been used since Plato, who compared the state to a ship and the king to a captain, and these metaphors steadily re-emerge in European thinking (see Naas 1992: xlv). To discuss possible future routes of the navigation of an ambivalent social theory, we continue to use these metaphors.

In navigation, a vessel has a route, a heading, and a destination. “Heading” refers to an “oriented, calculated, deliberate, voluntary, ordered movement” (Derrida 1992: 14). But the vessel can change heading at any time, and when we can speak of other headings in plural, the word heading acquires multiple meanings. Derrida’s expression “The Other Heading”, which he uses to discuss Europe’s future routes, suggests that “another direction is in the offing, or that it is necessary to change direction”. It entails changing goals, deciding on another heading, or changing captains, “or even—why not?—the age or sex of the captain” (Derrida 1992: 14).

In this book, I have argued that not only are the illusory “fundaments” sought through the mainstream discourses severely problematic, but so is the “heading” these discourses seek. In the following table, which summarizes my discussions, I refer to these mainstream discourses as “The Mainstream Heading”.

What this mainstream suppresses, tries to discipline and order, excludes, or “overlooks” in the double sense of the term, can be referred to as “The Other of
the Mainstream”. The Other points to a “relation that no longer obeys the form, the sign, or the logic of the heading, nor even of the anti-heading—of beheading, of decapitation” (Derrida 1992: 15). The Other has another, own, heading:

Indeed... there is another heading, the heading being not only ours [le nôtre] but the other [l’autre], not only that which we identify, calculate, and decide upon, but the heading of the other, before which we must respond, and which we must remember, of which we must remind ourselves, the heading of the other being perhaps the first condition of an identity or identification that is not an egocentrism destructive of oneself and the other. (Derrida 1992: 15)

The destructive egocentrism, or what Levinas calls Egotism, must be left behind in the relationship with the heading of the other. The mainstream heading must recognize its other not to destroy both itself and the other. Because its identity necessitates its other, it must develop relationships with the other. “The other is the future. The very relationship with the other is the relationship with the future” (Levinas; quoted in Dillon 1996: 1). So whereas the first column in the table presents The Mainstream Heading, the second one presents Its Other, or what this mainstream has to recognize.

I want to add a third column, which summarizes what I have suggested against the mainstream heading. This alternative route is called “The Other Heading”. In tune with my arguments in chapter 8, this third column both respects the qualitative differences between the first two columns (taking party, when necessary, with the other of the mainstream) and partly can be thought of as a “thirding” between the first two opposing headings. In reference to Edward Soja, “thirding” is an open perspective which tries to stimulate imaginaries that can counterwork to binary oppositions, which restrict thought and action to only two alternatives “by interjecting an-Other set of choices” (Soja 1996: 5).

In this critical thirding, the original binary choice is not dismissed entirely but is subjected to a creative process of restructuring that draws selectively and strategically from the two opposing categories to open new alternatives. (Soja 1996: 5)
The mainstream heading | Its Other, | and "The Other Heading"
---|---|---
Order | Chaos / Contingency | Ambivalence/Archipelago
Purey | Hybridity | Hybrid order/Chaotic hybridity
Us/Them | The stranger | The stranger

Roots | Routes | Roots and routes
Assimilation/integration | Difference | Heterogeneity/Hybridity
Multiculturalism | Interference | Inter-culturalism
Pure essence | Contamination | Contiguity
Dichotomies | Reversal/deconstruction | Thirding

Unity/totality | Deconstruction | Ambivalent social theory
Systemness | Contingency | Continuum + differences in kind
Grand narratives | Local narrations | Perspectivism/Dialogism
Singled voices | Silenced voices | Fugue/Poliphony
Heroic agents | Victims | Situated actors
Analytical gazing | Invisible subjects | Dialogue
Cognitive reflexivity | Aesthetic/hermeneut ref | Heterogeneous reflexivity
Abstract time/space | Lived time/space | Perceived/conceived/lived t./s.
Qualitative analyses | Qualitative analyses | Both, without metaphysics

Identity politics | Politics of difference | Difference/Inclusion
Power as transmission | Tactics/Non-response | Networking/association
Politics of illusion | Non-response / Silence | Politics of inclusion
Ethics/Totality | Morality/Singularity | The uses of disorder
Movement politics | "Ethics of blindness" | Campaign politics
Justice creation | Disciplined actors | Injustice removal
National framework | "Glocalization" | Postnational frameworks
Kitsch/Rhetorics | Irony | Irony/Rhetorics
Work-society | The underclass | Politics of inclusion
Discipline/activation | Decentred work-ethic | Meaningful work

The UniCity | Urban fragments | The PolyCity
The fear of touching | Touching | Fragment planning
Segregation | Exposure/Overlaps | Exposure/Overlaps
Paranoid spaces | Visual agoras | Both diversity and touching
The plan-bureaucracy | The nomad | Displacement
The map/Reductionisms | Walking | Heterogeneous reflexivity
Detail-regulation | Local uses | Affordance/Polyvalence
Community | Explosion/Implosion | Fragments + Communication

Now it remains to find the words to finish with. If I could myself have chosen a single image to leave behind with this book, it would be another image of “us”: we need another definition of what “us” designates. The story told in this book began with the polarized images of “us” and “them”, images that can only do damage to both sides. Let me finish by returning to this binary opposition, a theme that has continuously recurred, as a leitmotif, throughout my discussions.
In his essay, *The Fire Next Time*, James Baldwin starts with a letter to his (black) nephew. In this letter, from one black person to another, he mentions the “whites” as “them” and formulates advice for his nephew: “there is no basis whatever for their impertinent assumption that they must accept you. The really terrible thing, old buddy, is that you must accept them. And I mean that very seriously. You must accept them and accept them with love” (Baldwin 1964: 16). Playing with racial stereotypes in the pages that follow in the essay, Baldwin expresses the plight and rage of the black people, but significantly, he does not end up with a picture of the whites as the only evil, as the Black Muslim movement of his time did. Instead, he deconstructs the stereotype of “us” and “them” and begins speaking of an “us” in other terms:

Everything now, we must assume, is in our hands; we have no right to assume otherwise. If we—and now I mean the relatively conscious whites and the relatively conscious blacks, who must, like lovers, insist on, or create, the consciousness of the others—do not falter in our duty now, we may be able, handful that we are, to end the racial nightmare.... If we do not dare everything, the fulfilment of that prophecy, re-created from the Bible in song by a slave, is upon us: *God gave Noah the rainbow sign, No more water, the fire next time!* (Baldwin 1964: 89)

Richard Sennett uses and interprets this text to demonstrate the idea of “exposure” in the following way:

Baldwin’s essay suggests the emotional experience that lies beyond identity; it is experience that incorporates incompleteness and doubt rather than aims at assertion. In this essay we are told the story of someone whose confusion turns him outward rather than plunges him even more inward, looking for a resolution, for an answer. His language comes to include the enemy.... Baldwin’s voice is that of someone who has learned how to speak to strangers, not in the polite tones of eighteenth-century civility, but instead more directly and forcefully. It is about a harsher connection made out of arousal by the Other, made by the feeling of the presence of those who are different. In order to sense the Other, one must do the work of accepting oneself as incomplete. (Sennett 1990: 147-8)

In between “us” and “them” we find the stranger. With the stranger, we find ourselves.
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